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1 General introduction: concept of governance 
Hogl, K., R. Nordbeck, E. Nußbauer and M. Pregernig 
The term governance1 appeared in political science about 10 years ago, connected to 
the claim that the traditional model of the nation state did not adequately represent 
political reality anymore, and has since then, evolved into a central concept of the 
political science discourse. Governance has been used in different arenas within 
political science, such as policy analysis, European Union research or international 
theory, on different levels of research- e.g. global, European, national, regional or 
corporate, and connected to normative claims as in “good governance”. (Benz et al. 
2006 1; Schuppert 2005) 
Governance is usually interpreted as consequence of changes in society that 
challenge the modern state, being: deregulation of financial markets that question the 
abilities of governments to steer their economy; rising assertiveness of regions and 
cities; and cohesive policy networks that challenge the ability of the state to govern 
hierarchically and impose its will on society (Pierre 2000, 1) 
A large number of definitions are to be found in the literature, Rhodes (1996, 652-3) 
e.g. defines governance as “a change in the meaning of government, referring to a 
new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method 
by which society is governed”, Kooiman (1993, 2) writes about “the patterns that 
emerge from governing activities of social, political and administrative actors” and 
Yee (2004, 477) calls all “new governing activities that do not occur solely through 
governments” new modes of governance. 
Within the governance debate, two strands can be traced back. A more state centred 
one which is rooted in the older concept of “steering” and a wider one, that basically 
refers to sustaining co-ordination among a wide variety of actors with different 
purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, civil society, 
corporate interest and trans-national organizations (Pierre 2000, 3).  
The main question in the first strand is about the capacities of central government to 
solve collective problems under the condition of major changes in its environment. 
Peters labels it the “old governance” approach. The normative assumptions here are 
that the state is the only legitimate locus to solve societal problems, and that the 
society is incapable of going beyond self-interested outcomes and thus the state is 
necessary to defend the public interest. “The basic argument, therefore, is that the 
state and old governance are necessary to produce better outcomes from social and 
political activity than would otherwise be possible (Peters 2000, 40). Thus, the main 
analytical question in this first approach is to what extent the state still has the 
political and institutional capacities to steer and how the role of the state relates to 
other influential actors (Pierre 2000, 3). In general, this approach suffers from an 
implicit assumption that politics is basically about collective problem-solving 
(“Problemlösungsbias”), but not about power (Mayntz 2005).  
The second approach, often called “modern governance” or “new governance”, takes 
a more society-centred perspective and poses questions about how the centre of 
government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decisions. The focus 
                                            
1
 Governance is a common term in the English language. End of the 1990s a certain meaning was 
ascribed to it in the field of science though which also lead to the transfer of the term into other 
languages.   
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is on different forms of co-ordination and self-governance as such. According to this, 
Rhodes (1997: 53) defines governance as a form of coordination other than 
hierarchical steering, but especially refers to self-organizing, inter-organisation 
networks. Similarly, Héritier (2002: 3) states that “governance implies that private 
actors are involved in decision-making in order to provide common goods and that 
non-hierarchical means of guidance are employed”. The common denominator in the 
various definitions of governance under this approach is that it refers to the process 
through which public and private actions and resources are coordinated to solve 
collective problems. Societal actors and their resources manifesting in networks, 
communities or other form of interest organization are regarded as an asset for 
governance contributing to the formulation and implementation of policies (Peters 
2001: 41). The normative element in this approach is that society is able to manage 
its own affairs and solve collective problems without much guidance from the state. 
Accordingly, social capital as it has been defined by Putnam (2000) is argued to be 
necessary for good and democratic governance.  
 
To summarize, the literature on (new) governance is about shifting roles of 
government as a reaction to fundamental changes in its economic, political, and 
societal environment, not just about shrinking roles of government (Kooiman 2001: 
139). The analytical perspective has shifted from steering capacities of the 
government to modes of interaction between state and society. And furthermore, the 
reasoning on collective problem-solving has been extended with questions about the 
legitimacy of governance processes. What has been previously regarded as roles 
and tasks for the government are in the governance debate interpreted as more 
common, societal problems that can be solved by political actors and institutions, but 
also by other actors.  
 
As regards content, Benz and Papadoupoulos (2006, 2-3) describe six points that 
picture the main components of governance regarding structures, actors and modes 
of policy making: 
• Governance implies a plurality of decision centres, between which no clear 
hierarchy can be detected. Governance structures can be embedded in 
formal hierarchy; conflicts between social groups, organizations and 
individuals are expected to be regulated in networks though, which consist of 
relatively stable relationships between autonomous organizations and actors. 
• Boundaries are defined in more functional and less territorial terms; they are 
also fluid concerning inclusion of actors and effects of decisions. 
• Actors are experts, public actors (government officials and state 
administrators) and representatives of private interests; elected officials are 
less important. 
• The issues and preferences are defined by collective actors who are 
represented by individual actors in the decision-making processes and 
networks. Corporate actors play an important role in governance. 
• Governance includes a mixture of different modes of control and coordination. 
Mutual adjustment in processes of negotiation predominate, although 
unilateral decisions can happen; While organizations and collective actors 
interact by competition and cooperation, they are at the same time, when 
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being a member of a network, expected to demonstrate an inclination to 
compromise and possibly also a will to learn from each other.  
• Usually governance leads to less formal decision making, within structures 
that are not part of the official institutions of representative democracy and 
that are mostly opaque to the public.  
Although governance is sometimes referred to as “governance without government”, 
Benz and Papadoupoulos point out that political institutions are still relevant for 
understanding governance, since the institutional framework often shapes power 
relations, defines who is included and who not and guides interactions of actors. 
Furthermore institutional rules of collective entities restrain their representatives in 
networks and the dynamics of governance is rooted in the interplay between formal 
and informal processes. (Benz et al. 2006, 3) 
 
The extensive theoretical discussions connected to “governance” have not entirely 
clarified its meaning. (see Jordan et al. 2005, 477) Nevertheless, governance calls 
attention to specific changes of the state and of society, which no other term grasps. 
In GoFOR, the definition of “new modes of governance” was rather left open; 
following Benz et al. (2007, 15-16), governance was basically understood as concept 
that allows a certain point of view on modes of coordination between interdependent 
societal actors.  
The GoFOR project is to be seen as contribution to the empirical testing of “new 
modes of governance” which is called for by several scientists. (see e.g. Jordan et al. 
2005, 477) The analyses were carried out along several elements of governance that 
were derived from previous work in the field of nature policy. They provided the basic 
guideline for the empirical work and also for theoretical thoughts and conclusions.  
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2 GoFOR approach: conceptual framework and 
methodology 
Hogl, K., R. Nordbeck, E. Nußbauer and M. Pregernig 
2.1.1 Introduction to the conceptual framework and methodology 
The main goal of GoFOR was to assess evolving practices of new modes of 
governance in Europe. Considering this, the nature and preconditions of the 
research field, a multi-case study approach was chosen2; According to Yin (1994), a 
case study approach is advisable when “how” or “why” questions are posed, when 
the investigator has little control over events and when the research focus is on 
contemporary phenomena within some real-life context” (Yin 1994,13). Since the 
GoFOR project perfectly meets these criteria the design of the GoFOR project, as 
multi case study research project with governance processes as “units of analysis”, 
seemed appropriate. 
This basic methodological decision was supplemented with a conceptual 
framework which was developed in the initial phase of the project. A first and 
foremost challenge was thereby to operationalise the concept of “governance”. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, governance and new modes of governance have 
become a catchword in both politics and science over the past years. Nevertheless, 
the concept of governance is still evolving; and in forest policy and adjacent fields, 
the issue and the main policy actors´ assumptions, preferences and policy positions 
concerning new modes of governance have only been poorly explored so far. In 
order to grasp the multi-actor and multi-level negotiation processes that revolve 
around governance processes in forestry politics, the terms need to be clarified. The 
problems lie thereby on two levels, the lack of a uniform theory of governance and 
the lack of clear definitions of governance. The issue of “governance theory” was 
already addressed in chapter one. The way the project handled the lack of clear 
definitions and operationalised “governance” is, amongst others, subject of this 
chapter. 
The conceptual framework aims at operationalising ”governance” by focusing on 
certain aspects which are usually associated with the overall concept. Some basis for 
this operationalisation was provided by the COST-Action E19 “National Forest 
Programmes in a European Context”, in which a first attempt to conceptualise the 
main elements of modern governance in the field of forest policy was undertaken: 
e.g. participatory approaches (Appelstrand 2002), inter-sectoral co-ordination (Hogl 
2002a and 2002b) and adaptive-iterative approaches (Barstad 2002). However, as 
COST-Action E19 was not a research programme which allowed comprehensive 
research work, the empirical input was rather limited to theory-based contributions, 
conceptual clarification and narrative data. A broad conceptual framework for 
assessing new modes of governance was still lacking.  
Nevertheless, building on the foundations laid by the work of COST-Action E19 (cf. 
Schmithüsen and Zimmermann 2002, Glück and Humphreys 2002) the GoFOR 
project developed a conceptual framework to assess existing and evolving practices 
of new modes of governance which was subsequently applied to cases of 
                                            
2
 For an extensive discussion on how to define a case see Ragin/Becker (1992) 
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governance process from the fields of forest policy, nature protection policy, and 
regional developments policy in 10 European countries. 
The complexity of multi-actors and multi-levels governance processes (iii) was taken 
into account by assessing “governance processes” in a case study research design. 
The GoFOR case studies are therefore not country or sector reports, but examples of 
concrete policy processes, in which “new modes of governance” or certain elements 
thereof were applied or meant to be applied. Hence, the GoFOR project itself can 
also be seen as an attempt to further clarify the manifestation of “governance” 
practices as found in forest policy and the adjacent policy domains.  
Empirically the research basically followed three lines of inquiry (cf. Eberlein and 
Kerwer 2002, Sanderson 2002): 
I.  Analysis of programmatic policy statements 
The first line of inquiry sought to assess the salience of new modes of 
governance and its constituting elements on the basis of the strategic and 
programmatic role they play in the repertoire of political institutions and 
policy actors. Empirically these roles were determined by investigating 
programmatic policy statements such as White Papers and other strategy 
documents, position papers, general procedural guidelines for governance 
processes (such as NFPs), but also the more programmatic parts of 
legislative texts, subsidy schemes and the like. Programmatic policy 
statements were seen as promising to be useful by providing a 
straightforward image of the current political compromises on the meaning 
and specific materialization of new modes of governance and its 
constituting elements in a given policy arena. 
II.  Analysis of practices of governance 
GoFOR did not only look at the rhetoric about governance but also and 
primarily at current and evolving practices of governance. The term 
“practice” refers, on the one hand, to policy processes (e.g., the 
formulation of an NFP, the planning of a national park, the formulation and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies), but also to the policy outputs 
(such as new policy programmes or procedural and institutional reforms) 
and, to some extent, also to policy impacts and outcomes . However, the 
focus of our empirical work was on the two first-mentioned categories of 
“effects”, simply because most of the governance policy processes which 
were analysed are not yet advanced enough to allow drawing empirically-
based conclusions as regards to their effects in the bio-physical world, 
e.g. “in the forests”. 
III.  Assessment of theoretical approaches 
The clarification and operationalisation of new modes of governance and 
its constituting elements was not only build on empirical evidence (i.e., 
programmatic statements and practices of policy makers) but the potential 
of new governance was also assessed in the light of theoretical 
approaches and concepts. Given the variety of procedural elements of 
governance the development of a conceptual framework had to rely on a 
multi-theory approach. Actually the elaboration of theory oriented, 
conceptual input papers by the lead and co-lead teams served to integrate 
the theoretical lenses into the case study research. 
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For clarifying the necessary work-steps, the main objective of the GoFOR project, i.e. 
to assess evolving practices of new modes of governance as a basis for policy 
relevant conclusions, was broken down to the following sub-objectives: 
1. development of a sound conceptual framework and methodologies for the 
evaluation of evolving practices of new modes of governance in forest policy 
2. elaboration of an enlarged set of criteria that operationalise the concept of 
“new modes of governance” and its constituting elements in European forest 
policy 
3. exploration of the main policy actors’ assumptions, preferences and policy 
positions with regard to new modes of governance and of the contextual 
factors (socio-economic, political, ecological) that mediate the practices of new 
modes of governance and their effectiveness 
4. overview of existing practices of new governance, identification of successful 
models, and critical evaluation of the transferability of such models to other 
political contexts 
5. deduction of policy relevant conclusions and recommendations with regard to 
procedural and institutional approaches for the implementation of new modes 
of governance to promote sustainable forest management in Europe. 
Figure 1 depicts the overall conceptual framework of the GoFOR project, presents 
the main concepts which were subject to the cases studies, and describes three 
analytical steps that had to be taken, in order to tackle the sub-objectives as 
described above. 
Figure 1: The general conceptual framework 
Governance
public participation
inter-sectoral coordination
multi-level coordination
adaptive and iterative policy making
accountable expertise
?
?
?
?
?
Governance 
in the light of theoretical approaches
(and its constituting elements)
Programmatic policy statments
as regards governance
(and its constituting elements)
Practices of governance
(and its constituting elements)
Main policy actors
assumptions
preferences
policy positions
?
?
?
Context
socio-economic factors
political factors
ecological factors
?
?
?
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Actually, the overall approach comprised 5 steps (for 1-3 see also Figure 1): 
1. Clarification and operationalisation of new modes of governance 
2. Exploration of the broader political context 
3. Assessment of the scope and effectiveness of new modes of governance 
4. Cross-national and cross-sectoral comparisons 
5. Overall synthesis 
These steps are not neatly separated entities which have to be taken in a 
chronological sequence. Rather they were seen as underlying guidelines. Steps 1-3 
e.g., were actually run through several times along the research process. As relates 
to the content and the actual time line, the research process can be described as one 
of recurring adaptation, interrelation and evolution of three parallel strands. The first 
being the general theory on governance, the second the development of a common 
methodological basis and a common research frame for GoFOR (Input Papers, 
Terms of Reference, Comparative Frame), and the third strand as having been the 
actual process of carrying out the case studies, from starting with detecting possible 
cases up to the final reports on 19 fully fledged case studies (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: GoFOR Work packages: Sequence and interrelation of steps along 
the research design  
 
 
 
 National 
case-studies 
Comparative 
European analysis 
Theoretical 
focus 
WP 1:  
conceptual framework 
WP 2: approaches to 
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(criteria) 
WP 3: 
ToR for pre-
assessments 
WP 4: 
pre-assessments 
WP 5:  
re-drafting ToR 
WP 6:  
survey / data 
collection 
WP 7: discussion of 
reports,  ToR  for 
reports 
WP 8: comparative 
framework; synthesis 
report 
 
Enhancing the set of 
criteria 
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1st Step: Clarification and operationalisation of new modes of governance (cf. 
Figure 1) 
At the beginning of the process it was quite obvious, that it was necessary to clarify 
the definition of governance and its constituting elements in order to have a common 
ground from which the next steps could be taken, and to finally allow comparing and 
synthesizing findings from different case studies as far as possible. At the same time 
the research design emphasized that the conceptual framework should not be too 
rigid or too narrowly defined in order to stay open not only towards changes in the 
still evolving concept of governance but also to differences in context of the various 
national case studies to be done. In any case, one of the major challenges 
throughout the project was to search for an appropriate balance between conceptual 
openness and a sufficiently defined common basis that also promises to allow the 
appliance of a comparative perspective and a synthesis across cases. 
The elements of new modes of governance which were meant to be focused on in 
the GoFOR project – i.e. participatory approaches, inter-sectoral and multi-level co-
ordination, adaptive and iterative policy-making and the role of accountable expertise 
– were generally acknowledged, both in the political arena (cf. EC White Paper on 
European Governance; MCPFE Approach to National Forest Programmes in Europe) 
and in the scientific realm (Powell 1996, Glück et al. 2003); Nevertheless they were 
interpreted quite differently in various contexts in practice.  
From the very start of the project, country teams (lead- and co-lead partners) were 
assigned to lead the conceptual work on one of the governance elements, as defined 
in the research framework: Participation, Multi-Level Coordination, Inter-Sectoral 
Coordination, Accountable Expertise and Adaptive and Iterative approaches. The 
“lead teams” started by elaborating conceptual input papers on the respective 
element. These input papers were broadly discussed among all partners within the 
consortium, both online (Bulletin Board) as well as in workshops, and further refined 
and elaborated by the respective lead teams, and served as the conceptual basis for 
drawing up terms of reference for the pre-assessment of potential cases later on.  
2nd Step: Exploration of the broader political context (cf. Figure 1) 
Both programmatic policy statements and the evolving practices of new modes of 
governance cannot be appropriately described and understood if the analysis is not 
focussed on the broader political environment. A comprehensive analytical 
framework must not only take into consideration (a) the main policy actors, their 
interests, resources, strategies and actions, but also (b) the wider political context in 
which a respective governance process takes place. (see the dotted arrows in Figure 
1)  
It goes without saying, that the policy actors in the relevant fields significantly 
determine the practices of governance. Therefore the assumptions, preferences and 
policy positions of the main policy actors were systematically analysed in order to 
learn about their expectations concerning as to how and why the various practices of 
governance work.  
Furthermore, new modes of governance are not only determined by the assumptions, 
preferences and activities of the actors which are directly involved, but also by 
contextual and environmental factors that mediate the evolvement and 
effectiveness of different practices of governance (Rowe and Frewer 2000). Thus, 
the influence of ecological, socio-economic and political factors such as, for example, 
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different systems of interest representation, needed to be taken into account as well 
when evaluating practices of new modes of governance.  
The first two steps of analysis lead to an enlarged set of criteria that 
operationalised the concept of new modes of governance for the GoFOR project. 
Practically, these criteria were reflected in form of the Terms of Reference for the 
empirical assessments  
In the course of conceptual clarifications it was pointed out that the five constituting 
elements of governance, as defined in the research proposal, have to be regarded as 
a minimum set of elements of governance, as a common starting point which should, 
however, be open for additional elements. In addition, it became quite clear that the 
five elements can not be seen and analysed separately, but have to be seen and 
analysed as aspects of overall governance arrangements, since they are strongly 
interlinked in practice. Furthermore, in the course of the project the issue of “effects” 
of the governance processes turned out to be another major focus for empirical 
analysis, and was addressed further focused on, both conceptually (for providing 
common ground) and empirically in the empirical assessments.  
Finally, it should be emphasised that the first two steps of the GoFOR research 
design – as assumed from the very beginning – further evolved in parallel to the 
other work steps, largely parallel throughout the whole project, up to the formulation 
of a comparative framework by mid 2007. That is, both the conceptual work as well 
as well as the empirical analysis done by individual GoFOR partners was cross-
fertilized by research work of the overall project consortium almost throughout the 
project duration.  
3rd Step: Assessment of the scope and effectiveness of new modes of 
governance (cf. Figure 1) 
Based on the amended set of criteria (ToR for Main Assessment) and the improved 
understanding about the contextual factors that shape practices of governance, the 
project turned to the case study research. The case studies were conducted in order 
to assess the actual manifestation, the characteristics and effects of governance 
processes, with a focus on the aspects depicted above (see Figure 1). The case 
study research was conducted in a two-step approach (see Figure 2).  
 
Selection of potential cases for pre-assessment 
As a first step, potential cases had to be detected. At the kick off meeting in Vienna 
(February 2005) the partners were asked to bring forward proposals for possible 
case studies and to portray these case proposals along the following criteria for the 
selection of case studies:  
• Policy fields: According to the research contract a number of case studies had 
to be done in the field of forest policy, in particular the concept of “National 
Forest Programmes” had to receive attention. Anyhow, the project contract 
also asked for looked at “adjacent” sectors in order to draw lessons from 
policy-making processes, which apply similar governance principles and 
approaches. 
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• Scope of policy issue: The policy issues to be selected should be issues 
lasting at least a few years in order to promise rich empirical materials for 
analysis. It was stressed that selecting cases with a longer time scope would 
usually be more favourable for analyses than processes having only little 
“historical background” and development and/or probable changes in 
characteristics. 
• Level of government: The GoFOR project was mainly aimed at analyzing 
national level policy making (as opposed to local or international). However, 
sub-national processes were also considered as providing analytically fruitful 
cases, in particular if they were expected to provide process links to national 
level policy making. Since GoFOR was also interested in the implementation 
of policies, quite a lot of document analyses and interviews had to be done 
also on regional and even on local level processes.  
• Stage of implementation: Governance processes could still be in the stage of 
formulation or already in the stage of implementation or even evaluation. Both 
types of processes were considered relevant. However, the selection of case 
studies was aimed at achieving a picture as comprehensive as possible, in 
terms of the stages of the policy cycle. 
• Analytical contributions to all or at least some of the constituting elements: 
This criterion addresses the question on in how far a specific policy process 
contributes to the understanding of a specific constituting element? (e.g., 
processes with and without multi-level governance; processes with different 
forms of participation etc.). The goal was that the overall set of cases to be 
finally selected for the main assessment promises to provide sufficient 
empirical insights on all the governance elements as defined in the conceptual 
framework (see Figure 1. 
• Available research: For some governance processes previous research (done 
by GoFOR team members themselves or by other researchers) was available. 
The assumed advantage of choosing such “well-researched” processes was 
that existing research might provide a good basis to start from.  
• Process change: Cases which provide evidence of significant changes in 
processes were seen as particularly promising from an analytical point of view. 
Analysing changes over time in terms of the use/presence of new modes of 
governance should allow to formulate hypotheses or even to draw conclusions 
as regards triggers, barriers, effects, etc., i.e. as regards cause-and-effect 
relationships inherent in the governance processes analysed. 
• Policy change: From a similar analytical perspective, cases that promised to 
show some change in policies were also considered “potentially rich cases”, 
since they promise to allow for analysing “how and why dominant policy 
patterns might have changed”.  
• Not just Strategy processes: In particular in forest policy science, scholars had 
until then very much concentrated their research on “new modes of 
governance” on “strategy processes” (e.g. national forest programmes). It was 
assumed though, that strategy processes are just one category of governance 
processes and that GoFOR should deliberately avoid taking a too narrow 
analytical focus by emphasising this type of processes.  
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The goal was to elaborate a list of cases for the pre-assessment which promises to 
detect governance processes that (i) allow to derive rich empirical data as regards 
the leading research questions, (ii) sets some focus on cases from the field of forest 
policy while (iii) at the same time promises to allow drawing lessons from adjacent 
policy fields.  
Based on the above mentioned criteria possible cases were discussed in depth and 
selected to be researched in the run-up to the pre-assessment. In a first exploratory 
round, this broader range of possible cases was probed, on the basis of a few 
exploratory interviews with key actors, e.g. within the national GoFOR project 
advisory groups, and exploratory document analysis and research reports (Halffman 
& Hoppe 2004: 16). Additionally the case selection was coordinated across the 
partner countries in order to get a well-balanced, analytically fruitful set of case 
studies. 
Based on the result from this exploratory phase the following list of 24 cases were 
selected for the pre-assessment, which aimed at gaining deeper insight into the 
cases as a basis for the final selection of the “sample” of cases. This Table 1 also 
provides an overview on the case characteristics along the above mentioned criteria. 
  
Table 1: List of cases for pre-assessment and summary of pre-assessment findings relating to criteria for the selection of cases 
Country Case Title Policy 
field 
Level of 
government 
Stage of 
implementation 
Research 
available 
Partici-
pation 
Inter-
sectoral 
Multi-
Level Co-
ordination 
Long-
term 
iterative 
Account-
able 
expertise 
Effects 
Process 
changes 
Policy 
changes 
AUT Forest 
Dialogue 
Forest National NFP adopted 
Dec 2005 
Limited ++ + + 0 + Yes No 
Biodiversity 
Strategy 
Nature 
Conservation 
National Implem. since 
1998 
Limited 0 + +/0 0 + Minor No 
Sustainability 
Strategy 
Sustainable 
Development 
National Implem. since 
2002 
Several 
studies 
++ + ++ ++ + Yes Yes 
DK National Park 
Pilot Projects 
Nature 
Conservation 
National Implem. since 
2003 
Broad 
range of 
studies 
++ + + 0 +   
Natura 2000 Nature 
Conservation 
EU + 
National + 
Regional  
Implem. since 
1994 
Limited + + ++ 0 ++   
ESP Regional 
Forest Plan 
Catalonia 
Forest Regional + 
National 
Approval of RFP 
planned end of 
2005 
Own 
research 
++ + + + + N/A Yes 
Natura 2000 in 
Catalonia 
Nature 
Conservation 
EU + 
National + 
Regional 
Implem. since 
1994 
Very 
limited 
+ + ++ 0 ++   
FRA Territorial 
Forestry 
Charters 
Forest National + 
Regional 
Implem. since 
2001 
Own 
research 
+ +/0 + + + Yes Yes 
Relief Plan 
Vosges 
Forest National + 
Regional  
Implem. since 
2000 
N/A + 0 ++ 0 +   
GER Integrated 
Rural 
Development 
Rural 
Development 
+ Forest 
EU + 
National + 
Provincial 
(Implem.) Own 
research 
+ ++ 0 + + Yes Yes 
Leader+ Rural 
Development 
EU + 
National + 
Provincial 
Implem. since 
2001 
Own 
research 
++ ++ ++ + ++ Yes Yes 
  
Country Case Title Policy 
field 
Level of 
government 
Stage of 
implementation 
Research 
available 
Partici-
pation 
Inter-
sectoral 
Multi-
Level Co-
ordination 
Long-
term 
iterative 
Account-
able 
Expertise 
Effects 
Process changes Policy 
changes 
GER Regionen Aktiv Rural 
Development 
National + 
Provincial 
Implem. since 
2002 
Own 
research 
++ ++ ++ ++ ++   
GAK Rural 
Development + 
Agriculture 
National + 
Provincial 
Implem. since 
2004 
- 0 0 + 0 0   
GRE National Park 
Reserve Policy 
Nature 
Conservation + 
Forest 
National Implem. since 
1992 
Own 
research 
+ + + 0/+ + Yes Yes 
Forest Fire 
Management 
Forest National Implem. since 
1998 
Limited 0 + + 0 + No Yes 
HUN NFP Forest National Plan adopted 
2004, Impl. 2006 
Own 
research 
++ + 0/+ + ++ Minor Yes 
National Rural 
Development 
Plan 
Rural 
Development + 
(Forest) 
National Implem. since 
2004 
- 0/+ 0/+ + + + N/A Yes 
NL Nature for 
People 
Nature 
Conservation + 
Forest 
National Implem. since 
2000 
Own 
research 
+ + + + + + Partial N/A 
Groene Woud Nature 
Conservation 
Provincial + 
National 
Implem. since 
1995 
- ++ + ++ + +   
Utrechtse 
Heuvelrug 
Nature 
Conservation 
Provincial + 
National 
Implem. since 
1993 
- ++ + + 0/+ +  Yes 
NOR “Shadow” NFP Forest National Implem. since 
1999 
Studies + 
Own 
research 
++ 0/+ ++ + + Yes Yes 
Living Forests 
Project 
Forest National Finnished 1995-
1998 
Various 
studies 
+ + + 0/+ 0   
ROM Sustainability of 
Private Forestry 
Forest National Implem. since 
2004 
Limited 0 ++ 0/+ 0/+ 0 Yes Yes 
Policy against 
Corruption in 
Forestry 
Forest  + 
General 
National + 
Local 
Implem. since 
2003 
Limited 0/+ + + 0 0 Yes Yes 
Legend: ++ … plays an important role; + … plays a role; 0 … plays a minor/no role 
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Development of Terms of Reference for Pre-assessment 
Alongside the process of the case selection, the lead teams elaborated conceptual 
input papers on their respective governance elements (see above). These papers 
served as a basis for developing the Terms of Reference for the pre-assessment 
studies in a common effort of the consortium. 
The ToR guided the empirical work carried out in the pre-assessment phase The 
ToR outlined basic methodological questions such as the appropriate depth of pre-
assessments and survey methodologies, how result had to be synthesised and 
reported, and, at its core, the ToR described the research questions to be addressed 
in terms of the criteria that describe the manifestation of the governance processes to 
be studied. 
The resultant pre-assessment reports were presented and discussed at the third 
workshop meeting in Hurdal/Norway in February 2006. Based on the criteria 
described above and on the insights gained from the pre-assessment the following 
19 cases were finally selected for the main assessment (see Table 2). 
Table 2: List of cases for the Main assessment arranged in thematic clusters 
Thematic cluster Case title Acronym Country 
Forest policy 
(incl. National 
Forest Pro-
grammes, NFPs) 
Territorial Forest Charters in France FR-CFT France 
Relief Plan for Forests in France FR-RPF France 
Anti-corruption policies in Romania ROM-ACP Romania 
The Living Forests Project NOR-LF Norway 
Austrian Forest Dialogue AT-AFD Austria 
National Forest Programme Hungary HUN-NFP Hungary 
Forest Policy General Plan of Catalonia ESP-FPGP Spain 
Austrian Implementation Strategy for the Convention 
on Biological Diversity 
AT-BS Austria 
Biodiversity  
and nature 
conservation 
Implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark DEN-HD Denmark 
National Park Pilot Projects in Denmark DEN-NPP Denmark 
Implementation of Acquis Communautaire in Nature 
Protection Policies in Romania 
ROM-NAT Romania 
New modes of governance for protected areas through 
Management Agencies in Greece  
GR-MA Greece 
Utrechtse Heuvelrug NL-UH The Netherlands 
Groene Woud NL-GW The Netherlands 
Nature for People, People for Nature NL-NPPN The Netherlands 
Integrated Rural Development Policy in Germany GER-IRD Germany 
Rural 
development 
policies  
GAK - Joint Task “Improvement of Agricultural 
Structures and Coastal Protection” 
GER-GAK Germany 
LEADER+ – EU pilot programme for the advancement 
of rural development 
GER-L+ Germany 
REGIONEN AKTIV – National pilot programme for the 
advancement of rural development 
GER-RA Germany 
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Terms of Reference for the Main Assessment 
Building on the experiences gained in the course of the pre-assessments as regards 
the strength and weaknesses of the ToR, they were refined and amended for guiding 
the subsequent main assessment on the selected case studies.  
Furthermore, a workshop meeting in summer 2006 was dedicated mainly to the 
discussion of the ongoing research in terms of experiences with the methodology and 
the research question as described by the common ToR. The aim of this interim step 
was to co-ordinate on corrective measures, where necessary. This eventually led to 
another revision of the Terms of Reference. 
Half a year later, at the workshop meeting in Budapest, 19 draft main assessment 
reports were presented and examined thoroughly. Insights and open questions to the 
case study authors were subsequently taken up and incorporated in the main 
assessment reports, which were finally delivered in summer 2007. These 
comprehensive main assessment reports provided the basis for the next step along 
the overall research design: 
 
4th Step: Cross-national and cross-sectoral comparisons 
Finally, the main results of the main assessments should be synthesised and 
described from a comparative perspective. This report, in particular chapter 4, 
constitutes the outcome of this effort.  
 
Comparative Framework 
In order to prepare the comparisons methodologically a Comparative Framework 
(CF) had to be elaborated. This was done in a three-step approach:  
First, the lead and co-lead teams examined the main case study reports with a focus 
on their respective governance elements, to derive the research questions for the 
comparative phase of GoFOR, that is: 
(i) overarching analytical questions and 
(ii) interesting “partial” analytical questions that only apply to a subset of GoFOR 
case studies. 
These analytical questions for the CF had to fulfil the following two prerequisites: 
(a) There must be substantial evidence available to answer those questions in all or 
at least a number of GoFOR case studies 
(b) Research questions have to be scientifically interesting and “bold”. The Criteria 
for “boldness” has been whether an analytical question could be apt to make the 
core of a scientific publication (journal publication or book chapter). 
In order to demonstrate that an analytical question can be addressed in at least some 
GoFOR case studies, lead teams not only had to formulate research questions for 
the CF but had to provide the examples of how and which cases might be relevant to 
address these questions.  
In a second step, a draft CF was elaborate by the co-ordinators On the basis of this 
input of the lead teams. This draft CF was then sent to all cases study authors. In a 
third step, case study authors had to verify, correct and amend the lead-teams’ 
interpretation of their respective case reports, and to report back on the research 
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questions raised in the draft CF. The feedback by case authors was summarised by 
the lead teams and finally presented an discussed in-depth at the final workshop 
meeting in August 2007. 
This overall approach provided a sound and cross-verified empirical basis for the 
final CF which subsequently served the lead teams to elaborate the comparative 
chapters as outlined in this deliverable (D12). 
 
Step 5: Overall synthesis 
The extensive characterization and theory-based evaluation of alternative 
governance approaches allowed to judge as to whether successful models in one 
country (“best practices”) can be applied in other countries as well, whether country-
specific conditions impede the simple transfer of a specific model, and what 
modifications would be necessary to take into account cultural peculiarities. 
Eventually, it was possible to provide an overall view of the existing models and to 
explain in what circumstances a specific model is adequate and where its limits of 
application are. 
So finally, the knowledge gained in the conceptual clarifications, the exploration of 
political influences, the empirical and theoretical evaluations, and the cross-
comparisons were drawn together to come up with policy relevant conclusions 
and recommendations with regard to procedural and institutional approaches for 
the implementation of new modes of governance to promote sustainable forest 
management in Europe. 
2.1.2 Methods applied in case study research 
As regards methods, both quantitative and qualitative techniques were applied. 
However, the main emphasis was on qualitative analyses of documents and 
transcripts of qualitative interviews.  
In some of case studies, further methods were successfully applied to collect 
complementary data such as participatory observations (Hungarian NFP process, 
Austrian Forest Dialogue), postal surveys (Norwegian case) and telephone interviews 
(Greek case). 
 
Document analysis 
For a content analysis of documents, three main groups of different sources were 
used in the case study research: 
 
• General documents about the field at hand 
• Documents out of the respective policy process (minutes, reports, official 
documents, speeches, stakeholder statement and position papers, e.g.) 
• Documents about the respective policy process prepared by someone 
external to the process (evaluations, research reports, etc.) 
 
Basically, a large amount of documents was accessible in all cases, providing a 
fruitful empirical basis and background materials to e.g. complement and validate 
interview results or data collected in the course of participatory observation. In 
general, the attitudes of organisations, persons and administrations towards the 
project were quite positive. Most of the interviewees showed a high interest in the 
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study subject and in the expected results. (e.g. Austria, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Romania) Accordingly, most of the actors that were contacted in the 
course of the empirical research were willingly providing relevant documents. 
 
Document analysis was not only used to describe and analyse the process, but also 
to prepare for the second main source of the case studies: the interviews. 
 
As regards the analysis of documents the case study authors applied different 
approaches, also depending on the “nature” of the documents. On the one hand, 
documents were often used as “background materials”, providing introduction to the 
research field, the actors involved etc., and as a source of validating materials from 
other sources. On the other hand documents were partly analysed in just as 
systematically as the interview transcripts (see below), in particular when the 
documents had to been as policy statements of actors in the governance processes 
which had been the subject of research. 
 
Interviews 
In all of the case studies qualitative interviews were carried out with a variety of 
stakeholders, administrative personnel, politicians and other involved persons.3  
Methodologically the researchers followed the principles of interviewing and analysis 
as outlined in the common Terms of Reference: 
• The interviews were done in a semi structured format using interview guidelines 
that were elaborated based on the questions as formulated in the ToR and pre-
information derived from document analyses. Interviewers were free to adapt 
the order and focus of questions to the context of the respective case and 
interviewees. The basic idea was to create a positive, open atmosphere so that 
the interviewee would speak as freely as possible about his experiences, 
perceptions, judgements etc. 
• Most interviews were tape recorded and transcribed afterwards. Only a few 
interview partners opposed to tape record their statements Three partners 
(France, Hungary, Romania) have chosen not to tape record the interviews 
because in their experience this would have compromised the goal of 
developing an open and trustful interview atmosphere. The Greek team 
consciously turned off the tape recorder at the end of the “official“ part of the 
interviews for allowing some time to speak more freely about more sensitive 
topics. Also in Spain some important information was provided “off the record” 
only. Such “additional” information turned out to be helpful for understanding 
certain aspects of a given case, even though – by definition – off record 
information can not be used for formal analysis procedures and reports. 
• It has proven worthwhile to carry out interviews by teams of two. By doing so 
one researcher was able to concentrate on the conversation while the other 
could concentrate on taking notes and to “check off” questions of the interview 
guide. Apart from that, the experience was that contribution of two interviewers 
to the conversation as well as cross check of interview notes helped to increase 
the amount and the quality of information that was derived from the interviews.  
                                            
3
 The appropriate mode of selecting interview partners is a case specific issue. It is described in 
more detail in the respective main assessment reports (see D10). In average, 17 persons were 
interviewed per case study (see Table 3). 
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• Interviews were conducted by the researchers themselves. Since the 
interviewers had to be very familiar both with the GoFOR research design (ToR) 
and the governance processes under study, it was not advisable to employ 
external personnel. This also allowed using the interview guidelines as real 
“guideline” but not in terms of rigid frames, which is a precondition for 
successful qualitative interviewing of experts.  
• Researchers conducted pre-assessment interviews and redrafted their interview 
guide according to the experiences gained from that. In some cases (e.g. the 
research on the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy) additional interviews were 
carried out at a very late stage of the research process, in order to clarify open 
questions which emerged from the analyses. 
For transcribing and coding the data some partners used software, such as Express 
Scribe and MAXqda®, i.e. tools specifically designed for the systematic analysis of 
text materials. Other partners used standard office tools to organize and assess their 
materials systematically. The choice of software tools was left to the partners. 
 
Table 3 provides an overview about the methods of data collection as applied in the 
case studies: 
 
  
Table 3: Methods of data collection and data analyses 
Cou
ntry 
number of 
interviews 
interviewees other sources recording transcription software filing interpretation 
AT 41 
(22 AFD + 
19 BD) 
public administration 
NGOs 
Science 
at national and regional 
level  
Attendance of team 
members in process 
meetings (Expert Modules, 
Round Tables), Official 
documents, Internal 
documents, Research 
reports, Written comments 
by stakeholders 
Yes Yes  Express 
Scribe, 
MAXqda® 
CD and 
hard 
disks 
 
DK 23 public administration 
NGOs 
science 
conference (with MP, 
administration, NGOs, 
media), newspaper articles, 
parliamentary documents, 
research reports 
yes yes   on PC probably 
sometimes 
sensitive to 
wording, 
sometimes not 
ESP 25 Public Administration 
Forest owners 
Industry 
NGOs 
Research & Universities 
Documentation 
(Intermediate Reports, 
Meeting Reports, Forest 
Laws, Evaluations), Direct 
observation in workshops 
Yes, in 2 cases 
remarks were 
given off the 
record 
Yes, partly Digital Voice 
Editor 2 
Hard 
Disk 
Using a four 
column table 
FR 66 public administration 
NGOs 
Science 
at national, regional (3 
representative regions) 
and local levels 
scientific reports and 
progress reports, legal 
texts, publications in mass 
media 
no, to keep 
atmosphere of 
trust & 
confidentiality 
comprehensi
ve and 
systematic 
note taking 
with 
questionnaire 
as kind of 
“form” 
no minutes 
in hard 
copy 
analytical 
tables on 
PC 
classification per 
research question, 
per frequency and 
similarity/difference 
of the opinions 
  
Cou
ntry 
number of 
interviews 
interviewees other sources recording transcription software filing interpretation 
GE 35 public administration 
NGOs 
science 
at national and regional 
level (selected regions) 
internet, participatory 
observation during 
conferences 
yes (digital) partial (esp. 
key 
information 
and key 
expressions) 
MaxQDA audio 
and text 
files on 
PC 
interpretative case 
study approach 
GR 31 
(+ 12 
completed 
questionnai
res) 
management authorities 
Ministries 
regional administrators 
science 
local society  
legal texts, official policy 
documents, formal policy 
positions, relevant 
publications and reports 
issued by relevant policy 
actors, research reports 
yes, off-record 
discussion at the 
end (10-30 min) 
yes no on PC content analysis of 
each individual 
interview 
HU 8 associations of forest 
owners 
the woodworking industry  
professional foresters 
participatory observations, 
documentation 
no detailed 
notes 
no on PC content analysis 
NL 33 
(5 NPPN + 
14 UH + 14 
GW) 
provincial authorities 
national authorities 
NGOs 
local activists / experts 
science 
formal policy documents, 
leaflets, brochures, minutes 
of project teams, advisory 
and steering committees, 
news paper articles, 
research studies 
yes (digital), off-
the-records 
notes only rarely 
used 
yes (full), 
some 
transcripts 
sent back to 
interviewees 
no, but colour 
coding in text 
along 4 
dimensions 
of PAA plus 
keywords 
on PC 
and CD 
along dimensions 
of PAA 
NOR 28 National Ministries 
Regional Administration 
Interest groups 
NGOs 
Consultants 
written information, reports, 
newspapers and other 
media, evaluations, 
websites 
Yes Partially (key 
aspects) 
NUDIST Hard 
Disk, 
filing also 
thematic
ally 
Content analysis, 
focus on themes or 
arguments made 
  
Cou
ntry 
number of 
interviews 
interviewees other sources recording transcription software filing interpretation 
RO 23 public administration 
NGOs 
science 
newspapers, brochures, 
internet, official policy 
documents, position 
papers, press briefings, 
evaluation studies, 
participation in meetings 
yes (digital) or 
paper notes (last 
more appropriate 
for corruption 
case); not even 
notes in 1 
interview 
yes (except 
“context 
conversation”
) with 
transcripts 
sent back to 
interviewees 
no on PC interpretation of 
discourse in 
context; 
search for common 
features in 
interviews; 
interpretation only 
in early phase 
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3 GoFOR case studies 
The empirical evidence for this synthesis is based on the main assessment cases 
study reports which relate to three broad and rich thematic fields: first, biodiversity 
and nature conservation, including all processes engaged in the implementation of 
the habitat directive (92/43/EEC) and generally the operationalisation of nature 
conservation policies. Second, forest policy, including a number of case study reports 
that operate within the forestry field and thirdly, rural development policies, including 
a range of studies that aim at integrating development policies in the rural realm 
(Table 4). 
Table 4: Classification of governance case studies by policy field 
Policy field  Case study 
Nature conservation AT-BS, DK-HD, DK-NPP, GR-MA, NL-NfP, ROM-NAT   
Forest policy FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-NFP,  NOR-LF, SP-NFP, 
ROM-COR 
Rural development GER-IRD, GER-RA, GER-L+, GER-GAK, NL-GW, NL-UH,  
 
Chapter 3 briefly describes the governance processes that have been analysed in 
GoFOR, case by case. These case descriptions do not go into the details but 
emphasise the cases’ main characterics to provide the basis for the comparative 
analysis along the elements of governance, which is provided in Chapter 4. 
The following Table provides brief characterizations of the case studies. 
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Case title Brief characterization 
Austrian Implementation Strategy for the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
national strategy process mainly  
driven by international obligations 
Austrian Forest Dialogue participatory and sector-integrated  
national strategy process 
Implementation of the Habitats  
Directive in Denmark 
national implementation of EU policy 
National Park Pilot Projects in Denmark participatory planning processes at  
regional level as non-binding input  
to policy formulation at national level 
Territorial Forest Charters in France participatory and sector-integrated strategic 
planning approach at the regional level 
Relief Plan for Forests in France ad hoc governmental assistance programme  
in the aftermath of devastating storms 
Integrated Rural Development policies in  
Germany (with three embedded sub-cases): 
integration of new policy approach  
(regional governance) in three programs: 
− LEADER+ − EU pilot programme for sustainable  
rural development 
− REGIONEN AKTIV − national pilot programme for  
sustainable rural development 
− Joint Task “Improvement of Agricultural 
Structures and Coastal Protection” (GAK) 
− mainstream funding instrument  
of agricultural policy 
Restructuration of management agencies  
for protected areas in Greece  
reorganization of administration and 
management of protected areas  
mainly driven by EU policies 
National Forest Programme Hungary participatory and sector-integrated  
national strategy process 
Norwegian Living Forests Project participatory and sector-integrated  
strategy process initiated and  
promoted by private actors 
“Nature for People, People for Nature”  
program in the Netherland 
formulation and implementation  
of strategic policy document 
Nature policy in the Groene Woud area, NL long-term policy development  
around nature conservation 
Nature policy in the Utrechtse Heuvelrug area, NL same as above 
Anti-corruption policies in Romania policy formulation and implementation driven 
by international obligations and pressures 
Implementation of Acquis Communautaire in 
Nature Protection Policies in Romania 
national implementation of EU policy 
Forest Policy General Plan of Catalonia, Spain participatory and sector-integrated  
regional strategy process 
Table 5: Brief characterization of GoFOR case studies 
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3.1 Austrian Biodiversity Strategy 
Nordbeck, R. and M. Pregernig 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The Austrian Biodiversity Strategy (BS) constitutes an example for a national 
strategic planning approach in the broader field of sustainability. The Austrian 
Biodiversity Strategy process has a history of more than ten years now. Following a 
year-long dialogue and negotiation process, the first biodiversity strategy was 
adopted by the Austrian Council of Ministers in 1998. The strategy was evaluated in 
a two-step procedure in 2001 and 2003. Based on that evaluation the strategy was 
revised and updated with the “Advanced Biodiversity Strategy” being adopted in 
2005. 
The Austrian BS process was mainly chosen to provide a contrasting governance 
case to the Austrian Forest Dialogue (see Chapter 3.2). The set of two processes 
was thought to give valuable insights into the conditions of success (or failure) of 
national strategies for sustainability in Austria and beyond. 
3.1.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The main driving force for the initiation of the Austrian BS process stemmed from the 
international level with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) requiring each 
country to develop a national biodiversity strategy. 
Recognizing the divided formal responsibilities for biodiversity, with many key 
competencies, like e.g. nature conservation, lying not with the federal state but with 
the provinces, a National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) was set up as a policy 
coordination mechanism in 1996. The NBC is a multi-stakeholder body, including 
representatives of administrative departments (both federal ministries and provincial 
authorities), public and private interest groups, science, and NGOs. It is a 
predominantly informational body which has no authority to make politically binding 
decisions. 
The formulation process for the first biodiversity strategy proceeded in several steps 
with drafts being sent out for comments by relevant stakeholders and new draft 
versions being prepared based on the comments received. The process provided 
rather limited opportunities for participation of interest groups and NGOs. Inter-
ministerial coordination was also limited because Ministries other than those for 
environment and agriculture had little interest in being involved with the strategy. 
Furthermore, the process struggled with the complex allocation of competences 
within and across territorial levels. 
The first strategy sets out general policy directions and guidance for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, combined with broad lines of action for 
specific problem areas. It is written mostly in a general, non-committal language 
including good, but rather unspecific intentions and objectives, with only few details 
about what should be achieved at what time. The strategy also states no 
responsibilities and makes no resources available for its implementation. 
Soon after its adoption, the strategy was evaluated in a two-step procedure. The first 
evaluation study assessed to what degree the measures formulated in the strategy 
had already been implemented and by whom. The second evaluation study assessed 
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the strategy document itself. Based on the two evaluations, the Austrian BS was 
revised and updated. In this revision phase, the process has become more expert-
driven. Both the updating of the strategy document as well as the formulation of an 
Action Plan on invasive alien species were commissioned to experts at the Federal 
Environmental Agency. After almost two years of discussions and negotiations, the 
“Advanced Biodiversity Strategy” was adopted by the NBC in July 2005. 
In the second strategy, some of the most severe flaws of the first strategy could be 
cured. The revised strategy has a coherent structure and the individual chapters 
follow the same logic and do not differ substantially in style and length. Still, very few 
of the formulated goals and measures have been operationalised in measurable 
qualitative or quantitative terms. With that, it is still very hard to analyse the 
implementation of the strategy and to measure its effectiveness. 
3.1.3 Major insights and conclusions 
Without any doubt, the Austrian BS falls far behind an ideal-type strategic planning 
approach. Some of the problems faced are directly linked to the strategy process and 
the work of the NBC in general, whereas others are more structural problems the 
solution of which lies beyond the limited capacities of the NBC. 
As regards process, the biodiversity strategy suffers from various problems, including 
limited public participation and outreach, the incapacity to integrate relevant 
economic sectors as well as barely effective procedures of coordination across 
multiple hierarchical levels. Positive aspects of the Austrian BS can be found more 
on the informal side. The NBC fulfilled important networking functions for its 
members, e.g. by providing scientists and representatives of interest groups with 
direct and easy access to ministerial officials. Furthermore, the biodiversity strategy 
played an agenda setting role with regard to topics related with the CBD and the 
biodiversity 2010 target. Last but not least, the biodiversity strategy and its targets 
have been used by environmental NGOs but also by public authorities as an 
argument to legitimise their actions and demands. 
The underlying structural problems that the Austrian BS process is struggling with are 
manifold. The loss of biodiversity has not been perceived as an urgent policy problem 
in Austria and the strategy process didn’t manage to improve the visibility of 
biodiversity concerns in any notable way. Both the NBC and the biodiversity strategy 
have low political weight. This situation is aggravated by the complex allocation of 
competencies between various federal ministries as well as between the federal state 
and the provinces creating an ample network of actors when it comes to the 
implementation of biodiversity-related policies in Austria, including a high number of 
possible veto players. 
Altogether, the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy, up to now, can be viewed as not much 
more than a “work-to-rule exercise” initiated and driven mainly by international 
reporting obligations. The whole strategy process would have certainly benefited 
from a greater transparency, more actor involvement, and the possibility for real 
dialogue. 
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3.2 Austrian Forest Dialogue 
Hogl, K. and E. Kvarda 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This case study deals with the elaboration of a ‘National Forest Programme’ (NFP) 
by means of the so-called ‘Austrian Forest Dialogue’ (AFD), an ongoing governance 
process at the national level. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
Environment and Water Management (FMAFEW) launched the AFD in April 2003 
taking into account basic procedural principles for the elaboration of a NFP as agreed 
in international commitments: e.g. stakeholder participation, and efforts towards inter-
sectoral as well as multi-level coordination.  
The case analysis covers the time span from the run-up phase to the AFD up to a 
first period of implementation (Summer 2007). 
This case was chosen for analysis for three reasons: Firstly, the field of forest policy 
stands central in GoFOR and the AFD is currently the most prominent governance 
process in Austrian forest policy. Secondly, with its traditionally rather introverted 
policy style the Austrian forest policy sector, was seen as challenging “test case” as 
regards the effects of governance principles which call for broad process of 
deliberation and participation. Last but not least, the AFD was chosen for 
comparative analysis with the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process, which partly 
took place in parallel to the AFD under the auspices of the very same ministry. 
3.2.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The main motivations for initiating the AFD have been i) external pressures induced 
by international commitments on NFPs and EU regulations, ii) political will to 
measure up to ongoing NFP processes in other European countries, iii) the hope for 
achieving more effective problem solving and implementation based on broad stake-
holder consensus as well as iv) the aim to raise awareness and support for forest 
policy issues beyond the forest sector in a narrow sense. Ultimately, from 2002 
onwards the NFP approach found growing support within the Forestry Department of 
the FMAFEW and growing acceptance among other key actors. 
The key actor responsible for the procedural management and administration of the 
AFD was and is the FMAFEW. Two types of discussion and decision-making panels 
were established in the first formulation phase: a Round Table and Working Groups 
(WGs). The Round Table, chaired by the Minister (FMAFEW) acted as the main 
political decision-making body. About 40 representatives of forestry, economic, social 
and environmental interest groups, both governmental as well as non-state actors, 
participated in this body. Three thematically oriented WGs served as forums for 
expert discussion, for the search for common denominators and divergent positions 
and a balance of interests on more detailed topics. The WGs were focused on 
elaborating the textual content of the Forest Programme and the related Work 
Programme. Participants of WGs were invited both as experts and representatives of 
about 80 groups and organisations, ranging from public administrations, universities 
to all sorts of interest groups that have a stake in forest matters. Hence the process 
was characterised by participation of quite a broad range of organisations. However, 
beyond these collective actors, public awareness of the AFD process has been 
rather low, e.g. in terms of media coverage. 
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After about three years, the first ‘Austrian Forest Programme’ and a related ‘Work 
Programme’ were adopted by the Round Table in 2005. As a non-binding strategy 
document the Forest Programme shall provide guidance for decision-makers in forest 
policy. It describes the actual state of forest and forestry affairs (including trends, 
problems and challenges), it comprises guiding principles and forest policy goals and 
it sets of measures and defines indicators for measuring goal achievement. 
The related Work Programme shall serve as the main implementation-tool. It lists 84 
measures - primarily rather ‘soft’, informational ones - and also defines time frames 
for implementation as well as the actors who voluntarily took over responsibility for 
implementation. This Work Programme is not a static one, but is defined as a ‘living 
document’ to be revised and amended continuously, just as the related indicators. 
Further elaboration and monitoring of the Work Programme’s implementation shall be 
done by a newly established institution, the so-called ‘Forest Forum’, which 
comprises the participants of the previous three thematic WGs. 
As regards content the Work Programme mirrors the AFD-discussions: the measures 
cover a broad range of topic areas as regards economic, ecological and social 
interests on forests. However, core forest policy programmes have not specifically 
been subject to the AFD agenda as such, but have been decided upon beforehand 
(the forest law) or in parallel procedures (forestry subsidy scheme), mainly because 
of the traditional forest policy actors’ preference to basically retain status quo. 
In terms of ’effects’, besides the outputs depicted above, some change in the key 
actors’ behaviour has been observed in the course of the process, i.e. a significantly 
enhancement of the climate for dialogue between traditionally antagonistic groups. 
However, for the time being a number of new rather detailed initiatives have been 
taken, but no significant policy changes that are directly linked to the AFD process 
have been observed. 
3.2.3 Major insights and conclusions 
This kind of participatory and inter-sectoral process was kind of new to the Austrian 
forest policy sector, traditionally characterised by close cooperation between forest 
owners’ interest groups and the forest authorities. However, the AFD as a new mode 
of governance, basically turned out successful in its institutionalised effort for 
allowing a broader range of actors to become more effectively engaged in forest 
policy. As a result, the legitimacy of the process and its output rests on its 
participatory nature. A broad range of actors find their issues, contributions and 
positions represented in the output documents. 
However, so far the AFD was less effective in terms of inter-sectoral and multi-level 
co-ordination, even though some achievements have been made on issues which 
cross sectoral and/or as territorial boundaries. Strategic behaviours of a number of 
actors, e.g. of the hunting and tourism associations as well as of some 
ministries/ministerial departments (in the fields of tourism and energy policy, e.g.), for 
preventing interference with their respective interest domains turned out as main 
barriers against more effective co-ordination. In some highly relevant subject areas, 
like nature conservation, landscape planning and hunting, also the distribution of 
legislative competencies between the federal and the Länder level remained a 
significant challenge for more effective coordination in this national level strategy 
process. 
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Altogether, for the time period analysed the ongoing AFD can be characterised as 
“process-oriented”, the main “innovation” lies in the nature of the strategy process 
itself which took up governance principles as predefined in international 
deliberations. As regards output, there was no major policy change induced, even 
though some of the measures which were adopted are new to the sector.  
3.3 Danish National Park Process 
Boon, T.E., D.H. Lund and I. Nathan 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The National Park Pilot Process (NPP) was intended to identify options for 
establishing national parks in Denmark. The expected output was a non-binding input 
to policy formulation.  
In 2003, the Minister of Environment (MoE) enquired counties and municipalities of 
six areas whether they were interested in hosting a pilot project. The Outdoor 
Council, an umbrella NGO for outdoor and environmental NGOs, entered the political 
arena, adding 2 ½ mio Euro to the project and entered into an agreement with the 
Minister of Environment regarding how to implement the pilot projects, and it was 
decided to support pilot projects in seven areas.  
In the following phase (2003-2005), the MoE initiated the process by sketching out 
rough guidelines for the organisation of the pilot projects to the counties and 
municipalities. The pilot projects were to elaborate a report with recommendations on 
how to organise a prospective National park. Locally, the pilot projects were led by 
steering committees headed by (in most cases) mayors from the municipality 
assisted by the local state forest districts and with representatives from a broad 
range of organisations. At the national level a national advisory group was set up with 
members representing different Ministries, NGOs and the chairmen of the seven 
steering committees. The purpose of this committee was to assist in carrying out 
relevant investigations and to compile the reports from the seven pilot projects 
elaborating one final report to be submitted to the MoE. So far the process has 
resulted in the elaboration of a draft proposal for a National Park Act. 
From the initiation and onwards, the Government rhetoric was dominated by wanting 
a voluntary approach, extensive participation by landowners and other local 
stakeholders, and an inter-sectoral solution. Along with a participatory approach, 
expert knowledge was attributed a significant role.  
3.3.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The NPP can be seen as rather participatory while at the same it was initiated and 
framed ‘from above’; altogether, it can best be characterised as a governance 
process induced and embraced by Government. The identification and appointment 
of the pilot project areas was a bilateral communication between the Minister of 
Environment and the mayors of the municipalities. If a municipality did not want to 
join, that area was omitted. From a local perspective this may be fair insofar as the 
mayors are elected representatives of the local population. But it also meant that 
possible areas of national interests were omitted without national stakeholders 
having a say in it. 
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Within this government induced process, the pilot projects took a bottom-up 
approach. In pilot project ‘Kongernes Nordsjælland’ the steering committee initiated 
the establishing of thematic groups which prepared a number of proposals which 
were brought up at a citizen summit for (what was intended as a socio-
demographically representative) deliberating dialogue and voting procedure. There 
was a high degree of transparency and information, tending towards information 
overflow in the pilot projects. 
The process managed to involve new stakeholders, notably the local mayors, who 
traditionally have not been involved in nature policy, since nature and agriculture was 
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipalities, until the Structural Reform in 2007. But 
the organisers of the process, the Forest and Nature Agency, found it difficult to 
mobilise the ‘ordinary citizens’ despite active efforts. 
Experiences from pilot project ‘Kongernes Nordsjælland’ indicated that the NPP had 
problems dealing with minority viewpoints: The one main conflict was that agriculture 
wanted to restrict the national park area to already publicly owned areas, whereas 
the proposal that evolved from the steering committee included corridors on privately 
owned land. Agricultural stakeholders played a hesitant role in the process and left, 
at the end, proposing its own suggestion for demarcation.  
There is tradition for involving interest groups from different sectors in decision-
making in Denmark, yet the ISC was more formalised and deliberately emphasised in 
this process than formerly, and as a new thing, the local level was involved. Prior to 
the Structural Reform 2007, nature policies related to the national (MoE) and county 
level, and agricultural policies entirely to EU and the national level. By establishing a 
discussion at local level too, the ‘column-like’ character of the nature and agricultural 
sectors was partly dissolved. The monopoly of agriculture to determine how the 
country side should be managed was broken.  
The degree of multi-level governance varies with the phase one looks at. Seen as a 
whole, the NPP was a top-down governed process. The pilot project phase was 
bottom-up with active involvement of local levels, but the pilot projects were 
evaluated by the national advisory group, and the parliamentary statement and draft 
Act on National parks was prepared by the National Forest and Nature Agency for 
the Minister of Environment. It appears that the decision-making power lies with the 
MoE, the National Forest and Nature Agency and the Outdoor Council.  
There was a focus on the need to investigate specified topics, defined by the 
MoE/NFNA. Many experts participated from various research institutions, 
consultancy firms, counties and NFNA. In principle there was rich opportunity for 
contesting viewpoints. In practice, it was division of work within strictly limited time. 
The final expert reports were not included in the discussions for time reasons. Still, 
the new thing was that experts got closer to the public, i.e. experts were asked to 
report on their methods towards the broad public, possibly strengthening 
accountability. 
A report about biodiversity came up in the middle of the process, showing that the 
chosen pilot projects were not optimal from a (insect) biodiversity perspective. This 
information was deliberately set aside by most stakeholders, even the Danish Nature 
Conservation Association. 
The aim of the process was to decide if and how National parks should be 
established. So in that sense the process was part of an adaptive, iterative 
planning process (AIP), because this question was addressed at national, local and 
then again national level. There was a great degree of complexity and uncertainty, as 
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during the pilot project phase it was uncertain if pilot projects would ever be 
implemented. Fundamentally, though, the concept ‘AIP’ does not contribute much to 
our understanding of the process as it is not central to the case. 
3.3.3 Major insights and conclusions 
The NPP was initiated and framed ‘from above’, and can best be characterised as a 
governance process induced and meta-governed by Government. The process 
managed to involve new stakeholders, notably the local mayors, who traditionally 
have not been involved in nature policy, whereas the organisers of the process found 
it difficult to mobilise the ‘ordinary citizens’ despite active efforts. ISC was more 
formalised and deliberately emphasised in this process than formerly, and by 
establishing a discussion at local level too, the ‘column-like’ character of the nature 
and agricultural sectors was partly dissolved. Expertise was rhetorically considered 
important in the decision process, but apparently the expert reports did not have any 
significant impacts on the process. 
 
3.4 Implementation of the Habitats Directive in Denmark  
Boon,T.E., D.H. Lund and I.Nathan 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The Habitat Directive (HD) was adopted in the EEC (now EU) in 1992. It has 
subsequently been in the process of implementation, encompassing the following 
phases:  
1992-2001, 2005: Designation of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) by the 
Danish government 
2003-2005: Implementation in legislation: Revision of Acts (incl. Act on 
Environmental Objectives) 
2005-2007: Technical specification of the HD in a Danish context: identify 
nature types, quantitative interpretation of ‘favourable 
conservation status’ for each nature type mapping and conduct 
basis analysis 
2007-2009: Elaboration of Natura 2000 plans and Natura 2000 action plans 
This case study follows the implementation of the HD in Denmark, beginning with the 
designation of SAC sites in 1995 and ending with the basis analysis in 2006. 
The HD was chosen to contrast the NPP case (see chapter 3.3) rather than for being 
an example of new modes of governance. The HD case has major financial and 
political significance and is characterised by a multilevel decision structure. In 
contrast to the NPP, the HD case was deliberately strongly sector specific, expertise 
driven, and not participatory. 
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3.4.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
Participation was restricted to public hearings of sector related NGOs, agriculture 
and public authorities, whereas ordinary citizens were not a target for participation. In 
the first designation of SAC sites, the affected landowners were not directly 
consulted. This gave rise to critics, and in the subsequent revised designation of 
SACs landowners were consulted on an individual basis. Complaints over insufficient 
designation of SAC sites and insufficient implementation of the HD in the Danish 
legislation caused the EU to require the Danish Government to follow up on this. 
Indirectly, the right to lodge a complaint is used by NGOs to strengthen their position 
of influence towards the environmental, public authorities in general and maybe the 
most effective mean of influence.  
At the outset, the general impression in the public administration was that the HD 
would have little practical influence on land management. It was assumed that the 
existing legislation was sufficient to conserve biodiversity corresponding to the 
requirements of the HD. In 1995, the MoE at the time explicitly stated that the HD 
would have minor significance to private landowners. This was also the excuse for 
not consulting landowners in advance of designating SAC sites in 1995. Subsequent 
cases at the European Court of Justice showed that implementation of HD would 
require changes of management. These fundamental changes of preconditions 
caused a serious loss of trust among landowners towards the environmental 
authorities.  
The HD overrules all other regulations, except for pressing societal matters. The 
intersectoral coordination in the HD case took place as forced coordination rather 
than cooperation. This mode of policy implementation clashes with the administration 
culture in Denmark: Danish environmental legislation is based on decentralisation 
and framework legislation providing discretionary powers to the local public 
authorities to balance economic, social and ecological interests in the specific 
context. In contrast, the HD has to be implemented according to specific, uniform 
standards, with limited room for interpretation. As such, the implementation of the HD 
is a move away from more soft modes of governance towards hierarchic top-down 
rule based government. 
The HD case is clearly multileveled, involving EU, national, county and municipal 
levels, even landowners. Decisions made at the Environmental Court of Justice apply 
to all EU countries, even if the case is raised regarding one country only. This means 
that the scope of influence for NGOs etc. has widened to encompass activities and 
authorities throughout Europe. This relatively strengthens EU aware NGOs like 
BirdLife.  
The HD has a strongly technical and scientific character. The HD specifically calls for 
scientific expertise in its implementation and there was extensive use of experts 
from the sector research institutions of the Ministry of the Environment (DMU, S&L, 
GEUS) and staff from NFNA to specify and interpret the different elements of the HD. 
From the perspective of the NFNA, all known experts were involved. There were 
discussions and different viewpoints among experts about what the correct 
interpretation of the HD is. It was not a transparent process. Documents have been 
both physically and linguistically difficult to access, because of the technical-scientific 
language applied.  
The HD was a forced iterative process. Built-in mechanisms to induce iterativity 
were: (i) six-yearly reporting to the EU, (ii) possibility for citizens to lodge a complaint 
to the EU Commission, (iii) monitoring of habitats, (iv) possibility of supplementary 
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designation of SACs, (v) lack of legal implementation leading to infringement 
proceedings from EU Commission and revised legal implementation in Denmark. The 
weakness of the process is that it is designed as a one-way learning process, with 
little scope for revising the foundation: the EU policy design. This may be critical, e.g. 
in a period where climate changes forces a new and more dynamic approach to 
nature conservation than the HD allows for.  
3.4.3 Major insights and conclusions 
The HD has altered the Danish tradition for balancing economic and ecological 
interests and possibly giving exemptions from legislation. In contrast, EU and ECJ 
require a strict interpretation of the HD, and not only measured on actions and 
intentions, but on the actual conservation status of the habitats and species. This can 
be considered a strengthening of the ‘rule of law’ (citizen rights).  
The HD is far less participatory than the NPP case. But as the two cases shows, the 
participation process in the NPP was less suited at managing conflicts of interests, as 
that of a powerful minority group (agriculture) against a majority. In contrast, The HD, 
based on legislation and the court, is able to deal with such conflicts. 
 
3.5 Two new approaches in French forest policy 
Buttoud, G. and I.Kouplevatskaya 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Two major factors could be reported as decisive for the changes in the system of 
governance in forestry in France. First it is the international context with the debate 
on sustainable forest management which had an impact on the management 
procedures and imposed the modality of participation. Debates on acid rains and 
climate change have stressed uncertainty and the need for links between politicians, 
technicians and scientists, thus enforcing the issue of accountable expertise. 
Globalisation of the market has influenced the timber market related networks and 
had an impact on the re-assessment of the values of the forest. A second major 
factor is the internal context in France with economic changes caused by the 
modifications in the system of the timber market; social development with the 
increased role of the local governments and ongoing decentralisation and transfer of 
power to the territorial levels. These general trends have been still more re-enforced 
by the dramatic consequences of the storms in 1999, which have trigged the re-
assessment of visions and approaches to the traditional forest management. Certain 
initiatives taken at the National level in France (National Forest Strategy, Strategy for 
Biodiversity; Forest Law; National Forest Programme; Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC) etc.) have also contributed to 
the promotion of governance in forestry.  
Nevertheless, the relations between the state and the other actors and stakeholders 
are still unclear as regards to the forest policy issues. While the state is retrieving, 
giving more space for governance, the lack of clear mechanisms and modalities for 
the transfer of power and responsibilities at different levels results in poor articulation 
between the different elements of governance. In general, the adaptation of 
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traditional procedures to the new modes of governance in France is basically re-
active to the international forestry dialogue, global changes in the society and 
procedures imposed by the European Union. The process is still rather slow, with no 
clear signs of a great capacity for anticipation. Two case studies were selected for 
the analysis of the situation with governance in the forest sector in France: the new 
instrument of Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT) and the Relief Plan for the 
Reconstitution of the Forests (RPF) after the storms of December 1999. 
3.5.2 Case study 1: Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT) 
The Territorial Forest Charters (CFT) are development projects at the local level 
aiming at the increased role of forestry in regional development, multifunctional 
resource management, re-groupment of public and private owners and re-
enforcement of wood chain competitiveness. CFTs are elaborated based on 
willingness and initiative of local actors including stakeholders and local politicians 
who are joining the project with formerly established duties, engagements and 
responsibilities. They are generally considered as a basic element for the new 
strategy for forestry development and one of the major instruments, used by the 
State to promote consensus on forestry development at the local level.  
CFTs have institutionalised local forums for decision-making; have introduced 
participatory processes for discussions; and thus have promoted changes in the 
distribution of competencies. The main driving force for such an important change 
was a change from a sectoral to territorial policy making. The national Programme for 
CFTs has been set up in order to give some content to a decentralisation process 
which was new in France, where traditionally the top down centralised conventional 
style of decision making is prevailing. This new system, when introduced, did not 
formally take into consideration the five constituting elements of governance, as 
defined in the GOFOR project, except for participation, and somehow adaptive policy 
making. 
At the same time, the introduction of CFTs has concretised two important changes in 
the French forest policy. From the sectoral scale, the forest policy measures has got 
basically a territorial character, when the activities aimed to forestry development are 
defined locally by the main stakeholders and presented as project proposals for 
funding. This represents a change from the previous conventional practice of 
centralised administration but also means a switch from the cash-desk logic in the 
support to the forest development activities with systematic funding of the actors, 
corresponding to the national norms imposed through a top down decision making 
process. Although the system does not work perfectly yet; the introduction of CFTs 
has brought a huge psychological change in the way the forestry actors are involved 
in the process of forest policy formulation. This change has also produced an 
intersectoral view on forest development, bringing up the priorities of the territorial 
approach, thus providing a concerted framework for integrating social and 
environmental values in forest economy around a local project. Currently, the main 
focus of CFTs is on the promotion of income generation and employment at the local 
level. Lack of the clear reference to environmental services in the National 
Programme for CFTs restricts the dimension of intersectorality. Nevertheless, even if 
the co-ordination between the sectors is still to be reached, the involvement of 
different actors and the responsibility of local politicians, promote the opening of the 
process to issues outside of the forest sector.   
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The CFT process has also brought many results in terms of involvement of the local 
actors. The CFTs have promoted the development of common discussions among 
stakeholders at the local level. The local politicians have clearly become the leaders 
of common actions towards forestry development of territories. They are viewed and 
legitimated by all the stakeholders as the co-ordinators and promoters of links 
between the forestry field and the other dimensions of the development. This 
situation has been favoured by both the decentralisation scheme in France and by 
the recent development of inter-communal associations. Certainly, participation is 
more or less restricted to the representatives of the productivists’ interests, while the 
environmental and social aspects are still weak in the CFT process, but even with 
such restriction, participation at the local level is a real new phenomenon. From this 
point of view, the CFTs have brought a huge impact on the mentality and on the 
principles for forest policy formulation and implementation. At the same time, this 
usual restriction of the process mainly to the local sectoral groups representing 
productive interests has resulted in the fact that the forestry debate in CFTs still 
remains linked basically to timber production, even if there would be a need for a 
priority address of land use and environmental issues. The disbalanced 
representation of the various interests could be also accounted for by the lack of 
clear procedures and rules defining organisation of participation. Still, the contribution 
of the CFTs to the establishment of the local networking and need for emerging 
dialogue between different stakeholders is quite considerable.  
The issue of expertise as such has not been raised in the CFT related documents, 
still several types of expertise have been mobilised: (i) expertise of local politicians in 
representing social demands, which is highly accountable in a representative 
democracy system; and (ii) traditional management expertise, which provids a basic 
technical knowledge and which is highly valorised by society. Seeing the risk of 
losing the power in decision making, representatives of this type of expertise showed 
a capacity of adaptation to the changed process which in some cases has led to a 
better balance between these two types of expertise, although the priority position of 
the technical expertise is still prevailing. Such a context maintains the role of 
institutions traditionally in charge of providing expertise on technical fields, although 
their expertise becomes accountable through the exposure to the transparent 
participatory CFT process. 
In relation to multilevel governance, the lack of co-ordination between the local 
decision making level and other (departmental, regional or national) levels is still 
remaining an issue with the consequent incidence on the efficient use of the limited 
financial resources and concrete results.   
The introduction of CFTs has certainly provoked a change in the behaviour of public 
and private forest owners and national agencies: the CFTs have built up a system of 
local networks for solving conflicts and generating consensus and partnership (at 
least for productivists topics). It gave a new possibility for allocation of resources, as 
a replacement of the Forestry National Fund, which had been cancelled in 1999. The 
existence of CFTs is supposed to define conditions and priority in attributing grants 
from the State. 
CFTs were initially conceived as new mechanisms for funding the forestry 
development. But due to the contextual factors (CAP reform) this objective has not 
been achieved yet and there is still some uncertainty in the potential funding of the 
CFT projects during the coming years. Due to that, most of the CFT processes have 
currently resulted in nice projects on paper without being followed up by clear 
concrete actions, unless they are funded directly by the actors.  
GoFOR case studies 35 
 
 
3.5.3 Case study 2: Relief Plan for the Reconstitution of the Forests (RPF) 
The “Relief Plan for Forests” (RPF) was established as a response of the French 
government, as a major assistance programme aimed at supporting the forest sector 
after the devastating storms in December 1999. The context of the RPF designing 
and implementation is clearly a context of crisis which has an unpredictable 
character, leading to the situation of high uncertainty and a pressing need for 
emergency solutions of the main problems. Such reaction is not easy to be 
considered through conventional forest policy means as they work in the usual 
French forest policy situations, with clearly defined long term objectives to be 
achieved through stable fixed means. The occurrence of this crisis has created the 
necessity for a rapid adaptation which could go until some important conceptual 
changes in forest management.  
The development of the new modes of governance in the RPF process has been 
studied through two clear phases with different objectives, beneficiaries and time 
scales: the first stage dealing with the immediate consequences of the storm; and the 
second stage (ongoing) aiming at re-building and improving of all the components of 
forest ecosystems (ecological, economic and social). Basically the RPF has provided 
incentives for the restoration of the damaged stands (through natural or man made 
regeneration); for the restructuring of the economic background (infrastructure and 
land tenure); and for the re-enforcement of forest organisations.  
Due to the emergency of the situation and the necessity to react to the crisis in a very 
short time span, the State has overtaken an important role in the process with a 
parallel development of elements leading to the new modes of governance. Thus, 
spontaneous broad participation and inter-sectoral coordination were immediate 
reactions to the emergency situation. The psychological shock caused by the storms 
easily led to a consensus among the various stakeholders about a common view on 
the immediate concerted actions and measures to be taken after the storms. This 
consensus was built through a complete process of participation, which was 
particularly new for France. All measures of the RPF were completed with the 
additional means established at different levels of governance (European, national, 
provincial and local). In the implementation phase of RPF the State was confronted 
with the need of assuring coherence with the other measures and defining its own 
role in terms of complementarity. In such a situation, the accountability of expertise 
had acquired a new meaning, as at the beginning there was no exact knowledge 
available and the process itself was conceived as learning by doing. For this reason 
the implementation of the RPF has foreseen some flexibility and has not been 
conceived as a rigid executive framework. At the same time, regardless of the actual 
active presence of the different elements of the new modes of governance in the 
RPF process, the state has played a central role, constituting the basic decision 
maker.  
RPF as a policy tool has proved to be adaptable to the crisis situation with a capacity 
to evolve through time and the changing requirements of different actors. From this 
view point, RPF is a very iterative instrument, but mainly because it was an 
emergency tool designed for an extraordinary crisis situation. RPF was the first (at 
such a scale) experiment in France of the new elements of governance, especially: 
flexible participation, complementarity between various multi-governance levels, 
systematic call for scientific expertise, as well as institutionalisation of adaptability 
and iterativity. Although the RPF itself does not constitute a fixed strategy, it brought 
some consistency and applicability to the 2001 forestry law. It also gave mechanisms 
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for a permanent set of tools more or less adaptable to the solution of the problems 
created by the storms.  
Two types of effects of the governance process may be identified as resulting from 
the RPF process in France after six years of implementation: (i) For the first time in 
France there has been a clear consciousness that the local actors can play a role in 
the formulation of concrete measures in the forestry sector. The spontaneous system 
of a common debate on forest policy, gave to the local actors the feeling that their 
opinion could be (and was) taken into consideration. In a way, one of the bigger 
changes was this shift from consultation to concertation in the framework of RPF. (ii) 
The second effect is that for the first time since the reform of the French forest policy 
in the second half of the 1990s, stakeholders and the state administration have built 
up together a framework for action. During many years corresponding to the collapse 
of the national forestry fund, in the French debate on the forest policy, there were no 
clear ideas about the redefinition of objectives and means of organisation for forestry 
development. Due to this extra-ordinary event, all the interested people were obliged 
in a very short period (of a few months) to elaborate a framework in which the forest 
policy measures would have to be implemented. The RPF process has created a 
method that did not exist before, without any normative guidelines or requirements, 
just through the establishment of mechanisms of governance. And this is a really big 
change in France.  
The RPF process has led to certain institutional changes: a spectacular come back of 
the central state into the design of the French forest policy. Correlatively to this 
increase of the role of the State, the Ministry of Agriculture in charge of the forest 
policy has gained a lot of legitimacy and credibility, which in turn, has led to an 
almost complete exclusion of the Ministry of Environment from the forestry issues. 
The RPF process has also resulted in a spectacular come back to the subsidies as 
instruments of National forest policy.  
3.5.4 Major insights and conclusions 
A first conclusion from the analysis of two forest policy case studies, the CFTs and 
the RPF in France, shows that both processes correspond to the introduction of new 
modes of governance. Both processes have led to the consolidation of power of local 
politicians on the one hand and administrative bodies at the national regional and 
departmental levels on the other hand. With the storms of 1999, and the importance 
of land use management through decentralisation, forest is now considered as part of 
the territory and not as a specific sector. This is a big change in France where forest 
policy was usually considered as a purely sectoral one.  
A second conclusion is related to the understanding of the new modes of governance 
as being based on mechanisms, rather than on normative directives, as well as on 
participation more than on a rationalist decision making system. Although, that does 
not necessarily lead to the diminishing of the roles of the state, and to a better 
importance of markets in forest policy, even, if only productivist measures are 
concerned. The French cases clearly show that the five elements from the definition 
of governance in GoFOR are not necessarily all met together in the new modes. The 
case of RPF, for instance, shows that participation, intersectorality and iterativity may 
lead to a consolidation of the conventional technical expertise. This re-concentrates 
expertise and decision making at the top national level. The same is valid for the 
case of CFTs, where the openness of the process at the local level and its 
itersectoral nature have directly resulted in the exclusion of the other sectors, 
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especially in the evacuation of the environmentalists interests. Thus, in the same 
country, with the same legal context, during the same period, two different tools can 
have different approaches to the importance of several elements constituting 
governance. The CFT and RPF cases have both followed the principle of 
governance, although not respecting all the constitutive elements in the same way. 
The cases of the CFTs and RPF in France show that it is often unclear how different 
elements may be assessed in a linear way. In some forest policy processes different 
simultaneous aspects may be traced with separately positive or negative impacts on 
the constitutive elements of governance. This brings complexity to the assessment of 
how those forest policy processes fit into a re-condition which is supposed to be 
defining a governance system. 
3.6 “Integrated Rural Development” policies in Germany 
Giessen, L. and M. Böcher  
3.6.1 Introduction 
Rural development policies show a gradual but distinct shift in paradigm concerning 
the governance or rural areas. Traditional rather sector-oriented policies are recently 
being complemented by more integrated and area-based strategies. One policy 
approach discussed in this context is ‘integrated rural development’ (IRD). This 
normative concept largely aims at facilitating decentralised negotiated spatial 
planning processes among a variety of public, private and civil society actors. In this 
it takes an integrated, cross-sectoral approach to area-based development of rural 
regions.4 In a German context this concept is being reflected in recent rural 
development funding programmes. On the one hand the approach is taken up by two 
pilot programmes, aiming to test and demonstrate the approach. First, the EU’s 
LEADER+ initiative has been implemented from 2000-2006, building on experiences 
made by forerunner programmes since 1991. Second, Regionen Aktiv was launched 
by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture as a national demonstration project and is 
being implemented since 2002 to date. The programme largely builds on the 
LEADER experiences and elements, but also made an attempt to even develop them 
further. On the other hand, IRD elements also have been taken up by a national 
mainstream funding instrument of agricultural policy - the ‘Joint Task Improvement of 
Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection’. All three programmes, in one way or 
another, entail competitive elements, i.e. they are not applied all over the country. 
The three different funding programmes are being delivered by different entities, but 
have in common the beneficiaries or addressees, which are local and regional 
partnerships, negotiating, formulating and jointly implementing endogenous 
development strategies. Thus, programme formulation at EU or national level is 
contrasted with implementation at regional level. This case study analyses both 
territorial levels. It aims at reflecting in how far governance elements have emerged 
and evolved in IRD-programmes and whether or not they actually affected rural 
development policy in a wider sense.  
IRD was selected as a case study because it addresses various actors from different 
sectors in rural areas. This trend towards more integrated policy approaches was 
                                            
4
  Regions in our understanding comprise more than one municipality but still are smaller than one of 
the Federal States of Germany. 
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found to be interesting for forest policy as well. In this design, the three programmes 
mentioned above serve as contributing case studies reflecting some sort of policy 
continuum from the pilot stage of testing an approach (LEADER+) to further 
improving (Regionen Aktiv) and finally to mainstreaming it (Joint Task). Thus, all 
three case studies may be viewed as being embedded into an overarching ‘case’ on 
the impact of IRD as a concept on rural development policy. This comparative design 
allows to analyse the approach before the background of different programmatic, 
institutional and interest settings and to draw conclusions on different degrees of 
appearance and acceptance of new modes of governance.  
3.6.2 Main characteristics of governance cases 
The context out of which IRD evolved is characterised by changing demands on 
rural development policy. The decreasing role of agriculture as a main source of 
income in rural areas as well as international trends of trade liberalisation and 
subsequent changes in the EU’s CAP paved the way for new approaches of 
supporting rural regions. The crisis in agriculture caused by ‘mad-cow’ or ‘foot-and-
mouth disease’ in a German context led to a process referred to as ‘Agrarwende’ 
(translates into ‘agrarian turnaround’), which was driven by a change of the Federal 
Government in 1998 and the first ‘Green’ Minister for agriculture in 2001. This finally 
caused an increased application of integrated approaches to rural development 
policy.  
All three programmes show a relatively clear divide between the formulation of 
programmes at a central level and its implementation in regional settings. 
Formulation to a vast degree remains in the hands of public actors such as Federal 
and Länder ministries or the EU Commission. The latter as well as the Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture have been central actors in the IRD discourse, but also private 
actors were observed playing an increasing role here. Especially under the pilot 
programmes one has observed an opening of public administration for the ideas of 
private actors regarding the design of IRD-programmes.  
From a governance perspective the implementation process bears fruitful aspects. 
Here certain IRD-specific instruments are being employed, empowering regional 
actors and triggering processes of collective action. Regional public-private-
partnerships are the central decision-making body during programme 
implementation. They negotiate and jointly formulate so called ‘regional development 
concepts’ which serve as a basis for the following process. In addition, the 
partnerships also decide on project proposals and on a regional budget dedicated to 
each participant region and hence, also accompany the implementation of the 
regional strategy. Finally, a regional management facility runs the multi-annual 
development process, facilitates networking among the various actors and 
coordinates the diverse interests.  
The effects of IRD as a governance case mostly are associated with the different 
funding programmes. The two pilot programmes were observed to inspire policy 
makers at EU, national and sub-national level to adopt the IRD approach. They 
created several self-sustained projects and increased social capital in the regions. 
Such soft effects have been the base for more significant changes in funding policy 
for rural areas. The pilots caused attitudinal and culture changes among regional 
actors and policy makers and resulted in the introduction of new funding instruments 
under the ‘Joint Task’ programme which now are available for country-wide 
application. Moreover, based on the LEADER+ experiences the approach has been 
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mainstreamed in the EU’s rural development policy, which now states that at least 
5% of co-funded expenditure is reserved for funding through the LEADER approach. 
On the contrary, the introduction of new modes of governance into mainstream 
policy led to very limited effects. This was mainly due to the rather narrow application 
of the IRD approach within the agricultural mainstream programme.  
3.6.3 Major insights and conclusions 
One of the main case characteristics is the delegation of responsibilities and 
competencies from Federal State to the regional level. Such regions have not 
necessarily been defined as a level of political coordination prior to the IRD-
intervention. Governance elements are employed mainly in the implementation of 
rural development programmes at this regional level. Here, participatory and inter-
sectoral processes of collective action are triggered and supported through public 
funding. 
The case study gives valuable insights as to how governance elements may 
function in IRD programmes. It shows a clear divide regarding the application of 
governance elements at different stages of the policy cycle, suggesting that such 
ideas mostly play a role in improving programme implementation. Here however, lies 
the strength of these elements, as in regional settings they can facilitate successful 
cooperation among various actors. In the literature such processes are described as 
‘regional governance arrangements’, highlighting regionalisation tendencies and the 
increasing importance of regions as a level of political coordination. We also 
observed deliberative and reflexive elements during programme formulation, which 
again has been limited to the pilot programmes. This leads to the question, whether 
governance features are merely capable of improving programme implementation, or 
if they may lead to better formulation and design as well? 
Finally, the use of such elements has been observed to be more advanced in pilot 
than in mainstream programmes. While under LEADER+ and its predecessors IRD 
as a governance-like approach has evolved, Regionen Aktiv even developed it 
further. During this ‘trial phase’ governance elements showed many positive effects, 
most of which were of a rather soft nature. After this era of testing, the approach has 
been mainstreamed. Consequently it now is struggling with the conserving forces of 
traditional funding systems (such as the CAP and the Joint Task regime) and well 
established sectoral boundaries. The question remains, whether governance ideas 
serve as a toy in small arenas only, or if they cause significant change in the tradition 
of policy making? 
3.7 National Forest Programme Hungary 
Mészáros, K., E. Schiberna, G. Beltos and A. Lengyel 
3.7.1 Introduction 
The National Forest Programme Hungary (NFPH) is the national level development 
programme of forest management related activities and it relates in general to the 
future role of forests and covers almost all thematic areas of the development of the 
forestry sector. It also includes strategic principles on sustainable forest management 
(SFM), but its main task is to be the basis of programme implementation. 
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It is a mid-term programme with a 10 years period of implementation scheduled from 
2006 to 2015. The NFPH is set up of 10 sub-programmes with concrete objectives to 
be achieved in this time frame.5 One of its major characteristics is that it got 
elaborated in partnership and open participation of many different stakeholders and 
interested parties in forestry and forests, meaning governmental and non-
governmental organisations and other actors in society.6 
Its overall aim is the promotion of sustainable forest management (SFM) at the 
beginning of the 21st century in Hungary. Hereby the provision of answers to conflicts 
and problems originating in general from the new conditions and structure changes of 
the political-economical system transition since 1989 including the 2004 EU-
accession of the country plays a central role. It is a framework or policy process 
integrating different interests on thematic issues and in general.  
The Programme can be divided into three main phases: (i) programming, 2001-2003, 
(ii) decision making, 2004-2005, and (iii) implementation, 2006-2015.  
The process started 2001 under the title of “National Forest Programme and 
Strategy”. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development was the government agency in charge for its programming as 
programme “owner”. In autumn 2004, the Programme got adopted by the 
Government by the passing of the Government Resolution Nr. 1110/2004 on the NFP 
Hungary. 
Its implementation should be by far the highest priority task in current Hungarian 
forest policy, however through financing and institutional difficulties this is 
endangered to a large extent or it is sub-ordinated to financial options of other 
programmes, such as e.g. the National Rural Development Programme or thematic 
projects. 
3.7.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
In Hungary, the participatory approach got introduced in the last 10 years in policy 
preparation supported by pro-forma legal requirements and societal changes 
demanding for more transparency and participation in general. However, its 
implementation is still far from being satisfactory. Top-down approaches are still 
practiced or the influence of the central administration is decisive in policy setting. 
This gets obvious when it comes to decision making and finances. The NFP Hungary 
process affirms these observations. In the case study the features of process 
participation got analysed and a number of supporting and impeding factors could be 
identified. The most important supporting factors are the existence of an independent 
coordination unit, process transparency in the programming phase or the use of a 
partnership approach. The most severe impeding factors are lack of information in 
the decision making phase, the limited international experiences of stakeholders, no 
compromising ability or no institutional set up for implementation. 
The NFP public discussion forums (2002-2003) provided good opportunities for a 
wide and free participation of interested organisations or private persons, although 
                                            
5
 Operative Programs of 1) State Forest Management Development, 2) Private Forest Management 
Development, 3) Rural Development, Afforestation and Tree Planting, 4) Nature Protection in 
Forests, 5) Modern Forest Protection, 6) Sustainable Game Management, 7) Rational Wood 
Utilization, 8) Duties of the State Forest Service, 9) Innovation and Research Development 10) 
Effective Communication about Forests to Improve the Man-Forest Relation (GR Nr 1110/2004). 
6
  For more information see: www.erdostrategia.hu 
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these forums were not particularly institutionalised. One of the major merits of the 
discussion forums was that they secured open access to the process and its 
stakeholders in a transparent way. They provided a platform for free exchange 
between different stakeholders compared to previously used negotiation forms in 
forest policy. New actors could enter this policy domain as well, like hikers, students, 
teachers and a wide range of NGOs of different territorial levels. Fundamental 
differences between parties got not necessarily resolved, but prejudices could be 
eliminated in some cases. This was clearly to be recognised at the final expert level 
meeting, where compromises and consensus on a number of issues could be 
achieved. However, many differences occurred concerning follow up and 
implementation. These differences existed basically between the Governmental 
officials and the other stakeholders. These neither could be resolved entirely but 
resulted in some important modification of the proposal mainly done by government 
officials of the Forestry Department in MARD. However, learning in the process took 
certainly place as almost all parties are stating this.  
On inter-sectoral coordination (ISC) the NFP Hungary states some aspects explicitly 
but the analysis also shows that between responsible governmental organisations 
this aspect is still largely absent in practice. The NFPH document states the 
importance of ISC in principle, but the implementation has not paid sufficient 
attention to the inter-sectoral approach. This is not purely a government failure, as 
neither civil society nor the public discussion phase of the NFP have paid enough 
attention to it. Actor behaviour rather was focused on the own, often short-time 
interests and was not aiming for general solutions or a classified problem analysis 
including many sectors. In this respect similarities can be found to multi-level 
governance (MLG) concerning the intentions and some successes in the 
programming, but no success in decision making or implementation so far.  
In the NFPH, policy statements called for a wide social and professional 
representation of stakeholders providing their expertise legitimated by open 
participation. Following this, in programme development and coordination, science 
and specialists of thematic fields played an outstanding role, such as also in the 
process phases of the programming and decision making. The direct influence of 
expert advice during the programming is rather obvious as the working group and 
expert sessions developed both, the White Book (as the public debate’s basic 
information document) and also the final expert proposal on the NFPH. On structure, 
priorities, and content apparently experts had a decisive role. An increase of the role 
of experts in the forest policy domain can be therefore made out.  
Aspects of adaptive and iterative programming can be clearly recognised in the 
drafting phase, but evaluation and monitoring got not set up further in the process. 
The main shortcoming, however, is the failure in setting up an institutionalised 
programme implementation structure with own resources, which could have secured 
continuity into the implementation phase and which could have kept up the process, 
which got practically stuck in 2006/2007.   
3.7.3 Major insights and conclusions 
The Hungarian National Forest Program in its current form and programming closely 
adheres to the standpoint of the resolution about the national forest programs of the 
Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Forests of Europe (MCPFE V1 A1). It 
must be pointed out that for the first time ever such a process was initiated in forest 
policy in Hungary. It is therefore an accomplishment that international forest policy 
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commitments arrived into Hungarian forest policy practice. It was viewed as an 
important contribution to the country’s EU accession in the programming phase by 
many process stakeholders.  
An another aspect to be stressed is that with the NFPH process Hungary’s forest 
policy stepped out from the historical tradition of forest policy making driven by mere 
law-setting. Further, it must be stated that with the passing the NFPH society and its 
representatives expressed their long run commitment for forests and forest 
management. However, in spite of wide participation in the programming phase, the 
absence of the direct interests of politicians at all levels, including the Parliament, as 
well as the presence of conflicting interests of the state administration of different 
policy areas concerned (environment vs. agriculture, agriculture vs. forestry etc.) led 
to the situation that, so far, no organisational and financial means for programme 
implementation have been provided. This situation has put at danger the positive 
effects of the process to a large extent.  
It must be concluded that without the implementation of the NFPH forest policy will 
not gain real structure or form and a consensus based overall development will be 
very difficult. Separated thematic issue development will be possible, of course, but 
tends certainly to loose the process’ achievements in general and especially as 
regards intersectoral coordination and iterativity. The danger will increase that this 
policy field at national level will be simply sub-ordinated to other ones, such as rural 
development or environmental policy. Without implementation Hungary could neither 
claim for practical contribution to the further improvement of the sustainable forest 
management highlighted e.g. in the MCPFE process or the EU Forestry Strategy.  
3.8 Management of protected areas through management 
agencies in Greece 
Kassioumis, K., K. Papageorgiou and M. Vakkas 
3.8.1 Introduction 
An appraisal of the progress of nature conservation policy has been undertaken in 
the Greek case study, specifically addressing the administration and management of 
protected areas and concentrating mainly in the recent developments in this field, 
especially after the creation of the ministry of Environment, Planning and Public 
Works until today. The main focus was to provide an evaluation of how new 
governance and its constituting elements have influenced policy outcomes. 
A stronger set of policy elements, institutional reforms and increased state 
declarations has evolved in the national park arena over time in the country. National 
park administration and management in Greece is now, not to be understood as a 
process aimed simply at identifying and selecting the most suitable and biologically 
rich wilderness sites to be preserved, but as a continuous way of managing national 
parks by describing the breadth of the political and societal basis engaged in national 
park administration, focusing on the degree and empowerment of participation of 
various stakeholders and the increased mobilization of decentralized societal 
capacities. In this respect, the encompassing case study policy process 
macroscopically offered a generic and evolving practice of governance in the highly 
prioritized field of nature conservation. The value of this governance process is more 
meaningful in a nation-wide level of analysis, where country-specific weaknesses, 
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strengths, inherent deficiencies as well as social, political and natural area 
dependencies, can provide an overarching overview on the state of administration 
and management of national parks, beyond the traditional direct management by a 
governmental actor.  
The characteristics discussed in this case study are still the subject of on-going 
developments, which have started being placed more systematically into the core of 
the political agenda in the mid 1980s, but have revealed their higher integrative and 
democratic dynamics features after the initiation of the habitat directive in the early 
1990s. The operationalisation of what can be described as new governance operates 
in a national environment where the reality of greater participation of interest groups 
in decision-making is gaining weight in a national policy setting that is becoming 
increasingly transparent and decentralized.  
3.8.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The recent revision of environmental legislation, induced by the EU framework, led to 
the reorientation of Greece's existing conservation policy introducing a number of 
changes in the nature reserve administration system aiming at a more efficient 
pursuit of the desired objectives. Notably, the new legislation provided inter alia for 
the establishment of autonomous Management Agencies or Boards, legally entitled 
to take over responsibilities concerning the national parks’ and other protected areas’ 
organisation and functioning from the formal coercive powers and direct state control 
of forest service and the ministry of EPPW.  
Before the background of these institutional changes the central question is whether 
the introduced policy processes for broader stakeholder participation, greater 
coordination between state and non-state actors, increased multilevel coordination, 
enhanced possibilities for adaptive and iterative planning and higher issues of 
accountability and legitimacy are adequate for planning an integrative and 
sustainable conservation outcome. 
The analysis has shown that the recent administrative and legal changes laid the 
ground for more actors involved in protected area planning and management. The 
new governance process instituted a framework which has shifted participation from 
a pure informative and communicative approach towards a more participatory by 
granting possibilities to the public for negotiation, deliberation and reaction to 
proposals. However, field experience has shown that the legal recommendations of 
participation remain often merely rhetorical; there are problems affecting the use of 
participation in decision-making which could be regarded as generic and inherent to 
the prevailing political attitude style of administration. Moreover, the involvement of 
many different interest groups and stakeholders in the decision-making has raised a 
private (economic) vs. collective (environmental) dichotomy. Inter-sectoral conflicts 
on the competencies of the various ministries and institutions more or less reflect the 
historically developed dominant political culture of public authorities that favour 
sectoral isolationism. Classical arguments resisting change in behaviour of policy 
actors in various levels may be those providing continuity and security. A tendency 
for increased engagement of scientific knowledge in the policy process was apparent 
in this case study.  
GoFOR case studies 44 
 
 
3.8.3 Major insights and conclusions 
The new governance process in national park administration was found to be still 
ambiguous as an approach to ensuring sustainable management and conservation of 
national parks in Greece. Nevertheless, the analysis has shown that national park 
issues that have most commonly been the domain of professional state 
bureaucracies at national levels are increasingly subjected to involvement from 
institutions at sub-national level following patterns of negotiations between state and 
non-state actors. The new approach that brings participatory approaches in the 
management and planning of protected areas to the forefront of practice, has been a 
significant change in the direction for a more participatory and democratic decision-
making in an increasingly cooperative national policy environment. The research 
identified the above elements as wielding influence in the outcome of conservation 
processes since they have ensured the involvement of several actors and the 
interconnection of a policy network.  
Besides the positive aspects, long-established organizational problems, deeper 
institutional weaknesses such as the national policy style of administration, low 
political commitment of the political actors and most essentially a reality that most 
management actions have not been pursued and completed, constitute an impeding 
factor and are inconsistent with the new patterns of politics geared towards open 
decision-making. Likewise, the research disclosed attitudes, perceptions and 
behaviours of some respondents that are not compliant with the new governance 
process but are rather rooted to a more reactive form of governing that used to be 
dominant in the past. Similar behaviour was identified among the lay public especially 
in areas regarding public participation in open forums and negotiations. Interest 
groups and the public need to be trained and raise their experience to interactions as 
laid out by the new governance process.   
3.9 Dutch “Nature for People, People for Nature” Process 
Turnhout, E., R. Arnouts, and M. Van der Zouwen 
3.9.1 Introduction 
It was the prominent presence of governance discourses in recent Dutch nature 
conservation policy, that triggered us to look closer into this neglected aspect in the 
governance debate. Where did these discourses come from and how could such a 
discourse develop and institutionalize? The development process of the Dutch nature 
policy plan “Nature for People – People for Nature” (NfP) which was adopted by 
Dutch parliament in 2000 served as a case study to answer this question. 
3.9.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The NfP policy plan strives to shed a broader view on nature policy. The policy 
document is characterized by three governance discourses: about the importance to 
include people’s perceptions, wishes and knowledge in nature policy, about the 
importance of citizen participation in, involvement in and responsibility for nature 
policy and about the importance of an integrated perspective in nature policy. These 
discourses were present already in the first drafts of the plan. Also the development 
process started out as a governance process in terms of actors involved, the 
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distribution of power and resources, the type of interactions, interaction rules and 
places where interactions were situated as well as the content of discussions. After 
the first stage, the process increasingly appeared to be a government practice 
regarding the actors involved, the way the power game was played and the 
interaction rules and loci which were important. 
Participation and intersectoral coordination were stressed as important in all the 
drafts of the plan. Intersectoral coordination is clear in the sense that the plan 
integrates hitherto separate policy plans on nature conservation, forestry and 
landscape. In the process, broad participation and intersectoral coordination 
characterised the beginning. After that both were ended for a period of time in which 
further development took place in a closed shop context. After that, the process 
shows selective forms of participation about particular issues and ISC in the sense of 
interministerial coordination about financial and spatial issues. Accountable expertise 
was stressed as important in all the drafts of the plan in the sense that social science 
knowledge and the input of citizens was viewed important in addition to ecological 
science knowledge. In the process no special attention was paid to this, although the 
participation and intersectoral coordination meetings, of course, implied that the 
participants could speak up and share their knowledge and perspectives. Interactive 
and iterative planning and multilevel governance do not play an important role in this 
case study. 
3.9.3 Main insights and conclusions 
Although the governance discourses on policy integration, societal responsibility and 
people’s perceptions have been reproduced throughout the entire process in the 
drafts of the plan, the process shows dynamics in terms of governance. Broad 
participation and intersectoral coordination was discontinued and replaced by 
selective ad hoc participation and interministerial coordination. This leads us to the 
conclusion that the governance discourses in the final policy document do not go 
hand-in-hand with a governance process. 
3.10 Nature policy in the Groene Woud area (The Netherlands) 
Arnouts, R., M. Van der Zouwen and E. Turnhout 
3.10.1 Introduction 
The “Groene Woud” area, also called “Meierij” or “Midden Brabant”, basically 
consists of a core of several large natural areas surrounded by agricultural land, in 
between the Dutch cities of Den Bosch, Eindhoven and Tilburg. The area is situated 
in the province of Noord-Brabant in the south of the Netherlands. This study area 
was chosen because of the rapid development in policy processes over the last 
decades and because of the tension between different interests that comes to the 
fore over time (mainly between nature and agriculture). To be able to focus on a 
more long-term perspective, the case has been divided into three periods, each of 
them characterized by specific events and governance processes. 
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3.10.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The first period is characterized by rebuilding the regional economy after the Second 
World War. This is mainly visible in two large scale agricultural reallocation 
processes. The first one, Oirschot – Best, is implemented without much resistance. 
Landscape and nature conservationists try to keep natural areas out of the 
reallocation by buying them, which is sometimes successful. From the mid-seventies, 
because of societal unease with unbridled reallocation, policy initiatives are emerging 
that support landscape and nature conservation. The second reallocation process, 
which commences from the mid-seventies, has to take into account non-agrarian 
interests, but still is dominated by agrarians. However, the implementation of this 
process is not going very smoothly. 
From a governance perspective, the first period is already quite interesting. The 
reallocation processes are quite participative due to their corporatist character, but 
are dominated by agricultural actors. Towards the end of the period, some attention 
is being paid to non-agrarian sectors, but this does not change the dominant agrarian 
position. Furthermore, technical agricultural expertise is dominant in this period, 
although later on, ecological and environmental expertise is used to challenge the 
dominant agricultural position. Iterativity and adaptiveness is mainly found in the Sint-
Oedenrode reallocation, which takes into account multiple interests. From a multi-
level perspective, there are no signs of exceptional multi-level coordination. 
The second period commences with the introduction of the Nature Policy Plan in 
1992. It aims at the creation of a network of natural areas which is being demarcated 
by the province, supported by nature conservationists, but resisted by agrarians. This 
latter sector gradually loses its dominant position. Furthermore, the WCL policy 
(“Waardevolle Cultuurlandschappen”, Valuable Cultural Landscapes) is created, 
which focuses on several functions of the rural area. However, this initiative is not 
very successful, because of a lack of public support and private commitment. In the 
shadow of these two initiatives, the Groene Woud ideals are conceived, which aim at 
the creation of a large natural park in Midden Brabant. At the end of the period they 
are being put under the footlights.  
From a governance perspective, mainly the demarcation of the EHS (Ecological Main 
Structure), the development of the WCL policy and the conception and launch of the 
Groene Woud ideals are interesting. All these initiatives are carried out in a 
participative fashion, though with changing success. ISC mainly comes to the fore in 
the WCL policy and EHS demarcation, where actors from different sectors meet each 
other. The difference in success between the EHS demarcation and the WCL policy 
can be partially explained from a multi-level perspective because in the former, there 
is a good connection between the provincial and local level, which is missing in the 
latter. As a result of the EHS policy, ecological expertise gains in importance. 
Moreover, social types of expertise come to the fore. The general way in which 
policies are conceived in this period is more adaptive and iterative.  
The third period begins with the incorporation of the Groene Woud in provincial 
policies and in the municipality of Boxtel. Meanwhile, the WCL policy is being 
transformed into a new initiative, the IDM (“Innovatieplatform Duurzame Meierij”, 
Innovation Platform Sustainable Meierij), whose participants enthusiastically support 
the Groene Woud developments. Along the way, ideas are conceived to create a 
spin-off effect, which broadens the Groene Woud ideals, involving more and more 
actors, including agrarians, who start working together with nature and landscape 
conservationists. Another important process in this period is the Reconstruction, 
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which aims at the creation of an all-encompassing policy for the Midden-Brabant 
area, with a main focus on strengthening the regional economy. However, 
implementation of the Reconstruction plans has not commenced yet due to massive 
delays. This leaves the Midden-Brabant area with two integral policy initiatives. 
Governance practices mainly come to the fore in the Groene Woud developments, 
but as well in the IDM activities and in the new Reconstruction policy. In all three 
examples, participation is clearly visible. In the Reconstruction, it is most formalized, 
whereas the Groene Woud and IDM have a more informal character. ISC is visible in 
the broadening of the Groene Woud ideals, in which agrarians and nature 
conservationists cooperate, and in the Reconstruction and IDM. From a multi-level 
perspective, the uneasy relationship between the Ministry of LNV (agriculture) and 
the province of Noord-Brabant, the involvement of the municipality of Boxtel and 
connections between the local and provincial level (and the lack thereof) are 
interesting. Furthermore, the attention for more integral policies implies an integration 
of all types of expertise, while policy process in general get more adaptive and 
iterative, mainly visible in the approach of the province of Noord-Brabant. 
3.10.3 Major insights and conclusions 
From the historiography of nature policy in the Groene Woud area it can be 
concluded that participation is not new, it already was visible in the first period. 
Throughout time, though, it becomes more common, involving more sectors. 
Moreover, one witnesses an intersectoral trend which is clearly visible in the 
relationship between the agricultural sector and nature and landscape 
conservationists. Several intersectoral initiatives appear over time, and the Groene 
Woud seems to be successful. However, with the start of the Reconstruction, there 
now are two integral policy plans for Midden Brabant, with no clear relationship 
between them. From a multi-level perspective, what is most striking is that regional 
commitment is needed, both from local and provincial actors, in order to create a 
successful policy plan for Midden Brabant. As well, the province of Noord-Brabant 
seems to become more headstrong, positioning itself more clearly at the expense of 
the Ministry of LNV. From an expertise perspective, social kinds of expertise seem to 
become more important over time, whereas agricultural expertise loses its dominant 
position to more ecological kinds of expertise. Finally, over time policy processes 
become more adaptive and iterative. In dealing with the Groene Woud, the province 
of Noord-Brabant is especially iterative and adaptive. 
3.11 Nature policy in the Utrechtse Heuvelrug area (The 
Netherlands) 
Arnouts, R., M. Van der Zouwen and E. Turnhout 
3.11.1 Introduction 
The ‘Utrechtse Heuvelrug’ is a large and mainly forested natural area in the centre of 
the Netherlands, divided over the provinces of Utrecht (for two-thirds) and Noord-
Holland (for one-third). It can roughly be divided into three parts, i.e. the southern, 
central and northern Utrechtse Heuvelrug. Because it is situated close to the highly 
urbanized west of the country, it has always been subjected to strong urbanization 
influences, which have left the area in a quite fragmented state. Therefore, it is 
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interesting how nature policies have been developed over time. To achieve a 
comparative overview, the case has been divided into three periods, each of them 
characterized by specific events and governance processes.  
3.11.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
The first period, which begins after the Second World War, is characterized by the 
“flowerpot model”, meaning that actors mainly focus on their own affairs. Large scale 
expansions of villages, military terrains, (recreational) businesses and infrastructure 
occur, supported by the province of Utrecht. Such activities are allowed to flourish, 
ownership of the land is an important resource. The area is mainly owned by the 
Ministry of Defense, large health care institutions, private landowners, the State 
Forest Agency and large nature conservation organizations. From the mid seventies, 
societal unease with the unbridled expansions begin to occur, leading to some more 
political attention for nature- and landscape conservation and some first initiatives to 
put a halt to unbridled urbanization, although without much effect. 
In this context, virtually no governance practices are visible. Participation is restricted 
to an insignificant provincial policy plan. Intersectoral coordination only happens on a 
small scale within the provincial organization. Multi-level characteristics do not go 
beyond the Dutch constitutional relationships. Expertise is mainly technical and 
focused on spatial planning, although this is complemented with ecological expertise. 
Provincial and municipal policy plans are only adaptive because they allow for formal 
consultation, which in practice seldom occurs. Most actors see no need to get 
involved because they focus on their own activities.  
In the second period (starting in 1992), the Ecological Main Structure, or EHS (Dutch 
abbreviation), is introduced. The entire Utrechtse Heuvelrug is demarcated as natural 
core area. Moreover, a new provincial spatial plan is formulated in 1994, which aims 
at the creation of red and green contours on the Utrechtse Heuvelrug. As well, the 
ministry of LNV issues a decentralization impulse, giving the provinces and 
municipalities new responsibilities. The most important development in this period is 
the installation of a National Park in the South of the area. After the national 
committee has failed, a group of regional actors takes over and eventually launches 
a preliminary National Park. Furthermore, several private actors create a vision in 
which the Utrechtse Heuvelrug is seen as a whole, instead of focusing on just parts 
of it. 
From a governance perspective, the second period shows the demarcation of the 
EHS in a participative fashion, with the help of ecological expertise from involved 
nature conservationists. Moreover, the new provincial spatial plan of 1994 shows 
explicit signs of intersectoral coordination. The decentralization impulse causes some 
multi-level related problems. To cap all that, however, the National Park initiative 
harbors several governance characteristics. The first attempt partly fails because of a 
multi-level related dispute between the regional actors and the national committee. 
However, private actors start a new and bottom up attempt to install a National Park 
on their own terms. This attempt is eventually supported by the committee and the 
province, making the process quite adaptive and iterative. Another participative 
process concerns the “Heel de Heuvelrug” initiative, launched to put the Utrechtse 
Heuvelrug as a whole on the political agenda. 
The third period (from 1998) shows waning attention for the “Heel de Heuvelrug” 
idea. After initial enthusiasm, it is not really taken up. Meanwhile, the National Park is 
formally installed, so the second attempt has been successful. A formal body of 
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consultation and a management plan are established. However, cooperation within 
this body is not easy because of the voluntary character of participation and the 
tough attitude of the private owners. Most important in this period is the “Hart van de 
Heuvelrug” project, which focuses on the middle of the area. The province aims at 
solving the deadlock between green and red interests, arisen because of a new 
provincial spatial plan which has significantly strengthened the EHS. In this project, 
patches of land are being exchanged and given another function. It is enthusiastically 
taken up, but there is a lot of critique as well, because it is feared that “red” interests 
will dominate, which will lead to further deterioration of the area. 
In this period, governance processes from the second period keep on developing, 
while new processes are occurring. An exception is the “Heel de Heuvelrug” initiative, 
characterized by participation and a multi-level approach, which after initial 
enthusiasm wanes away. In the National Park, a participative, adaptive and iterative 
approach is followed, which gradually results in some trust, but participation is 
uneasy. The most important governance processes in this period is the “Hart van de 
Heuvelrug” project. It bears signs of participation, intersectoral coordination, multi-
level coordination, different uses of expertise by governmental and non-governmental 
actors and an iterative and adaptive approach. However, there is some scepticism 
towards the project as well. 
3.11.3 Major insights and conclusions 
All in all, one can conclude from the Utrechtse Heuvelrug case that over time more 
and stronger governance practices are occurring. However, the difference between 
the second and third period is not that significant, i.e. in the second period there are 
some pretty interesting governance patterns already. Important examples of 
governance practices are the processes around the National Park and the “Hart van 
de Heuvelrug” project, but for example also the “Heel de Heuvelrug” ideal, the 
continuous update of provincial spatial plans, the decentralization impulse and the 
issuing, demarcation and implementation of the EHS. Important actors are the 
province of Utrecht, which is adopting a truly iterative and adaptive approach 
throughout the three periods, the private owners, especially concerning the National 
Park, and Utrechts Landschap, a non-governmental actor that plays an important 
facilitating and mediating role. Mainly in the “Hart van de Heuvelrug” project, all 
governance characteristics are visible. Furthermore, the case of the National Park 
shows that more governance (in this case participation) does not always lead to 
better, i.e. more effective policy processes. 
 
3.12 Norwegian Living Forests process 
Moen Ouff, S., E.R. Yttredal and L.J. Halvorsen  
3.12.1 Introduction 
Norwegian forestry is overall characterized by relatively small forest properties and a 
large amount of forest owners. Today it has remained the third largest export industry 
in the country. The Living Forests (LF) Process is a new mode of governance in 
Norwegian forestry, and was initiated in order to secure sustainable forestry in 
economic, social and ecological terms. The process had a modest start between the 
forest owners, the forest industry and the government in 1995, growing over the next 
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year into a large scale process of face-to-face negotiations on standards for 
sustainable forestry also with NGO’s on environment and social issues. The analysis 
deals with the process from the beginning in 1995, until a major shift is made late 
2006, transforming the project-organisation into a permanent Living Forests Council.  
Governance as such is a growing phenomenon in the Norwegian policy context. 
However, in forestry this is the very first example of this kind of process, and of this 
scale. Also, the Living Forests Standards is included as one of several documents to 
make up the Norwegian NFP. For these reasons, it was decided to analyse the Living 
Forests Process in the set of GoFOR case studies. Being the only non-governmental 
part of the NFP, it was interesting to find out what it consisted in, in order to achieve 
this status, and how the parties carried out the cooperation in order to obtain the 
objectives of their efforts.  
3.12.2 Main characteristics of governance case 
Living Forests 1995-2006 is an inter-sectoral co-operation process taking place 
between stakeholders from forestry, environmental and outdoor recreational 
organisations, trade unions, consumers’ organisations and the government. The 
main objective of the process is to achieve and document sustainable forestry in 
Norway. This is handled by providing new knowledge on forest conditions, forestry’s 
impact on forest conditions and by forming this knowledge into standards for 
sustainable forestry. Later, certification schemes have also been worked out. In the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s opinion the government should not be directly involved in this 
kind of regulation in industry and commerce. The requirements in LF Standards 
1998/2006 are thus imposed onto private forest management by themselves. 
The Living Forests process would most likely not have been formed had it not been 
for the international market demands forced upon the forest sector. The process of 
certification has therefore become one of self interest for the forest owners and for 
the industry. In 1994, this was a project merely within the timber industry. However, 
this was changed in 1995 and Living Forests was established as a three-year project, 
financed partially by governmental bodies, and inviting other stakeholders to take 
part as well. An agreement was signed in 1998. After signing the agreement, the 
cooperation came to a halt, as there was alleged malpractice of the agreement 
among the forest owners. This led in the end to one major ENGO’s leaving the 
cooperation prior to the revision of the standards in 2004-2006. In replacement, 
another umbrella ENGO was invited in. After evaluations and revision of the 
standards and their impact on the actual forestry performed, the parties decided to 
institutionalise the co-operation in the Living Forests Council in late 2006. This 
council was constituted on Dec. 1st 2006, and is now a permanent cooperation 
between the parties.  
The most extraordinary feature of the process was the amount of people let into this 
kind of policy making process in forestry. At its most the process involved more than 
150 people in the advisory committee and hearings. Still, there were restrictions as to 
who was invited into the decision-making committees and working groups. The 
down-side of negotiations is pointed out to be the time-consuming aspects of the 
partnership and the fact that not all organisations hold the same finances needed to 
take part.  
The main outputs from LF 1995-2006 are the foundation and continuing renewal of 
environmental standards for Norwegian forestry, the appointment of the Living 
Forests Council and the fact that LF is being incorporated in public policies. However, 
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the cause and effect relationship in environmental issues like this are complex and 
hard to detect.  
There are two main impacts that can be found in the case study: (i) A change in 
actors’ attitudes towards each other, and then mainly a shift in attitude towards 
ENGOs from the forest owner and industry side. Included and a part of this is also 
training schemes and courses in sustainable forestry, developed parallel and as a 
result of the Living Forests process. (ii) A change in attitude towards regimes in 
governmental forestry administration. The first has lead to a shift from focus on 
documentation to focus on actual environmental sustainability in forestry. The latter 
has led to policy making outside the political sphere and the question still remains to 
be answered whether this stands for a democratic turn or not. 
The Living Forests Standards have only been in use for ten years, and it is still early 
to look for the actual outcomes on property level. Still, some changes have can 
already be observed. The two main improvements are the amount of old growth trees 
left behind when logging, and in relation to the border areas. One area which needs 
greater improvement is among other things an increased use of closed stand felling.  
3.12.3 Major insights and conclusions 
The actual outcomes on property level is far from visible yet, expect some early-
stage conclusions on the improvement of the amount of old growth trees and the 
border areas. The more obvious impact the process has made, is on actors’ attitude 
towards each other, which constitutes a major change between these actors. This 
turn is probably for a large part due to the extensive time span of the process, and 
also a strong will among the actors to find acceptable solutions for all. International 
market demands and pressure from global-wide ENGOs, contributes for a large part 
to this will. The broad participation and inter-sectorial manner of the process also 
gave without doubt grounds for success. Still, the major output, in the shape of the 
Living Forests Council, and the Living Forests Standards being implemented in the 
NFP, is the most extra-ordinary product of the efforts. 
3.13 Policies to fight corruption in Romania 
Bouriaud, L. 
3.13.1 Introduction 
In Romania, policies to prevent and fight corruption are issued in a governance 
process developed at the scale of the whole society. It is a process dealing at the 
national level with economic, policy, and cultural issues. The process is elaborated 
and controlled from the central level, the sub-national levels having a role limited to 
execution or implementation. Combating corruption was set as a “national priority” 
because Romania’s integration to NATO and the EU was pending on it. Policies to 
fight corruption were asked in the frame of critics received from the World Bank, the 
European Union, Transparency International etc., particularly starting at the mid of 
the 1990s, and under the pressure of civil society. As a consequence, highest levels 
of State authorities (President, Parliament, and Premier Minister) were directly 
involved in the formulation of policies to prevent and fight corruption. 
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Corruption is also a relevant topic in the forest sector. Studying the forest sector 
allows insights on how a general, transversal policy is perceived and implemented 
(transposed, enforced, applied) in a particular sector. 
3.13.2 Main characteristics of the governance case 
The main policy issue addressed by the governance process is how to cope with the 
corruption phenomenon in the Romanian society. Modifications of legislation were 
undertaken constantly since 2000, to include the acquis communautaire and “good 
practices” at the European level. The Romanian accession to the EU was a strong 
reason for close monitoring of policy implementation by European officials. In the 
process, partnership with NGOs and co-operation with the mass media were 
developed. 
The forestry sector was not nominated in the programmatic documents as a sensitive 
sector; therefore an action plan against corruption in the sector is not yet adopted. 
Instead an action plan to fight illegal logging is under progress. Elements of new 
modes of governance are present, yet the process is not advanced enough to 
conclude on its effects. 
It has to be noticed that the process is still recent, as far as most measures taken 
since 2000 were not implemented properly until 2004. In the forest sector, the 
implementation of anticorruption measures is in an incipient stage, and one cannot 
speak yet about effects. 
The outputs produced by the process were in form of laws, institutions, public 
campaigns, private-public partnership, coalitions, programmes, strategies, 
institutionalisation of actor forums, demission of officials, and incrimination of some 
high-situated people involved in corruption. 
The impact of the process results from the fact that it succeeded to put corruption 
issues in the national debate; to increase the transparency of the political decision 
making process; to develop actor networks; to increase the credibility of the state in 
fighting corruption towards the citizens and the EU; to increase the capacity of the 
Department Anticorruption to investigate high-level corruption; to strengthen the law 
for corruption-related offences; to improve the procedures for investigating 
corruption; to increase mass-media freedom; to succeed in the EU integration 
process (knowing that in December 2004 the country had two “red flags” on justice 
and on corruption that could have delayed the integration after 2007). 
In terms of outcomes, one could notice that the interest and skills of NGOs have 
risen, they were able to monitor the process. The foreign investors have become 
more confident in the actual government. The Transparency International annual 
index on corruption has improved (to a little extent, however). The EU Commission 
appreciated the “significant positive efforts” in policies to cope with corruption. The 
Romanian president is still very popular amongst citizens while the Prime Minister’s 
popularity decreased rapidly when the press published about a possible cooperation 
with a corrupted person. That means that the electorate has become more 
concerned by the corruption accusation brought by the press against the officials. 
The magistrates declared to feel more independent, yet the mass media is putting 
pressure in their decisions. Finally, the percentage of those declaring that they paid 
bribes to officials decreased by 4% in the latest two years. 
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3.13.3 Major insights and conclusions 
Participation, monitoring and evaluation are the main factors explaining the obtained 
outcomes. The process developed in a continuous evaluation from external 
observers (e.g. EU, NATO), or internal structures (NGOs, self-evaluation of the 
institutions involved in fighting corruption). The participation element is explaining 
most of the effects, if considering also the “participation” of EU commissioners who 
supported always the reform of Ministry of Justice and the justice system in general. 
However, the “leadership” element role is salient: any progress in the process could 
not be done without the strong personal commitment of the Minister Monica Macovei 
in the period 2004 – 2007. 
Compared with the global process, the fight against corruption in the forestry sector 
contains less new elements of governance. Actually, up to date (end 2007), the 
corruption and illegal logging affairs in the forest sector were addressed through the 
same mechanisms that failed in the first place, e.g. regulatory intervention. However, 
it is expected that the role of civil society increases in the next years. 
3.14 Implementation of the acquis communautaire in nature 
protection policies in Romania  
Bancu, D. 
3.14.1 Introduction 
Romanian nature protection policies between 1928 and 2000 were limited to merely 
declaring protected areas without having a proper administration system for the 
protected areas. The process of accession to the European Union which started in 
2000 brought another perspective towards nature protection. It led to changes in the 
environmental field, because of the requirement to adapt the national legislation to 
the European legislation.  
The focus of this case study is on the governance process related to the 
implementation of European legislation in the field of nature protection, notably the 
establishment of the European Natura 2000 network.   
3.14.2 Main characteristics of the governance case 
The governance process takes place at the national level and is generated by the 
need to fulfil the requirements for accession to the European Union. The timeframe 
considered in the case study was 2000 – 2007. The main policy issues dealt with are 
the process of transposing the EU legal provisions, the process of site designation, 
and the process of establishing administration structures for protected areas. 
Starting from 2000 up to the present, substantially changes were introduced in the 
nature protection policies under the pressure factor represented by the need to fulfil 
the requirements for EU accession. The outcome of these changes consists in:  
• a new legislative framework, e.g. Environmental Law 265/2006, Protected Areas 
Law 345/2006; 
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• new as well as restructured organizations involved in nature protection policies, 
e.g. the new Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Agencies for 
Environmental Protection, Inter-Ministerial Committees; 
• new “rules of the game”: new modes of interaction and linkage between state 
actors and NGOs, an increased degree of the involvement of non-state actors in 
the process. 
3.14.3 Major insights and conclusions 
The constant effort to ensure an adequate framework for nature protection in line with 
the European provisions resulted in the adoption of a series of legal acts and the 
development of plans and programmes. Furthermore, the ongoing process employed 
in the implementation of Natura 2000 determined gradual changes in the behaviour 
of state actors and NGOs.  
All the procedural elements of the governance process identified in the conceptual 
framework of the GoFOR project contributed to explaining and understanding the 
above mentioned effects of the governance process. The difference among them 
stem from the degree of their involvement in the explaining and understanding the 
effects. 
The most significant contribution to understand the effects of the process is that it 
had strong “participation”. The changes in the behaviour of different actors favoured 
most of the effects presented above. A second important element is the role of 
“accountable expertise”. In this governance process, the interest is in a specific type 
of expertise, namely scientific information necessary for site designation. From this 
perspective, the presence or absence of this data might explain some effects of the 
governance process. Thirdly, the coordination between different levels might explain 
some effects. 
In the process alongside with state actors is acknowledged the presence of non-state 
actors, as well. An important aspect to consider is the new ways NGOs developed to 
interact with state actors at different levels (e.g. contacting directly the European 
level, mediating, launching a petition with the aim to put nature protection back on the 
agenda etc.). The coordination between different sectors is requested and 
necessary. Unfortunately, there is still much to do in this respect, beyond the mere 
inclusion in different programmatic documents of the need for inter-sectoral 
coordination. 
3.15 General Plan of Forest Policy of Catalonia (Spain) 
Pecurul, M., G. Dominguez, J. Tena 
3.15.1 Introduction 
Meeting legal requirements of the Catalan forest act (law 6/88 forestal de Catalunya) 
was the main driving force for the formulation and implementation of the General 
Plan of Forest Policy (Pla General de Política Forestal, PGPF). The forest act also 
states that the administration responsible for forest competences is in charge of this 
task. Thus, the sub-General Directorate of Forests and Biodiversity in the 
Environment and Housing Department (Departament de Medi Ambient i Habitatge, 
DMAH) was directly in charge of developing the PGPF. 
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The formulation of the new Forest Plan was seen for the editor board to implement a 
new policy style, considering participation as a main tool to involve the largest 
possible range of social, technical and scientific actors related to the Catalan forestry. 
The sub-General Directorate of Forests and Biodiversity in the DMAH took this 
opportunity to reinforce the traditionally weak power of the forest administration in 
relation with other administrations. 
3.15.2 Main characteristics of the governance case 
The process of formulation of the Forest Plan of Catalonia lasted four years and so 
far has not been approved. During this period participation has been observed in all 
the stages of the policy process: Diagnosis of the Catalan Forest Sector (April-June 
2003), Definition of Objectives (July-October 2004), Definition of Strategies 
(December 2004-February 2005), Definition of Action (March-April 2005) and 
Presentation (June-October 2005). Three main limitations to the process detected 
during the analysis are the following:  
1. The process lasted beyond two legislatures and the political instability was a 
limitation for the approval. Even one year after the project had been finished, the 
document has not been approved yet. 
2. The forest administration had little weight in the government (the forest sector is 
not very important in economic terms and the forest department was managed by 
the smallest party of the coalition), therefore it was difficult for them to negotiate 
the economical support to the plan in the government.  
3. Internal and old fights in the Environment Ministry among foresters and biologists 
running different under-secretaries have influenced the limits of the PGPF and 
also the attitude of some actors towards the new PGPF. 
The team in charge of the document was an editorial board, including people from 
the forest administration and researchers from a research institute. In order to include 
more points of view and contribution in the document, four different groups of people 
were considered, and also four different specific strategies of participation were 
designed.  
1. A panel of experts elaborated the Diagnosis of the Catalan Forest Sector (SWOT 
analysis) and facilitated the establishment of a working dynamic and a dialogue 
between those entities and associations.  
2. Associations and entities in the sector participated in the Definition of Strategies. 
Forest owners, industry but also nature conservation entities, and forest users’ 
entities (e.g. excursionists) attended workshops.   
3. A mandatory process of public information also was organized to include the 
opinion of citizens not included in any association.  
4. Finally, 25 thematic groups within the forest administration were organized. They 
transformed the result of the participatory workshop in some actions “do-able” for 
the forest administration and they assigned a preliminary budget for those 
actions. 
A broad participatory process was carried out, with the involvement of 70 
associations, with some actors joining the process only once it had already begun 
(e.g. Greenpeace or the Motor Vehicle Association). Access to the information was 
considered good by the participants. Different layouts and media were displayed to 
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reach a major number of groups and people (web pages, different versions of the 
same document, etc.). However, the process had a low impact on the media.  
The main motivation for actors to participate was their will to influence the content of 
the NFP. New actors took the process as an opportunity to be known by the 
traditional sector. 
3.15.3 Major insights and conclusions 
Overall, the participatory process has been assessed as satisfactory and only 
inconstant feedback on the information has been pointed out as a problem, 
especially at the end of the process. Although in general, the opening of the process 
to other actors has been seen as positive; the traditional sector (forest ownership and 
industry) was afraid to loss their direct influence and complained about it in certain 
moments. 
Intersectoral coordination has been conducted mainly through bilateral private 
meetings between departments in the administration. The 25% of the actions 
contained in the document are coordination and planning actions. However, only 44 
of the 96 actions specify the actors that should be coordinated. More than half of 
them (56%) claimed for coordination between departments and undersecretaries 
within the Department of Environment and Housing. 
Regarding multilevel coordination, deficiency or absence of coordination between the 
regional and the national forests administrations have been observed. There are no 
channels that foster this communication like in other policy fields (e.g. natural 
protected areas) where there are some commissions. However, in practical terms, 
this multilevel coordination was not compulsory as the responsibilities are clearly split 
between the different levels. The local level was poorly involved in the process. Lack 
of resources and different interests from the strategic scope of the FPC were some 
impeding factors for local administrations to participate. In fact, this process 
established the basis for a new tactical forest planning figure. This figure should 
cover the gap between the regional and local forest planning, fostering the 
coordination between local and regional actors. 
In general, the majority of interviewed people expressed the opinion that the outcome 
of the panel of experts had been more technical than political. The panel of experts 
was formed by sixteen people that were selected by the Editor Board. They had 
varied training, field of work and geographic origin. Furthermore, they had some 
common characteristics: they are all good experts in the Catalan forest field, both in a 
practical way and theoretical, they are members of more than one forest organization 
and good communicators and with a real involvement in the forest sector. Despite of 
the partial selection of the experts, and their membership to different organizations 
makes it difficult to distinguish them from a stakeholder, all the interviewed agreed on 
the experts’ accountancy and legitimacy. This credibility is based on the belief of their 
professionalism and on their own responsibility as well-know agents in the forest 
sector 
A system of periodical meetings for planning next steps was established in order to 
do not lose track of the process and feed it continuously: Previous outputs for the 
process were taken into account when defining the next steps of the process and 
measures for monitoring and assessing the implementation have been established, 
with a revision of the actions (but not of the objectives and the strategic lines, that 
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were defined for the long term) every 5 years. However, the implementation has not 
started as the plan has not been approved yet. 
The main output of the program was the Action Proposal with 391 actions in 5 
thematic programs. Other outputs are a new normative associated to new land-use 
planning figures range and a new tactical forest management plans (ot approved 
yet). On the other hand the most important impact of the process has been the 
improvement of the communication among actors and the inclusion of new actors 
(mainly users) in the forest policy outcomes.  
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4 Analysis along procedural elements 
4.1 Participation 
Boon, T.E., I. Nathan, D.H. Lund, G. Buttoud, and I .Kouplevatskaya 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role of participation in each of the 19 cases 
within the GoFOR project, covering 10 European countries. The overriding question 
is: what is the anticipated role/aim of participation and how does it work out in 
practice? 
The chapter is introduced with a conceptual framework for analysing participation 
(Chapter 4.1.1), followed by analysis of the case studies (Chapter 4.1.2) and 
conclusions (Chapter 4.1.3). 
4.1.1 Conceptual approach 
A political ambition to strengthen public participation in forest and natural resources 
decision-making has grown during the past twenty years throughout the European 
countries. It is reflected in the international forest policy agreements, from Rio to the 
Lisbon Resolutions on people and forests, and indeed, with the Aarhus convention 
on access to information, participation and rights to appeal environmental decisions 
(Boon 2002). But to this date, it appears that public authorities initiate participation 
processes as an end in itself, without a clear idea of the scope, form and 
consequences of conducting such a process.  
From a citizen viewpoint, participation can be defined as “activities that affect 
formulation, adoption and implementation of public policies and/or that affect the 
formation of political communities in relation to issues or institutions of public interest” 
(Andersen et al. 1993:32). Such activities can be membership of associations, 
signing or initiating petitions, lobbying, civil disobedience, forest policy discussions, 
participation in advisory boards and hearings, use of public appeal rights, or buying 
forest products according to political convictions, i.e. be a political consumer (Boon 
2002). 
From a public administration viewpoint, participation can be defined as, e.g. for 
forestry:  “The effort of forest management or the planning team (1) to actively and 
continually provide the public with a wide range of opportunities to influence forest 
planning and management, and (2) to systematically analyse, evaluate and 
subsequently incorporate - to the extent possible - the resulting public input in the 
forest plans” (Gernow 1995:22). This form of participation may be labelled ‘public 
involvement’. Such efforts are often characterised by the degree of power sharing 
with the public, ranging from restricted two-way communication (e.g. surveys, public 
excursions), to consultation (hearings, advisory boards) and co-operation (e.g. task 
forces) to partnership and citizen control (e.g. self-governing land owner groups, 
Agenda 21 or NGO initiatives) (Boon 2002). 
 
A third definition is suggested by FAO/ECE/ILO (2000):  
“Participation – public participation is a voluntary process whereby people, 
individually or through organized groups, can exchange information, express 
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opinions and articulate interests, and have the potential to influence decisions or the 
outcome of the matter at hand. The aim is to generate a widely acceptable 
management plan; increasing reliance on market forces as alternatives to state 
governance” (FAO\ECE\ILO 2000). Notice, that this definition deliberately includes 
the aim to move from state governance (government) towards market forces. 
 
The essence of all three definitions is that participation is about citizens being given 
or themselves taking opportunities to influence decision processes of public interest. 
In continuation of this, Arnstein (1969) formulated participation as “… the 
redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from 
the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future”, and 
distinguished between forms of participation according to the degree to which they 
actually enable the redistribution of power. 
 
Why participation? 
There are many, possible purposes of participation, as stated in policy documents as 
well as theoretical papers on participation (summarised in, e.g. Boon 2000, 2002, 
Kouplevatskaya 2006): 
• Giving citizens opportunity to influence decision processes of public interest 
• A more effective natural resources management, e.g. by adapting the services 
and products to consumer/user demands, by using local knowledge to improve 
management, or to co-operate with key stakeholders on joint problem-solving, 
hereby mitigating adverse conflicts. 
• A legitimate, public natural resources management, adapted to the shifting 
expectations of society.  
• Enhance shared understanding of a given decision process and the related 
interests and viewpoints of the various stakeholders. 
• Social capital: create local networks, build mutual trust, generate ideas, 
commitment and resources 
• Empower citizens to take part in environmental decision-making 
• Increase environmental awareness among the public 
• Mobilise citizens to voluntary environmental work, either independently, or as 
part of public management. 
• Democratisation of political-administrative systems. 
 
To use each of these objectives as yardsticks for evaluating a given participation 
process would be unfair. Each process should be measured up against the 
objectives stated for that particular process. But the list serves to illustrate the many 
expectations there may be to a participation process, irrespective of stated 
objectives.  
  
What is an appropriate degree of participation?  
There is a standing disagreement as to how extensive participation in public 
decision-making should be. Some would argue that participation should be limited to 
the periodical public election of representatives (i.e. the politicians in Parliament, 
municipalities, etc.). And further, that public decision-making should be left entirely to 
the politicians in between elections, as that is the best way to ensure a just and equal 
treatment of all citizens, with no citizens having better opportunities than others to 
affect decision-making according to their own interests. A main philosophy is that 
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citizens should be protected from the state and a criterion of success is an optimal 
distribution of scarce resources among citizens. Democracy is a procedure to ensure 
this. Participation should either be based on representation (e.g. socio-demographic 
sample as used for e.g. surveys and citizen summits), or they should be limited in 
relation to topic and influence, e.g. consultations to adapt public services to user 
demands. 
 
Others would argue opposite - that citizens should be ensured access to take part in 
decision-making, being part of the state. Because individual interests are not fixed, 
and through dialogue, it is possible that new and shared understandings and 
interests may emerge. A criterion of success is that citizens can see themselves as 
an included part in decision-making. Hereby, it becomes essential that citizens have 
access to decision-making also between elections. In this perspective, democracy 
becomes a way of life, rather than merely a procedure. Participation based on 
deliberating dialogue is an integral part of this. 
 
Participation processes can be evaluated with regard to representation and the 
extent to which they allow for deliberating dialogue, respectively. The importance 
attached to these two factors varies with the democracy perspective.  
 
Different forms of participation 
The different forms of public participation can be categorised according to their 
potential degree of power sharing between decision-makers and participants, see 
Table 6. With the criterion that participation should allow affected parties to influence 
decision-making, then information dispersal and exchange of information (e.g. 
excursions and surveys) cannot be labelled participation, but they may be useful part 
of an overall involvement strategy. Public consultation is where the decision-maker 
invites affected parties for public input with the aim to take it into account in decision-
making, but still without delegating or sharing decision authority. Consultation then 
potentially allows affected parties to influence decision-making.  But Arnstein (1969) 
argues that participation is only genuine when it comes to actual co-operation with 
shared decision-power, whereas consultation is nothing more than tokenism as long 
as decision-makers are only obliged to consult the public, not necessarily to take the 
resulting input into account in decision-making.  
 
Consultation methods vary, from simply public meetings or allowing for written 
feedback on e.g. draft acts or plans, and on to facilitated series of workshops, 
seminars and conferences structured with the aim to stimulate dialogue among 
participants and eventually come to conclusions on recommended future action, 
whether based on majority vote or consensus. Examples are scenario workshops, 
consensus conference (Andersen & Jæger 1999), and constructive confrontation 
method (Buttoud 1999). Some methods further include a structured combination of 
expert and laymen input, as e.g. with citizen panels. Other methods combine 
deliberation and representation, as e.g. deliberative polls (Hansen 2000, Price and 
Neijens 1998) and citizen summit (Smith 2005), where a socio-demographically 
representative sample of citizens is invited to discuss a set of topics and 
subsequently vote among a set of options for each topic, based on informed 
dialogue. Obviously, the potential degree of influence depends on the applied 
method. An overview of methods can be found in, e.g. Smith (2005). 
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Table 6: Categories of participation 
Participation method 
Info dispersal Pamphlets, newsletters, bulletin boards, press releases, newspaper articles, 
radio & tv programmes, advertising, readers' letters, home pages, exhibitions, 
excursions, nature schools 
Info feedback Public meetings, open house, excursions, hot line, telephone calls, feedback 
mailings, daily employee-stakeholder interactions, surveys, environmental 
impact assessment (EIA), social impact assessment (SIA), focus groups, 
interviews  
Consultation 
& 
collaborative 
learning 
Public hearing, expert advisory boards, collaborative learning, transactive 
planning, workshops, mutual gains method, community of interests, 
environmental mediation, 4R method, constructive confrontation, informed 
consensus approach, citizen panels, landcare groups, search conferencing, 
planning cells, citizen juries, consensus conferences.  
Co-operation Method involving shared decision-power, whether it be standing committees, 
project groups or one of the consultation methods mentioned above 
Public control Activities where citizens hold the initiative and decision-power, e.g. Agenda 21 
activities, local action groups 
Appeal 
decisions 
Rights of affected stakeholders to appeal decisions made according to 
particular acts.  
based on Boon (2000) 
 
Analytical framework based on input-output legitimacy 
The Gofor cases were selected to examine new modes of governance in Europe 
including the significance of participation. The aim was to compare the case studies 
with regard to the significance of participation in relation to effectiveness and 
procedural legitimacy.  
The terms democratic legitimacy and effectiveness draw on two identified core 
concepts of legitimacy: input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). Input legitimacy 
refers to legitimisation through participation (inclusion) and balanced representation 
of relevant stakeholders. Input legitimacy is defined as follows: “political choices are 
legitimate if and because they reflect the will of the people, that is, if they can be 
derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. Input 
oriented arguments often rely simultaneously on rhetoric of participation and 
consensus (Scharpf 1999). Output legitimacy refers to legitimisation through problem 
solving (“effectiveness”).   
Participation is sometimes considered as an aim in it self, sometimes as a means to 
improve problem solving (“effectiveness”). In this sense, the role of participation in 
relation to normative criteria of legitimacy can be interpreted both in terms of 
democratic/input legitimacy and in terms of effectiveness/output legitimacy.  
In the analysis we look at  
1. Rhetoric: The extent to which the different cases are designed as participatory 
processes, what are the rationales for designing them as such (input or output 
legitimacy?)  
2. Process: What forms of participation characterise the processes, and whether 
participation can be said to have been a basic feature of the process or rather 
just a corner of it, factors having supported or constrained participatory 
processes, 
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3. Effect: The extent to which the participatory elements have actually created 
momentum for new stakeholders to influence the processes including (a) the 
extent to which the processes have been inclusive or exclusive (input) (b) the 
extent to which participation has actually made a difference (output) (c) or 
rather has been a show off for decision makers to legitimise their decisions 
 
4.1.2 Participation in comparative analysis 
All GoFOR cases were selected partly for featuring some form of public participation 
as this element is a prominent characteristic of new modes of governance. Therefore 
all 19 case studies provide empirical examples of various formalised forms of public 
participation, reasons for including participatory procedures in policy processes as 
well as experiences of how they worked out in practice.  
The vast majority of selected cases are government initiated and therefore the 
participatory procedures were induced, designed and to differing extents controlled 
by public officials. The only exceptions are the second national park initiative of the 
Dutch Utrechtse Heuvelrug and to some extent the Groene Woud cases and the 
Norwegian living forest project which were partly considered non-governmental 
processes, but even here the public administrators still played an influential role. The 
GoFOR project therefore focuses on government initiated participatory processes, 
not on pure bottom-up, non-governmental processes. 
This chapter is concerned with how the chosen modes of participation match the 
stated aims and reasons for having participatory procedures. The overriding question 
is: what is the anticipated role/aim of participation and how does it work out in 
practice? 
 
4.1.2.1 Importance of participation in the case studies 
Table 7 shows to what degree ‘participation’ can be considered a characteristic 
element of the case and to what degree it may explain success or failure of the policy 
process, according to the overall judgement of the case study authors (GoFor 
Comparative Frames, country reports August 2007). For both dimensions, an ordinal 
scale has been applied, with three categories being: ‘rather unimportant’, ‘important’, 
‘very important’. 
In 15 of the 19 GoFor cases participation has been ranked as an important (4) or 
even very important (11) element to characterise the governance process.  
In 16 of the 19 cases, participation was also considered either important (6) or very 
important (10) to explain the overall successes/failures of the governance process.  
Participation was considered important to specify the overall character of the 
governance process for various reasons: In some cases participation was considered 
particularly important because of former lack of participation in policy making (GR-
MA, ROM-ACP, ROM-NAT, HUN-NFP), whereas in other cases participation was 
visible already at an early stage (NL-NfP, NL-GW). In some cases participation was 
considered important because it dominated the Ministry’s rhetoric regarding the 
process (AT-AFD, DK-NPP), and in others because participation enabled participants 
to actively shape and influence the process (FR-CFT, F-RP, ROM-ACP, NOR-LF). 
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Participation was considered important to explain the overall successes/failures of 
the governance process for various reasons, acknowledging that the rated 
importance depends on what it understood by success/failure).  In case of the AT-
AFD, DK-NPP and NOR-LF, participation added democratic legitimacy to the 
process, whereas e.g. the limited participation in the AT-BS also limited the political 
standing of the Austrian BS, as struggling opposing actor coalitions led to a weak 
strategy. In F-RP and NOR-LF participation was essential in shaping the output and 
the continued implementation, and in the DK-HD complaints from ENGOs and 
landowners also actively shaped policy implementation, in spite of limited emphasis 
on public participation in the policy design. In some cases, the participation led to an 
increase in the diversity of stakeholders being involved (GR-MA, DK-NPP, NL-NfP). 
 
Table 7: Importance of Participation in the GoFor case studies 
  Participation as characteristic element of the 
governance case 
Importance of 
participation 
for success or 
failure 
 Rather 
unimportant 
Important Very important 
Rather 
unimportant 
GER-GAK   
Important DK-HD AT-BS 
ROM-NAT 
ROM-ACP 
GER-RA 
GER-L+ 
Very important  FR-CFT AT-AFD 
DK-NPP 
F-RP 
GR-MA 
HUN-NFP 
NL-NfP 
NL-UH 
NL-GW 
NOR-LF 
Source: GoFor Comparative Frames, country reports August 2007 
 
4.1.2.2 The role of participation in the rhetoric of the studied policy processes and 
why the processes are participatory  
In the following, we describe what role participation plays in the rhetoric of the 
studied policy processes, and what are the main rationales given for designing 
participatory processes. 
The following Table gives a descriptive overview of the rationales and aims of having 
participatory procedures in the 19 case studies as they were stated by the initiators of 
the processes. 
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Table 8: Stated aims of participation in the cases 
Austria AFD 
2003–2005 
 
The process should be an open, ongoing dialogue to formulate and document interests and mutual 
expectations in forests and forestry among national governmental and non-governmental organisations in 
a first Forest Programme. There should be active participation; openness and transparency in the 
process; an inter-disciplinary, holistic approach was pursued; and the highest degree of consensus and 
mutual accommodation was sought through deliberation.  
The forest dialogue should be a “Cornerstone for new forms of cooperation for cross-linkage of 
ecological, economic and social concerns” (yet within the limitations of existing rules and regulations i.e. 
e.g. existing subsidy programmes were excluded from deliberations) 
Austria 
BDS 
1996-2007 
The purpose of participation in the Biodiversity Commission was to ensure Information exchange 
regarding biodiversity, facilitate coordination and cooperation between different activities and 
programmes in the field of biodiversity. Decision-making should be consensus-based, but the commission 
had no authority for politically binding decisions. Participation in the revision process was to ensure 
awareness rising of 2010 goals, the collection of suggestions of necessary activities, and to derive 
objectives and measures to include in the BS. 
Denmark 
HD 
1992-2007 
From the onset participation was not considered an issue as the process was perceived to be a technical 
procedure without actual consequences for others than public authorities. It was not until late in the 
process when the procedures regarding the Natura 2000 plans were disclosed that there were any 
statements regarding participation: citizens and organisations were to have the possibility to bring in their 
ideas in a 6 month hearing phase. 
Denmark 
NPP 
2001-2007 
The rhetoric of the Minister of Environment when initiating the process was dominated by the need to 
bring in local values and norms in the determination of the content of a prospective national park, ensure 
openness and direct involvement of citizens in addition to the involvement of interest organisations in 
boards, and in cooperation with local and national authorities as well as businesses. Active participation 
was to ensure local anchorage and co-ownership of the prospective national parks among the citizens. 
France CFT 
2001-2007 
Participation as such is a goal and promoted by a clear legal requirement. The forest charters are to 
enable mutual decisions between public and private forest owners providing services and the users and 
stakeholders interested in those services. Stakeholders should bring their contribution to the restructuring 
of French forests. In the processes the participants should strive for consensus or at least recognised 
compromise. All potential interests should be heard and decision-making take place in and by networks of 
actors and as a continuous process. 
France RPF 
1999 – 
2007 
(ongoing 
until 2009) 
There was no a priori rhetoric. Participation occurred as a necessity to address the crisis created by the 
1999 storm. In the relief plan participation was considered the key to ensure common action and 
transparency regarding how various measures were implemented. Lessons learned in one place should 
be available for others to learn from. 
Germany  
IRD, 
LEADER+, 
Regionen 
Aktiv, GAK 
2000-2007 
“Regional development builds primarily upon the existing potentials and the expertise of a region’s 
population.” and that “the heart of integrated rural development is the partnership between policymakers 
and administration, the citizens, economic operators and science”. And: “With all due respect to the 
elected local structures, the development initiative must maintain its creative independence, while policy-
makers and administration contribute their administrative professionalism and support to the process” 
(BMELV 2005: 11). 
Both the interested and proactive as well as the more reluctant citizens should be involved. Citizens 
should rediscover forms of civic engagement within their communities. Transparent structures and clear 
rules for all actors involved are recommended. 
Greece NP 
End 90s-
2007 
From legal texts can be deduced that participatory procedures aim to establish public dialogue, raise 
environmental awareness and give interest groups and affected stakeholders possibility and right to 
deliberate with the public authorities. Landowners directly affected by conservation measures are entitled 
to negotiate compensation measures with the state authorities. Participation should furthermore lead to 
more transparent and democratic decision-making. 
Hungary 
NFP 
2001-2007 
(2015) 
Participation was to give institutions, organisations and individuals concerned with forestry the chance to 
respond to the challenges in coordinated and active manner in order to achieve a common programme 
and develop the social utilization of forests. Consensus seeking for further social development of the 
forest. There was a specific aim to open up for others than the usual suspects 
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Netherlands 
GW 
1945-2007 
There are different discourses over the years, and the case study covers a wide variety of processes that 
individual aims are difficult to discern. Landowners are from the beginning important to involve in 
participatory procedures in order to implement coherent plans. Gaining knowledge of the area is also a 
reason for participation. Furthermore local commitment is deemed as a prerequisite for successful 
projects. 
Netherlands 
NfP 
1999-2000 
Nature should meet the demands of society, the government wished to introduce policies which integrate 
multiple objectives, the people should embrace their responsibility for nature and the approach should 
ensure a better implementation on the ground. 
Netherlands 
UH 
1945-2007 
Participation is necessary to make the various projects successful, as the different landowners need to be 
involved. Regarding the ecological main structure knowledge of the local conditions is needed. 
Norway LF 
1995-2006 
The process aims to improve the reputation of Norwegian forestry in terms of sustainability. As public 
awareness on environmental issues is growing, the government finds it wise to incorporate a wider range 
of actors in the policy making, also to legitimise the process towards international markets. 
Romania 
Anti-
Corruption 
2000-2007 
To ensure transparency and openness to decisions in the public administration. Control of agency 
regarding the spending of public funds. Informing, involving and educating the public and establish 
partnerships with NGOs. 
Romania 
Natura 
2000 
To ensure transparency and openness to decisions in the public administration. Control of agency 
regarding the spending of public funds. .A rationale for involving the public is to raise awareness of the 
negative consequences and costs of corruption, and hereby changing the public culture to strengthen 
democracy. 
Spain RFP Broad public involvement in order to strengthen the forest sector. “to promote the public participation, to 
improve the social perception and to motivate the communication of the forest sector” (p. 8). “It is 
expected that the process stimulates capacity-building and favours the development of beliefs and 
preferences for public participation and democratic institutions” (p. 43). All actors should contribute their 
knowledge. Participation is defined as a wide array of processes and mechanisms that allows taking part 
in decision-making. 
Source: GoFor Main assessment reports, comments to CF draft, Göttingen meeting 
2007 
 
It was expected that (in the government-initiated cases7) participatory processes 
have been initiated with reference to requirements of international treaties and 
national legal frameworks, particularly in those cases where participation has not 
traditionally been considered part of the political culture. 
 
The Austrian Forest Dialogue (AFD). The process was initiated by government, who 
from the beginning declared participation one of the main basic principles of the 
process. The motivating elements first and foremost included ‘the international 
discourse on participatory processes and international commitments’, e.g. EU 
legislation, the Proposals for Action of the IPF and IFF, the MCPFE Vienna 
Resolution. Ongoing NFP processes in other EU countries and ongoing participatory 
strategy processes in Austria including the Austrian Strategy for Sustainable 
Development inspired the process. Rhetorically, the initiators and coordinators of the 
process emphasised openness and transparency, and the aim of reaching 
consensus. The rationales for having a participatory process thus, first and foremost, 
                                            
7
 For the government initiated cases, it obviously makes sense to look at the governments’ stated 
reasons for introducing participation. In the NOR-LF and in cases where participation has rather 
spontaneously emerged, like the Dutch cases, it cannot be understood in the light of rhetoric. 
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relate to international and national legal frameworks and are stated mainly in terms of 
input legitimacy.   
 
Austria’s biodiversity strategy is also a process initiated by the government. In its 
rhetoric, the government makes no explicit reference to the importance of 
participation, but the issue is brought forward in other formal documents closely 
related to the national biodiversity strategy. These include (1) the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, which encourages the co-operation between governmental 
authorities and private actors in developing methods for sustainable use of biological 
resources, and (2) the Pan-European Strategy on Biological and Landscape Diversity 
seeks to ensure that “full public involvement in conservation … is assured”.  Hence, 
for the specific case, participation is not a declared aim, but it does play a role in the 
process, the rationale includes references to international treaties and national 
frameworks. Moreover, the rationale tends to fall into the category of output 
legitimacy, as participation is closely tied up with sustainability and conservation, but 
this link is not very clear from the case.  
 
In the implementation of the Habitat directive/Natura 2000 by the Danish 
Government, participation was not considered an issue in the beginning of the 
process apart from having limited consultative processes with regard to ensuring 
good technical quality of the decisions. The reasons given were that Natura 2000 
would only rarely affect private citizens and that nature types and habitats would be 
conserved sufficiently through voluntary agreements and preservation. Gradually, 
rhetoric changed towards actually having public involvement. This happened mainly 
with reference to a wish of making the process efficient/effective through dialogue 
with affected landowners, and by having the public contributing with proposals, ideas, 
and comments. Hence, the major rationale was to ensure efficiency/effectiveness by 
creating support from the public was a major element in the rhetoric of the Danish 
government. Here, again the distinction between input and output legitimacy is 
blurred because the argument links participation with effectiveness, but as the main 
objective is effectiveness, the argument tends to approach output legitimacy. 
 
Like Natura 2000, the Danish National Park Pilot Project was designed by the 
government. Contrary to Natura 2000 it was designed as a participatory process from 
the very beginning. The process was initiated as a response to OECD’s 
recommendations of introducing national parks in Denmark and of having 
participatory processes leading to the selection of these national parks. The first 
nature commission (national) explicitly referred to these recommendations and to 
international treaties such as Rio and the Aarhus convention. Later on during 
implementation, there was hardly any reference to the international level. Here, 
rhetoric focused on issues such as creating a sense of local ownership, basing 
policies on voluntary action and dialogue, finding new models for co-operation, and to 
ensure clarity, transparency, and rule of the law. Hence, in the very beginning, 
reference to the international level was a major issue, while during implementation 
input legitimacy in terms of creating support from the public was a major element in 
the rhetoric of the Danish government. 
 
The CFT case in France is a government designed legal framework opening up for 
initiatives from below. As a framework, it was initiated by the government with clear 
reference to the Forestry law 2001 which requires participatory processes. The 
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Forestry Law refers to the Rio declaration and considers participatory processes as a 
new modality for public and local management as a whole. One of the purposes of 
the CFT process was to ensure that forest decisions were based on consensus or at 
least on recognised compromises between clearly expressed positions of 
stakeholders, and to involve actors even in direct funding of policies. With regard to 
the rationales explicitly given for participation, the CFT case thus tends to fall into the 
category of input legitimacy, and the process indirectly refers to international and 
national requirements as well. 
 
In the French Relief Plan for Forest, participation was spontaneously promoted in a 
situation of crisis. All stakeholders acknowledged that participation was needed 
because the local administration was not sufficiently equipped to face the 
emergency. In the initial project document, participation was mentioned as a key 
word and it was justified from two view points: The need to structure a common 
reaction to the crisis, and the need for transparent processes and learning. Hence, 
this case is based on input as well as output legitimacy but does not refer to 
international treaties etc. 
 
In Germany, LEADER+ is an EU programme, and as such has to follow the 
LEADER+ rules. Here, EU states that LEADER is a new approach to rural 
development policy which is participative.  One of the rationales is to ensure “a broad 
and well organised participation of individuals and local groups” and thus, 
participation is seen as an aim in its own right. Another rationale is to address 
problems in partnership in a more effective and efficient manner, and to ensure 
“acceptance” for policy measures by involving actors concerned. A third rationale 
was to ensure labour free of charge resulting from voluntary work and contributions 
from different stakeholders. Participatory processes are what “Regionen Aktiv” is all 
about. Following arguments in favour of participation could be identified: achievement 
of regional specific solutions, providing decision making processes with democratic 
legitimacy, mobilisation of people as a goal in itself, to create synergies between 
people within the regions, to mobilise ideas, activities and resources contributed by 
regional actors.  GAK Participation is important for re-allocation of tasks among 
citizens and the state. Hence, in the German cases, participatory processes are 
initiated on the basis of all three categories of rationales. 
 
The Government-led Greek National Park Administration case is, as other initiatives 
in Greece, based on legal reforms influenced by the Rio conference and Agenda 21, 
and the effort of the state to harmonise EU environmental law and Directives into the 
national law. Based on this, many programmatic statements and legal texts since 
1992 include provisions to encourage greater degree of direct public influence in the 
management of protected areas by putting more emphasis on the deliberative role of 
the society in formulating management plans, to inform the public about 
environmental issues, and to initiate a dialogue between local interest groups and the 
authorities. A major stated objective of having participatory processes is to reach 
consensus between the different interest groups. In the specific case, there is not 
much rhetoric in relation to participation. The only documented argument in favour of 
participatory processes was that it leads to more democratic and transparent 
decisions. The expectations of regional authorities were to ensure that the biological 
resources are adequately protected on the ground. Hence, with regard to rationales, 
the Greek case is not strong in relation to participation. In general, it appears that the 
Greek government tends to justify participatory processes by referring to international 
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and national legal frameworks and by input legitimacy while the regional authorities in 
the specific case refer to output legitimacy. 
The Hungarian government explicitly recognises the participation principle in relation 
to the national forest programme case. The main reason for this is that this principle 
is stated in international forest policy documents such as the FAO NFP guidelines 
and MCPFE resolutions.  EU accession supports governance in the sense that it 
provides for additional motivation through political commitments at the national level 
from outside the forestry sector. Some reference is made internally to the 
development and reform needs of the Hungarian forest sector. Moreover, there is 
some mentioning of the added value of participation in terms of enhancing the 
implementation process. In this light, the Hungarian case falls into the category of 
input legitimacy. 
 
The Dutch cases are examples of participatory processes which have not been 
initiated by government, but which have grown out of initiatives by different actors 
having changed over time. Hence, it does not make sense to analyse rhetoric in 
relation to these processes. 
 
The Norwegian Living Forests process (1995-2006) is another example of a process 
which is not formally initiated by the government. It is an inter-sectorial co-operation 
project between governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. The main 
objective of the process is to achieve and document sustainable forestry in Norway. 
These objectives have not changed over time. Hence, participation does not play any 
significant role in the rhetoric surrounding the Living Forests process, but 
participation does play a significant role in that it is an integrated part of the process.   
 
In the two Romanian cases (fighting corruption in the forest sector and 
implementation of the EU acquis communautaire) there are no programmatic 
statements about participation of the public. The processes are, however, submitted 
to different laws, which do call for participation in this and similar processes. These 
laws refer to participation and democracy as an aim in itself: democracy needs to be 
strengthened through increased options for participation. Moreover, the laws refer to 
participation as a means to increase efficiency/effectiveness through increased 
openness and transparency in the process and providing the public with information 
(both cases), and by creating greater public awareness about environmental 
protection, and taking into consideration the interests of the local communities 
(acquis communautaire). International conventions such as the Aarhus Convention 
has been transferred to Romanian environmental law ensuring public access to 
information, the right to address the authorities with environmental problem and to be 
consulted regards environmental policies. Hence, the rationales of the two Romanian 
cases fall within all the three categories of international level, input and output 
legitimacy.  
 
In the Spanish FPGP case, participation is characterised as “an inspiring principle”. 
The purpose is for all sectors and social groups to contribute with knowledge and 
proposals, to improve communication in the forest sector, to improve the social 
perception, to increase the forest sector cohesion and confidence, political 
commitment of the results, to increase transparency in the process and to ensure 
access to information. It is expected that the process stimulates capacity-building and 
favours the development of beliefs and preferences for public participation and 
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democratic institutions. In the end, the main objective of having participation is “to 
improve the success of the implementation”. In this sense, the Spanish case tends to 
fall mainly within the category of input legitimacy although it is difficult to separate the 
two categories, as participation is seen both as an end and as a means.  
 
Table 9 below lists the conclusions for easy comparison.   
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Table 9: Comparing government rhetoric in the different cases 
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Specific rationales classified  
as input/output legitimacy 
Austrian 
Forest 
Dialogue 
+ + - Openness; Transparency; Consensus 
Austria’s 
Biodiversity 
Strategy 
+ (-) (+) Ensure public involvement; Sustainability; Conservation 
Danish Natura 
2000 Process 
- (+) + Dialogue with landowners; The public contribute with 
proposals, ideas, comments; Creating support from the 
public; Efficiency/effectiveness 
Danish 
National Park 
Pilot Project 
(-) + - Local ownership; Voluntary action; Dialogue; New 
models for co-operation; Clarity, transparency, rule of the 
law 
CFT case in 
France 
+ + (-) Consensus/recognised compromises; Involve actors  
French Relief 
Plan for 
Forest 
- + + Participation needed to solve crisis/problem solving; 
Transparent processes and Learning 
German IRDP 
(Leader + , 
Regionen 
Aktiv, GAK) 
+ + + Ensure broad participation; Ensure stakeholders’ 
acceptance; Provide decision making with democratic 
legitimacy; Mobilise people; Create synergies between 
people within the regions; Mobilise ideas and resources; 
Address problems in a more effective and efficient 
manner; Ensure contributions from stakeholders; 
Achievement of regional specific solutions 
Greek 
National Park 
Administration 
case 
+ + (+) General: Encourage direct public influence; Inform the 
public; Dialogue; Create consensus 
Specific: Democratic and transparent decisions; Local: 
Adequately protection of natural resources 
Hungarian 
NFP process 
+ (-) (+) Enhance the implementation process 
Dutch cases / / / Analysis of rhetoric not relevant 
Norwegian 
Living Forest 
/ / / Analysis of rhetoric not relevant 
Romania Anti-
Corruption 
(+) + + Strengthen democracy; Openness and transparency; 
Information to the public; Increase efficiency/ 
effectiveness 
Romania 
Natura 2000 
+ + + Strengthen democracy; Openness and transparency; 
Information to the public; Create awareness; Increase 
efficiency/ effectiveness 
Spain - 
Catalonia 
- + (-) Participation/democracy; Knowledge; Proposals; 
Communication; Confidence; Political Commitment; 
Transparency; Information; Capacity building; Success 
of implementation 
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It seems that reasons for referring to output/input as source of legitimacy depends on 
the nature of the process, i.e. whether it is focused on preparing a plan/policy 
document or whether it is centred around action. 
In a few cases there was a deliberate aim to include a broader set of stakeholders 
than formerly, as in the NOR-LF mentioned above, the HUN-NFP, and in the DEN-
NPP where the focus was both on the organised interests (business, NGOs, local 
politicians), and also on direct involvement of citizens. In other cases, the main focus 
was on involving the stakeholders considered crucial for implementation of the 
decision at hand, typically landowners. This was the case at the outset of the NL-GW 
and NL-UH from 1945 and onwards. 
 
4.1.2.3 What were the different formalised forms of participation? (and can they be 
considered a basic feature of the process or rather just a corner of it?) 
All cases were characterised by not only one but a number of formalised forms of 
participation. An overview of the different forms of participation and stakeholders 
involved can be found in Table 10. 
 
The cases where the aimed output was a policy document (AT-BS, AT-NFP, HUN-
NFP, ROM-ACP, DK-NPP etc.), or a similar specific task (e.g. FR-RPF to prepare 
relief plan, and GR-MA to manage national parks, GER-rural development cases) 
had a project organisation with steering committee/board/advisory group, either with 
intra-ministerial representation (AT-BS) and/or comprised by representatives from 
main NGOs and business interests, and assisted by a ministerial secretariat (except 
in the case of NOR-LF where the process was governed by the forest owner 
organisation). 
 
During a series of meetings the steering committee would then draft the document in 
question, and the draft document would be circulated for public comment before 
further refinement and, eventually, be the focus of a public workshop/conference, 
before final drafting and submission. 
 
In all cases, the steering committee or the assisting secretariat arranged 
supplementary forms of participation along the process to get input from a broader 
range of participants. This broader involvement could take the form of: 
1. Additional advisory groups that were nominated to assist the steering 
committee with specialised input, e.g. expert/scientific advisory groups (HUN-
NFP, NOR-LF, ESP-FPGP), thematic working groups (AT-BS, DK-NPP) and 
certification committee (NOR-LF).  
2. One-time participation events to involve a broader range of interest groups or 
citizens at broad include (café) meetings, seminars, (scenario) workshops, 
citizen summit (DK-NPP), conferences, public hearings through roundtables 
and public discussions.  
3. Multilayered structures. The German rural development cases and the DK-
NPP case had a multilayered structure, with a ministerial, (GER also regional) 
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and a local level, each level with its own participatory structures. At the local 
level, the process was organised and steered by a (GER: self-nominated) 
local action group. In the German case this was done according to EU 
guidelines required to obtain financial support, and in DK-NPP the local 
steering committees were set down according to some few guidelines laid 
down by the Minister of Environment, and facilitated by the Ministry of 
Environment.  
4. A range of information activities and informal participation have been carried 
out in all cases, from press releases and press conferences, internet 
discussion platforms (HUN-NFP), bilateral conversations, to public-private 
partnerships between key actors, e.g. between the Romanian Ministry of 
Justice and the League for human rights (ROM-ACP). 
5. Participatory monitoring: In ROM-NAT case, the ministry introduced a 
participatory nature monitoring system – ‘the Informational System for Natura 
2000’, where everyone was invited to upload information about habitats and 
species in Romania. Another interesting initiative in this case was that the 
NGOs took on an awareness raising role towards fellow NGOs by conducting 
‘train the trainers workshops on NGOs role in securing implementation of the 
Bird and Habitats directive’. 
 
Top-down versus bottom-up initiated 
A ‘bottom-up process’ has positive connotations – ‘the People itself taking the 
initiative and being active to change the world they live in to the better’. But what if 
the bottom-up approach involves only some and marginalises other interests? And 
how can grassroots be held accountable when they are not responsible to anyone 
but themselves, eventually their organisation? In contrast, a top down approach may 
be less well-suited at creating local commitment and sense of ownership. But a well-
managed top-down approach might be better equipped to ensure representativity 
and accountability of the process, as ultimately the politicians are accountable to their 
constituents through the elections. 
With one exception, the participation processes were in all cases government 
initiated, aimed at public input to formulate acts, policies or plans (AT-BS, AT-AFD, 
DEN-HD, DEN-NPP, FR-CFT, FR-RPF, GR-MA, HUN-NFP, NL-GW, NL-NPPN, NL-
UH, ROM-ACP, ROM-NAT, GER-GAK, GER-L+, GER-RA)8. 
The Norwegian case, the Living Forest Project (N-LF) is unique among the 19 cases 
as it is the only process that was initiated ‘bottom-up’. The initiator was the private 
forest owners’ organisation realising the need to strengthen the environmental brand 
of Norwegian forestry.  
In the case of Leader+ in Germany, the public authorities were the initiators, but with 
the aim to stimulate bottom-up participation, similar to the intention of the Agenda 21. 
In a few cases, the public processes were initiated as a response to pressure from 
NGOs, e.g.  
                                            
8
 For instance, in Spain, the General Plan of Forest Policy of Catalonia (ESP-FPGP) was developed 
through a participatory process, with an expert panel as the core to draft the plan, and inclusion of 
a broad range of stakeholders through hearings and a public workshop, to give input and comment 
upon the draft plan. 
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• In Romania it was pressure from NGO (Transparency International Romania) and 
the media that led to the initiation of anti-corruption policies. 
• The HD implementation in Denmark as well as Romania was furthered by NGO 
pressure (Birdlife International DK/Romania) 
 
What was the role of the public administration in facilitating the process?  
In the cases where the Government/public administration was the initiator, it also 
governed the process more or less directly.   
A few cases aimed at stimulating bottom-up participation, including Leader+ in 
Germany and DK-NPP. In these processes, the public authorities set the frames and 
provided funding, but the process itself was to be conducted by participatory 
committees established for the purpose. Here, the public administration played the 
role as meta-governors, i.e. indirectly governing the process through e.g. framing and 
boundary setting. 
In the AT-AFD case there were diverging opinions within the Forest Administration 
(FA) as to how the participation process should be conducted. One group aimed at a 
participatory set-up with open, flat and transparent, discussion-oriented decision 
process. Another group favoured a top-down approach in order to be able to control 
and conduct the process effectively, e.g. the right to decide which thematic topics to 
include/exclude in the process, something the participating NGOs refused to accept, 
however. 
In the DK-NPP case the Minister of Environment deliberately refrained from imposing 
detailed guidelines onto the seven national park pilot project groups. All they got was 
a letter of introduction and a budget. This ‘blank paper’ approach caused some 
uncertainty, both among the participants and as to the appropriate roles of the public 
servants involved. For instance, the public servants associated with the local working 
groups were to assist with expert input if requested but not to impose proposals. 
 
What was the intended output of the processes? 
In half of the cases, the aimed output of the process was a non-binding policy 
document: A national forest programme/action programme for sustainable forest 
management (AFD, NOR-LF, ESP-FPGP, HUN-NFP), a biodiversity strategy (ABD), 
anti-corruption policy statement (ROM-ACP), forest policy charter (FR-CFT) and a 
national park proposal (DK-NPP). In the rest of the cases, participation was either 
linked to project implementation, (GER-cases), management of an area (NL-cases, 
GR-MA, FR-RPF) or implementation of legally binding policies (ROM-NAT, DK-HD).  
 
Who participated and who was key participant? 
Regarding participation we distinguish between organised (representatives of interest 
groups) and non-organised participants (‘ordinary citizens’).  
As Table 10 shows, the forms of participation in the cases focused on ensuring 
representation of the affected interests through participation by well-defined interest 
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groups that were considered legitimate representatives9 of the interests. Another 
main focus seems to have been on including the participants that were considered 
crucial for process success. 
In 11 of the cases, the national government held the agenda setting power, in five 
cases it was shared with (DKK-NPP, GER-GAK) or entirely held by the federal/local 
government (GER-RA, GR-MA, NL-GW), and in four cases, the national government 
shared the agenda setting power with NGOs (FR-RPF, GER-L+, GER-RA, NL-UH), 
see also Table 10.  
The national government, represented by its public officials, was a key participant in 
all but three cases (GER-RA, NL-GW, NL-UH). And in 11 cases, the federal/local 
government was a key participant (too).  Other typical key participants were 
environmental and recreation NGOs, NGOs representing landowners/farmers/forest 
owners, and NGOs related to the specific topic at hand (rural development, anti-
corruption) as well as representatives from industry (forestry, rural development 
consultants) and research. In the case of DK-NPP the local steering committee was 
comprised by a mix of NGO representatives and local mayors, hereby lending 
legitimacy from the publicly elected politicians. In contrast, the local action groups in 
the GER-L+ case did not have local politicians seated, and the local politicians were 
hesitant to accept the role of these action groups. 
Involvement of ordinary citizens was limited to information campaigns and (passive) 
access to participate in public hearings. As an exception, the DK-NPP process was 
deliberately structured to combine interest representation with a socio-demographic 
representation of ‘ordinary citizens’ through a citizen summit. 
 
Who did not participate - was anyone excluded? 
In some cases, actors were reluctant to participate because they didn’t see the 
benefit in it.  This was the case for the farmers in relation to GER-L+, as they mainly 
perceived it as a restraining factor. In other cases actors felt excluded from the 
process, e.g. in the GR-MA, local farming groups, residents associations and hotel 
associations felt excluded, in the NL-NPPN the regional and local actors were 
excluded, and in the NOR-LF, environmental NGOs and representatives of the sami 
people felt excluded and without influence on the decision-making, as they were not 
represented in the core steering committee. More subtle, the AT-BS case reported on 
exclusion of those with less resources to participate and without good ministerial 
connections. And in the HUN-NFP the process was inclusive at the beginning, but 
excluding when it came to the decision-making phase.  
A review of the cases gives the impression that on the one hand, public authorities as 
well as actors who had hitherto had a privileged position with the public authorities in 
terms of gaining influence on policies (corporate involvement of typically landowners 
and industry) could be reluctant to open up for a broader range of stakeholders 
because they feared diminished influence and having additional restrictions imposed 
on their management. But on the other hand were public authorities as well as e.g. 
forest owners organisations facing changing market conditions, where it was no 
longer sufficient to produce the optimal output, but rather, the right output – that is, - 
what the public demands, eventually mediated through opinion makers, like 
                                            
9
 Legitimacy is typically obtained by having many members, being an organisation with elected 
representatives, having seats in other fora as well, taking actively part in the public debate and as 
such exposing its viewpoints for public comment 
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environmental NGOs. So, there emerged a need to involve other stakeholders both 
to identify what the right output would be, but also because participation was a way to 
develop legitimacy of the process and, hence, the output. So in many cases the 
process design would likely be so as to invite for participation to ensure legitimacy of 
the process and the sector as such, but to retain the decision power with a restricted 
range of stakeholders, eventually the public authorities. 
As an example, in the case of NOR-LF, the forest owners and the industry 
recognised the call for sustainable forest management and they recognised that it 
would take both a change of practices and a communicative effort to establish an 
image of Norwegian private forestry as being sustainable and this led to the creation 
of the NOR-LF where also environmental NGOs were invited to participate. But as 
we can see from the case, the decision power was still retained with the forest 
owners, industry and ministerial representatives. 
 
4.1.2.4 How do the forms of participation appear to work in practice in terms of 
achieving the stated aims? 
In all cases, it was through interest based representation that the processes gained 
democratic legitimacy. This works to the extent that all affected interests are actually 
represented (inclusiveness) and to the extent that the participating representatives 
are considered legitimate by and accountable to their support base. And it also 
requires that the process is transparent and with sufficient information for any 
potentially affected stakeholder to be able to follow the process. 
In the AT-AFD there was an overrepresentation of public officials and forestry sector 
people, and the AT-BS was too focused on expert input. The DK-HD case too was 
mainly based on expert input, the selection of experts as well as the whole process 
was in-transparent, and the directly affected landowners were not consulted in the 
first designation of habitat areas. So basically, it was a non-participatory process in 
its very design. In spite of this, NGOs managed to significantly influence the decision 
process. They did so by using the right to complain to EU over improper 
implementation of EU directives at national level.  
In contrast, the DK-NPP process was designed as a multilayered participatory 
process. At the local level it was even deliberately designed to ensure not only 
interest based representation but socio-demographic representation as well: The 
local steering group invited all citizens in the region for two public meetings. At the 
second meeting a number of thematic groups were formed by those interested to 
participate. These groups developed close to 300 proposals for the possible contents 
of a national park. Ten of these proposals were selected for discussion and voting at 
a citizen summit where people were invited based on a socio-demographically 
stratified sampling of the population in the region. The voting results were therefore 
given much weight by the local steering group in the final policy recommendations. 
With this case as the exception, all cases had very limited involvement of ‘ordinary 
citizens’. Mostly, they were approached in a passive way, e.g. providing access to 
internet fora, public hearings or being the target of information campaigns. But in all 
cases, including the DK-NPP it is experienced that ‘ordinary citizens’ are difficult to 
mobilise. 
The FR-CFT process was unbalanced in the sense that environmental and social 
interests were being excluded due to lack of guidelines to ensure this, and the image 
of forestry as mainly timber producing furthermore limited public interest to 
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participate. But those who participated experienced that communication improved as 
a result of the process.  
The FR-RPF process all failed to include environmental interests, partly because of 
its initial focus on economic aspects and partly because of lack of resources to 
conduct a broad process. But the process managed to alleviate the crisis and ensure 
financial compensation for the affected forest owners, hereby gaining output 
legitimacy for its problem solving capacity.  
The GER-L+ also was a success in terms of problem solving capacity (output 
legitimacy) – as it led to increasing visibility of EU rural development programmes, it 
changed the attitudes and norms, created new networks, and improved local 
cooperation towards rural development. In terms of input legitimacy, the process 
suffered from landowners being hesitant to participate, elected politicians being 
skeptical towards the initiative, and the process itself was administratively very 
demanding.  
The GER-RA similarly was successful in empowering regional actors to decide on 
the use of public funds, and to include new interests in the partnership, although the 
selection of the Jury was rather in-transparent.  
In the GR-MA case a more participatory culture gradually developed and informal 
networking was stimulated. Still, some interest groups felt excluded and some partly 
because they simply hadn’t been informed of the possibility to participate.  
In the case of HUN-NFP, participants also felt they had influence and the information 
flow was good. There was a broad representation at the first phases of the process, 
whereas at the final and decisive phases, the decision-making was held exclusively 
within the Ministry. 
The NL-GW case evolved over several years from a narrow agricultural towards a 
more broadly participatory, inclusive initiative.  
The NL-NPPN was appreciated for being an inclusive and very open process 
although the process became more excluding at the end (input legitimacy). Overall 
the process had the result that societal values are now being better recognised in 
nature policy (output legitimacy). 
In the NL-UH case the participatory process increased over the years and resulted in 
building of trust, mutual understanding and in the establishing of a national park 
(output legitimacy), although not without power struggles between landowners and 
the other actors over right of land use and access to decision-making (input 
legitimacy).  
The NOR-LF gained much (output) legitimacy in managing to develop a programme 
for sustainable forest management, including outreach/extension to forest owners. In 
terms of input legitimacy, various NGOs felt excluded from important decision bodies 
and, e.g. women were underrepresented. Still, the case authors report that over time 
the process became more inclusive and they report that most informants felt that all 
stakeholders were incorporated in the dialogue and that the process was conducted 
by democratic rules of the game.  
In the ROM-AC case the process was in-transparent and some stakeholders felt they 
were only invited to enable the initiators to apply for funding (i.e. weak input 
legitimacy). Still, the process stimulated a more participatory political culture. 
The ROM-NAT was open for broad and active participation but suffered from 
shortage of resources and sometimes late information (input legitimacy). The NGOs 
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even took on a training the trainers role and the Ministry actively supported this by 
providing venues for its involvement.  
In the case of ESP-FPGP, participants felt they had influence: the process was 
perceived open to anyone who wanted to participate, there was good access to 
information, internet communication helped to ensure a geographical balance, and 
the editor board has a neutral and professional approach.  
 
Table 10: Formalised participation in the cases 
Austria AFD 
2003 – 2005 
 
Formalised forms: Start-up meeting, 20 days of working group sessions, 4 round 
tables, 5 one-day work shops for the elaboration of the forest programme and the 
work programme (216 hours of meetings). The Forest Forum succeeded (after 
2005) the working groups for ongoing dialogue among stakeholders. 
Main actors: The Forest Department (two groups with differing view points: as open 
and flatly structured as possible>< top-down steered – fear of ineffectiveness and 
loss of control) was the main process coordinators; set up the thematic structure of 
the working groups. Management and process coordination group consisted mainly 
of members from the Forestry Department. The most active participants were 
Austrian Chamber of Agriculture, national federation of Agricultural and Forest 
Enterprises, Forestry Department of the FMAFEW, WWF, and Green Party. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: Interest groups organised at the national level and invited 
actors. Broad range of actors was invited (81 organisations). Actively participating: 
environment, nature conservation, sports, forestry, (agriculture), wood and paper 
industries, employees and consumer protection, (hunting), the church, development 
cooperation, youth, science, education, energy, federal provinces, public 
administration.  
Implementation of working programme: responsibility remains with the ‘inner core’ 
of the traditional forest policy actor network. 
The general public: informed through internet and newsletters (only marginal 
involvement). 
Perceived problems: lack of capacity relating to time and personnel resources, 
huge amount of papers to read and comment, confusing linkages between drafts, 
for some lack of expertise. Overrepresentation of public officials (2/3) and forestry 
sector, mix-up of roles as WG leader AND representative of FMAFEW 
Perceived benefits: good atmosphere for discussions evolved, tensions eased, 
better understanding of the rationale of the ‘adversaries’, more open ways of 
thinking. Differing opinion regarding the output – the forest programme and the 
working programme, dependent on a priori expectations of participants. In general 
it makes sense, yet for some only a first step. 
Austria BDS 
1996-2007 
Formalised forms:  The National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) held 42 meetings 
until 2007, higher frequency before 1999 of 6-7 meetings per year, later only twice 
a year (advise and inform, evaluate the first BDS), participating in the editorial 
group established December 1997, commenting on the four strategy drafts. 
Additional venues for the revision of the strategy: Workshops, working groups on 4 
thematic issues. 2 further strategy drafts for commenting. 
Main actors: Public authorities drafting the strategy. Two actor coalitions: Those 
with strong economic interests in the use of natural resources (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Presidents’ Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, 
Chamber of Commerce) and those motivated by an interest in nature conservation 
(Ministry of Environment, WWF, ÔGNU). The first coalition was the most powerful. 
The revision process: Provincial representatives, stakeholders from the economic 
coalition were the most active and influential actors. 
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Inclusion of stakeholders: The NBC: representatives of all relevant organisations 
(Landowner associations, Chamber of Commerce, ENGOs), public authorities 
(federal and provincial administrative departments) and science (Universities, 
Austrian Academy of Science, Natural History Museum). 
The editorial Group: seven members representing different ministries, federal 
provinces, the Presidents’ Conference of Chambers of Agriculture and the 
Federation of Environmental Organisations (writing the draft strategies). Supported 
by working groups in most cases led by public officials 
The general public: website established to inform the public. It was not actively 
used. 
Perceived problems: The NBC only had an informative role, no binding decisions, 
and hence impact. Declining interest to participate over time from a number of 
stakeholders. The revision process: Not sufficiently open for discussion, 
unbalanced – too focussed on scientific experts. Comments to drafts 
communicated bilaterally – only the Chair of the NBC and the person in charge of 
the up-dating process at the Federal Environmental Agency knew all the comments 
= insufficient transparency and opportunity for real dialogue. State driven, the 
process favours the resourceful with good ministerial connections. 
Perceived benefits: Networking perceived as important by in particular NGOs and 
science representatives, access to information 
Denmark HD 
1992-2007  
Formalised forms: Formal hearings of acts and Natura2000 plans, consultation of 
the forest council regarding the revision of the forest act. Interview survey with 148 
forest owners. Group of experts from NERI and Forest & Landscape regarding the 
technical implementation. Bilateral consultation of affected landowners. Statements 
from legal experts. 
Main actors: Ministry of Environment (Minister and National Forest and Nature 
Agency) and the Counties in charge of the process and its implementation. BirdLife 
Denmark, The Nature Council, Professor of Law, Peter Pagh for forcing the revised 
perception of the scope of the directive. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: BirdLife Denmark complained to the EU of insufficient 
implementation. Landowners (Danish Agriculture, Danish Forest Society) regarding 
the new and revised acts, NGOs commented on drafts acts. Experts regarding the 
technical implementation, the Nature Council consisting of Scientific experts from 
Universities, held conferences, published a book on the status of the 
implementation 
The general public: Hardly informed, not involved. 
Perceived problems: Closed, expert-driven, undemocratic process. Prioritised list of 
species and habitats are defined at EU level and does not necessarily match the 
Danish context. Inflexible. Difficult for smaller NGOs to gain access to EU 
processes. 
Perceived benefits: For ENGOs the binding nature of the EU directives and the 
possibility to lodge complaints to the EU Commission on insufficient 
implementation, give them new power to ensure minimum standards in nature 
protection. 
Denmark NPP 
2001 - 2007  
Formalised forms: Organised interests and local mayors participated in local 
steering committees and scenario workshops and the national advisory group. 
Seminars and conferences. Citizens in local working groups, seminars, café-
meeting, citizen summit with voting for/against ten controversial proposals. 
Main actors: Minister of Environment taking the initiative, The National Forest and 
Nature Agency as secretariat for the steering committees and the national advisory 
group, writing guidelines for the investigations to be undertaken. The Outdoor 
Council, providing half the funds, proposing the areas for the pilot process. 
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Inclusion of stakeholders: Main organised stakeholders (landowners, environmental 
organisations, recreational interests, tourism) included through the steering 
committees (local organisations) and the national advisory group (national 
organisations). 
The general public: included mainly through working groups and also public 
meetings. They could furthermore inform themselves by means of the webpage 
created for the process. 
Perceived problems: Landowners felt as a minority who were to bear all the costs. 
Some citizens felt the work from the working groups being diluted on its way up 
through steering committees and the advisory group and that the National Forest 
and Nature Agency had too much influence.  Difficult to mobilise the ‘ordinary’ 
citizens. 
Perceived benefits: The process was considered unusually open and transparent, 
increased understanding of the viewpoints of the ‘adversaries’. Strong commitment 
from the participating mayors lifted the process. For many: the fact that national 
parks would become a reality. 
France CFT 
2001 - 2007 
Formalised forms: Concrete contractually defined public-private partnerships based 
on permanent participation of all stakeholders in the management decisions and 
activities. Participation was organised on an informal basis without specifically 
allocating resources for it. The practical organisation of the forest charters are 
mainly taken care of by the public officials. 
Main actors: The local communities which in almost all cases initiated the process 
in order to advocate a better involvement of the politicians in local decisions. The 
national federation of forestry communes as it managed to change the perceptions 
of forests in the minds of the local decision-makers by means of the communal 
forest charters. Local public foresters taking over the practical organisation of the 
forest charters. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: In the beginning of the processes local administrative 
and institutional actors were systematically invited. Recreationist’s associations 
were usually informed but not clearly invited to the constituting meetings; 
environmental NGOs were rarely informed. Hence partnerships were mainly 
between the local administration and the producer-interests. Tourism organisations 
were often invited but seldom took part. 
The general public: Civil society is rarely represented as such. 
Perceived problems: Unbalanced processes where environmental and social 
interests are being excluded, due to insufficient guidelines and obligations as for 
whom the project bearers should invite. This has led to a lack of trust in 
participation for those excluded. The traditional perception of forests as being 
mainly a timber resource is limiting the interest of the general public to take part in 
the decision-making process. Some private forest owners feel ruled out by the 
public foresters. 
Perceived benefits: Meeting and confronting views give an added value and a 
better communication between public and private actors in the wood chain. 
France RPF 
1999 – 2007 the 
process is 
ongoing until 
2009 
Formalised forms: Participation was spontaneously promoted by the shock of the 
crisis which urgently needed to be addressed and therefore informal. At the 
national level: Emergency Commission with representatives from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and professional stakeholder organisations 
Main actors: The State (Ministry of Agriculture) providing substantial funds for 
alleviating the crisis and consolidated its powerful position. The national federation 
of forestry communes established contacts with and between all the municipalities. 
The National Forest Service organised seminars and prepared guidelines for the 
reconstitution of the forests. 
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Inclusion of stakeholders: The crisis situation initially led to an open process where 
all stakeholders felt they could influence the process, which is unusual in a French 
context. Furthermore there was financial incentive to participate, which was a 
driving force. The following reconstitution plans rapidly became a non-inclusive 
technical matter led by the National Forest Service. However; WWF informally 
affected the reconstitution by editing leaflets regarding environmental consideration 
when reforesting and some of their advice was headed by the National Forest 
Service. Recreational interest organisations were not consulted during the process. 
The general public: Outside of the forestry sector no involvement (not specifically 
dealt with in the case) 
Perceived problems: Since the economic aspects were prominent from the 
beginning, and the economically affected actors participating in the first phase 
simply continued to the second phase, environmental interests have been excluded 
from the process. There was furthermore a lack of institutional capacities at the 
regional level to include a broad array of stakeholders. 
Perceived benefits: Alleviation of the immediate crisis, financial compensation for 
the incurred losses. Local politicians are now taking more active part in the 
management of forests. The national federation of forestry communes has better 
possibilities of selling its timber. 
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LEADER
+ 
2000-
2006 
 
Formalised forms: Many forms of participation formalised through EU guidelines 
and programmatic prescriptions 
Main actors: Local Action Groups as the drivers and decision-makers of the 
regionally based processes, the European Commission since LEADER+ is an EU 
initiative. The Minister for Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection wanted to put 
the IRD approach on the political agenda.  
Inclusion of stakeholders: Local action groups are to represent all relevant regional 
actors and their interests, non-governmental actors should constitute at least 50% 
of the participants. It was mainly organised actors who participated. In many cases 
project initiation and agenda setting took place within a small group of actors, 
followed by a phase of broader participation whereas implementation again rests 
on a more narrow set of actors. 
The general public: The process was in principle open for non-organised citizens, 
but practically mainly organisational representatives took part. 
Perceived problems: Private and corporate are perceived to be less represented. In 
particular farmers were reluctant to join the LEADER+ process and when they did 
merely played a restraining role. Farmers and forestry actors did not a priori see 
sufficient benefits from participating. Elected politicians feared a loss of decision-
making power to the, in their view, not democratically legitimate local action groups. 
Excessive demands on a few honorary actors from the requirements affiliated with 
the action groups combined with demands from other regional policy initiatives. 
Enormous administrational effort at the provincial administrations. 
Perceived benefits: Increased visibility of EU rural development programmes. 
LEADER+ caused changes in attitude and thereby improved local cooperation.  
Actor networks evolved and increased social capital.  Various local stakeholders 
got the possibility to influence the rural development of the area and actually had 
decision-making power.  
Regionen 
Aktiv 
2001-
2007 
Formalised forms: A Jury was convened to assist the Ministry in the selection of 
applicant regions for the programme, but did not have decision-making power. A 
Council with seven members emerged from the Jury to assess the progress in the 
selected regions, grant performance dependent extra funds decide on changes in 
regional integrated development strategies and give advice to the Ministry. The 
Council was expanded to 13 participants in 2005. At the regional level: Public 
private partnerships. 
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Main actors: The Ministry (BMVEL) was a central actor and initiator of participation 
but conducted an active management of the project environment (e.g. excluding the 
federal states initially p.66). At the federal level a coalition of actors from the 
organic farming movement, the federal agency for nature conservation, department 
525 of the Ministry of Agriculture, the German land care association, the ENGO 
NABU and a private consultant for rural development issues, discussed the initial 
idea of setting up an integrated federal rural development programme as well as 
certain fundamental decisions.  
Inclusion of stakeholders: The Jury consisted of a wide range of actors who in a 
broad sense were concerned with sustainable rural development. The partnerships 
were open to all relevant and willing regional public (<50%) and private actors 
The general public: could be involved in the regional partnerships, but there was a 
weak mobilisation of private (organised and non-organised) actors. 
Perceived problems: Not transparent how the Jury was composed. The federal 
states as constitutional stakeholders were neither invited to the Jury, nor the first 
Council much to the indignation of many federal states. Private and corporate are 
under-represented in the partnerships. 
Perceived benefits: For the first time actors in the region were empowered to 
actually decide on the use of public funds. Inclusion of traditionally rather weak 
interests in the partnerships and the possibility for mutual learning regarding 
interests and concerns. New networks for cooperation formed. The creation of 
regional identities. 
GAK 
2004-
2006 
 
Formalised forms: NGOs may address their concerns to members of The planning 
committee for agricultural structures and coastal protection (PLANAK) (see below) 
or informally the relevant public administrators. Formal hearings of concerned 
associations. 
Main actors: Members of PLANAK. For implementation: the communes as 
beneficiaries for regional management and development concepts they are 
required to be involved in order to have rural development strategies funded (?) 
Inclusion of stakeholders: PLANAK: only ministers (or their representatives) from 
the federal states and federal government representatives (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Ministry of Finance) are participating. 
The general public: Not involved 
Perceived problems: There was very limited scope for participation, i.e. in this 
sense the adaptations of the GAK towards the IRD philosophy have been more 
rhetoric than practise. GAK is a planning system reluctant of including new actors 
Perceived benefits: none 
Greece 
End 90s-2007 
Formalised forms: Park boards composed of 7-11 members. Open discussions 
organised by private planning bodies who undertake to conduct Special 
Environmental Studies for establishing new, protected areas. Public hearings and 
the possibility to give feedback to the Special Environmental Studies 
Main actors: Park board members, including a representative of the provincial 
governor, a political entity, which can act as a general authority to approve and 
decide upon all region-related management policies and decisions. (This authority 
was given recently and represents a power-redistribution from the state to the 
provincial level, which is what has given better opportunities for participation in the 
first place). The Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works appoints the 
President of the Boards. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: The boards are comprised of a variety of sectoral 
organisations, environmental organisations and private interest groups. Some 
interest groups feel excluded (local farming groups, residents associations and 
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hotel associations). Certain interest groups have not participated because they 
have not been informed about the possibility. 
The general public: can participate in the open discussions organised by the park 
board and in hearings, but unless there is a strong interest, it is difficult to mobilise 
non-organised citizens. 
Perceived problems: The boards have been criticised for excluding other interests 
and being elitist, however; in most cases the board compositions are considered 
satisfactorily balanced in particular regarding local versus national interests. There 
is not yet a mature culture of participation in Greece which is an impeding factor. In 
some cases the local authorities have resented the Boards, as they meant handing 
over some power, and some of the local interest groups and sectoral organisations 
participate defensively the keep status quo. 
Perceived benefits: A more participatory culture is developing. Board members 
have found their ability to participate a very positive experience, which has also 
stimulated informal networking. 
Hungary 
2001-2007 
(2015) 
Formalised forms: Expert level working groups, conferences and workshops, 40-50 
public roundtables, internet discussion platform, information events, press 
conferences. 
Main actors: Programme owner was the Forestry Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development which funded the process. Coordinator was the 
Institute of Forest Policy and Forest Management at the University of West 
Hungary which organised almost all events. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: Differed in the various phases. Experts from research 
organisations took part for the initial analyses and drafting of the programme along 
with civil servants. Interest organisations (directly forestry related public and private 
organisations, forest research organisation, forest industry, ENGOs, workers 
unions, local/regional politicians, recreational interest groups) took part during a 
phase of public discussion as well as through public hearings in the Parliament 
sub-committees. 
The general public: Informed through the media, broadcast and print. 
Perceived problems: The decision making phase was of an excluding character 
and took place within the Ministry, where the previously informed stakeholders did 
not have neither sufficient access nor information. There was no actual power 
redistribution. 
Perceived benefits: In the programming phase the access to information and 
general information flow was very good and the level of actor satisfaction was high. 
There were many organisations involved which gave the phase a high legitimacy. 
The process was much more open to stakeholders than previously in forest policy 
in Hungary. Mutual learning took place.  
Netherlands 
Groene Woud 
1945-2007 
Formalised forms: First period: The reallocation committee (Oirschot-Best) solely 
for actors with agricultural interests, consultation of the Staatbosbeheer. 
Reallocation Sint-Oedenrode: local committee with agricultural (dominant), 
recreational and nature conservation interests represented. Second period: 
Working group for the Ecological Main Structure established in the province Noord-
Brabant by means of a covenant between the province and the provincial 
landscape and nature conservation interest groups and agriculture. Deliberation 
boards at the local level for making proposals for the Ecological Main Structure 
demarcations. The Valuable Cultural Landscapes project: Committee with broad 
organisational representation. This committee is later reorganised into Innovation 
Platform Sustainable Meierij, again with broad regional representation, but 
participants oblige themselves to a minimum effort and are better locally anchored. 
Groene woud: Management platform: municipalities, nature, agricultural and 
recreational interests are represented. The province creates reconstruction 
committees with formal responsibility of preparing and implementing the 
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reconstruction process and with representatives from the municipalities, the 
Chamber of Commerce, agricultural, nature and recreational interest organisations. 
Furthermore deliberation boards are installed consisting of local representatives 
and a social-economical platform where knowledge institutes are added to the 
municipal and interest organisation representatives. 
Main actors: Initially the agricultural organisations (in particular NCB – North-
Brabrant Christian Agricultural League, which however due to agricultural 
reorganisation is later merged into a new organisation) and farmers who are to 
ensure food production and the rural economy. Brabants Landschap and 
Natuurmonumenten, who both aim at the preservation of natural values by buying 
up nature areas. Later during the demarcations for the Ecological Main Structure 
they are able to play an influential role because of their ecological knowledge. 
Brabants Landschap furthermore is behind the original Groene Woud plan in 
cooperation with public officials. Staatsbosbeheer (semi-private state forest 
agency) is an important landowner and becomes a part of the coalition with 
Brabants Landschap and Natuurmonumenten. The province initiating and 
facilitating many of the processes. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: Initially corporative involvement of the agricultural 
interests. Increasing influence to nature and landscape conservation organisations. 
The Valuable Cultural Landscapes Committee: broad representation of interest 
groups and public officials from the province and municipalities. The Groene Woud 
project: broad participation and much local enthusiasm for the process. 
The general public: agrarians and nature- and landscape conservationists assisted 
by their organisations participate in the demarcation of the Ecological Main 
Structure. A Groene Woud festival takes place were the regional entrepreneurs 
present themselves to the public. Two Groene Woud symposiums (not clear what 
they are and for whom) 
Perceived problems: Antagonism between agricultural interest and nature and 
landscape conservation interests causes toilsome negotiations. Valuable Cultural 
Landscapes: limited commitment from the committee participants as they are not 
really locally anchored. Local actors do not see any benefits and are hence not 
committed either. The reconstruction process is problematic and the agricultural 
organisation and the environmental federation steps out of the process. Some find 
the lack of steering and structure in the Groene Woud process problematic. 
Perceived benefits: Because the demarcation of the Ecological Main Structure 
discussion took place at the local level there was no need to argue at the provincial 
level. As the Groene Woud ideals are strengthened cooperation begins to occur 
between the farmers’ organisation and Brabants Landschap – the animosity of old 
begins to wane. The Groene Woud process flourishes – some say because it is 
flexible and without one single head steering the process. This generates initiative 
and many bottom-up projects. Participation becomes broader and more inclusive 
over time. 
Netherlands 
Nature for 
People, People 
for Nature 
1999 - 2000 
Formalised forms: Open general workshops in the initial phase, thematic 
workshops on five themes constituted by about 15- 20 governmental and societal 
actors. Bilateral conversations/contacts between the Ministry and selected 
participants. Public presentations of draft papers. (Project team: Public officials 
from different sectors, province representatives. The team was later reduced in size 
to consist of five members from the nature department. The steering group with 
representatives from different ministries and regional authorities – but was later 
reformed into an inter-ministerial advisory group.) 
Main actors: Ministry of LVN initiated the process, defined themes to be discussed, 
in the later stages of the process defined which stakeholders should be further 
included, The project team writing the drafts and in particular the nature department 
representatives. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: Initially a very broad inclusion. New actors such as a 
cooperative bank, the general building association, the National Agriculture Union, 
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and the Federation of Private Landowners were explicitly involved by the Ministry in 
addition to the ‘usual suspects’, but restricted to national level actors. Later in the 
process participation was limited to bilateral contacts with selected stakeholders. 
The general public: Not specifically addressed in the case report 
Perceived problems: After the first draft after the participatory phase there were 
inter-ministerial concerns, where some public officials were concerned that their 
areas of expertise were not sufficiently covered. After the initial open phase the 
process became increasingly exclusive to others than the Ministry. 
Perceived benefits: The willingness of the Ministry to include new actors at an early 
stage and the openness of the process was highly appreciated. The societal values 
are being better recognised in nature policy. New non-governmental actors were 
included. 
Netherlands 
Utrechtse 
Heuvelrug 
1945-2007 
Formalised forms: The Ecological Main Structure: The province involves nature and 
landscape organisations (how?), and the private owners are consulted. The 
national park initiative: First the VCNP makes a public hearing for an assembly of 
regional actors to comment on their national park study. Private landowners 
participate by blocking the plan of the VCNP and initiating bottom-up participatory 
procedures with the other landowners (Utrechts Landschap, Natuurmonumenten, 
Staatsbobesher). Supported by the the Province of Utrecht a formal deliberation 
board is set up. The Hart van the Heuvelrug Platform with representatives of red 
(urban development) and green interests (nature) as well as ministerial 
representatives. Referendum regarding the creation of an ecoduct over A28 (road), 
however; too few people vote for the referendum to be considered 
Main actors: In the beginning Natuurmonumenten and Utrechts Landschap buying 
land for conservation. The latter remains a key actor later mediating between the 
private landowners and the other involved actors and initiating the holistic approach 
to “Heel  de Heuvelrug”. The coalition of landowners who initiates the national park 
after the failed attempt of the VCNP.  
Inclusion of stakeholders: Private owners, Nature conservation interests (Utrechts 
Landschap, Natuurmonumenten), the semi-private state forest agency 
Staatsbosbeheer, recreational entrepreneurs, municipal and provincial 
representatives, agricultural interest organisation. 
The general public: Apart from the landowners, not dealt with in the MA-report 
Perceived problems: The demarcation of the Ecological main structure: recreational 
entrepreneurs were late in realising the consequences of the demarcation, and 
hence were unable to influence the process. The first national park initiative: The 
members of the VCNP were locally considered as ‘intruders’ who did not listen to 
the local concerns in their Utrecht National Park study. Private landowners 
therefore blocked the plan. Negotiations are tough due to the voluntary character of 
the process as the private landowners are headstrong and continuously threaten to 
stop cooperation if they do not get things their way. Local interest organisations and 
recreational entrepreneurs feel excluded from the Hart van de Hevelrug project.  
Perceived benefits: A national park is established. Stakeholders begin to think 
beyond their own borders. Trust is gradually built among the stakeholders. 
Definitive increase in participatory processes over the years. 
Norway LF 
1995-2006 
Formalised forms: The steering committee with forest owner representatives, forest 
industry representatives and representatives from the ministries of agriculture and 
environment. Four working groups with representatives of the forest production 
interest groups. The Certification Committee where ecological, economic and social 
interests were equally represented. The Scientific Committee comprised of ten 
researchers. The Advisory Committee where more than 200 organisations were 
invited to open hearings and plenary discussions as well as working groups. An 
Evaluative Steering Committee with six members covering economic, ecological 
and social interests. Public hearing of the draft for revisions of the Living Forest 
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Standards with a consultation round for all organisations. The permanent Living 
Forest Council with broad representation. 
Main actors: The Forest Owners’ Federation was the driving force behind the 
project and together with the forest industry and the government defined the 
framework and objectives for the project; the government representatives did not 
have formal right to vote. The Forest Owners Federation was moreover in charge of 
the Living Forest secretariat. Environmental organisations had some power as they 
were needed for legitimising the process. 
Inclusion of stakeholders: In the working groups and the steering committee there 
were only representatives of the economically focussed interest organisations: 
forest owners, the forest industry as well as observers from the Ministry. There was 
a broader representation in the certification committee, and in particular in the 
Advisory Committee and the Living Forest Council. Furthermore during the 
consultation phase regarding the revision of the standards everyone could 
comment. 
The general public: Could respond to during the public hearing of the revision of the 
Living Forest standards 
Perceived problems: ENGOs and recreational interest organisations felt excluded 
from the important decision-making bodies. The ENGOs felt that there were 
insufficient assurances that the certification criteria were complied with. Some of 
the conflicting issues were defined out of the project, e.g. natural forests which 
made one ENGO leave the process. The sámediggi was unable to participate due 
to insufficient resources, but did respond to the public hearing. No stakeholders 
regarding cultural heritage were present, neither was the tourism sector. Women 
are underrepresented. The industry is generally more resourceful i.e. powerful than 
the other interest groups. 
Perceived benefits: Over time the process became more inclusive and most 
informants feel that all stakeholders have been incorporated in the dialogue and 
democratic principles and consensus seeking have become rules of the game. 
Romania Anti-
Corruption 
2000-2007 
Formalised forms: Consultation through roundtables and conferences of NGOs 
regarding the formation of new legislation. The central group for analysis and 
coordination of preventing corruption actions had representation of five NGOs, the 
Strategic Committee for Evaluation  and Control of Anti-corruption activities had 3 
NGOs represented appointed by an NGO coalition. This anticorruption coalition had 
a working group and a business association which partnered with the Ministry of 
Justice and held monthly decentralised meetings. Public private partnership 
between the Ministry of Justice and the League for human rights. In the forest 
sector: Commission for Social Dialogue with representatives form producers 
associations and trade unions. 
Main actors: The Ministry of Justice, active NGOs (8 are mentioned as being the 
most active, most of them are specifically concerned with fighting corruption, others 
with human rights, sustainable development and reforming the justice system) and 
the media proving corruption and therefore the need to fight it. The media took part 
in a campaign to raise awareness 
Inclusion of stakeholders: Many coalitions were formed among NGOs, some 
entered into partnerships with government, others specialised in raising public 
awareness. 
The general public: Informed through campaigns 
Perceived problems: The creation of various commissions for law preparation is not 
transparent. Some stakeholders at the local level felt that they were only asked to 
participate in order for the local administration to obtain funding from different 
donors 
Perceived benefits: At times participation has been well functioning and 
stakeholders felt they had genuine influence. The anticorruption policies have 
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stimulated a culture of participation inspired also by the models of other countries 
and international NGOs 
Romania 
Natura 2000 
1999-2006 
Formalised forms: Meetings and public debates with invited interest organisations 
before area designation 
. The Access project initiated by the Deputy Chamber to support NGOs in the 
legislative process where 80 organisations were contacted. The College for 
Consultation which is a common forum for consultation with the civil society 
facilitating communication. The Informational System for Natura 2000 was an 
online system for data gathering and information exchange. Seminar organised by 
WWF and the Romanian Partnership Foundation led to the formation of the NGOs 
Coalition Natura 2000. They furthermore arranged “train the trainers” workshop for 
NGOs on their role in securing the Birds and Habitats Directives implementation. 
This was followed by a series of training and awareness raising activities for NGOs. 
NGOs produced a “shadow list” of site proposals for the Commission 
Main actors: Ministry for Environment and Water Management being responsible 
for implementation, BirdLife Romania which signed a partnership agreement with 
the Ministry. WWW arranging seminar and workshops.  
Inclusion of stakeholders: BirdLife Romania, WWF, Romanian Partnership 
Foundation, SOR, NGOs Coalition Natura 2000, The Resource Centre for public 
participation, municipality representatives, public officials from the national, regional 
and local level and landowners. 
The general public: Information campaigns, NGOs organised meetings to inform, 
educate and increase awareness of nature protection 
Perceived problems: Difficult to verify the data put into the Informational System for 
Natura 2000. Lack of funds for participation was initially a constraining factor. 
Sometimes late announcements of meetings by the Ministry, shortage in human 
resources. 
Perceived benefits: NGOs were active and organised a number of activities and 
training sessions and the Ministry changed attitude towards NGO involvement and 
actively organised venues for this involvement. 
Spain 
2003-2005 
Formalised forms: Workshop, meetings for draft presentations, two expert groups. 
Main actors: The Undersecretary of Forests and Biodiversity Management which 
initiated and coordinated the process 
Inclusion of stakeholders: Expert groups: SWOT analysis done by 14 experts from 
the traditional forest sector, after which 80 organisations were invited to make 
contributions. Those were forest owner, forest industry, environmental, recreationist 
and consumer organisations. Only those who made contributions were invited to 
the workshop. The administration transformed suggestions into budgeted action 
plans in 25 thematic groups of 3-7 public administrators. 
The general public: was encouraged to make contributions 
Perceived problems: Time pressure for the public officials making action plans. All 
the participants from the private sector were constrained by lacking resources in 
terms of financial and human resources. Time gaps between events may have 
injured the process.  
Perceived benefits: The process was perceived as open to anyone who wanted to 
participate, good access to information, and internet communication has been 
favourable in terms of geographical balance. A neutral and professional approach 
in the editor board. Participants felt they had influence. 
Source: Main assessment reports, comments for CF draft, Göttingen meeting. 
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4.1.3 Main conclusions on participation 
In almost all GoFor cases, participation was considered an important element to 
characterise the process. As such, they can be considered critical cases, i.e. if 
participation does not work according to stated objectives in these cases, it is 
expected to work even less in other cases.  
In current natural resources policy, the dominating rhetoric is that more participation 
is better participation. This is also reflected in the majority of GoFor cases. First of all, 
there is an increasingly recognised need for participation.  Although more hesitant in 
biodiversity politics (AT-ABD, DK-HD) than in other processes, partly because of its 
sector nature. The calls for participatory approaches can partly be explained by the 
increased international focus on the topic from the 1990es and onwards, but partly 
also from a recognition among decision-makers that problem solving is not possible 
without the participation of stakeholders that can affect or are affected by the 
decision.  
In the GoFor cases several forms of participation were used. The dominating form 
was however still to consult main interest organisations in various forums for 
discussion.  
The rhetoric showed a concern for who should participate (representation), calling for 
broad participation (GER-cases), involving actors (FR-CFT), local ownership (DK-
NPP). And all cases reported on a tendency towards broader participation over time, 
although in several cases, some stakeholders were excluded from parts or all of the 
process (e.g. AT-BS, HUN-NFP, NOR-LF, FR-RPF). The involvement efforts remain 
focused on interest based representation via the organised stakeholders. The non-
organised citizens are mainly addressed in terms of information campaigns, and 
where they are invited for actual (consultative) participation, they are difficult to 
mobilise. The lack of ‘ordinary citizen’ participation may worry the public authority that 
has it as a sub-objective, e.g. in the case of the DK-NPP. But it can be questioned if it 
is always relevant to invite for citizen involvement considering the topic and the 
scope for influence: citizens do not always have an interest in getting involved: it may 
take too much time from other activities, the topic is perceived too distant to their 
everyday lives and/or they may trust other parties to manage the policy area with due 
concern for the various, affected interests. Or they may (true or not) perceive that 
their opportunities to influence the process is very limited. 
Arnstein (1969) argues that participation is about redistributing power from those who 
have power to those who do not have power. So it would be natural to assume that 
an aim for broader participation is to include the ‘have not’s’ in decision-making. In 
most of the cases it appeared, however, that the aim of broadening the participation 
and involve new actors was to mobilise networks and resources that could further the 
implementation of already identified policy objectives. Because nature politics 
depends on other policy areas for its implementation, both because it has inter-
sectoral implications in practice, and because the decision power and related funds 
are mostly located elsewhere (in the ‘producing’/business sectors, .e.g agriculture, 
tourism). Examples can be found in the cases dealing with national forest 
programmes, where part of the task is to redefine the role of forests in society and 
maintain and rebuild legitimacy of the forest sector (AT-NFP, ESP-FPGP, HUN-NFP, 
NOR-LF). Having this scope for broader participation is not a problem in itself. It only 
becomes a problem insofar as there are actually ‘have not-minorities’ who are 
affected by the decisions but are excluded. This was the case in the NOR-LF where 
the sami people were excluded, partly also because they didn’t have the necessary 
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resources to participate. This was also the case in the NOR-LF and the NPP-DK 
case where women were underrepresented in the participatory processes. Gender 
and other biases may have characterised all the processes to a larger extent than 
appears from the case descriptions: it was not a common goal to study such 
particular biases.  
From the rhetoric there appears to be focus on the quality of interaction/input 
legitimacy in at least some cases: the processes need to be transparent and provide 
information (ESP-FPGP, AT-AFD, DK-HD, FR-RPF, GR-MA, ROM-AC, ROM-NAT). 
Some process aims are to achieve dialogue, create consensus, inform the public, 
create awareness, capacity building, mobilise people and create political commitment 
(various cases). And some cases refer to output legitimacy aiming to address 
problems in a more effective and efficient manner to achieve regional specific 
solutions (GER-cases), successful implementation (ESP-FPGP), or protection of 
natural resources (GR-MA, AT-BS). 
Judged from the case study reports, some cases actually did manage to conduct a 
transparent process with sufficient information whereas in other cases, potentially 
relevant participants were not aware of the process going on (GR-MA), or there were 
insufficient capacity and resources to ensure information and access opportunities to 
all relevant stakeholders (FR-RPF, ROM-NAT).  
Common to almost all the cases with invited participation is that the initiators have 
followed rather ‘traditional’ processes, inviting organised participants who are easy to 
reach, and who are already known to the decision makers. Moreover, most of the 
processes were based on traditional forms of participation such as inviting important 
actors for consultation and meetings, while there have been few experiments with 
new modes of participation. Decision makers have only to a limited extent reflected 
on how the participatory processes could contribute to inclusion of “new” actors, how 
they could lead to “new” forms of dialogue and interaction, for instance between 
experts and common people, and how they could lead to genuine learning processes 
e.g. through active facilitation of each meeting. DK-NPP may constitute an exception.  
Finally, it can be asked whether the participatory procedures in the various cases 
improved the access of affected stakeholders to participate. Did the participation 
processes lead to power redistribution or did it mainly consolidate the power of the 
already powerful?  
A short answer across the cases could be that participatory procedures have 
changed the political landscape, but the extent of genuine power redistribution still 
appears to be limited on the short term:  
Some processes were tightly administered by the ministry in charge and eventually 
only invited a limited range of stakeholders (e.g. AT-BS). Other processes were 
apparently network based, whereas in practice they were meta-governed by the 
government, e.g. DK-NPP, GER-GAK. The NOR-LF was different in that it was a 
bottom-up process. Nevertheless, also in this context, environmental NGOs felt left 
out of significant influence as they were note included in the steering committee. The 
difference to the other cases then was that the power struggle was less between 
government and NGOs, but more between forest owners/industry and environmental 
NGOs. 
For all cases it seems that when looking at the long-term, the overall policy culture is 
likely to become more participatory, providing more opportunities to participate and 
providing a broader range of stakeholders legitimate access to influence decision-
making within the given policy field. So even if the power redistribution within the 
Analysis along procedural elements 89 
 
 
+individual cases was limited, then the participatory processes have still stimulated 
the establishing of new networks, a first step towards legitimate demands for 
influence among new stakeholders, and- hopefully -increasing understanding among 
all stakeholders of the value of broad and inclusive decision-making to not only input 
but also output legitimacy.  
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4.2 Multi-level coordination 
R. Nordbeck  
(with contributions from D. Bancu, M. Böcher, T. Boon, G. Buttoud,   
L. Giessen, K. Kassioumis, I. Kouplevatskaya, D. Lund, I. Nathan,   
M. Pregernig, K. Papageorgiou, and M. Vakkas) 
Multi-level coordination describes the dispersion of authoritative decision-making 
across multiple territorial levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001). In all democracies power 
is necessarily divided to some extent between different political institutions. The 
dispersion of power can be based on a functional logic or between territorial units. 
Federalism, as an example of the territorial logic, can be regarded as the most typical 
and drastic method of dividing power as it divides between entire levels of 
government (Lijphart 1999: 185). Multi-level systems have two important functions: 
(1) the division of power among territorial units (levels), and (2) the allocation of 
competences and task among these levels. 
New forms of governance and dispersion of decision-making away from central 
states have gained attention from a growing number of scholars in the recent years. 
Many of them argue that modern governance is and should be dispersed across 
multiple centers of authority, and that decisions are made at different territorial 
scales. The diffusion of decision-making away from the central states raises 
fundamental questions of design and coordination in multi-level systems.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an analytical framework for the 
participation and involvement of territorial units (“levels”) in governance processes 
and to deliver empirical results from selected GoFOR case studies. Our findings are 
based on 19 policy case studies across ten countries (ranging from 1 to 3 in the ten 
countries). These countries include two federal states, two semi-federal systems 
(countries that do not describe themselves as federations but have many federal-like 
constitutional provisions), and six unitary countries, with three of them being more 
decentralized.  
In a nutshell, our policy case studies suggest that multilevel or networked 
governance of varying kinds is becoming widespread if not pervasive, with complex 
intergovernmental relationships involving international, national, regional, and 
municipal governments increasingly the norm. We also found, however, that this 
complex web of relationships among different levels of government is by no means a 
partnership of equals and that the role of non-governmental actors may be more 
modest than some of the academic literature presumes (e.g., Marks and Hooghe 
2004). Many of the case studies point time and again on the hierarchical nature of 
the power relationships. Thus, we end up postulating a gap between the normative 
argument for multilevel and networked governance and the observed reality. 
 
4.2.1 Conceptual frame  
Scholars in political science have responded in two different ways to the unravelling 
of the central state (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 234). One intellectual response has 
been to stretch existing concepts over the new phenomena. Issues and problems of 
multi-level coordination have been discussed extensively in the literature on 
federalism and intergovernmental relations. Studies in this tradition have still stressed 
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the importance of formal rules between different tiers of government (e.g. unitary vs. 
federal political systems). An extensive literature on federalism examines the optimal 
allocation of authority across multiple tiers of government and how governments at 
different levels interact. Another intellectual response was to create new concepts to 
catch up with changing realities, such as multi-level governance (Benz 2003, Hooghe 
and Marks 2003) or network governance (Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999). These new 
concepts regard the connection between different tiers as much more fluid and the 
range of actors involved as much larger, involving not only state actors but also non-
state actors.  
The various theoretical strands in the discussion of multi-level coordination have 
generated quite different terms to analyse empirical realities in multi-level systems. 
Hooghe and Marks (2003: 234) described these different theoretical strands as 
“islands”, because the density of communication within them is much higher than that 
among them. These differences can be partly explained by their divergent research 
focus. One main theoretical strand in the literature is particularly interested in the 
effects of internationalization and Europeanisation on national decision-making. For 
instance, in the research on EU policy-making, the concept of multi-level governance 
to characterize the particularities of the European structures and processes of policy 
making has made an astonishing career in the last decade. Another main strand of 
literature is interested in processes of regionalisation, thereby focussing on changes 
at the sub-national and local levels. Furthermore, these different theoretical 
approaches often do not ask the same questions. Some are mainly interested in 
coordination problems in the stage of policy formulation, whereas others focus on 
implementation deficits well known in hierarchical policy-making.  
This chapter will outline the most important issues discussed in the theoretical 
approaches with respect to multi-level coordination.  
In the following sub-chapters we will describe the main characteristics of multi-level 
governance in greater detail. Beginning with a descriptive typology of types of multi-
level systems and problems of multi-level coordinaion, followed by an outline of the 
different mechanisms of coordination available in multi-level systems, we will 
conclude the conceptual frame with some remarks on the possible strategies to solve 
coordination problems in multi-level systems. We will then continue with a 
comparative analysis of multi-level coordination in the GoFOR case studies (chapter 
4.2.2) before we present the findings from six selected case studies (chapter 4.2.3). 
Finally, we draw some major conclusions on multi-level coordination based on our 
empirical analyses and findings  (chapter 4.2.4).  
 
4.2.1.1 Scaling-up or scaling down? Multi-level coordination between 
Europeanization and Decentralization  
Thinking about the vertical dispersion of authority away from central governments 
leads automatically to the question to which territorial levels authority has been 
transferred. Obviously there are two possibilities: authority can either be transferred 
to upper levels, a process which implies the scaling-up of policies; or it can be 
transferred to lower levels, a process in which policies are scaled down. Both 
processes are discussed at length in the literature. The processes of scaling up are 
discussed in the literature on internationalization and Europeanization of domestic 
politics, while processes of scaling down are discussed in the literature on 
regionalisation.  
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a) Defining Decentralisation 
Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its 
agencies to the lower levels of government. Decentralisation is closely linked to the 
concept of subsidiarity, which proposes that functions or tasks be devolved to the 
lowest level of social order that is capable of completing them. As the UNDP (2004) 
states: "Decentralizing governance is the restructuring of authority so that there is a 
system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional 
and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall 
quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority 
and capabilities of sub-national levels."  
Generally speaking, the factors which influence the intergovernmental processes of 
decentralization in a given state are various and cover a wide range of elements, 
including legal tradition, major institutional solutions within a constitutional system, 
political set-up and economic background. The extent to which a given unitary state 
is centralized or decentralized depends, on two crucial elements of a given 
institutional design (Basta 1998: 32): 
• on how the allocation of powers between the central and local governmental levels 
has been legally operationalized, as well as 
• on the division of powers among major central authorities (system of powers). 
 
Forms of decentralization 
There are three broad types of decentralisation: political, administrative and fiscal 
and three major forms of decentralisation: devolution, delegation, and 
deconcentration (Work 2002: 6, UNDP 2004). 
Political decentralisation normally refers to situations where political power and 
authority has been transferred to sub-national levels of government. The most 
obvious manifestations of this type of decentralisation are elected and empowered 
sub-national forms of government ranging from village councils to state level bodies. 
Devolution is considered a form of political decentralisation. It refers to the full 
transfer of responsibility, decision-making, resources and revenue generation to a 
local level public authority that is autonomous and fully independent of the devolving 
authority. Political decentralisation requires a constitutional, legal and regulatory 
framework to ensure accountability and transparency. It also necessitates the 
restructuring of institutions and developing linkages with civil society and the private 
sector.  
Administrative decentralisation aims at transferring decision-making authority, 
resources and responsibilities for the delivery of select number of public services 
from the central government to other levels of government, agencies, and field offices 
of central government line agencies. Administrative decentralisation often comes 
along simultaneously with civil service reform. There are two major forms of 
administrative decentralisation: deconcentration and delegation. Deconcentration 
refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility from one level of the central 
government to another while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability 
from the local units to the central government ministry or agency, which has been 
decentralised. Delegation redistributes authority and responsibility to sub-national 
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and local units of government or agencies that are not always necessarily branches 
or local offices of the delegating authority.  
Fiscal decentralisation is the most comprehensive and possibly traceable degree of 
decentralisation since it is directly linked to budgetary practices. Fiscal 
decentralisation refers to the resource reallocation to sub-national levels of 
government. Arrangements for resource allocation are often negotiated between the 
central and local authorities based on several factors including interregional equity, 
availability of resources at all levels of government and local fiscal management 
capacity.  
 
Rationale and limitations 
Economists justify decentralisation on the grounds of ‘allocative efficiency’, 
enhancing the responsiveness of policy-making and the effectiveness of poverty 
reduction. Decisions taken closest to a local constituency are expected to better 
reflect the preferences of citizens, especially the poor. As a result, local governments 
are more likely to implement policies through community participation and social 
inclusion. The challenge is to maintain a policy focus at central and local levels, 
especially given the risks of local governments being captured by local elites and 
interest-groups. 
Decentralisation is not a panacea. Clearly, there are limits to what it can achieve. Not 
all government functions can or should be decentralised. Decentralising weak states 
may compound the problems. An appropriate balance of centralisation and 
decentralisation is essential, and there needs to be complementary attention to 
central government. Decentralisation requires a strong central entity to regulate, to 
provide an overall framework to manage the re-allocation of responsibilities and 
resources in a predictable and transparent way, and to assist local governments build 
capacity in the early stages. Decentralization is not an alternative to centralization. 
Both are needed. The complementary roles of national and sub-national actors 
should be determined by analyzing the most effective ways and means of achieving 
a desired objective. And decentralization is much more than public sector, civil 
service and administrative reform. It involves the roles and relationships of all societal 
actors, whether governmental, private sector or civil society. 
 
b) Defining Multi-level Governance 
The term “multilevel governance” was pioneered in the context of the European 
Union, where it was initially meant to capture the “scaling-up” of the national state to 
the level of the European Union, that is, the voluntary abdication by member states of 
certain responsibilities to the emerging supranational structures of the European 
Union. Multilevel governance relates to the condition of power and authority that is 
shared in institutional relationships in which the scope of public policy and the 
mechanisms of policymaking extend by necessity beyond the jurisdiction of a single 
government. Multi-level governance was initially described as a “system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—
supranational, national, regional and local” that was distinctive of European Union 
structural policy (Marks 1993: 392), but the term is now applied to the European 
Union more generally as a result of the broad process of institutional creation and 
decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the 
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state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level (Bache 
and Flinders 2004; Grande 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001). 
Multi-level governance is a complex concept that embodies different aspects. It is 
essential to notice the dual character of the concept. MLG is composed of a multi-
level aspect and a governance aspect. Kohler-Koch speaks about levels of 
government and systems of governance (Kohler-Koch 1996). Levels of government 
emphasize the different layers of policymaking and the dynamic partition of 
competences and power between these layers. On the other hand systems of 
governance zoom in on the specific ways of governance within and between these 
different policy levels. Relationships among institutions at different tiers of 
government in this perspective are believed to be fluid, negotiated and contextually 
defined. Previously hierarchical models of institutional "layering", for example formal 
treatments of federalism, are being replaced by a more complex image of 
intergovernmental relations in which subnational authorities engage in direct 
exchange with supranational or global institutions and vice versa (Peters and Pierre 
2001: 1).  
In short, the MLG concept points at a political system composed of different but 
entangled policy levels and governed by non-hierarchical networks of interacting 
public and private actors. Since both the governance concept (except for the 
regulatory aspect) and the multi-level aspect are utterances of modern governance, 
they are not only applicable on the European Union but also on other policy systems. 
And while some conceive multi-level governance as an alternative to hierarchical 
government (Rhodes 2000), others view policy networks as nested in formal 
government institutions (Peters and Pierre 2000).  
In a more recent article Arthur Benz (2004) made an effort to further refine the 
concept of multi-level governance. For him MLG is defined by three main 
characteristics: first that “levels” are territorial divided political units, secondly that 
MLG is concerned with political structures and processes connecting these levels, 
and thirdly that interrelationships exist between inter- and intragovernmental rules. 
According to Benz, the course of action and the results of multi-level coordination 
depend very much on interaction patterns regulating the policy process. Policy 
coordination is possible through four different forms of interaction: reciprocal 
adaptation, competition, hierarchical steering or negotiation (Scharpf 2000). Decisive 
for the logic of policy-making in multi-level governance is not the institutional context 
as such, but to what extent actors' behavior is determined by the specific rule 
systems (Lehmbruch 2000). To summarize, governance in multi-level systems can 
be described through the following characteristics (Benz 2004: 135): 
(1) Interdependencies between different levels resulting from external effects or 
distribution conflicts; 
(2) Interaction rules between the involved levels, which will mainly be based on 
negotiation, but can also include elements of hierarchical steering and 
competition; 
(3) Institutionalised intra-level rules steering the behaviour of the actors (Veto 
rights, Party competition, Negotiations, Exit-opportunities); 
(4) The type of coupling (strong or loose) between the internal and external rule 
systems, deciding to what extent the actors are bound by these rules.  
(5) The collaboration between public and private actors (Governments, 
Administrations, Interest groups and NGOs, Experts). 
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4.2.1.2 Problems of Coordination in Multi-level Systems 
Economists and political scientists have often argued that even simple forms of multi-
level coordination may lead to severe problems, reasoning that there is often a trade 
off between the scope of coordination and the problem-solving capacity (Scharpf 
1976, 1997). There are two problems with regard to multi-level decision-making: first 
the costs of multi-level negotiations increase both in terms of complexity of decision 
and in terms of time required for exchanging positions and argument; and secondly, 
even more serious than the costs of decision-making are the ramifications of 
interdependent decision-making. The greater the number of actors involved the 
greater the difficulties: “As the number of affected parties increases […] negotiated 
solutions incur exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction costs” 
(Scharpf 1997: 70). Additionally, in case of strong opposition due to divergent 
interests, common agreement is likely to be blocked and negotiations may end in 
deadlock. The problem with interdependent decision-making is that agreements on 
one level may reduce the chances for consent on the other level, because actors are 
committed to previous decisions. It is often very difficult to coordinate interdependent 
negotiations at different levels and not having the actors caught in double-binds. 
Furthermore, intergovernmental negotiation is mostly linked to forms of intra-
governmental cooperation. Region or local programs, which have to be coordinated 
with central policies, are to be coordinated between different public administrations 
and have to be elaborated in public-private partnerships on the regional or local level. 
Again, effective negotiations at one level might reduce space for manoeuvring at 
other levels, because participants are bound to agreements.  
The horizontal and vertical dispersion of power does not necessarily affect the 
process of decision-making negatively as long as the separate units are able to act 
independently. Political tasks and problems which can be limited in their functional 
and spatial appearance are best solved by a decentralized approach at the 
appropriate level of administration or by functionally specialised units (“principle of 
subsidiarity”). However, in many cases political problems are not conforming to the 
horizontal and vertical boundaries of the politico-administrative system. The more 
political competences and tasks in a democratic political system are divided between 
territorially levels, the higher is its vulnerability to increasing economic, technical, 
ecological and communicative interdependence among territorial units. Under such 
conditions, choices within a given unit will create, and suffer from, external effects 
(Scharpf 2000). To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have spillovers for other 
jurisdictions, either positive or negative externalities, a “management of 
interdependencies” (Mayntz 1997: 272) is necessary to avoid socially perverse 
outcomes. The larger the externalities are, the greater the potential harm (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001: 23).  
Joint decision-making in multi-level systems is thus confronted with three typical 
problems (Mayntz 1997, 275): 
- Possible blockades in decision-making; 
- The danger of suboptimal compromises; and  
- The danger of implementation deficits due to poor binding effects of the 
decisions made.  
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These ideal-type coordination problems can be ascribed to the combination of 
processes within the levels ("intragouvernemental") and between them 
("intergouvernemental"): Stable blockades are created if no decisions altering the 
status quo come about in multi-level coordination and if this is accepted within the 
levels. Suboptimal compromises also emerges from negotiated solutions with a low 
degree of innovation, which is partially accepted within the levels, partially however it 
is rejected. Implementation deficits are often interrelated with decisions made that 
include a high degree of policy change, but which are not accepted within the levels. 
If these events happen, a political system either is blocked, the political steering 
becomes ineffective or plagued with unintended results and undesirable 
consequences, or the political programme does not receive any approval from those, 
which must execute it (implementation deficit). Successful coordination in a multi-
level system requires both effective negotiation of solutions and their acceptance 
within the levels (Benz 2000, 99). 
 
Figure 3: Problems of Coordination in Multi-level Systems 
 
An elaborate theory of the first two of these three problems of joint decision-making 
was presented by Fritz Scharpf (1976, 1988), conceptualised by its well known “joint 
decision trap”. The central hypothesis of the joint-decision theorem is that fragmented 
multi-level systems like German federalism or the EU are likely to produce 
inappropriate policy outputs and that they are, at the same time, unable to change 
the institutional conditions responsible for the deficiencies. In order to avoid these 
deadlocks and stalemates, actors in intergovernmental relations are searching for 
conflict avoiding strategies. Therefore, governments and administrations develop 
pragmatic strategies to cope with problems of intergovernmental coordination and 
cooperation. For instance, agreements are reached on regulations or political 
programs by formulating goals as “soft norms” catching all relevant interests without 
too much interference; financial resources are allocated in such a way that all 
involved governments profit from it; and compromises are found by solutions which 
only marginally alter the status quo.  
Implementation 
deficit 
Successsful 
coordination
suboptimal 
compromise
stable blockade instable blockade 
high 
low 
high medium low 
Policy change in the 
multi-level system 
Acceptance of political decision-making among 
the territorial levels 
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4.2.1.3 Modes of Coordination  
To analyse multi-level coordination we look at collective action that is influenced by 
institutionalized structures. These structures determine the distribution of power and 
the stability of the interaction as well as the possibilities and costs of exit strategies. 
The coordination of action can take two distinct major forms (Schimank 2007): mutual 
adjustment without direct interaction, but on the basis of observation, or mutual 
influence upon direct interaction of the involved protagonists (see Table 11). 
To adapt their behaviour, actors are either influenced through restrictions (force) or 
through attractive options (chances). Influence is practiced by conviction (information, 
arguments) and/or incentives (exchange of resources), and coordination of action 
through influence can either be based on trust among the actors or must be agreed 
explicitly in negotiations. This differentiation of elementary mechanisms of 
coordination of action helps to understand the functionality of typical modes of 
governance in multi-level systems. In hierarchies, the coordination takes place 
through reciprocal adaptation under the condition of unequal distribution of power, 
that is established formally, and high exit costs. The distribution of power emerges on 
that occasion as well as from the formal establishing of authority and duties of 
implementation also as from the asymmetrical distribution of information. Under the 
mode of competition we see equal actors who take part voluntarily in the procedure, 
adjust their behaviour on the basis of comparisons and the outlook on relative 
advantages to the most successful market protagonists. Networks and also 
communities as modes of coordination are not formalized; nevertheless they 
normally show asymmetrical distributions of power between central and peripheral 
actors. Coordination of action takes place through established norms as well as 
through trust that is destroyed if actors leave the network and causes therefore high 
exit costs. In difference to this, reciprocal influence takes place in negotiations 
between formally equal actors who all have veto-power at their disposal. Agreements 
are gained by direct communication, but participants being able to leave the 
negotiation table at any time with low exit costs.  
 
Table 11: Basic Modes of Governance 
Mechanism of 
coordination 
Mutual adjustment Mutual influence 
Constraints Opportunities Trust Agreement 
St
ru
ct
ur
e Power Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric 
Exit 
costs 
High Low High Low 
Governance 
mode 
“Hierarchy” “Competition” “Network” “Negotiation” 
Source: Benz 2006  
 
Most of the governance types discussed in the literature can be assigned to the four 
modes of coordination suggested above. Markets for example let themselves 
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describe as complex structure of competition, the state is equated in the economic 
literature with hierarchy, clans and communities are based on networks, and 
deliberation is to be classified as variation of negotiations. However, this doesn't 
exclude that other divisions are held for more suitable. In the end, typologies are to 
be produced for areas and objects of research and with consideration on questions of 
the respective examination. However, it is crucial on that occasion that the 
mechanisms and the structures are identified, in which coordination actually takes 
place. 
The combination of modes of coordination has effects on the operational mode of 
collective action. If different modes have an influence on the behaviour of actors at 
the same time, disturbances of the coordination can be caused by it. Hierarchical 
control can fail if the actors, who should follow instructions, bind themselves in 
networks or negotiations or reinforce the asymmetric distribution of information in the 
hierarchy through their own relationships of communication. Competition 
mechanisms are to be pushed through heavily against actors in stable networks and 
can be evaded by negotiations. For disturbances especially susceptible are 
negotiations and networks, if they include actors that are indebted as representatives 
of organizations on specific interests and are induced by it to competitive actions. 
However the probability of failure of governance does not rise with the complexity of 
the modes of coordination, it rather depends on the type of the combination of modes 
of coordination (Benz 2007). Furthermore, combinations do not cause blockades 
necessarily; rather they cause dynamics when actors seek to avoid possible 
blockades by changing the combination of modes of coordination. The analysis of 
governance therefore should heed both the potential of coordination failures and the 
reactions of the actors and the modifications of the modes of coordination resulting 
from it. 
 
4.2.1.4 Possible strategies to solve multi-level coordination problems  
Effective decision-making in multi-level structures might be impaired by the problem 
of complexity, resulting from a high number of participants and arenas of policy-
making to be co-ordinated. Rising transaction costs and complications in procedures 
make an unlimited extension of the number of actors participating in 
intergovernmental negotiations impossible. This dilemma is aggravated by the 
problem of institutional diversity, i.e. the fact that actors and arenas to be co-
ordinated follow different decision rules which often create incompatible orientations. 
This institutional challenge is particularly pressing in the case of the EU which is 
composed of several differently organized intergovernmental negotiating arenas 
across more than two levels (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 332).  
While many observers expect that ‘vertical activities’ in multi-level systems increase 
the degree of interlacing and interlocking politics accordingly (e.g. Scharpf 1998), 
empirical studies on multi-level governance suggest that many of these systems work 
in a reasonably satisfactory way. The main reason for this dynamic may be that 
inherent tensions arising from the threat of overcomplexity and from conflicting 
operating logics of different arenas and levels trigger and drive restructuring 
processes, which have the potential to bring about successful adjustments to new 
requirements (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 332).  
The structural limits to the coupling of multiple arenas caused by the problems of 
complexity and institutional diversity are recognized by actors. They are able to learn 
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from problematic situations and develop ‘heuristics that approach best-response 
strategies’ (Ostrom 1998: 9). Based on practical experience, they react to problems 
created by the dynamics of multi-level politics in a pragmatic way. Concerning the 
internal architecture of existing vertical and horizontal structures of policy-making, we 
can expect ongoing efforts to improve effectiveness of co-ordination. This is best 
achieved by limiting the access of new parties from external levels or arenas. At the 
same time, pressure for participation exercised by ‘externalized’ third parties might 
destabilize established patterns of decision-making and be a force of change.  
The literature on interorganizational and international negotiations indicates three 
alternative solutions to the dilemma of exclusion and inclusion (Benz and Eberlein 
1999: 333, Benz 2000: 107): 
• The first one consists of a hierarchical-sequential ordering of arenas of policy-
making, whereby upper-level decisions work as binding corridors for lower-
level decision-making. However, this can only work if tasks can be subdivided, 
and if higher-level decisions leave some room for autonomous decision-
making on the lower levels (Simon 1962). Otherwise, centralization with all its 
negative consequences prevails. 
• The second solution involves a flexible dissociation or decoupling of external 
relations from the intraorganizational arena during the policy-making process. 
‘Decoupling’ has, however, the disadvantage of reducing participation and 
coordination, allowing at best incremental mutual adjustment of policy-making 
at different levels. 
• Thirdly, actors may be able to act in and link up multiple arenas by patterns of 
‘loose coupling’ (Weick 1985), which perform interorganizational linkages and 
co-ordination between simultaneously operating arenas of negotiation. Instead 
of resorting to binding mandates or externally defined bargaining positions, 
they mediate between institutionally separated arenas and foster the 
exchange of information and informal contacts.  
These modes of informal mediation and co-ordination exhibit several crucial 
advantages (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 333): they enable actors to circumvent 
rigidities of formal decision-making by informally linking arenas and problems; they 
can mobilize the power of policy ideas; they can give expertise-based policy 
entrepreneurs a better chance of overcoming conflicts; and finally, they allow the 
introduction of competition between arenas as a way of encouraging innovation. 
Given their advantages, these modes are likely to prevail in adjustment processes of 
multi-level structures, unless they are impeded by existing institutional structures. 
As a result of these adjustments, we can expect multi-level systems to consist of 
separated, but loosely coupled, arenas. They are linked primarily by communication, 
and not by resource dependencies or control. Actors avoid using power to control 
their agent’s behaviour, even if they are able to do so. Instead, they seek to influence 
their representatives by way of negotiation and to advance their interests by forming 
advocacy coalitions or informal networks, which often cut across the boundaries of 
institutionalized arenas. 
On the basis of these theoretical considerations, we assume that processes of multi-
level coordination constitute a dynamic, three-fold process of structuring (Benz and 
Eberlein 1999: 333): they create independent arenas of negotiation, they intensify 
communication and they stimulate learning. All three elements are essential for 
making co-operation and problem-solving effective. Differentiation of arenas reduces 
the problem of complexity. At the same time, it makes sure that actors are not bound 
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to fixed positions in their negotiations and enjoy sufficient flexibility to find 
agreements. Communication helps to improve the information base of negotiations 
and makes intergovernmental decisions acceptable to members of regional 
parliaments, citizens and associations. Learning leads to innovation and flexibility, 
which favours adjustment of existing structures. 
 
4.2.2 Multi-level coordination in GOFOR case studies in comparative analysis 
 
4.2.2.1  Degree of federalism and decentralization 
Table 12 shows the degree of federalism and decentralization of the 10 countries in 
which case studies have been conducted in GoFOR. The primary federal 
characteristics of non-centralization and decentralization are the building blocks for 
the construction of the fivefold classification. The first criterion is whether the 
countries have formally federal constitutions. This criterion yields an initial distinction 
between federal and unitary countries. Each of the resulting five categories can then 
be divided into centralized and decentralized subclasses. Finally, an intermediate 
category of semi-federal systems is needed for some countries that cannot be 
classified as either federal or unitary.  
Table 12: Degree of federalism and decentralization 
Federal and decentralized Germany 
  
Federal and centralized  Austria 
  
Semi-federal  Netherlands 
 Spain 
  
Unitary and decentralized Denmark 
 Norway 
  
Unitary and centralized  France 
 Greece 
 Hungary 
 Romania 
Source: Lijphart 1999 
 
The ten countries form which case studies are included in the GoFOR project cover 
all five categories. GoFOR includes case studies conducted in countries ranging from 
federal and decentralized (Germany) over semifederal (Netherlands and Spain) to 
unitary and centralized (France, Greece, Hungary and Romania). 
 
4.2.2.2 The importance of multi-level coordination in the GoFOR case studies  
Connected with the empirical findings from our case reports, we were also interested 
to analyse in greater detail how important the different governance elements (i.e. 
participation, intersectoral coordination, multi-level coordination, evaluation & 
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monitoring as well as the role of expertise) have been in our case studies (i) to 
specify the overall character of the governance processes and (ii) to explain the 
overall success or failure of the governance processes.  
Table 13 shows how important the element “multi-level coordination” has been to 
describe the case and to explain the outputs and impacts of the policy process 
according to the overall judgement of the case studies authors. The importance of 
multi-level coordination is defined by two dimensions: First, how much multi-level 
coordination contributes to the general characterization of the governance process 
analysed in the case study, and secondly, how relevant multi-level coordination has 
been as a factor to explain the overall success or failure of the governance 
processes in terms of policy output and impact. For both dimensions a three-point 
judgement scale has been applied (very important, important, and rather 
unimportant).  
Table 13: Importance of Multi-level Coordination in the GoFOR case studies 
 
  MLC as characteristic element of the governance case  
  Rather 
Unimportant 
Important Very Important 
 
 
 
Importance of 
MLC for success 
and failure 
 
 
 
Rather 
Unimportant  
HU-NFO 
NL-GW 
NL-UH 
AT-AFD 
DK-NPP 
FR-CFT 
GR-MA 
ROM-NAT 
 
 
Important  NL-NfP FR-RPF 
NOR-LF 
GER-RA 
 
Very Important  
  AT-BS 
DK-HD 
GER-L+ 
GER-GAK 
It has to be mentioned, that this categorisation is meant to draw a rough picture as 
regards the significance of multi-level co-ordination among the GoFOR cases study 
processes only. 
However, it stands out that for 12 GoFOR case studies multi-level coordination has 
been ranked as a very important or important element of the governance process. 
Only in four cases multi-level coordination was judged as rather unimportant to 
characterize the governance process. A slightly different picture emerges when it 
comes to the importance of multi-level coordination for explaining the overall success 
and failure of the governance process. In this dimension, multi-level coordination was 
viewed as very important or important for only eight cases.  
Based on the results shown in Table 13 we can distinguish three groups of cases in 
our set of GoFOR case studies with regard to multi-level coordination. The first 
group, located in the bottom right corner, is defined by a high relevance of multi-level 
coordination on both dimensions. This group includes four case studies, three of 
them from federal countries (Austria and Germany), and the last case being from a 
unitary but decentralized country (Denmark). On the contrary, the upper left corner, 
we have three cases defined by a low importance of multi-level coordination on both 
dimensions. Here we find the Hungarian case study, a unitary and centralized state, 
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but also two of the Dutch cases. The latter dealing with governance processes on the 
regional level paying not much attention to coordination with upper territorial levels. 
The middle group in the first row is defined by a large set of cases in which multi-
level coordination has been viewed as important element, but still as not having 
much importance for the explanation of the final results. It comprises different 
countries, ranging from unitary countries (France, Greece, and Romania) to semi-
federal (Denmark) and federal systems (Austria). However, the majority in this group 
are case studies in unitary countries analysing decentralization approaches. 
At a very general level Table 13 suggests a basic relation: the more important multi-
level co-ordination was judged for characterising the processes that were studied, the 
more important it was for explaining the overall processes’ success or failure in terms 
of policy outputs and impacts, and vice versa. 
 
4.2.2.3 The involvement of territorial levels in the case studies  
To conduct an analysis of the role of multi-level coordination in the 19 case studies 
analysed in the GoFOR project we first need to know which territorial levels are 
involved in our case studies. Table 14 provides an overview on the involvement and 
relevance of territorial levels for each of the GoFOR case studies  
Almost all case studies in GoFOR deal with governance processes which heavily 
involved the national level. There are two exemptions from this rule: the Spanish 
case study analysing the General Forest Plan in the autonomous region of Catalonia, 
and the German case study on the implementation of LEADER+. In all other 16 
cases under scrutiny the national level (and the central government) played an 
important role. 
In seven case studies impact from the international level was mentioned, i.e. 
included in the analysis, but in five out of these seven cases the internationalization 
is either related to legally non-binding instrument or an indirect influence. E.g. the 
three cases dealing with Forest Programmes (Austria, Hungary, and Spain) refer to 
the role of MCPFE resolution on NFPs and their indicators for SFM, and the Danish 
and Norwegian cases refer to the general background of international conventions for 
biodiversity and nature conservation. However, only two cases analyze the domestic 
implementation of international legally binding conventions (Austria-BS, Romania-
ACP).  
Eleven cases mention an impact of the EU level, which are almost two-thirds of all 
GoFOR cases. However, in five of these cases the impact of the Community level is 
rather indirect (both AT, ESP-FPGP, FR-CFT, HU), i.e. the case studies refer to non-
binding EU decisions or political documents (e.g. the EU Forest Strategy), mention 
the EU accession as an important overall background or regard the EU as an 
important source of possible future funding opportunities. In six case studies the 
influence of the EU level is more direct. Three of them analyze either directly the 
implementation of EU law or EU law plays an important role (Habitat Directive in 
DK+ROM, Anti-corruption policies in ROM). In three cases the impact of the EU level 
is connected to the provision of a significant amount of financial means (FR-RPF, 
GER-L+, GR-MA). In total our case studies show a fair amount of internationalization 
and Europeanization.  
The sub-national level plays an important role in the four GoFOR countries with 
federal or semi-federal political systems (AT, ESP-FPGP, GER, NL). In total, seven 
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case studies mention an important influence of the sub-national level in their 
governance processes.  
The regional and/or local level is mentioned as important in 14 case studies. 
However, many case studies also stated that the actual level of influence of the 
regional/local level in the governance processes has been limited, in some cases 
very limited.  
  
Table 14: Involvement of territorial levels in the 19 case studies analyzed in GoFOR 
 
 
Country 
Level 
AT-
BS 
AT-
AFD
DK-
HD 
DK-
NPP 
ESP-
FPGP
FR-
CFT
FR-
RPF
GER-
LEADER
GER-
RA 
GER-
GAK 
GR-
MA 
HUN-
NFP 
NL-
GW
NL-
NFP
NL-
UH
NOR-
LF 
ROM-
ACP. 
ROM-
NAT 
International X Xa  Xa Xa       Xa    Xa X  
EU (X) (X) X   (X) X X  (X) X (X)     X X 
National  X X X X  X X  X X X X X X X X X X 
Sub-national  X X   X   X  X   X X     
Regional/ 
Local 
  X X X X X X X  X X X X X (X)  X 
X = directly involved         (X) = indirect influence or reference to legally non-binding commitments 
 
Summary (19 cases): 
International (UN, OECD, MCPFE): in total 7 cases, five of them only indirect 
EU: in total 11 cases, five cases only indirect 
National level: in total 16 cases, only the Catalonian Forest Plan and LEADER+ in Germany are focussed mainly on the sub-national level 
Sub-national level (Federal states, Autonomous regions, Provinces): in total 7 (5) cases, of course only in the federal and semi-federal countries  
Regional and local level: in total 14 cases 
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4.2.2.4  Interdependency among levels  
The question about “interdependency” refers to the question about “why” and in 
“which way” territorial levels are interconnected: i.e. which problems have to be 
solved (because of external effects or distributional conflicts), which goals should be 
reached, and which tasks have to be fulfilled by multi-level coordination. 
As Table 15 shows, empirically we found four categories of major reasons why 
territorial levels in the GoFOR case studies are interconnected: the need for legal 
compliance, the division of formal competencies, financial issues, and the need or 
ambition to improve policy effectiveness.  
Legal compliance was found as a major reason in nine cases. Here, multi-level 
coordination occurred because international commitments or Community and 
national requirements have to be fulfilled. In the majority of cases these commitments 
and requirements are legally-binding. The legal obligations might originate from the 
international level as in the case of the implementation of the CBD in Austria or the 
anti-corruption policies in Romania. In other cases, such as the implementation of the 
Habitat Directive in Denmark and Romania, the need for compliance was triggered 
by EU law.  
In other cases international and European legally non-binding obligations were 
important for the interconnection of territorial levels. This was especially important for 
the three cases which analysed National Forest Programmes (Austria, Hungary, and 
Spain), where the international level played an important role as an explicit authority 
for the initiative of the process, particularly as regards the obligations by the 
Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) for obligatory 
process principles and elements. The international background served as source of 
legitimacy and of initiative. However, its influence is rather political, as the EU 
Forestry Strategy and the self-commitment status of signed MCPFE resolutions have 
no further legal means for implementation of the NFP approach at national level. 
However, in all three cases the National Forest Programmes were developed 
applying the MCPFE approach towards NFPs, in particular by using the MCPFE 
criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management.  
The second main trigger is the division of power and responsibilities among 
different territorial levels. This has caused the need for multi-level coordination in ten 
cases. The big majority of these cases are found in countries with federal or semi-
federal political systems. Austria, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain alone comprise 
eight cases where divided responsibilities are associated with the appearance of 
multi-level coordination. For instance, in both Austrian cases the division of legislative 
powers between the federal state and the provinces and the coexistence of national 
(i.e. forestry) and provincial law (e.g. nature conservation) to the very same object, 
the forests, has occasionally lead to problems of coordination. The same situation 
prevailed in two of the German cases, where the coordination among different levels 
under REGIONEN AKTIV is characterised by a high degree of devolution of 
responsibilities into regions, and where the responsible ministry actively tried to admit 
a maximum degree of freedom for the regional level while cutting back 
responsibilities of intermediate territorial levels. Also in the case of the “Joint Task for 
Agriculture and Coastal Management (GAK)” led the distribution of decision-making 
powers to certain interdependence among the two levels and all actors involved, as 
alliances for decisions are needed. The third German case refers to another multi-
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level system of policy-making. Here, the system of EU framework legislation implies 
certain legal competencies, procedures and interdependencies among all levels 
involved (GER-L+). Furthermore, the distribution of responsibilities also triggered 
multi-level coordination in unitary and centralized countries. For instance, in the 
Greek case on national park management, power distribution and legal provisions 
were impetuses for coordination across levels, and the provincial governor coming in 
between having the assigned power to coordinate between the national and the local 
level. 
The third main trigger for coordination between territorial levels was the provision of 
financial means. This was an important factor for MLC in seven GoFOR cases. In 
three cases funding came primarily from EU budgets as for instance in the case of 
LEADER+, where “the principle of EU co-financing of eligible measures under 
LEADER+ also illustrates the distribution of rules and competencies among levels. All 
projects to be supported by the EU need to be co-financed by national or regional 
governments. EU regional policy can be characterized as a system of joint finance, 
linking budgetary policies of different levels of government” (Giessen and Böcher 
2007, LEADER+). Also in the case of the implementation of the Habitat Directive in 
Romania it was mentioned that “at this stage in the process, the national level is 
dependent on EU financial resources and guidance” (Bancu 2007). In the French 
case study on the Forestry Relief Plan the EU gave “an indirect financial support 
through the inclusion of storm measures (roads, clearing and reconstitution of 
damaged stands) within the French Plan de Développement Rural National” (Buttoud 
and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF). In one case EU funding was combined with other 
sources of funding to provide for functioning Territorial Forestry Charters, where “the 
EU, the State, the Region and the Department granted funds for specific actions” 
(Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, CFT).  
In the other cases the main source for funding was the central government. For 
instance in Germany, where “REGIONEN AKTIV is a funding programme of the 
Federal Ministry and interdependencies result from the need of BMVEL to inform 
beneficiaries about programme requirements and details” (Giessen and Böcher 
2007, RA). In the Greek case “financing is a key issue that keeps the negotiation 
process in close contact between levels. There is a strong interdependence between 
local actors, the state and the EU as regards funding.” In the case of the French 
Forestry Relief Plan, ”the major funding from the state basically concerned subsidies 
to support the transportation of timber fallen by the storms; the subsidies to the ONF 
for the restoration of its financial balance; the subsidies to forest communes, and 
measures supporting employment and education” (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 
2007, RPF).  
The fourth trigger for multi-level coordination was found in the concern for effective 
implementation of the respective policies, and thus the effort to involve actors from 
the regional and local level where implementation had to take place. In this sense, “to 
coordinate with sub-national actors is therefore a precondition for successful 
implementation” (Nordbeck and Pregernig 2007) or as one of the Danish case 
studies put it: “Since the case deals with a transfer of an EU directive to the national 
level, multilevel coordination is a prerequisite for success” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 
2007, HD). In some cases the role of the local level in the process was very much 
highlighted. This important role was most prominently stated in one of the French 
cases: “During the process itself, the local communities are supposed to take all 
initiatives for the agenda setting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in the 
context and under the umbrella of the state regulation” (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 
2007, CFT). The idea of regionalisation was also very prominent in the German 
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cases, where the need for “regionalisation” especially of decision-making 
competences has been articulated as a key element in rural development policies 
(Giessen and Böcher 2007). And “Leader+ is supposed to improve vertical 
intergovernmental co-ordination and partnership with regional actors” (Giessen and 
Giessen 2007, LEADER+).  
In other cases, the “coordination between different territorial levels was not 
mentioned in any of the examined policy statements. There was, however, much 
concern about how to ensure involvement and representation of local interests and 
local authorities in the process” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, NPP). And also the 
Greek case study concluded, that “the empirical research compared to the previous 
administrative park regime, found that the most profound influence comes more from 
the involvement of several local interest groups, NGOs and all other bodies that care 
locally” (Kassioumis, Papageorgiu and Vakkas 2007). 
Additional to the four main reasons for multi-level coordination outlined above two 
more triggers were mentioned in the case studies: the actual problems at hand and 
the ambitions for policy learning. The former was mentioned in one of the Danish 
cases: “Furthermore the “problem at hand”, i.e. declining biodiversity which led to the 
HD in the first place, must be addressed at all levels to be solved” (Boon, Lund and 
Nathan 2007, HD). The issue of policy learning was mentioned in one of the French 
cases: “All the possible levels were mobilised and each of them might have evolved 
through learning from the experience form the other ones, even if it has not been the 
initial expectation from the process” (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF). 
 
 
  
Table 15: Interdependency of territorial levels in the 19 case studies 
 
 
Country 
Trigger 
AT-
BS 
AT-
AFD 
DK-
HD 
DK-
NPP 
ESP-
FPGP
FR-
CFT
FR-
RPF
GER-
LEADER
GER-
RA 
GER-
GAK 
GR-
MA 
HUN-
NFP 
NL-
GW
NL-
NFP
NL-
UH
NOR-
LF 
ROM-
ACP 
ROM-
NAT 
Legal 
compliance 
X X X  X   X    X    X X X 
Divided 
responsibilities 
X X X  X   X X X X X X X X    
Financing       X X X X X X       X 
Problems at 
hand  
  X    X            
Implementation/ 
Effectiveness 
  X X X X X X   X  X X X X   
Horizontal 
Policy Learning 
 Xa  Xa               
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4.2.2.5 Interaction patterns 
In the background paper we stated that the course of action and the results of multi-
level coordination depend very much on the interaction patterns regulating the policy 
process (Nordbeck, Bouriaud and Bancu 2005). Policy coordination is possible 
through different modes of coordination: hierarchical steering, competition, 
negotiation or mutual adjustment. Decisive for the logic of policy-making in multilevel 
systems is not the institutional context as such, but to what extent actors' behaviour 
is determined by specific rule systems. 
In Table 16 we provide an overview on the modes of coordination used to coordinate 
territorial levels in the 19 cases of GoFOR.  
There are four governance processes in which a single mode of coordination seems 
to have prevailed: the Danish case study on the implementation of the Habitat 
Directive, the Dutch case study on the Nature for People Plan, the French case study 
on Territorial Forestry Charters, and the Romanian case study on the implementation 
of Natura 2000. In the majority of cases a combination of modes of coordination has 
been applied. 
However, overall it seems that hierarchical steering is still the prevailing mode of 
coordination between territorial levels. At least, hierarchy was mentioned as an 
important factor to explain and understand multi-level coordination in 13 out of the 19 
GoFOR cases. Interestingly, hierarchy as a mode of coordination appears in different 
forms. The classical case has been described in one of the Danish cases: 
“Coordination is clearly triggered by legal provisions and the mode of coordination 
was hierarchy through all levels with little room for negotiations” (Boon, Lund and 
Nathan 2007, HD). And also in the Romanian case on the implementation of Natura 
2000: “The interaction between the levels within the country follows a hierarchical 
logic” (Bancu 2007). Also one of the two French case studies provide an example of 
a multi-level system where despite the high degree of involvement of regional and 
local actors “the final decisions always remained in the hands of the State. There was 
no real decentralisation of the decision-making. […] The organization remains 
centralised” (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, RPF). In some cases, hierarchy 
refers only to parts of the political decision-making process such as the setting of 
general policies objectives. This was mentioned in the German case on Regionen 
Aktiv: „The objectives at the programming level have been set hierarchically by 
BMVEL“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, RA). 
In other cases hierarchy seems to be based not so much on legal power, but on the 
distribution of resources. For instance, in the Greek case study it was stated that “the 
dominant attitude in the Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works 
(MEPPW) acting as a central nature conservation actor is one of a body that controls 
the policy by regulating financial resources and places a boundary around the 
cooperation with the forestry department” (Kassioumis, Papageorgiu and Vakkas 
2007). 
In ten cases hierarchy was combined with other modes of coordination, mostly 
with negotiation, and sometimes with market incentives (France, Greece and 
Germany), and sometimes with mutual adjustment (Denmark-NPP and Spain). The 
mix of coordination modes seems to provide for greater flexibility in decision-making 
in multi-level systems. As it was stated in the German cases: „The mode of 
interaction between the different levels concerned varies between hierarchy and 
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competition“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). „However, if consensus can not 
be reached, negotiations are complemented with hierarchical modes“ (Giessen and 
Böcher 2007, RA).  
Furthermore, in some cases the mode of coordination changed over time as 
mentioned in one of the Dutch case studies: “The relation between the ministry of 
LNV and the regional authorities changed from negotiation in the first stage to one of 
hierarchy in the second stage” (Arnouts, van der Zouwen and Turnhout 2007, 
NfP/PfN). 
The second most common mode of multi-level coordination found in our case studies 
is negotiation. It was important in eight cases. This mode of coordination is of 
special importance for multi-level systems in which legal competences are distributed 
among different territorial levels. As one of the Austrian case studies states: “Veto 
players always referred to the distinct allocation of competencies between the federal 
and the province level” (Hogl and Kvarda 2007). Negotiation was also very important 
in the German cases, where „the logic of interaction within the work of the National 
Network Unit (NNU) and the Observatory can be assumed to be based on 
negotiations“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). And in another case 
„negotiation is the prime logic of interaction between the two levels“ (Giessen and 
Böcher 2007, GAK). Sub-national governments may use different mechanism to 
coordinate as mentioned in the second Austrian case study: „The provinces use 
three mechanisms to coordinate with the federal level: a common representative for 
nature conservation of all nine provinces, a representative for the CBD, and 
institutionalised liaison body (Verbindungsstelle der Länder)“ (Nordbeck and 
Pregernig 2007) .However, negotiation has also been used in other cases as an 
informal mode of coordination as shown by the Hungarian case study: „An informal 
rule of the planning phase was that regional and local actors are to be involved as far 
as possible into the process. The mode of interaction between participants was 
clearly dominated in the programming phase by negotiation and discussion“ 
(Meszaros et al 2007). 
The third form of coordination found in our cases is competition induced by 
economic incentives. Competition has been an important factor in six cases, often 
induced by available EU funding. The competition of regional actors for financial 
means either from the European and/or the national level introduces market 
incentives as an important element in the implementation of political decisions. Funds 
are allocated among regions within the financial framework based on expressed 
needs: “The needs expressed at the local level go up to the state level and are more 
or less taken into consideration during the assessment of the distribution of 
necessary funds. The Ministry of Agriculture […] distributes the funds between 
regions depending on the expressed needs” (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya 2007, 
RPF). The procedure of running the financial programmes is in principal the same in 
the three German cases studies, i.e. „competition triggers the LEADER+ process in 
the respective federal states“ (Giessen and Böcher 2007, LEADER+). Market forces 
are also employed in the case of Regionen Aktiv. In the Greek case study financing 
was also a key issue “that keeps the negotiation process in close contact between 
levels“. 
The last mode of coordination that has been of importance in the 19 GoFOR case 
studies is mutual adjustment. Here, national (sub-national) governments continue to 
adopt their own policies in response to, or anticipation of the policy choices of other 
territorial levels. This mode of coordination has been found in six cases. It mainly 
refers to coordination with the international level (UN, MCPFE). For instance, the 
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case study on the AFD stated that “the Austrian Forest Dialogue is based on the 
elements and principles defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) of 
the United Nations and the pan-European Ministerial Conference for the Protection of 
Forests in Europe” (Hogl and Kvarda 2007). And the same influence has been 
mentioned in the Spanish case on the Regional Forest Programme of Catalonia: 
„The PGPF has been developed applying the MCPFE approach […] In addition, the 
strategic Spanish documents and state action plans that influence directly forest 
management have been taken into account“ (Pecurul, Dominguez and Tena 2007). 
The Romanian case study on anti-corruption policies also referred to the UN and EU 
level: “However, following the GRECO and EU recommendations, the mode of 
interaction is rather mutual adaptation – mutual policy learning” (Bouriaud 2007). 
However, the Danish case study on National Parks mentioned this mode of 
coordination also in the national context: “At the same time, there was some mutual 
adaptation between the territorial levels, in that the local levels had the option to 
abstain from joining the process” (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007, NPP). 
In a nutshell, at least at a first glance, hierarchy modes of multi-level co-ordination 
seem to stand central within the group of GoFOR case studies. However, each of the 
four basic modes of multi-level co-ordination was found as empirical phenomena that 
significantly contributed to describe the processes of co-ordination. 
 
 
  
Table 16: Forms of coordination between the territorial levels in the 19 case studies 
 
Country
Form 
AT-
BS 
AT-
AFD 
DK-
HD 
DK-
NPP
ESP-
FPGP
FR-
CFT
FR-
RPF
GER-
LEADER
GER-
RA 
GER-
GAK 
GR-
MA 
HUN-
NFP 
NL-
GW
NL-
NFP
NL-
UH
NOR-
LF 
ROM-
ACP 
ROM-
NAT 
Hierarchy   X X Xa  X X X (X) X X X X X X X X 
Negotiation  X X      X X X  X X X X X X?  
Competition/Market 
Incentives 
     X X X X X X        
Mutual Adaptation X X  X X X      X     X  
                   
Xa = Hierarchy in this case refer to the coordination between sub-national and local level 
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4.2.2.6  New Actors and Institutions  
In the set of case studies we furthermore attempted to identify common patterns as 
regards the involvement of new actors and institutions which came into play due to 
the interconnection of multiple levels. The term institution includes new organisations 
as well as any change of rules regarding multi-level coordination. Table 17 provides 
an overview on the involvement of new actors and the establishment of new 
institutions for multi-level coordination in the 19 GoFOR case studies.  
In almost all cases new institutions were set up to provide for some form of multi-
level coordination. Some of them were established only temporarily in the course of 
the decision-making process and were then either abandoned or transferred into 
other forms of organisation. Their time of existence varied from rather short durations 
to longer periods, e.g. one to two years, as in the case of coordination committees 
and working groups to formulate National or Regional Forest Programmes in Austria, 
Hungary and Spain, and six years as in the case of the coordination committee 
established for the Relief Plan after the Storms in France (2000-2006). In most cases 
the level of coordination induced by these institutions has been rather low, i.e. 
representatives from sub-national or regional levels participated in meetings and 
were informed about the progress of the decision-making process. In only a few 
cases a higher level of coordination has been observed, such as negotiations 
between the representatives of different levels of government. This was found mainly 
in connection with the implementation of EU or national funding programmes. In 
other cases new institutions were set up as permanent, such as the Territorial Forest 
Charters in France or the National Network Unit (NNU) and Local Action Groups 
(LAG) in the case of regional policy in Germany. Typically these permanent 
institutions are responsible for the implementation of political decisions. They have 
been set up in a later stage of the political process and fulfil a different function. As 
described in the Greek case study this had direct implication for the issues of multi-
level coordination: “Park boards work in close contact with the National Centre for 
Biotopes and Wetlands and the ministerial departments, but this process is more in 
seeking assistance rather than part of a multi-level decision making process” 
(Kassioumis, Papageorgiu and Vakkas 2007). In some cases processes of multi-level 
coordination also took place outside the formal political arena, i.e. the national and 
local committees and thematic working groups, and different organisations entered 
into alliances both at the national and at the local levels conducting preparatory 
meetings (Denmark, National park processes) e.g. 
With regard to the actor configurations we have observed different models in our 
case studies. In some cases the focus was on developing new rules of interaction 
between established actors, whereas in other cases new actors entered the policy 
arena to cope with the situation posed by the specific multi-level governance 
processes. One model that can be derived from our case studies is the “classical 
model”, in which state actors in particular from the executive (ministries and 
agencies) are dominating the process of multi-level coordination. The description 
given in the German case study on Regionen Aktiv provides a typical example of this 
model: “All institutions established under REGIONEN AKTIV are actively involved in 
the MLC with the administrative office having an outstanding role in facilitating MLC”. 
In other cases, such as the Danish and Romanian case studies on the 
implementation of the EU Habitat Directive, non-state actors were of particular 
importance for multi-level coordination: “The institutional set-up and hierarchy of 
multilevel coordination in the HD implementation process has furthermore given 
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NGOs with an interest in a strict interpretation of the Directive more comparative 
power towards the Government as they have the possibility to complain to the EU. 
BirdLife Denmark used legal proceedings to gain influence on the process along with 
other NGOs interested in the outcome of the implementation” (Boon, Lund and 
Nathan 2007, HD). 
Other case studies found that the network of actors has not changed on all territorial 
levels but only on some of them, and mainly this has happened at local levels as for 
instance observed in the French, German and Spanish case studies.  
  
Table 17: New actors and institutions 
 
Country 
Change 
 AT-
BS 
AT-
AFD 
DK-
HD 
DK-
NPP
ESP-
FPGP
FR-
CFT
FR-
RPF
GER-
LEADER
GER-
RA 
GER-
GAK 
GR-
MA 
HUN-
NFP 
NL-
GW
NL-
NFP
NL-
UH
NOR-
LF 
ROM-
ACP 
ROM-
NAT 
New 
Institutions 
Yes X X (X) X  X X X X X  X X X X  X X 
 No                   
                    
New 
Actors 
Yes    X  (X)  X X  X X X   X X X 
 No X X X    X   X    X X    
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4.2.3 Multi-level coordination between internationalization and decentralization 
– analyses and findings from selected GoFOR case studies 
 
4.2.3.1 Multi-level governance in EU policy-making 
 
Case study 1: LEADER+ - EU Community Initiative for rural development and 
its implementation in Germany (Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher)10 
Since 1991 the European Union (EU) has been implementing new territorial 
approaches to rural development in a pilot program called LEADER. Being well 
established as a European Community Initiative the LEADER+ approach aims at 
developing locally managed, so-called ‘bottom-up’ rural development projects across 
the EU. LEADER+ projects have developed across the EU in a variety of well-defined 
local areas. Currently there exist 893 LEADER+-Regions in 15 European countries. 
The approach is characterised by high levels of local stakeholder and community 
involvement, by partnership and cooperation, and by the encouragement of 
innovative approaches to rural development. 
In the programming period from 2000-2006 LEADER+ was financed with Euro 2000 
million, of which approx. Euro 250 million have been transferred to Germany.11 The 
EU initiative has been supporting local project groups in 148 rural regions in 
Germany, aiming to realise innovative pilot strategies for sustainable regional 
development. However, LEADER+ has neither been designed as an instrument for 
replacing investments in agriculture, nor to achieve policy goals by the allocation of 
enormous financial resources. Actually, the financial means of LEADER+ have just 
amounted to approximately 1% of the total European Union’s structural funds in this 
funding period. Hence, LEADER+ must rather be seen as a pilot program aiming at 
the development and demonstration of innovative approaches to rural development 
which subsequently might become part of the mainstream rural development policies. 
The reform of the EU structural funds policy in 1999 introduced a complicated system 
of multi-level-governance which for Benz and Eberlein (1999, 335) is characterized 
by 4 central attributes: 
 
“(a) It aims at implementing an integrative approach to policy-making by 
improving co-ordination of different Structural Funds. 
 
(b) It is supposed to improve vertical intergovernmental co-ordination and 
partnership with regional actors. Grants to selected regions are allocated on the 
basis of development plans and operational programmes, which are to be 
elaborated on the national and regional levels and have to be integrated into the 
Commission’s Community Support Framework. 
 
(c) All projects to be supported by the EU need to be co-financed by national or 
regional governments. EU regional policy can be characterized as a system of 
joint finance linking budgetary policies of different levels of government. 
                                            
10
 Based on Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher (2007), New Modes of Governance in Integrated 
Rural Development Policies, GoFOR Main Assessment Report, July 2007, University of Göttingen, 
pp. 27-58. 
11
 Deutsche Vernetzungsstelle LEADER+ (1999) 
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(d) Finally, regional administrations are requested to include public and private 
actors in the decision-making process in order to achieve broad support for policy 
goals and comprehensive information on development potential.” 
The EU Commission in its guidelines on LEADER+ articulates the need for and 
rationale of multi-level coordination as follows: For rural areas “developing their 
specific resources in an integrated approach that forms part of a territorial strategy 
which is tailored to the local context seems increasingly to be the route that will have 
to be taken if rural areas are to create and maintain competitive and sustainable 
products and services. […] Such an approach will become more effective, however, if 
it forms part of a Community policy and national and regional policies which are able 
to provide the framework, tools and impetus necessary for ensuring that the rural 
areas, and the people who live in them, are in a position to grasp development 
opportunities and translate them into practice using appropriate resources and 
arrangements.”12  
The assumption inherent in this EU programme that the involvement of EU, national 
and regional policies are most effective in terms of rural development can be seen as 
the central argument for an active approach towards multi-level coordination.  
Levels involved: The levels referred to under LEADER+ are Community, national, 
sub-national and regional, with the latter being defined by the regional actors 
themselves after a constituting process within Local Action Groups (LAGs; see 
Figure 1). All territorial levels are actively involved in the process which corresponds 
to the general partnership principle of the EU structural funds policy. While the EU 
Commission sets out framework standards in its guidelines, these standards shall be 
further elaborated in so-called operational programmes, which in Germany have 
been elaborated by 13 federal states. These programmes define an administrational 
structure and appoint authorisation agencies at the appropriate level (e.g. at federal 
state or district level), which shall guarantee the alignment of LEADER+ measures 
with EU and other relevant regulations. Based on the operational programmes LAGs 
were supposed to apply for funding. The funding programme through its guidelines 
establishes a thorough governance system comprising all territorial levels.  
At the EU level the Commission provides for funding and framework regulation. An 
European Observatory facilitates cross-national cooperation and networking activities 
between all involved 15 countries. The LEADER+ Observatory serves as facilitating 
organisation regarding coordination, networking and provision of.  
At the national level the LEADER+ guidelines establish so-called National Network 
Units (NNU). They play a crucial role in addressing MLC. NNUs shall coordinate 
between the different regions and facilitate the exchange of experiences across 
regions and federal states’ borders. They furthermore serve as a training institution 
and as a provider for information and services related to LEADER+.13 Inter-territorial 
exchange of experiences, transfer of know-how and information exchange and 
dissemination from national levels to the LAGs are considered vital in replacing 
central steering bodies and detailed procedural rules. Hence, the NNU plays an 
active role for multi-level coordination under LEADER+.14 The national government, 
however, plays a less important role than e.g. the federal states’ level. It merely 
                                            
12
 EU Commission (2000: 6) 
13
 Interview (6a) 
14
 EU Commission (2000: 9); EU Commission (2003: 15) 
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represents the federal states’ positions and interests at the EU level and supervises 
the NNU15. 
Figure 4: Multi-level coordination under the EU Community Initiative LEADER+ 
 
Own depiction. 
At the sub-national level operational programmes are supposed to substantiate goals 
and measures within the guidelines provided by the framework regulation. In the 
German context the federal states (Länder) are supposed to elaborate Operational 
Programmes based on the Commission guidelines, further elaborating the Leader 
approach under the specific federal states’ conditions. LEADER+ coordinators may 
also be funded at the provincial level for facilitating cooperation, networking, and 
exchange with the regions. In this case they also serve as mediator between the 
LAGs and the provincial authorities in some federal states. 16 
At regional level LEADER+ builds upon Local Action Groups (LAGs). Within the 
overall framework LAGs are the central feature of LEADER+. In the regions these 
public private partnerships can be seen as the central decision-making body 
concerning all LEADER+-related decisions. LAGs are to be established at the 
regional level with a minimum of 10.000 and not more than 100.000 inhabitants per 
region (on average: about 70.000).17 The LEADER programme aims at promoting 
collective action at this very level.  
According to the EU Commission’s LEADER+ guidelines LAGs are supposed to 
represent all relevant regional actors and their interests. These groups should be 
open to all citizens and representatives of different organised interest groups 
(farmers, Nature conservationists, Tourism, Handicraft, enterprises, social groups, 
etc.). Actors representing the regional or local government and administration may 
make up max. 50% of the LAG members.  
A wide range of competencies has been attributed to the LAGs. For example, they 
are supposed to formulate a coherent regional development strategy (so-called 
                                            
15
 Interview 6a (2006), 
16
 EU Commission (2000: 11); Interview 4a (2006), 
17
 Interview 5a (2006),; Interview 1a (2006a),  
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Regional Development Concept). According to the guidelines of such a genuine 
regional development strategy, LAGs shall develop and select regional development 
projects for EU funding.18 In addition to the LAGs LEADER+ also provides for 
“regional management”. So-called regional management facilities (Leader-Managers) 
are the organisational core assisting LAGs and facilitating their work.  
Overall, the Leader+ programme is very much based on modern concepts of 
endogenous rural development which emphasise a combination of network steering, 
the guideline functions of regional development concepts and the work of a regional 
management as steering actor.19  
 
Interdependencies among territorial levels 
The EU’s approach for LEADER+ of providing a framework legislation which focuses 
on minimum requirements and core topics is a central feature of MLC in the context 
of LEADER+. It aims at ensuring a maximum of partnership, subsidiary and local 
adaptation of the initiative.  
Formally, the distribution of competencies among the different levels involved in 
LEADER+ is characterised by subsidiarity. The EU lines out a framework legislation 
leaving as many competencies to the regional level as possible, whilst setting central 
minimum requirements. Reducing the role of intermediate authorities (here the 
national level) can be seen as an innovation of the LEADER approach. Even though 
overlaps can be identified, a more or less clear distinction can be made with regard 
to different levels’ competencies at different stages of the policy cycle. Whilst the EU-
level is more involved in the overall design phase, the federal states’ level is 
important to further elaborate and formulate the programme and reflecting the 
specific situation of the respective state. Regional actors are put in charge for the 
implementation. Monitoring and evaluation have been required by the framework 
regulation too. It has to be addressed at the regional level and to be organised and 
commissioned by the federal states. The principle of EU co-financing of eligible 
measures under LEADER+ also illustrates the rules and competencies among levels. 
As mentioned above, EU through structural funds’ resources finances up to 50% of 
eligible measures in Western and up to 75% in Eastern federal states (Objective 1 
areas). The co-financing shares of 50% and 25% respectively have to be covered 
either by the federal states, the districts or the municipalities.20   
The EU plays a prominent role in promoting, supporting and requiring networking 
activities among different levels. The actual work associated with multi-level 
coordination remains a task of the NNUs and the Observatory. The system of EU 
framework legislation implies certain legal competencies, procedures and 
interdependencies among all levels involved. However, LEADER+ aims at reaching 
the regional level more or less directly from the EU level, with as little interference at 
intermediate levels as possible. Direct interdependence only occurs between the EU 
level and the federal states, and between the federal states and the regions (LAGs) 
respectively. The national level, as regards formal interdependencies, does not play 
a major role. Except for the LAGs all actors playing a central role in MLC, namely the 
NNU, the European Observatory, EU Commission, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
and the responsible Federal states ministries can be characterised as state actors or 
                                            
18
 EU Commission (2000); Böcher (2005:11) 
19
 see Benz/Fürst/Kilper/Rehfeld (2000) 
20
 Deutsche Vernetzungsstelle LEADER+ (1999b) 
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at least as ‘closely related’ to public authorities. For LAGs no such general statement 
can be made. No deductions can be made with regard to informal roles and interests 
of MLC.  
 
Modes of MLC 
The primary mode of interaction between the different levels concerned varies 
between hierarchy, negotiation and competition, depending on the levels concerned. 
Certainly among the EU and national and sub-national level hierarchical modes and 
their implications prevail. This manifests in the LEADER+ guidelines as well as the 
operational programmes. However, the LEADER+ approach employs a competitive 
mode when it comes to the selection of single LAGs for LEADER+ funding, where the 
operational programmes shall elaborate selection criteria for funding the most 
promising strategies.21 Hence, competition triggers the LEADER+ process in the 
respective federal states. The logic of interaction within the work of the NNU and the 
Observatory can be assumed to be based on negotiation. 
 
Actors of MLC 
The LEADER+ approach led to an increase of the number of actors concerned with 
multi-level coordination. First, the establishment of the Observatory with about 40 
employees under LEADER II at EU level put a strong emphasis on the issue. Actually 
about 7-8 staff members work on aforementioned MLC issues.22 Secondly, NNUs 
present ‘new’ actors concerned with MLC. Their work is currently highly valued and in 
Germany the mandate of the NNU will be expanded for coordinating all rural 
development processes in the future.23 Thirdly, some federal states employ so-called 
LEADER+ coordinators at the provincial level as an intermediate level between the 
NNU and the LAGs, which also facilitate MLC. A fourth component illustrating the 
increasing range of actors can be seen in the involvement of the regional level 
(LAGs) in inter-level networking and learning. The institutions of NNUs, provincial 
LEADER+ coordinators and the European Observatory are direct results of the 
LEADER+ initiative and have been established to support inter alia MLC. 
 
Problems of MLC 
By applying the mode of competition to the funding policy the EU with the LEADER+ 
programme introduced a completely new paradigm into German rural development 
policy. Our empirical results suggest that this approach has caused problems too. 
First of all, the EU framework guidelines in some instances may have been too strict 
or too concrete for adequate implementation. For instance the maximum number of 
100.000 inhabitants per ‘region’ as stated in the LEADER+ guidelines, led to 
problems in the designation of regions. It was observed that during the formation 
phase certain areas, communes or the like, have been actively kept out of the 
process in order to comply with the maximum numbers. Even if for historical of 
geographic reasons certain areas were perceived as integral parts of a region, 
                                            
21
 EU Commission (2000, 10) 
22
 Interview 6a (2006),  
23
 BMELV (2006) 
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people stated ‘we can not take them on-board – we will not get funding if we do not 
comply’.24  
Furthermore, the diversity of operational programmes and respective experiences in 
the 13 federal states under LEADER+ in Germany may have constrained effective 
vertical as well as the horizontal exchange and learning.  
Although the decision over the eligibility of projects lies formally within the 
competencies of the LAG, provincial authorities have often the last say in whether 
financial resources are being allocated for respective projects.25 The MLC design of 
involving and even empowering regions shows deficits in the design of operational 
programmes and may obstruct innovations as well as the bottom-up approach. 
Another shortcoming of some operational programmes seems to be a focus on more 
traditional rural development measures. Some regulations seem to narrow the range 
of eligible measures under the programme to the standard EU mainstream 
measures.26  
 
 
Case Study 2: Implementation of the EU Habitats Directive in Denmark (Tove 
Boon, Dorthe Lund, and Iben Nathan)27 
The EU Habitat Directive (HD) was adopted in 1992 and has to be implemented 
through the designation of an European ecological network of special areas of 
conservation (SACs) on land, and at sea and by promoting sustainable management 
of the wider land and seascapes. Each member state is obligated to propose an 
exhaustive list of sites from which the Commission selects a number of sites of 
Community importance in agreement with the Member States. The Member States 
must then designate these sites as SACs. Furthermore, the HD must be 
implemented through appropriate national legislation (EU 2006). The HD is 
concerned with the protection of nature which is endangered or important from a 
European point of view and hence does not necessarily protect all the endangered 
species and nature types from a national point of view (Agger et al 2005). The 1979 
Wild Birds Directive entails the designation of special protected areas (SPAs) (EC 
1979). Together, the SACs and SPAs form the Natura 2000 network. Furthermore, 
the establishment of this network of nature conservation sites is also seen to fulfil the 
Community’s obligation according to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
(European Commission 2002). 
The main requirement of the HD is to ensure a favourable conservation status of 
habitat types and species. This must be done according to article 6 of the HD and 
involves an active management (Agger et al 2005). It is not enough that the Member 
States stop further deterioration of the SACs, they must actively establish measures 
that conserve, improve or even restore a favourable conservation status; the States 
are obliged to obtain a specific result (European Community 2000). Article 6 
furthermore obligates the Member States to prevent any deterioration of a designated 
                                            
24
 Interview 5a (2006); Interview 1a (2006), 
25
 Interview 2a (2006); Interview 5a (2006), see also Böcher (2007) 
26
 Interview 2a (2006); Interview 3a (2006),  
27
 Based on Tove, Boon, Dorthe Lund and Iben Nathan (2007): Implementation of the Habitats 
Directive in a Governance Perspective. GoFOR Main Assessment Report Denmark, July 2007, 
University of Copenhagen. 
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site, which also includes terminating ongoing activities which may previously have 
been allowed; for example agricultural activities. It is not acceptable to wait and see if 
deterioration occurs, precautionary measures must be taken (European Community 
2000). Plans or project which have a negative effect on the conservation status of the 
site can only be approved if there are imperative reasons of public interests. The 
Member State is obliged to take compensatory measures ensuring the overall 
coherence of the Natura 2000 network. Furthermore the Commission must be 
informed of the measures taken (European Council 1992).  
In Denmark, the HD has been in the process of implementation, encompassing the 
following phases:  
– 1992-2001, 2005: Designation of SAC sites; 
– 2003-2005: Implementation in national legislation: Act on Environmental Objectives 
and revision of existing acts; 
– 2005-2007: Technical specification of the HD in a Danish context: identifying nature 
types, quantitative interpretation of ‘favourable conservation status’ for each nature 
type, mapping and conducting base analyses; 
– 2007-2009: development of Natura 2000 plans and Natura 2000 action plans. 
This case study follows the implementation of the HD in Denmark, beginning with the 
designation of SAC sites in 1993 and ending with the base analysis in 2006. The HD 
implementation was chosen as a case study, because this policy has major financial 
and political significance, but also because it is characterised by multilevel decision 
making structures. However, in contrast to other cases that have been analysed, the 
HD case is deliberately very much sector specific, expertise driven, and non-
participatory in nature. 
 
The implementation of the EU Habitats Directive in Denmark 
The Danish government started the process of designating special areas of 
conservation in 1993 and sent the first list of site-proposals to the European 
Commission in 1995. At that time the process had low priority at the National Forest 
and Nature Agency (NFNA), the scope and impact of the HD was played down as 
existing Danish regulations were claimed to be good enough to comply to the HD 
This perception subsequently contributed to the slow and insufficient implementation 
of the directive. The Ministry of Environment apparently had neither recognised the 
scope of the HD nor realised that existing laws and regulations were not sufficient to 
comply with the directive. The EU Commission found the first list SACs proposed by 
Denmark insufficient. In July 1997 Denmark was issued a letter of formal notice 
threatening to pursue the matter at the European Court of Justice. As a 
consequence, Denmark made some additional site-proposals in 1998 but the 
Commission did not find the new list exhaustive either and consequently did not 
approve the enlarged list (Stecher 2004). 
Now the Danish government and the NFNA were forced to take the HD more 
seriously since a number of court orders made Member States - including Denmark - 
realize that the HD entailed more far-reaching consequences than had been 
presumed so far. The NFNA made a catalogue describing the different nature types 
to be protected building on a manual from the Commission on nature types in the 
HD. Using this catalogue the NFNA started to map the nature types in Denmark. In 
2001 the NFNA presented an extended list of site proposals to the Commission with 
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56 new sites. The total area of proposed Natura 2000 sites was now 16,638 km2, of 
which 21.6 % (3591 km2) is terrestrial, amounting to 8.4 % of the total land area of 
Denmark (Stecher 2004).  
Furthermore, an investigation of the transposition into Danish law was ordered by the 
NFNA in 2002. The resulting report came to the conclusion that the Member States 
were obliged to have a precise and binding legislative frame for the management of 
Natura 2000 areas and that the demands concerning precautionary measures for 
avoiding disturbances and deterioration of habitats and species where to be 
understood much stricter than what had been done so far (Kammeradvokaten 2002). 
As a result of the report, the NFNA realised that new legislation had to be made, and 
a new Act on Environmental Objectives dealing with the frames for management 
planning within internationally protected areas was formulated. The regulatory rules 
within the frames were addressed by changing the acts on forests and nature 
protection. Also a few more sites were proposed as SACs and a new departmental 
order on the demarcation and administration of international nature reserves was 
issued (Stecher 2004). 
 
Territorial levels involved in MLC 
The HD is entirely a document of multilevel coordination as it intends to coordinate 
nature protection efforts across the EU, between the EU level, the national levels as 
well as the level of implementation. The directive was issued by the European 
Commission, and is required to be implemented in national law in the Member 
States. The HD outlines a timeframe for national implementation: a draft list of sites 
to be transmitted within three years of notification of the HD; within six years the 
designation and establishment of the final SACs has to be achieved, and if the 
designation is deemed insufficient bilateral negotiations are intended to resolved 
open questions within six month (European Council 1992). Failure to comply with a 
directive may lead to legal sanctions through the ECJ.  
Since the transposition of EU law in national legislation invariably causes revision 
and/or new legislation the national level is inevitably included in the process. The 
Danish case was no exception. As the national implementation process was steered 
by the national level, i.e. by the NFNA, it played the central role in this case.  
Initially in the implementation process the main national level actors, i.e. the Ministry 
of Environment represented by the Minister and the NFNA, misinterpreted the scope 
of the HD, and consequently also the necessary efforts for coordination with the 
lower levels to implement the directive appropriately. Therefore, initially practically no 
coordination among these levels took place. This caused problems with local 
landowners feeling deceived as well as with the EU level in the form of warnings of 
legal procedures (opening statements). As the Ministry’s misperceptions became 
apparent additional resources were allocated to the process and the new Act on 
Environmental Objectives was decreed as well as revisions of existing legislation. 
These legislative reforms involved the regional level as well as individual landowners, 
as the counties had to contribute to the base analysis of the designated sites and to 
administrate the upcoming Natura 2000 plans. Landowners were involved in the 
creation of the Natura 2000 plans which affect their land use.  
The new legislation was the most significant contribution from the national level, 
prepared by the NFNA and adopted by a majority of the Danish Parliament. 
Legislation was submitted to a public hearing giving individuals, institutions and 
organisations form all levels an opportunity to make their opinions heard, hence 
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possibly contributing to coordination. However; only minor changes to the first 
proposal by the NFNA were made. I.e. the national level remained the most 
influential level in the legislative process and the NFNA can be seen as the most 
important actor. 
Due to the municipal reform in 2007 amendments of legislation were made which 
reallocated responsibilities between levels regarding the further tasks in the 
implementation of the HD. The amended Act on Environmental Objectives gives the 
Minister of Environment the authority to designate international nature reserves such 
as SACs, and when an area is designated all relevant authorities are obliged by the 
designation made for the area resulting from this act. Natura 2000 plans are made by 
the Minister of Environment; the municipal councils have to develop action plans for 
the specific habitats. 
In the course of the process the regional level – i.e. the counties – had a role in 
designation SACs outside of forest areas. The counties were already responsible for 
the administration of the Act on Nature Conservation, and hence also became 
responsible of the HD implementation. Furthermore the counties, due to their 
administrative responsibilities, were in possession of expertise and information 
regarding the areas to be designated as SACs and therefore they had the task of 
contributing to the designation outside of forested areas. Moreover the counties 
played a part in the development of criteria for determining the conservation status of 
the SACs as well as in the base analysis laying the ground for the upcoming Natura 
2000 plans. 
The municipal reform of January 2007 changed the allocation of influence among 
territorial levels. Before the reform the regional level was given a significant role in 
the future implementation process, as the counties were given the task of making 
and implementing the upcoming Natura 2000 plans. Hence the counties were 
responsible of carrying the new and revised legislation into action. However; the 
reform divided the task between the national level and the municipalities. The State is 
to elaborate the overall Natura 2000 plans and municipalities are to administer the 
implementations of these plans by elaborating and implementing concrete action 
plans. Hence the municipal reform gave the municipalities more influence on the 
implementation and introduced an additional level to coordinate efforts.  
As mentioned above, the State (NFNA) remains in charge of the further HD 
implementation in forest areas. 
 
Interdependencies among territorial levels  
The establishment of Natura 2000 happened as a response to the recognition of 
threats to a number of habitats and species which had declined or become extinct. 
The development in tourism and urban infrastructure and the intensification of 
agriculture and forestry had left an imprint on natural areas, for instance causing a 60 
percent reduction of wetlands in north and west Europe thereby endangering a 
number of species. Acknowledging that the pressure on nature would continue 
regulations were necessary in order to preserve the natural heritage of Europe. 
First and most obvious, the levels involved are interdependent by legal provisions. 
Furthermore, according to the philosophy of the HD the “problem at hand”, i.e. 
declining biodiversity described above, must be addressed at all levels to allow 
effective solutions: the problem transcends national borders and should thus be 
addressed at a supranational level, yet implementation of measures is bound to take 
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place at the local level and the national level is unavoidably involved since existing 
national legislation had to be revised to comply with EU framework legislation. 
 
Actors of MLC 
At all levels first and foremost state actors/public officials were formally involved, yet 
interest organisations also played an important part in the process by insisting that 
the HD had not been sufficiently implemented and thereby causing the European 
Commission to react. Participation was restricted to public hearings of sector-related 
NGOs and public authorities, whereas ordinary citizens were not a target group. In 
the course of the first designation of SAC sites the affected landowners were not 
directly consulted. This gave rise to criticism. As a consequence the landowners 
were consulted on an individual basis in the subsequent revisions of the SAC 
designation. Complaints over insufficient designation of SACs and insufficient 
implementation of the HD in the Danish legislation caused the EU to require the 
Danish Government to follow up on this. Indirectly, the right to lodge a complaint was 
used by NGOs to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis the environmental authorities. 
This was probably the NGO’s most effective means to exert influence.  
The European Commission (DG Environment and DG Agriculture) was the driving 
force by initiating the process, by issuing the directive, and by having the formal 
authority to institute legal procedures, which is hence the mode of steering (through 
first and second warnings, i.e. ‘opening statement’ and ‘explanatory statement’), 
followed by legal case if a member state do not follow the warnings. The ECJ in the 
effort to coordinate between Member States has to make final judgements as regards 
how HD articles are to be interpreted. The various judgements and the precedent 
created by them functioned as a leverage for those arguing that the HD had not been 
implemented sufficiently giving substance to the threat of complaining to the EU. 
Hence the ECJ played an outstanding role in this sense. Even if the Court is neutral 
in terms of interests, its results are important in terms of serving the interests. 
The biogeographical committees served also provided forums for coordination 
among member states and for interpreting the HD. However; they had little influence 
on multilevel coordination within Denmark. 
The EU working groups dealing with individual articles which were disputed can also 
be considered new actors which entered the arena as a consequence of the 
difficulties in multilevel coordination. Yet the working groups’ members were hardly 
new actors to the arena (mainly public officials). Hence the variety of actors did not 
increase. The working groups did play a role in facilitating coordination between the 
EU level and the member states in the sense of providing information to the national 
level process. 
The Ministry of Environment (i.e. the NFNA) steered the process at the national level 
and played an outstanding role in national coordination among levels: In its first 
attempts to designate SACs the NFNA (inadvertently) hindered coordination because 
of misinterpreting the necessary measures to comply with the HD. Here the interest 
of the Ministry may have been to avoid costly compensation schemes and to keep 
things simple.  
Later in the process the NFNA was significant regarding the formal coordination 
among levels as the Agency has written the drafts for the new and revised legislation. 
The NFNA works according to the wishes of the respective Minister, its influence is 
restricted to this frame. Formally, it is the Danish Parliament that has to adopt 
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legislation. But as mentioned above, the Government at the time, and hence the 
Minister, had a solid parliamentary majority supporting its/his policy. In so far the role 
of Parliament was practically a limited one. 
The NFNA has significant interests at stake as regards coordination as well as 
regards the distribution of influence and responsibility among levels. The further 
implementation of the HD is deemed to be very costly and it is to be assumed that 
responsibility for specific tasks will be accompanied by funds and jobs, which 
naturally are in the interest of the organisation. Furthermore, if most of the tasks are 
undertaken and therefore controlled by the NFNA, this would make reporting to the 
Commission an easier exercise. 
NGOs like BirdLife Denmark (DOF), and the Nature Council have repeatedly 
stressed that the implementation of the Birds Directive as well as the HD was 
insufficient as compared to the legal requirements (Agger et al. 2005; DOF 2003; 
Hansen 2003; Pagh 1999, 2001, 2002). BirdLife Denmark used legal proceedings to 
gain influence on the process and, along with other NGOs, BirdLife Denmark is 
interested in the outcome of the implementation. This NGO was a key actor in the 
sense that it was a pioneer in this form of influence seeking. The outcome of the 
insisting attempts to point to the insufficient implementation affected the re-
interpretation of the Ministry as regards the consequences of the HD. However; the 
legal statements and judgements from the EU and from the national level 
respectively have been the main triggers inducing the change of perceptions. 
 
Modes of MLC 
Coordination was clearly triggered by the legal provisions and the dominant mode of 
coordination was hierarchy through all levels leaving little room for negotiations. 
Coordination was institutionalised within the usual governing institutions: the 
European Commission and ECJ, the Danish Government, Parliament and attached 
bureaucratic system. No new institutions were established. 
The EU commission steers the implementation of the Natura 2000 through 
framework legislation and legal procedures, through first and second warnings 
(‘opening statement’ and ‘explanatory statement’), followed by legal cases if a 
Member State does not follow the warnings. Choosing this approach to steer the 
implementation makes the EU Commission dependent on actors (e.g. national level 
NGOs) to report deficits in fulfilling the requirements of the HD. The EU Commission 
itself does not have the resources to monitor the habitats. Complaints as regards 
insufficient compliance leading to legal repercussions can be reported by every 
citizen and organisation. Hence, citizens and organisations constitute an information 
link between the EU and the national level. 
The main venue of formal coordination is nonetheless direct communication between 
national governments and the EU Commission in the form of 6 yearly reporting from 
the national level to the EU and conversely in the form of reports of the Commission 
on the progress to the Member States. Biogeographical groups and the different 
working groups can be mentioned as further venues of coordination, mainly 
comprising public officials who negotiate how various articles of the HD are to be 
interpreted. Moreover multilevel coordination takes place through negotiations in the 
Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and in the European Parliament.  
At the national level the HD had a significant effect for Danish nature policy. Not only 
in terms of significant financial resources needed for its implementation. The 
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difficulties in the implementation have also pointed to a “clash of cultures of policy-
making” between traditional corporative consensus seeking and hierarchical rule of 
law. Danish environmental legislation is traditionally done in the form of framework 
laws, granting authorities wide discretion both to set and enforce environmental 
standards. The provision of discretion authorities also allows them to assess and 
balance economic and environmental benefits. In contrast, EU environmental 
legislation is based on legally binding standards, and, e.g. habitat protection cannot 
be set aside for economic reasons, as decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) have shown. Furthermore, Danish environmental legislation is based on a 
decentralised structure, leaving municipalities and counties the power to set 
standards and to decide how to enforce them.  
 
Conclusion 
Decision-making in the case of HD implementation has first and foremost taken place 
at the EU level since the annexes defining species and habitats were formed at the 
EU level; the list of appointed sites had to be approved at the EU level and the 
measures taken to improve the conservation status must be reported and can be 
deemed insufficient by the EU level. The ECJ was particular important in determining 
how the Directive was to be interpreted. Within this frame the national Government 
was decisive in terms of designing the national implementation through new and 
revised legislation as well by allocating financial resources. Since the Government 
together with the support party DF, had majority the remaining Parliament had little 
influence on the further process. The experts involved in the process had significant 
influence at the national level determining the criteria by which to evaluate the 
conservation status of the SACs as well as the monitoring efforts to be employed 
hence determining the future efforts to reach or maintain a favourable conservation 
status of the SACs. 
There were a number of problems regarding MLC, in particular between the national 
and the EU level as the Danish government had clearly misinterpreted the scope and 
consequences of the HD. This can be ascribed to a lack of informational resources 
devoted to vertical coordination, as this misinterpretation was prevalent in all of the 
member countries. The misinterpretation caused the allocation of inadequate 
resources in terms of staff to make the first list of SAC designations which was 
consequently not approved by the Commission. The misinterpretation at the national 
level furthermore led to coordination problems between the local and national level 
as the landowners were misinformed by the Minister of Environment and the NFNA 
at the start of the process. 
Pagh (1999) points to a clash between a traditional mode of governing and the 
implementation of the HD in Denmark, also as regards MLC. The traditional mode is 
based on flexible and decentralised framework legislation with possibilities to weigh 
interests and use exemption paragraphs to do so. The strict judicial mode of 
governing represented by the EU in contrast, very much builds hierarchical steering 
and legally binding standards. Danish environmental law has no tradition of legally 
binding standards. Furthermore the difficulties in the implementation process 
changed the NFNA’s perception: Before NFNA perceived Danish environmental 
standards, including nature protection, to be among the best and strictest in the 
world, but it realised that this is not the case. The NGOs were under a similar 
delusion and did not pay too much attention to EU legislation, but they more and 
more recognised the scope of e.g. the HD. 
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The process itself and the initial misinterpretations led to a certain level of mistrust 
among landowners to the promises of the public officials from the NFNA, who early in 
the implementation process denied that the HD would have much influence on 
private lands and afterwards designated a number of private lands as habitats. For 
national environmental NGOs the institutional set-up for the implementation of the 
HD, which is basically a hierarchical one, provided additional routes to take influence 
by raising their complaints directly at the EU level, by-passing the national 
government. This was successfully done e.g. by BirdLife Denmark. 
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4.2.3.2 Multi-level coordination in federal systems  
 
Case study 3: Between internationalization and sub-national blockade – a case 
study of the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy: (Ralf Nordbeck and Michael 
Pregernig)28 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is one of three Conventions under 
international law which were displayed for signing at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The 
Convention entered into force under international law in December 1993 and has 
three main objectives: 
• the conservation of biological diversity, 
• a sustainable use of its components, and 
• the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources. 
Article 6 of the Convention on Biological Diversity requires each Party to develop or 
adapt national strategies, plans, or programmes for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity and to integrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into relevant sectoral or 
cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies. This Article creates an obligation for 
national biodiversity planning, and in its Decisions VI/26 and VI/27 the Conference of 
the Parties of the Convention stressed that the development and adoption of a 
national biodiversity strategy constitutes a cornerstone of national implementation of 
the Convention. A national strategy will thus reflect how the country intends to fulfil 
the objectives of the Convention in light of specific national circumstances, and the 
related action plans shall constitute the sequence of steps to be taken to meet the 
goals (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Implementation of the CBD at the national level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
28
 Based on Ralf Nordbeck and Michael Pregernig (2007): The Austrian Biodiversity Strategy – A 
Failed Governance Process? GoFOR Main Assessment Report Austria, August 2007, BOKU, 
Vienna. 
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Source: Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft, 2005:6 
 
The conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity as targeted by the 
Convention of Biological Diversity is a cross-sectoral political issue. Its 
implementation touches upon many different competences across the federal political 
system in Austria. In many important areas the federal government has no or little 
legal competences; for example, nature protection, hunting, and land use planning 
are in the competences of the Länder. This creates a complex network of actors 
when it comes to the implementation of the CBD in Austria, comprising a high 
number of possible veto players. The Austrian biodiversity strategy is thus embedded 
in a multi-level system of coordination. 
 
The implementation of the CBD in Austria 
Austria has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1995 and has since then 
developed national measures and objectives for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity to ensure the implementation of the CBD. Recognizing the 
diversity of relevant legislation and the divided responsibilities for biodiversity in 
Austria a “National Commission on Biodiversity” was entrusted by the former Federal 
Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family soon after the ratification in 1995. The 
Biodiversity Commission was set up as a policy coordination mechanism. It should 
fulfil three functions: (1) guide efforts on implementing the CBD; (2) facilitate 
coordination and cooperation between different activities and programs in the field of 
biodiversity; and (3) play an important platform for information exchange on various 
issues related to biodiversity. The Biodiversity Commission is composed of various 
actors, including representatives of administrative departments (Federal Ministries 
and Provincial Authorities), public and private interest groups (Landowner 
Associations, Chamber of Commerce), science (Universities, Austrian Academy of 
Science, Natural History Museum), and NGOs (WWF, Naturschutzbund, Arche 
Noah). 
The first Austrian Biodiversity Strategy is the final output of a dialogue process 
involving various stakeholders. The formulation process lasted for almost a year from 
June 1997 to April 1998. During this time period four different drafts of the strategy 
document were elaborated. The final draft dating from April 1998 was then adopted 
by the Council of Ministers in August 1998. This national biodiversity strategy was 
meant to serve as the basis for the coordination and implementation of measures for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in Austria. 
The first strategy has been evaluated in a two-step approach in 2001 and 2003 
(Götz, 2001, Röhrich, 2003a). Based on this evaluation it was revised and updated 
after 2003. The resulting second biodiversity strategy, the so-called “Advanced 
Austrian Implementation Strategy for the Convention of Biological Diversity” 
published in October 2005, shall form a long-term framework for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity in Austria. It seeks for a compromise 
between necessary long-term goals and the financial and political opportunities. 
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Territorial levels involved in MLC and their interdependencies 
The international level has been very important for the Austrian biodiversity strategy, 
as regards the principle obligation to develop such a national strategy, but also 
content-wise: many of its themes as well as procedural and instrumental 
recommendations that were taken up nationally stem from the international level 
documents. The biodiversity strategy itself is regarded a part of the implementation of 
the CBD as indicated by the full title of the strategy, and its chapters closely mirror 
the relevant articles of the CBD. Another important source of influence was the EU 
level, with its upcoming EU Biodiversity Strategy. The Biodiversity Commission used 
the draft of the EU biodiversity strategy in its work. It is easy to recognise that the 
idea for the sectoral chapters in the Austrian biodiversity strategy have been 
borrowed from that source. 
Additionally, the involvement of sub-national actors is also very important for the 
biodiversity strategy in Austria. In accordance with Article 15 of the Constitutional 
Law all competences for nature conservation are held by the provincial level. There is 
no federal framework law on nature protection in Austria. To coordinate with sub-
national actors is therefore a precondition for successful implementation of the 
Austrian biodiversity strategy. 
The interdependencies between the territorial levels are primarily based on the need 
of legal compliance and characterised by the distribution of legal competencies in the 
federal system of Austria: 
• the international level as source of the obligation to elaborate a national 
biodiversity strategy; 
• the central government, which is responsible for the implementation of the 
CBD and accordingly set up the National Biodiversity Commission (NBC), 
chairs the NBC, and furthermore has the responsibility in relevant policy fields 
such as forestry and water management; and 
• the federal provinces which hold the legislative competencies in the field of 
nature protection, but also for fishery, hunting, and spatial planning. 
The exclusive right of the federal provinces regarding legislation and enforcement in 
the field of nature protection creates a need for coordination among the central 
government and the federal states, but also among the nine provinces. Obviously, 
the distribution of competences among the federal and the sub-national level has 
created significant challenges for the work of the Biodiversity Commission and the 
elaboration of the biodiversity strategy, as reported by a number of interviewees: 
„Because many issues immediately touch upon the competencies of the federal 
provinces it becomes more difficult through it.“ (Interview 09: 42) “The difficulties 
were that the responsibilities for the federal provinces really don't ease to work 
together.” (Interview 05: 39) Not surprisingly, it was very important for both levels, the 
central government and the federal provinces, to have a clear statement on the 
distribution of competencies right in the introduction of the biodiversity strategy. 
(Interview 06: 181) 
 
Modes of MLC  
The mode of coordination that predominantly has been used between the central 
government and the federal states is networking, rather seldom are negotiations 
necessary. The federal provinces have used two different mechanisms for 
coordinating with the national level: a common representative and a liaison body. The 
common representative speaks for all nine provinces in the Biodiversity Commission 
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and thus represents agreed positions of the federal provinces regarding the 
respective issues at hand. Additionally, the coordination between the nine provinces 
and between the federal and provincial level has been facilitated by an 
institutionalised liaison body (Verbindungsstelle der Länder). However, this liaison 
body only acts as an information-turntable (“mailbox”) between the federal provinces. 
Its main functions are to deliver information and make appointments. The liaison 
body conveys information between the provinces and if necessary between the 
federal government and the provinces, but does not coordinate different the 
provinces’ positions. 
The involvement of representatives from provincial administrations in the strategy 
formulation process was regarded as an active one, sometimes even as very active 
by other members of the NBC. Representatives from two provinces (Salzburg, Upper 
Austria) attended the meetings regularly, and the provinces were also involved in the 
editorial group drafting the biodiversity strategy. The chapters on species and 
landscape protection were mainly drafted by the representative of the province of 
Salzburg. 
However, leaving aside the active and personal engagement of individual official 
representatives, it must be concluded that the coordination between the federal level 
and the provinces during the elaboration of the biodiversity strategy remained 
insufficient, and the connection between the nature conservation policies at provincial 
level and the federal biodiversity strategy could have been strengthened much more. 
Accordingly, the role of the federal provinces has received much criticism from 
several interviewees, e.g.: “The provinces of course joined in, and wrote the chapters 
on nature conservation in the biodiversity strategy, but [these chapters describe] 
mainly what happens anyway. It is not strategically deliberate.” (Interview 12: 98) “It 
was difficult to include any measures which would have to be implemented by the 
federal provinces.” (Interview 09: 68) “Any issue that was related to changes of 
nature conservation laws has met with opposition from the federal provinces.” 
(Interview)  
Members of the NBC that have followed the discussions during the last ten years 
stated that in their opinion the federal provinces have become more and more rigid in 
defending their interest positions over time (Interview 19: 36). It was also reported 
that federal provinces would refuse to cooperate even in cases where financial 
means are available from the central government because they regard any national 
level planning as an outside interference (Interview 07: 65). Furthermore, the 
impression was reported that the federal provinces are pretty happy with the current 
situation and a weak biodiversity strategy (Interview 07: 28). 
To conclude, the federal provinces have taken a rather tough stance to defend their 
interest positions and showed no interest in any form of more effective multi-level 
coordination during the elaboration of the Austrian biodiversity strategies. This strong 
defence position has clearly added to the general problems of multi-level 
coordination in the federal system. 
 
Conclusions: Little multi-level coordination and a weak biodiversity strategy  
The domestic implementation of the objectives of the CBD cannot be realised by the 
mere introduction of single measures. Rather is has to be done in a continuous 
process, which is to finally result in a change of perspectives in all sectors and at all 
levels. Within such a process the National Commission on Biodiversity should have a 
central position as an information pool and by linking-up activities at different levels. 
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The Austrian biodiversity strategy should be a central factor in drawing up and 
building a consensus on these activities (Umweltbundesamt 2004: 19). 
While formally MLC has been of special importance for the National Biodiversity 
Commission, it was not given much weight in the strategy process. The Biodiversity 
Commission has not fulfilled its potential as a central institution that links the activities 
of different levels. As a consequence, the biodiversity strategy has failed to 
effectively link the objectives of the CBD with policies at the national and provincial 
level in a convincing manner. Furthermore, the exclusive formal rights of the 
provinces for legislation and enforcement in the field of nature protection create 
additional difficulties for the implementation of the biodiversity strategy as a federal 
government programme. A Federal Framework Law on Nature Protection might 
provide a better basis for MLC. However, given the current political constellation such 
a change in the distribution of competences is not in sight.. 
The majority of interviewed stakeholders regarded the degree of multi-level 
coordination in biodiversity-related matters as insufficient. Some see the lack of 
vertical coordination as the main explanatory factor for the shortcomings of the 
Austrian Biodiversity Strategy. It seems that internationalization in the field of nature 
conservation has led to a passive and defensive behaviour on the side of the federal 
provinces. Since most of the measures included in the Biodiversity Strategy cannot 
be implemented by the central government, and since most of the measures are ill-
defined, the Strategy remains weak. Furthermore, there are no specific budgets 
allocated for the implementation of the strategy, only some indirect financing by 
means of other programmes. 
One of our interviewees has labelled this general approach towards the elaboration 
of the Austrian biodiversity strategy as administrative behaviour in terms of 
compliance, instead of a problem-oriented strategic perspective (Interview 09: 125-
127). Indeed, the biodiversity strategy rather seems to be a product induced by 
international obligations than by national problem pressure. More than once 
members of the Biodiversity Commission pointed out that the biodiversity strategy 
has to be internationally presentable. In this sense the biodiversity strategy document 
resembles very much the focus of work of the NBC, with much more orientation 
towards international than national issues. 
 
 
CASE STUDY 4: REGIONEN AKTIV – Federal Model and Demonstration Project 
(Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher)29 
REGIONEN AKTIV – Land gestaltet Zukunft (‘Active Regions – Shaping rural 
futures’) is a pilot programme initiated by the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Consumer Protection of Germany (BMVEL). It aims at contributing to an efficient 
and goal oriented development of rural areas, based on cooperative problem-solving 
and the regional distribution of decisions and responsibilities. To a certain degree the 
programme shall serve as a model for future improvements of the national agriculture 
policy as well as the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), more specifically the EU 
rural development policy. 
                                            
29
 Based on Lukas Giessen and Michael Böcher (2007), New Modes of Governance in Integrated 
Rural Development Policies, GoFOR Main Assessment Report July 2007, University of Göttingen, 
pp. 59-97. 
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In 2001 a nation-wide competition took place in which 206 German regions applied 
for REGIONEN AKTIV funding. 33 regions were invited to prepare regional 
development concepts (RDC). Finally, in March 2002 18 regions were selected for 
funding. Until December 2005 45 million Euro have been spent on regional 
management and regional development projects within REGIONEN AKTIV. In 2005 
the BMVEL decided to prolongate the programme with some changes until 2007 
(‘Phase II’) – in this current second phase especially the building of regional value 
chains is in the centre of the BMELV’s interest.  
The model project builds upon the following principles: 
• Competition (among different regions and within a region for funding) 
• Regionalisation (decision-making powers as well as financial accountability 
are shifted to the local actors) 
• Integration (of different interests and different sectoral perspectives) 
• Partnership (on the regional horizontal level between all relevant actors, on 
the vertical level between the BMVEL and the regions) 
• Know-how and its transfer (continuous mutual learning of actors; learning in 
policy process through different forms of evaluations and incentives) 
• New approach to governance (integration of hierarchical steering, market 
based incentives and negotiated rules) 
 
Simplifying MLC by devolution 
REGIONEN AKTIV aims at a low degree of interdependencies among levels. The 
coordination among different levels under REGIONEN AKTIV is characterised by a 
high degree of devolution of responsibilities into the regions30, which explicitly are 
smaller then a federal state but larger than just a commune or a small group of 
communes. The need for “regionalisation”, especially of decision-making 
competences, is articulated as a key element in rural development policies.31 With 
REGIONEN AKTIV the federal ministry puts an emphasis on enabling people to help 
themselves, which implies a re-distribution of competencies to the regional level. This 
empowering approach is represented by four ‘anchors of regional responsibility’:32 
• content responsibility - regional selection of projects 
• procedural responsibility - regional partnership in combination with the 
professional regional management  
• financial responsibility - regional budgeting for funding projects in the regions 
• administrative responsibility - handling of funds by regional authorities 
The devolutionary approach is also reflected in the legal base of REGIONEN AKTIV, 
the notification text, which roughly replaces more detailed guidelines. Elbe (2006) 
finds that such guidelines would have made much more detailed specifications on 
measures etc. necessary than the mere notification did.33 As a consequence of 
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 Elbe (2006: 20) 
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shifting decision-making competencies to the regions, such competencies need to be 
withdrawn from elsewhere. In the case of REGIONEN AKTIV elsewhere refers to the 
federal states.34 Hence, BMVEL actively tried to admit a maximum degree of freedom 
for the regional level while cutting back responsibilities of intermediate territorial 
levels.  
Two levels having distinct competencies 
Before this background and having in mind that BMVEL to a large extend ignored the 
federal state level in the institutional set-up, it becomes obvious that only two levels 
play a meaningful role under REGIONEN AKTIV. Programme documents refer to the 
‘programming level’ (national) and to the ‘implementation level’ (regional), the first 
being in charge of the so called ‘framework steering’, while the later is supposed to 
execute ‘detail steering’ (Figure 6). Thus, active coordination across a minimum of 
two territorial levels is being pursuit. In this context of devolution, the term “framework 
steering” may be re-phrased as “management by objectives” being relatively open as 
regards the choice of ends. In particular it refers to fundamental programming tasks 
of the BMVEL, to the selection of regions by the Jury and accompanying advice by 
the Council. Detail steering includes proposing projects, deciding on proposals by 
Regional Partnerships (RPs), the employment of external advisors, control of legal 
alignment by managing authorities as well as the actual handling of public funds and 
networking by the regional management units.35  
Figure 6: Governance system established under REGIONEN AKTIV 
Source: Peter and Knickel (2006: 18) 
Figure 6 distinguishes between framework steering at the national (upper) and detail 
steering at the regional level (lower part). 
The two levels are interconnected through the regional development strategy 
document, which serves as contractual base between BMVEL and the regions. 36 As 
regards communication and the flow of information the two levels are also connected 
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by the GS, which in a literal sense must be assigned to the programming level.37 
Thus, all institutions established under REGIONEN AKTIV are actively involved in 
MLC with the Administrative office having an outstanding role in facilitating MLC. The 
Administrative office serves as a mediator between the regions and the ministry, 
having the role of a secretariat for managing the day-to-day work of the programme 
and at the same time functioning as an expert consultancy. In the regions, however, 
the Administrative office has been perceived as ‘the right hand’ of BMVEL. The 
number of actors integrated into MLC hence increased significantly. The majority of 
new actors in MLC now is stemming from the regional level, which formerly either 
has not been institutionalised or did not have far reaching decision and 
implementation responsibilities.  
Modes of MLC and interdependencies among territorial levels  
The modes of interaction and interdependencies between the two levels vary to a 
certain degree. Bearing in mind that REGIONEN AKTIV is a funding programme, 
where a central authority provides public funds for beneficiaries, who in turn have to 
comply with the programme objectives and requirements and have to enter into 
competition with other regions, it becomes clear that competition between regions is 
employed as a mode of co-ordination. That is, competition for funding serves as a 
means to trigger close compliance to the requirements. The objectives and 
requirements however have been set hierarchically at the programming level by 
BMVEL.38 Furthermore, the concrete goals to be defined at the regional level were 
supposed to be the result of negotiation processes among regional actors. Thus, this 
case shows a combination of three modes of MLC.39  
Interdependencies result from the serious need of BMVEL to inform potential 
beneficiaries about the programme requirements and details. This must be seen as a 
significant dependency, since REGIONEN AKTIV is not to be seen as a standard 
programme, under which every single detail has been laid down in specific 
guidelines. Many issues of programme governance, such as the 2-stage process of 
region selection, the performance-dependent extra funds, and the requirements for 
evaluation had to emerge in an iterative and adaptive manner and had to be 
communicated effectively. Likewise, funds are being transferred downstream. On the 
other hand BMVEL declared to count on (not to rely on) the knowledge and lessons 
generated in the regions (being a learning programme). Thus, BMVEL to a certain 
extent depends on an upstream flow of information through regional focus groups as 
well as on evaluation and reporting mechanisms.  
Complicating MLC through simplification 
Problems with MLC occurred at the national level, where the federal states have 
been actively ignored by the programme provider, even though they have the 
constitutional responsibilities concerning rural development issues. This approach led 
to ‘diplomatic irritations’ and was perceived as politically not being correct, but 
reasonable and understandable.40 The BMVEL was definitely able to overcome 
“normal” federal structures by one strong power resource: financial means helped to 
weaken the resistance of the federal states. The later inclusion of federal states 
marked a ‘considerable change in the multi-level approach taken by REGIONEN 
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AKTIV’41 and finally benefited BMVEL the most. It helped to overcome the 
implementation dilemma which BMVEL was facing, i.e. that implementation of the 
progressive ideas under the pilot scheme probably had been impossible with the 
states, while the transfer of results (implementation into mainstream policy for rural 
development) without the federal states de facto is unattainable.42 The approach 
taken by BMVEL consequently allowed the national level to intervene at regional 
level43, while at the same time demonstrating and testing the new approach to rural 
development policy for improving mainstream policy. 
The procedure of how BMVEL intervened, when it became clear that in many regions 
the composition of the decision-making bodies (RPs) was heavily biased towards 
public actors whereas private sector actors were underrepresented may serve as an 
illustrative example for MLC in REGIONEN AKTIV. The ministry through the 
intermediate institution of the Administrative office urged regions to improve the 
balance by including further actor groups into the development strategies which were 
to be handed in for the application for phase II. This soft and flexible way of 
management by objectives can be seen as one way for MLC under REGIONEN 
AKTIV. However, also harder and more hierarchical modes could be identified. The 
thorough system of reporting and sometimes ‘excessive evaluation obligations’ 44 
established under the funding scheme shows that management by objectives also 
was applied in a more rigid way, necessitating e.g. certain reports from the regions to 
obtain further funds.45  
Furthermore, REGIONEN AKTIV in some cases led to parallel regional governance 
structures resulting from various regional initiatives.46 This may serve as an indicator 
for problems at the national level, showing a lack of coordination between different 
ministries or departments.47 
 
Only two levels in a federal country – Does it work? 
From the above descriptions we conclude that in a federal context with the states 
having a constitutional stake in rural development issues, the federal ministry by 
made a provocative move delivering REGIONEN AKTIV. It did so because including 
the level of the federal states might have caused the approach taken under 
REGIONEN AKTIV to fail for different reasons. The example of LEADER+ with its 
existing variety of quite different implementation structures and operational 
programmes in different federal states shows that negotiations with the federal states 
upon REGIONEN AKTIV would not have been very easy and could have led to a 
diminishment of the BMVEL’s aims as well as to a serious delay of its 
implementation. Given the fact that the programme was designed as a temporary 
pilot project for testing a new approach, the federal states can accept (reluctant or in 
favour of the approach) this solo run of BMVEL. However, as soon as it comes to 
mainstream rural development policy the federal states will not accept the federal 
government to intervene in this manner. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the 
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‘diplomatic irritations’ will be offset by a success of the pilot programme or if, at least 
with some federal states, these irritations will negatively affect their relations to the 
federal ministry in the future. 
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4.2.3.3 Making decentralization approaches work 
Case study 5: Territorial Forestry Charters in France (Gérard Buttoud and Irina 
Kouplevatskaya)48 
In February 2001, in France an internal order of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries has introduced so-called “Territorial Forest Charters”, at first on an 
experimental basis, as an instrument of sustainable development of rural territories 
with a special focus on sustainable management and multifunctionality of the forest. 
A few months later, the Territorial Forest Charters (CFT) have been legally 
institutionalised by the Law on the Forest of July 2001, stating that «on a territory, 
corresponding to specific defined objectives, a territorial forest charter may be 
established for the implementation of a long-term programme of actions, integrating 
multifunctionality of the local forests» (Lequette, 2005). This legal provision has 
concretised the international engagements of France in the world dialogue on forests, 
and directly responded to the expectations of the society in relation to management 
and sustainable development of the forests.  
According to this innovation in forest policy, it is planned that those charters should 
be elaborated based on willingness and initiative of local actors including 
stakeholders and local politicians (mayors of rural communes, other elected 
responsible persons). This contractual approach aims at promotion of mutual 
decisions between public and private forest owners offering forest related services 
(timber and non–timber products, recreation services etc), as well as between users 
and stakeholders who are interested in those services and in the way the services 
are provided as well. A Territorial Forest Charter in this sense is a development 
project at the local level, aimed at the achievement of specific goals related to the 
increased role of the forestry activities in the economic and social development of a 
small region. A CFT unites different stakeholders and actors which are joining the 
project with defined established duties, engagements and responsibilities. According 
to the Forest Code of 2002, the Forest Territory Charters are aiming at four basic 
goals: 
• guaranteeing the satisfaction of the environmental and social domains, 
concerning the management of natural resources and forests;  
• contributing to employment and rural development especially through the 
re-enforcement of links between urban citizens and forest massifs;  
• favouring the re-grouping of public and private forest owners both for 
technical and economic matters through the land and management 
restructurization at the scale of the forest massif; 
• re-enforcing the overall competitiveness of the wood chain. 
CFTs are basically local instruments for managing forest development projects. The 
basic level of decision-making is a pure communal one as participation of local actors 
is specifically required as a mechanism for CFTs. The main decisions have to be 
taken at the local level. The main issue concerning MLC results from the need for the 
coherence with the key directives and orientations as defined at the national level.  
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 Based on Gérard Buttoud and Irina Kouplevatskaya (2007): Case Study 1: Territorial Forestry 
Charters (CFT). GoFOR Main Assessment Report France, July 2007, Nancy, ENGREF, pp. 25-61. 
Analysis along procedural elements 140 
 
 
Territorial levels involved in MLC 
The forestry law of 2001 which introduced the concept of CFTs, states that there are 
local initiatives borne by the local actors, and lead by local politicians if possible. The 
law specifies that the area of CFTs has to be validated by the departmental or 
regional Prefect (representative of the government) and that it has to be compatible 
with other officially approved documents related to the territory. Apart from this, no 
coordination between the CFT level and other decision-making levels is formerly 
required. 
The National Programme for CFT is basically established at the national level with 
the rationale of having the forestry decisions participatory defined at the local level. In 
the framework of the Programme the following levels of governance are mentioned:  
(1) The international level, because de-sectorisation of forest policy is presented 
as a way for complying with the international engagements of France. 
(2) The EU level, because of the territorial consistency of the EU policy, 
especially for the disadvantaged regions;  
(3) The National level because CFT is provisioned in national law. 
(4) The provincial level, because each CFT should be established in coherence 
with the provincial programme to be established,  
(5) The local level, evidently because of the location of the CFT activities.  
Nevertheless, none of these governance levels is mentioned clearly in the guidelines 
and related policy papers. In the official documents on CFTs only the local level is 
formally mentioned, which is new as compared to the traditionally centralised national 
based policies in France. 
Thus, except for the local level, the other levels of governance have only an indirect 
influence on CFT process. The most important in this regard is the European level 
which was presented as a possible source of future funding under the condition of 
CFT organisation. The EU is used from this view point as an argument for incentives 
and promotion of CFT. 
CFTs have been established by the national forest law, but the chapter on CFTs only 
provides a general direction and rough guidelines for forestry activities connected 
with CFTs. This means that projects developed by the CFTs do not necessarily fully 
comply with the objectives of the Forest Law, especially considering the rights and 
duties of any actor to promote sustainable forest management. But there are no legal 
provisions to formally control this coherence. As it has worked so far, the 
establishment of CFTs is basically supported by the state fundings. Although there 
are no specific criteria and indicators for validating the financial support, some 
technical norms mentioned in technical documents exist. 
As a consequence, in all CFTs, the local level is the most important level under the 
leadership of local politicians and with the technical expertise of public institutions at 
the departmental level. Of course, other levels of decision making also influence the 
content of CFTs. The design and organization of CFTs have been basically funded 
by the state organizations (Ministry of Agriculture, DATAR), because CFTs were part 
of their strategic priorities. 
As for the functioning of the CFTs the EU, the State, the Region and the Department 
provide funds granted for specific actions. Sometimes, they can guarantee some 
additional financing when actions are managed in the context of a CFT. For instance, 
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some Departmental Council only funds forest actions within CFTs or increase 
substantially the level of financial subsidies to CFT projects bearers.  
Urbanism documents or, more generally, land management documents such as Land 
Charters or Natural Regional Park Charters also influence the content of CFTs which 
have to follow the same guidelines. The Regional or Departmental Prefecture is 
responsible for the official validation of the CFTs area. With that, they also influence 
the formulation process of the document. 
But the national level remains essential through the definition of the French forest 
policy. The State thus orients the measures which are to be taken locally.  
Finally, the international policy has also an impact. After the Rio Summit, the 
importance of considering ecological and social functions has been put forward and 
has induced a relatively slow but growing awareness of the importance of a 
sustainable management of forests. The French state replied to this with the 
promulgation of the 2001 law and the creation of integrated management tools such 
as CFTs.  
 
Modes of MLC 
When creating the CFTs, the national forest administration had the idea to change 
the rules of the game for funding forestry activities through developing projects 
established by local actors and not continuing the funding mechanism that existed 
Instead of the forest fund which was financing national activities, the CFT was 
supposed to become a mechanism for creating a funding for local projects, 
particularly by the state and, if the procedures were well established, also by co-
financing through the European Union. But this system does not work yet because of 
the continuing CAP reform so that the control exerted by the state and EU in the 
attribution of funds, is actually not effective at all. 
Since there is no formal mechanism for CFT, there is also no formal distribution for 
competencies among the levels involved. But evidently, through providing financial 
incentives, the State is taking an important role in promoting the process. During the 
process itself, the local communities are supposed to take initiatives for the agenda 
setting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation under the umbrella of the state 
regulation.  
The National State Forest Agency (ONF) officers play a direct role in co-ordination 
between national, provincial and local levels and exert the role of key actors in the 
definition of the content of the activities to be carried out. It can even be wondered 
whether the ONF personnel is aiming at getting such a co-ordination as a priority. 
Less evident is the role of Regional Centres for Private Forests (CRPF) in the co-
ordination with provincial programmes. The other actors, including the mayors of 
forest communes and the NGOs, seem to play a more restricted role as they are 
mainly focused on the local aspects of the issues. 
However, there are presently no organized links between the different levels of 
influence. Each CFT-bearer is free to choose the interlocutors that can be particularly 
interesting for him/her, depending on the actions that he seeks to implement. After 
the validation of the area by the Prefecture, there is neither any requirement nor an 
obligation to inform the Region or the Department about the decisions taken. But in 
almost all cases, these interlocutors are integrated into the processes due to their 
funding role.  
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This lack of functional MLC, as well as the multiplication of land and forest 
management tools at different levels with no apparent dialogue among them are 
frequently criticised by the actors involved in CFTs.  
The main rationale for these critics is that most of the projects in order to be 
implemented need some complementary funds which were not initially foreseen in 
the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a stable system for funding forestry 
activities is not established yet in France, this lack of coordination is analyzed as a 
de-responcibilisation of the administrative structure at national and regional levels 
which are also promoting the CFT solutions. 
The National Federation of Forest Communes (FNCoFor) has constituted a national 
network of CFTs for being better informed about local initiatives and to ensure a 
dialogue between the Charters. Over time, this network may allow an increased 
understanding of Charters and, consequently, a better follow-up and coordination of 
actions at the departmental, regional or even national level. To achieve this, the 
State, responding to a demand expressed by the FNCOFOR, has also created a new 
tool which is not binding: the Forest Massif Strategic Scheme. Presently, two pilot 
zones have been defined: the Alps and the Central Massif, both of them are 
established under the leadership and expertise of FNCOFOR. In the future, this tool 
is supposed to provide a regional framework for the local forest policy formulation. 
Obviously, it will provide guidelines and directions for the formulation of the new 
CFTs. This strong presence of FNCOFOR at the strategic level of defining MLC 
related to CFTs generates critics from other stakeholders, especially from private 
forest owners.  
 
Effects and perspectives 
France is traditionally characterized by a centralized top down decision making 
system in the forestry field. That is why the CFTs represent a spectacular change by 
its aim of basing forest policy on the locally expressed needs.  
The national Programme for CFTs has been set up in order to give some content to a 
decentralisation process. The main driving force was a change from sectoral to 
territorial policy-making. This was not easy to be established in a conceptual way in a 
sole policy document; it had to be framed into a new governance system at different 
levels with concrete implications for the decision making system.  
The main impacts of the Programme for CFT are: 
• Certainly, a change in the behaviour of public and private forest owners and 
national agencies: the CFTs have built up a system of local networks for 
solving conflicts and generating consensus and partnership (at least for 
productivists topics). 
• Possibly, a new allocation of resources: after cancelling the Forestry national 
Fund in 1999 and the decrease of the State budget in 2003, after the end of 
the Relief Plan for the reconstitution of the forest after the storms of December 
1999, the existence of a CFT is supposed to define conditions or priority in 
attributing state grants. This is not clearly stated yet, but in most cases this 
argument was prominent as regards the involvement of actors. 
At the same time, the CFTs have concretised two important changes in the French 
forest policy:  
1) From the sectoral scale, the forest policy measures become basically territorial. 
The activities to be carried out for forestry development is not any more defined from 
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the top centralised administration as it was the case in the conventional way. 
Previously the support to the forest development activities was based on the cash 
desk logic, bringing systematic funding to those actors which were following the 
respective norms. In contrast to this, in the CFT approach, local actors are defining 
their project proposals to be proposed for funding afterwards. Although the system 
does not work fully up to now, CFTs have introduced a huge psychological change in 
the way the forestry actors are involved in the process of forest policy formation. This 
change has brought also an intersectoral view on forest development. Forest 
development activities are built up with the participation of local stakeholders, 
defining their projects. As the basis for projects is adaptable locally, they may induce 
a bottom up system of decision making.   
2) The CFT process has also brought many results in terms of involvement of the 
local actors. Local politicians have clearly become leaders of common actions 
towards forestry development of territories. They are viewed and legitimated by all 
the stakeholders as the coordinators and promoters of links between the forestry field 
and the other dimensions of development. This prominent position of local politicians 
has been strongly promoted by the FNCOFOR strategy as far as the increase of the 
role of the forests in the rural development is a major objective of the forest 
communes. This situation has been favoured by both the decentralisation scheme in 
France as well as by the recent development of intercommunal associations. Prior to 
CFTs, the mayors did not play any role in the design and promotion of forestry 
measures.  
The CFTs have also brought the development of common discussions among 
stakeholders at the local level. Certainly, the participation is more or less restricted to 
productivists interests representatives, environmental and social aspects are still 
weakly represented in the CFT process. But even if restricted to the productivist 
sphere, participation at the local level is a new phenomenon. Before CFTs, the 
participatory process was concerning representatives of productivist groups mainly at 
national and partly at the regional level, but not at the local level.  
The main benefit of de-centralization of forest policies certainly lies in the 
involvement of local politicians and the integration of forest within local development 
policies. The links between local elected people, forest institutions and associations 
are consequently reinforced. But a flagrant lack of general co-ordination remains 
problematic. There is a real lack of co-ordination between the CFTs as well as 
between the local decision making level and other levels of decisions making, and 
this lack of co-ordination can become a source of contradictions. For instance, two 
neighbouring Charters could perfectly consider contradictory actions: one aimed at 
the tourism development, while the other one promoting fuel wood collection. The 
case of several Charters and departmental actions undertaken on the same territory 
regarding the development of wood as a source of energy has also been observed. A 
departmental/regional co-ordination would be deemed necessary to optimise the use 
of resources, the funding and the concretization of actions.  
FNCOFOR has decided to assume a co-ordination role, but its role is restricted to the 
co-ordination among the various CFTs, i.e. to horizontal co-ordination but not 
comprising the vertical one. Up to now, vertical coordination is highly deficient. It is 
supposed to be established when the next CAP will be stated, in case CFTs may 
remain as an element of EU policy.  
The present lack of coordination between the local and departmental, regional or 
national forest policies is a problem that CFT bearers must deal with. This lack often 
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results in an insufficient funding, consequently hampering the animation and 
coordination of CFTs. 
At the national level, the forestry regulations and directives pretend to promote a 
multifunctional and participatory management. The CFTs are the local relay of this 
national will. But as it works now, CFTs are in no way forced to respect a balance 
between the different aspects of the forest sustainability. Concretely, the Charter 
bearers, at the local level, are free to consider the actions they want to carry out 
without any control.  
From the interviews it appeared that for most of the local actors, the involvement of 
stakeholders at the local level is considered as very important. However, in order to 
be supported by the regional or national policies, they have to follow general 
directives or at least respect some criteria and indicators which have not been 
defined by the participants of the CFTs locally, but, instead, at the regional or 
national levels. This lack of co-ordination directly explains the exclusion of some 
important topics (e.g. nature conservation, by some CFTs bearers). This results in an 
inconsistency of the national forest policy. It would therefore be necessary to improve 
the coordination between the work of CFTs at the local level and their good 
involvement of stakeholders, and the traditional funding programmes of forest policy 
at the regional and national level. 
More than 5 years after the introduction of CFTs, a mutual adaptation of those two 
systems, which are working simultaneously and concurrently, has not been done yet. 
This situation results in a lack of means (funding, personnel) for the work of CFTs 
and in a certain disaffection and reluctance of most of the stakeholders in the 
process, except for the forest communes.  
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Case study 6: National Park Administration in Greece (Kostas Kassioumis, 
Kostas Papageorgiou, and Michael Vakkas)49 
 
Territorial Levels of MLC - Attributes of the multi-level system 
Greece is a centralised country though a degree of decentralised administration has 
taken place (Papageorgiou and Kassioumis, 2005; Chaintarlis et al, 2004). There are 
three levels of administration clearly recognised in Greece that influence protected 
area policy planning: the EU, the central government and the provincial authorities 
(also including municipal authorities). It is a fact that the EU is one level of 
governance that has wield strong direct influence in the protected areas agenda by 
providing additional instruments such as framework regulations and funding to 
promote sustainable management. At the national level, most of the planning and 
management of protected areas fell under the Ministry of Environment, Planning and 
Public Works (MEPPW). More specifically, administration and management lie within 
the competencies of the protected area directorate at the MEPPW and receive all 
funding from central government and EU sources. The regional/local level appears to 
be the most critical one concerning the implementation of policy and planning in the 
locality. The weight lies within park boards that are in charge of taking decisions and 
working along with all involved sectors in the region. These Boards receive all 
funding and support from the MEPPW. All the above levels are active in the process 
that is examined in this case study, with a varied degree of influence. There is a great 
institutional influence coming from the EU in the form of directives and law as well as 
the EU funds devoted to environmental management. 
There has been a change, occurred in 1997, of the administrative structure to 
facilitate political and administrative decentralization. It denotes a process of transfer 
of authority from central government to an intermediate organisation. While the 
changing institutional architecture of the state in the recent past has been a 
significant input in national governing, there is little theoretically informed analysis of 
relations between institutions acting at different governmental levels in the area of 
protected areas’ management. Moreover, the analysis of policy documentation and 
field experience is important to understand the development and implementation of 
public policy on protected areas in the locality.  
The decentralised administration has introduced and empowered the provincial 
governo, to act as a general authority deciding and approving all projects, including 
environmental ones, and management decisions (Papageorgiou and Vogiatzakis, 
2005). This development caused some significant changes in environmental planning 
and in the administration of parks in particular, with most decision-making process 
shifting from central to the regional and local bodies. While the devolving 
development signals an improvement in the direct involvement of the provincial 
authority in decision-making, the legal statements and policy texts seek some kind of 
MLC between the national level and the park boards as regards the protected area 
network functioning and management. However, it is regarded as less of coordination 
between levels and more of a transfer of authority from the national to local level. 
The decentralisation process described above has been influential in dealing with 
coordination issues between national and sub-national levels but the empirical 
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research showed that this is not enough. The provincial governor acts as a mediator 
between levels but in most cases acts within the framework of political rationality in 
an effort to balance all social interest. It has coordinating powers, especially can act 
as a mediator between the ministry and local actors. But the experience has shown 
that in the past it has not made a full use of its powers especially on national park 
management issues. The reasons for this has been difficult to establish; some 
respondents argued that nature conservation was not a priority issue to the provincial 
administration, others interviewees denied the above assertion and claimed that 
provincial authorities have made the best use of their powers to coordinate. Others 
attribute to provincial authorities both limited experience and low expert knowledge 
on park management matters. Locally, park boards expect a great deal of assistance 
from the ministerial departments which in return, are unable to solve problems and 
local demands due to claimed increased workload and the distance from local 
problems.  
Our field research identified such a lack of coordination between local and national 
levels. Some respondents believe that these problems are due to a transitory 
decentralised administration process which is undergone in the country since 1997 
but, according to them, has not yet been completed. They argue that empowering 
regional governors with greater roles could alleviate MLC problems in the future. At 
the moment, park boards are straggling through formal procedures to get organised 
and to carry out their duties (such as conducting management plans, setting up 
monitoring schemes, evaluating outcome, setting up information centres) while they 
get only limited technical assistance and advice from the MEPPW. 
 
Actors of MLC 
Park boards with all interested groups, actors and organisations represented in the 
schema including provincial state authorities, are the main actors at the regional/local 
level. At the national level there are two state actors involved in the process. 
Principally the MEPPW through its General Directorate of Environment takes the lead 
in all issues regarding financing, long term planning, evaluation of monitoring 
schemes, etc.  
Furthermore, an independent committee, the Natura 2000 Scientific Committee was 
created in 1992 to help organise the set up of the Natura 2000 network of reserves in 
the country, to evaluate their ecosystems and revise the list of proposed sites that 
was initially proposed in 1992 (MD, 2002). The Committee has been inactive since 
2004 and no action has been taken by the ministry ever since to set up a new one. 
Instead, the National Centre for Biotopes and Wetlands (NCBW) was commissioned 
by the ministry to provide assistance to all park boards mainly on organisational 
matters but not on managerial issues or scientific advice. It was regarded by the 
ministerial interviewees as a substitute to the Natura 2000 committee. In their 
respondents the members of the Park board recognised NCWB’s value and 
assistance. The scientific community however, questioned its role as a consultant 
body that could put planning and management issues in perspective. The NCBW has 
experience in reserve management, was assigned no coordinating task and can only 
serve as a consultant body to the MEPPW on request.  
The ministry and the General secretariat of environment in particular, have a lot of 
administrative powers and key coordinating and communicative roles. It organised 
seminars for all park board chairmen and provided assistance and help, but it did so 
only on administrative and organisational matters. 
Analysis along procedural elements 147 
 
 
At the regional level there is a variety of both state and non state actors involved in 
the process of National Park administration, representing various interests groups or 
provincial policy sectors. While the devolving development signals an improvement in 
the direct involvement of the provincial authority in decision-making in any public 
policy in general, the law does not extent its powers to seek for coordination between 
the national level and the park boards as regards the protected area network 
functioning and management. As explained in previous sections, boards have the 
key coordinating role which was assigned to them by the founding law 2742. 
Coordination occurs at the regional level and only on those actors participating in the 
park board. Park boards work in close with the NCBW and the ministerial 
departments, but this process is more one of seeking assistance rather than a part of 
a multi-level decision making process. All bodies involved in MLC, including park 
boards, ministerial departments, and provincial authorities are permanent 
organisations, except the National Centre for Biotopes and Wetland. 
Decentralisation enabled more provincial state authorities, such as the provincial 
forest service, the provincial agricultural directorate etc. to engage in negotiations 
and deliberations. It increased the number of state organisations but had no effect in 
the involvement of non-state actors. Following the initiation of the EU Habitat 
Directive, most of the national and regional/local policy structures dealing with 
planning and management of protected areas, fell under the MEPPW. The various 
ministerial directorates certainly comprise new actors in the negotiation arena. Yet, 
the influence of the Natura 2000 committee as well as the roles of the NCBW, have 
had an influence at the decision making process especially for issues that are dealt 
centrally. However, the empirical research, when compared to the previous 
administrative park regime, found that the most profound influence comes more from 
the involvement of several local interest groups, NGOs and all other bodies that care 
locally, but less from the involvement of actors at higher levels. 
The field research highlighted that there is no single actor having an outstanding role 
to drive coordination across levels. In fact, the lack of central guidance and the 
absence of a central coordinating body either state or non-state, were repeated 
comments in the interviews with park board members. Interviews with ministerial 
administrators on the other hand, do accept that so far, efforts have not been very 
satisfactory in this respect. 
 
Interdependencies and modes of MLC 
Reality has shown that several problems have occurred between national and 
regional coordination processes which are partly linked to inherent weaknesses of 
the national style of policy administration in general and are partly connected to 
different views of the roles that each actor holds in the process. For example, boards 
expect some coordination, support and assistance from the ministry; there is a 
widespread feeling across respondents that boards are left alone. Using the words of 
an interviewee: “the ministry expects us to do all the dirty job they ought to have 
done’’(Interview 2006). On the other hand, the ministry claims that it has granted 
greater self-determination to park boards (boards, by law, are set up as autonomous 
and independent bodies) exactly as a remedy to these difficulties. But the field 
research showed that this has hardly been the case and none of the park boards was 
able to speed up and facilitate the process.  
National park management resembles a situation of good intentions expressed by all 
involved parties but with an inability to set the system work. The role of the National 
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Centre for Biotopes and Wetlands acting as a technical support intermediate is seen 
as a step forward but not as enough, as argued by the respondents. It should also be 
noted that the ministerial departments work under pressure and are bound on state 
commitments towards EU policy processes. 
There is a variety of reasons for negotiations among various levels, mainly between 
the central and the local level, such as policy formulation, allocation of funds and 
power distribution. Financing is a key issue that keeps the negotiation process in 
close contact between levels. Financial resources are found to be instrumental in the 
MEPPW’s efforts to achieve the protected area policy goals. But the analysis has 
shown that they remain insufficient for a long-term integrated national conservation 
strategy. Undoubtedly, a substantial amount of funding has been derived from the EU 
to aid the implementation of the Habitat Directive. The experience has shown that it 
is the size and availability of EU resources that drive the implementation of protected 
area policy rather than vice-versa. Thus, there is a strong interdependence between 
local actors, the state and the EU as regards funding.  
Power distribution and legal provisions are another impetus for coordination across 
levels. For example the provincial governor has the power to act in between the 
national and the local level. However, vertical coordination is limited, whenever it 
appears it takes the form of a negotiation between actors and less of a hierarchy. 
This has been a major step forward as compared to the past. In the past planning for 
national parks has been based on a deductive chain of decisions taken centrally by a 
close circle of foresters within the forestry department (Papageorgiou and 
Vogiatzakis, 2005). This supported a highly hierarchical model of administration 
between the forestry department and forest district offices. The initiation of the 
Habitat Directive and the creation of management boards, operate in a less 
hierarchical environment and have adopted interaction process that are closely 
resemble negotiations and mutual adaptation as modes of coordination. This is 
explainable on account of the history and the conditions that prevailed before the 
initiation of the Habitat Directive. In brief, the Ministry of EPPW had a short history in 
nature conservation; shifting the responsibility of managing parks from the forest 
department to MEPPW was a political decision. Over the years, the MEPPW secured 
funding options, created park boards and made necessary institutional changes to 
enhance the efficiency of national park management. Historically, we are still at the 
initial stage of a new planning process and that is why the ministry and park boards 
as well as all other involved groups and organisations are working in close contact in 
synergetic rather competitive terms. 
 
Conclusions: Problems and significance of MLC 
Our analysis provided some insight in the attempt to identify problems in MLCs. From 
a broad perspective, the reasons for lacking coordination results from the inability of 
the state to create a vertical organisation, similar to that of the forestry department 
that once managed national parks. Classical arguments resisting change in 
behaviour of policy actors in various levels may be those providing continuity and 
security. Moreover, the conflicts on the competencies of the various ministries and 
institutions more or less reflect the historically developed, the dominant political 
culture of public authorities that favour sectoral isolationism. The analysis of 
interviews also revealed a lack of cooperation and coordination between the MEPPW 
and the ministry of Rural Development and Foods (RDF), especially in the past, due 
to the vagueness of responsibilities and in some cases also due to opposing attitudes 
and ideologies. The dominant attitude in the MEPPW, acting as a central 
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conservation actor, is one of a body that controls the policy by regulating financial 
resources and placing a boundary, especially at the policy level, around the 
cooperation with the forestry department. The distance between the ministerial 
departments and the boards is large and creates what some respondents call 
‘administration gap’. A direct effect of that are major implementation problems in 
practice and reduced overall coordination efficiency. As noted above, the provincial 
governor comes in between. It was assigned with coordinating powers but in practice 
it was not able to make the best use out of it. A lack of experience in national park 
matters, and perhaps a resistance against becoming involved into negotiations 
between the ministry and local authorities, simply because additional problems are 
anticipated, can be invoked as plausible explanations. However, our empirical 
evidence is weak in this respect. Certainly, there is a political dimension to the 
problem. The ministry has not institutionalised structures at the provincial level that 
could enhance powers to the provincial authorities in order to deal with such issues 
or to put nature conservation matters higher on the provincial political agenda. 
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4.2.4 Major conclusions on multi-level coordination 
In the theoretical chapter we have outlined our conceptual frame elaborating four 
issues related to multi-level coordination: (i) the question of scaling up or scaling 
down, (ii) problems of coordination, (iii) modes of coordination, and (iv) possible 
strategies to circumvent deadlocks in multi-level decision-making.  
On the basis of the theoretical considerations we assumed that processes of multi-
level decision-making are constituted by three elements: differentiation of negotiation 
arenas to reduce complexity, intensified communication to improve the information 
base to make decisions, and learning as a mean towards innovation and flexibility.  
In chapter 4.2.2 we provided an overview on issues of multi-level coordination in the 
19 GoFOR case studies based on six criteria: (i) the degree of federalism and 
decentralization, (ii) the territorial levels involved, (iii) the interdependency among 
levels, (iv) the interaction patterns and modes of coordination, and (v) new actors and 
institutions. This overview closed with an overall assessment about the importance of 
multi-level coordination in the individual GoFOR case studies. The summarizing table 
showed remarkable differences among the case studies regard the importance of 
multi-level coordination as characteristic element of the case study and as an 
important explanatory factor for success and failure of the policy process under 
study.  
Based on these findings in chapter 4.2.2 we then selected six GoFOR case studies 
to be presented in greater detail in chapter 4.2.3. The six case studies were sought to 
represent three different kinds of multi-level systems, with each of them illustrating 
different characteristics and problems of multi-level systems in terms of political 
decision-making and policy implementation: European Union multi-level governance, 
multi-level coordination in federal systems, and decentralisation approaches in 
unitary systems. 
This provided us with a rich empirical base to describe and analyse coordination 
issues in different multi-level systems, and furthermore gave us a good basis to 
search for patterns of multi-level coordination among the diverse case studies. The 
six case studies have shown that the processes of Europeanization and 
regionalization entailed some novel elements of interlacing and interlocking politics. 
They raise the challenge of including actors from various territorial levels in a multi-
level system without impairing effective decision-making, which tends to suffer if too 
large a number of actors and arenas need to be co-ordinated in the decision-making 
process. From our analysis we see patterns of multi-level coordination emerging 
around three main issues: functional and territorial differentiation, institutional 
continuity and innovative forms of linkages between territorial levels, and the issue of 
mixed or combined modes of coordination.  
First of all, the case studies have shown that the necessity of multi-level coordination 
under the conditions of Europeanization and regionalization triggered processes of 
differentiation of intergovernmental decision-making structures.  
On the one hand, we observe a specific differentiation related to functions. Here, 
problems are divided into partial tasks to be dealt with by separate arenas, as it was 
shown in the Germany case study on LEADER+ and the Danish case study on the 
implementation of the Habitat Directive. On the EU level, decisions are made in both 
of these cases on the overall concept and the general policy goals, and additionally 
on the principles for the allocation of grants to regions in the case of LEADER+. The 
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substantial policy goals are formulated in both cases at the national and/or sub-
national level through operational programmes respectively Natura 2000 plans, and 
finally executed at the regional and local level for each regional partnership or Natura 
2000 site through individual projects and specific Natura 2000 action plans. Also in 
the German case study on Regionen Aktiv and the French and Greek case studies 
we see a functional differentiation between the decision-making at the national level, 
i.e. formulating the overall policy goals and adopt them as laws or programs 
(“framework steering” as it was called in the German case study), and the decision-
making at the regional level related to the establishment of regional partnerships, 
CFTs, and park management boards as well as the implementation of concrete 
projects (“detail steering”). In particular in the French and Greek case studies on 
decentralization we can observe this form of “decoupling” of levels of government. 
Interestingly, both case studies point to the benefits of decentralization as well as to 
negative effects. The lower levels of government face several challenges including 
the lack of financial capacities, the necessity of legal and scientific advice, and often 
they are cut off from information exchange with higher levels. This points out that 
reasonable decoupling presupposes the availability of the capacities that are needed 
at the level of the decoupled arenas (levels) to effectively fulfil their tasks within  
overall multi-level policy structures. 
On the other hand, the complexity of processes is simplified by territorial 
differentiation in intergovernmental relations. Here, multi-level coordination is limited 
to particular nations or regions. In contrast to systems of joint decision-making, 
including all decentralized governments, the dominant mode of decision-making 
under conditions of territorial differentiation is bilateral instead of multilateral. In this 
way, multi-level coordination can be adjusted to different institutional settings of 
lower-level governments. This form of differentiation is particularly evident in both 
German cases on regional policy, where individual regions apply for funding either 
from the EU or the federal government. The federal and/or sub-national ministries 
operating the funding programmes negotiate individually with each region, based on 
the general policy framework. In the French case, a similar mode is used for 
coordination, i.e. each regional Forest Charter is trying to collect funding for their 
projects bilaterally from different sources at the national, regional or department level. 
The same can be said about the vertical coordination with regard to specific Natura 
2000 sites in Denmark or the management boards of national parks in Greece.  
Regarding the institutional forms of linkages between territorial levels it can be said 
that the challenges of Europeanization and regionalization favour the rise of new, 
innovative forms of linkages between levels and, more generally, a new mixture of 
modes of governance. All of our six case studies describe and analyse some kind of 
institutional innovations. This is most obvious in the French and Greek cases where 
competences and decision-making processes have been administratively 
decentralized to regional and local levels. The German case studies show two 
different innovative forms of linking levels to empower regional actors: The case of 
LEADER+ provides us with an example of EU multi-level governance that is based 
on the idea of lesser influence of the central government compared to the sub-
national levels, whereas the case of Regionen Aktiv is an interesting example where 
the central government tries to circumvent the federal states and their constitutional 
rights by negotiating more directly with regional actors. In the majority of cases, 
institutional change and innovation takes place most obviously on the regional and 
local levels, whereas on the national-institutional level we have observed many 
elements of institutional continuity, with traditional patterns of level linkages and joint 
decision-making are largely being preserved.  
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Another important element of innovation are new patterns of ‘loose coupling’ of 
arenas and levels of government. The term ‘loose coupling’ means that decisions in 
one arena do not completely determine decisions in other arenas but only influence 
parts of the decision premises. Such a loosely coupled multi-level system is not 
structured in the form of ‘connected games’, in which actors’ strategies depend on 
outcomes of other games, but as ‘embedded games’, in which policy-making in one 
arena sets the context for negotiations in other arenas (Benz/Eberlein 1999). This 
context-setting is achieved by a shift in the mode of interaction from power and 
control to information exchange, communication and persuasion. Moreover, in the 
differentiated systems of governance, actors at the interface of arenas play the role 
of mediators and promoters. Good examples are the National Network Unit for 
LEADER+ in the German case study and the regional governors in the French and 
Greek cases. As a rule, in a loosely coupled structure state actors play less of a 
monopoly role of control and decision-making, but rather a mediation role. However, 
the more they can operate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, the better they can perform 
the softer role of mediation.  
This last point reminds us that effective vertical coordination in multi-level systems is 
often not delivered by one single form but rather by a balanced mixture of different 
modes of governance which helps to manage the tensions produced by the multi-
level framework. Co-operative networks and mediation are not the only modes of 
governance. As a matter of fact, the need for cooperation and consensus-building, 
which gives rise to patterns of ‘loose coupling’, can be successfully managed, as 
Benz and Eberlein argue (1999: 343), precisely because these modes of social co-
ordination are complemented by alternatives modes, namely competition and 
hierarchy. Of course, and as our case studies prove, the specific mixture of modes of 
governance varies with the given institutional and policy context. In all case studies, 
except the Danish HD case, different modes of coordination are combined, in some 
cases up to three different modes. Good cases in point are the German case studies 
on regional policy. Both cases present a mixture of three different modes of 
coordination, namely hierarchy, negotiation, and competition. In these cases the 
different modes are not used simultaneously, but rather subsequently, i.e. at different 
levels and at different stages of the policy process. As the results of the German 
case studies suggest, the provision of greater flexibility by applying different modes 
of coordination can lead to effective decision-making in quite complex multi-level 
systems. However, some (minor) problems of MLC have been reported for these two 
cases too.  
Other combinations of ideal-type modes of governance have been less successful. 
For instance, the combination of negotiation and networking as coordinating 
principles in the functionally differentiated multi-level system described for the case of 
the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy. The process analysed here led to weak MLC, 
ineffective decision-making and finally to rather modest outputs. Furthermore, the 
French and Greek case studies reported problems with horizontal competition among 
regional units in an otherwise hierarchically structured multi-level system. 
A case of its own in this sense seems to be the implementation of the EU Habitat 
Directive in Denmark. The former predominantly cooperative approach has been 
overridden by a hierarchical form of coordination. This resulted in quite a lot of 
mistrust among the affected target groups. However, it is too early to draw 
conclusions on how this finally will affect the whole decision-making, the 
implementation process and its outcomes in Denmark. 
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In conclusion, it seems useful to analyse the specific mixture of the different modes 
of governance which emerge, in order to manage the adaptation pressures and 
tensions arising from the processes of Europeanization and regionalization. Whether 
viable institutional solutions and devices can be found in every single case remains 
an open question which requires further research.  
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4.3 Inter-sectoral coordination 
Hogl, K., E. Turnhout, and M. van der Zouwen 
4.3.1 Introduction and conceptual issues 
This chapter analyses different intentions, processes, outputs and outcomes of 
Intersectoral Coordination (ISC) from a comparative perspective. Before presenting 
the comparative analysis of ISC in the different case studies and the conclusions, the 
following sections provide an overview, a further conceptualization and a specific 
elaboration of ISC in a governance context. 
 
4.3.1.1  The call for Intersectoral coordination 
ISC is part of political discussions and called for on various levels and in a number of 
policy documents. The concept of Intersectoral Coordination, in terms of coordination 
among e.g. different administrative units or policy sectors, has increasingly gained 
attention in studies on environmental and natural resource policy in the last decades. 
It became particularly prominent in international and national forest policy processes. 
The rise of the concept in the global forest policy arena was very much linked to the 
recognition of the importance of cross-sectoral linkages between forest policy and 
other public policy sectors for sustainable forest management. As Liss (1999) 
indicated, it has early been acknowledged that “the destruction and degradation of 
forests could not only be stopped by action within the forestry sector”. Authors like De 
Montalbert (1995) and Schmithüsen (2001) problematized these cross-sectoral 
relations for forest policy from the 1990s onwards. Besides the recognition of the 
importance of cross-sectoral linkages, various international governmental 
organisations called for intersectoral coordination to realise sustainable forestry. The 
issue has been present on the global forest political and policy agenda since the 
1980s. In a survey on the implementation of National Forest Programmes for 
instance, the FAO (1999) called for “adequate intersectoral coordination 
mechanisms”. Other examples are the debates within the UN arenas of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests 
(IFF) and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) respectively. Here, 
intersectoral coordination was seen as an important issue for the development of so-
called National Forest Programmes (NFPs).  
The call for intersectoral coordination has also entered the political and policy agenda 
in the Pan-European and EU forest arena. The Ministerial Conference on the 
Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) explicitly paid attention to the concept in 
the Vienna Resolution on NFPs and intersectoral coordination (1/2003). At the EU 
level, the EU Council adopted the ‘Resolution on a forestry strategy for the European 
Union’ in 1999 (1999/C56/01). The European Commission recently called for the 
strategy’s implementation (COM 2005, 84 final). Next to the global, Pan-European 
and EU level, intersectoral coordination has found its place at the national level in 
several European countries. As part of the development of NFPs, countries explicitly 
addressed the concept. Debates and statements in the abovementioned examples 
emphasised the need for more cooperation between traditional policy sectors (like 
forest policy, nature policy, agriculture policy, etc) in order to contribute to sustainable 
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forestry. As such, enhanced intersectoral coordination was interpreted as a solution 
for forest policy problems. 
Parallel to the increasing prominence of “intersectoral coordination” in the political 
realm, the concept has also become increasingly debated among forest policy 
scientists. The COST E19 action on ‘National Forest Programmes in a European 
Context’ and the 2002 International Conference on ‘Cross-Sectoral Policy Impacts on 
Forests’ in Savonlinna (Finland) are examples of joint initiatives that have put a focus 
on ISC (Tikkanen et al. 2002). 
In spite of this increasing acknowledgement of the need for ISC in national and 
international forums, a recent joint report by MCPFE, UNECE and FAO (2007) 
pointed out that the achievements in ISC within the framework of national forest 
program processes have been rather modest.  
 
4.3.1.2 Intersectoral coordination in the scientific literature 
Before elaborating on the concept of “sector” and “intersectoral coordination”, it is 
reasonable to provide an understanding and definition of what is meant when 
“coordination” is used in this study: A helpful definition of “co-ordination” among 
organisations, with a focus upon decision making, was provided by Warren et al. 
They define co-ordination as a “structure or process of concerted decision making or 
action wherein the decisions or action of two or more organisations are made 
simultaneously in part or in whole with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each 
other” (Warren et al. 1974, cited in Verbij and Schanz 2002, 94). 
In the scientific literature, different terminologies related to ISC are found in different 
strands of literature, e.g. policy integration (Jänicke/Jörgens 2004), joined-up 
government (6 2003, Pollit 2003), horizontal coordination (Peters 1998) or networks. 
The terminologies, although they differ in terms of scope or emphasis generally point 
to the aspect of horizontal co-ordination as contrasted with vertical/multi-level 
coordination. 
There are various definitions of the concept a sector, which differ according to 
research interest and methodological approach. Hogl (2002), for example, discusses 
two definitions. The first one encompasses the policy dimension and relates to 
“policies and programmes affecting certain subject areas”. A second definition 
approach addresses the polity dimension and relates to “actors, networks 
bureaucratic structures, etc.”. This definition points at sectors as more or less stable 
interaction and decision making structures in which a variety of state as well as non-
state actors interact. Sectors can be seen as networks (stable policy communities 
rather than ad hoc or temporary issue networks (Rhodes 1997) or subsystems 
(Sabatier 1993), which comprise governmental actors and private actors (e.g. interest 
groups, journalists, scientists)). The two definitions show that both substantial and 
organisational aspects are involved in sectors. 
Sectoral boundaries are not fixed. They may be interpreted differently by different 
actors, may be established, re-defined, modified and challenged altogether by factors 
and actors from within as well as from outside a sector. Furthermore, aspects that 
potentially contribute to the definition of sectors, i.e. to their boundaries and the 
boundaries of other sectors are manifold. Which factors add to establish sectoral 
boundaries and whether and how sectoral boundaries are perceived by policy actors 
remains an empirical question from this perspective. A common language, a common 
knowledge-base, related views of problems as well as shared goals, beliefs and 
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perceptions of causal mechanisms in the respective field may add to the 
establishment of sectoral boundaries. However, the most obvious factor that might 
establish sectoral boundaries seem to be administrative structures, which traditionally 
separate organisational units by allocating well-defined areas of responsibilities. 
Also Verbij and Schanz (2002) argue that taking into account the different context 
dependent perceptions of actors regarding the sector and its boundaries is key "in 
understanding intersectoral coordination” (Verbij & Schanz 2003). The character of 
sector boundaries and boundary setting and resetting processes are central for 
analysing ISC. Sectors are delineated from other sectors through the interaction of 
their actors and the way they set and challenge their boundaries. Accordingly, 
intersectoral co-ordination can only be analysed relative to these boundaries. 
“Understanding actor’s boundary setting is a basic requirement for the analysis of 
intersectoral co-ordination” (ibid.). A comparative analysis about meanings and 
frames of the forestry sector in Austria and the Netherlands provided further 
substantiation of the importance of focussing on perceptions of sector boundaries 
and boundary setting processes, as it showed definitions and meanings of the 
forestry sector to change over time and differ between different actors and countries 
(Verbij et al. 2007). 
To be able to do justice to this potential variety in empirical research, the GoFOR 
project has refrained from giving a strict theoretical definition of ISC. Instead, the 
character of ISC is seen as one of the results of empirical research. Accordingly, the 
Terms of Reference for ISC started by asking to examine what is seen as a sector or 
as sectoral by the actors of the respective case processes in their respective 
contexts and also tried to explore the boundary defining aspects.  
 
4.3.1.3  Intersectoral Coordination in a governance context 
In the GoFOR project we considered ISC one of the five interdependent constituting 
elements of the umbrella concept of ‘governance’. Hence it was one among a 
number of “indicators” of what we might find in practices in terms of governance in 
empirical reality.  
We conclude that despite the countless number of conceptions of the term 
governance, theorists in governance literature seem to agree that there is a 
development towards an increasing involvement of non-governmental actors in 
policy-making, that the boundaries between state, market and civil society become 
increasingly blurred, that policy processes are increasingly situated outside the 
classical institutions of the nation state and that decision making is increasingly done 
in network structures comprising both public and private actors (a.o. Van der Zouwen 
2006; Wageningen and BOKU team 2006). ‘Governance’ – if defined as a counter-
term to “government” in terms of top-down steering by hierarchy –, can thus be 
perceived as manifesting itself in contemporary policy processes through: 
• blurring boundaries between state, market and civil society,  
• an increasing interconnectedness between EU, national, regional and local levels 
of policy making; 
• shifts in the loci of policy making towards more informal practices; 
• the emergence of network like structures in which public as well as private actors 
from different territorial levels interact. 
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When considering these characteristics specifically related to ISC we can expect ISC 
in governance processes to manifest itself in:  
• blurring boundaries between sectors and increasing interconnectedness of 
sectors; 
• increasingly informal processes of ISC; 
• increasing occurrence of practices in which different sectors, actors and levels 
participate (combination of participation, multilevel coordination and ISC). 
 
The following chapter will provide the comparative analysis that will serve as 
empirical basis for the final assessment of these three expectations. 
For the GoFOR project, we were interested in the question to what extent and most 
importantly how we encountered governance, and intersectoral coordination as one 
of its constituting elements, in policy practices. We did not primarily focus on 
intersectoral coordination as a necessity to solve policy problems. Rather, we 
considered intersectoral coordination as a characteristic part of governance 
arrangements and processes which we tried to explore and understand by doing in 
depth case studies. 
The following chapter documents the different shapes and forms in which ISC has 
been observed. Most importantly, it makes clear that ISC implicated both substantive 
as well as procedural aspects of the policy processes under study. The concept of 
ISC was used to refer to (often site specific) processes which aimed for the 
integration of different interests, functions and uses of areas. In addition, it was used 
to refer to the coordination between different sectoral ministerial departments and 
policy networks. These meanings make sense as often calls for ISC are based on the 
perceived need for an integrated perspective, especially in forestry, nature 
conservation and environmental issues (e.g. Turnhout 2003; Turnhout et al. 2007); 
And oriented towards achieving the interactions between state as well as non state 
actors, from different sectors, which are seen necessary to formulate more integrated 
policies. 
 
4.3.2 Intersectoral Coordination in a comparative perspective 
This section presents the results regarding ISC of all GoFOR case studies in a 
comparative perspective. It is divided in four subsections. First the perceptions and 
actor definitions of sectors are reported. Then the main findings as regards the 
intentions for and of ISC are presented. This is followed by a comparison of the 
actual ISC processes and the outputs and outcomes. The final subsection deals with 
some tentative explanations of the ISC practices as documented in the first four sub-
sections. 
The analysis is based on the case reports (Deliverable 10) and on the comparative 
frame (Deliverable 11). Since the cases were chosen to provide empirical evidence 
for a rather broad range of aspects – but not just on questions as regards ISC - they 
differ quite a lot with respect to their focus, scope and level of detail in the analysis of 
ISC. It goes without saying that this has affected the comparative analysis. 
Consequently, we do not aim at integrating the empirical results of all cases into each 
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sub-chapter, but rather focus only those results which contribute to our research 
questions. 
 
4.3.2.1 Perceptions and definitions of sectors 
In general, with a few exceptions, the cases refer to sectors in the form of “policy 
fields” like agriculture, industry, tourism, environment, etc. Most often these 
definitions correlate closely with the respective administrative structures, e.g. with 
jurisdictions of ministries or ministerial departments. This applies for example to the 
AT-AFD, the GE-GAK and the HUN-NFP case, in which sectors were recognised 
along formal lines of competencies (state administrative structures) and flows of 
powers. This kind of perception is also found in the cases GE-RA in which on the 
other hand also the development of a “regional development community…, whose 
members were sharing common beliefs” is reported, where the highly specialised 
and institutionalised administrations do not prevail as they do at EU, national and 
sub-national levels.  
Sector definitions within the case studies done in the Netherlands (NL-NPPN, NL-
UH, NL-GW) also have these “administrative elements”. In addition the NL-UH and 
GW consider sectors also as policy issues which have institutionalized over time, 
around which several actors are usually involved (e.g. agriculture, water, spatial 
planning, nature, forest, landscape and urban area policy). 
The Norwegian case study refers to interests instead of sectors: economic, social, 
and environmental interests. 
In two case studies governance processes prescribe definitions of sectors. In the 
example of the AT-BS, the sector definitions were introduced by the EU Biodiversity 
Strategy which was adopted a year before the national process started. Accordingly 
the AT-BS mentions nine sectors: Agriculture, Fishery, Forestry, Hunting, Tourism, 
Mining, Industry, Energy, and Transportation. However, this closely correlates with 
Austrian administrative state structures and with the actors´ traditional perceptions of 
sectors. In the DEN-NPP case the areas of interest were defined by the Minister in 
charge. He constituted the sector definition by specifying the stakeholders to be 
involved. Hence in this case sectors are defined in terms of actors and interests 
rather than by thematic policy areas. 
Finally the cases also point out that there are of course quite different, subjective 
perceptions of sectors among the actors within specific policy processes. The GE-
GAK case provides an excellent example: policy administrators at national and 
regional level identified sectors as vertical fields of policy-flow having a common 
administrative structure, a sense of common understanding of issues and explicit 
legislative responsibilities assigned to each level. On the other hand, the scientific 
community and park board members did not define sectors following these strict 
departmental structures, but perceived sectors as processes of actors characterised 
by common objectives. 
 
4.3.2.2 Intentions 
Most cases show intentions for coordination among different sectors. But the 
character and the aims of these intentions differ between the cases. Seven issues 
regarding the intentions for ISC stand out: 
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1. ISC as an implicit or an explicit intention; 
2. ISC as a means to different ends; 
3. the question of why ISC was on the agenda; 
4. ISC as part of existing rules; 
5. ISC as a strategy to solve cross-sectoral problems; 
6. ISC as driven by economic incentives; 
7. ISC as triggered by regionalization. 
 
Implicit and explicit intentions 
In some cases ISC was explicitly aimed for. Both Austrian cases are good examples 
of such explicit intentions. Also the French cases, the German cases, the NOR-LF 
case, the Romanian cases and the ESP-FPGP case show more or less explicit 
intentions for ISC.  
Although there are no explicit aims for ISC, implicit intentions can be recognized in 
the DEN-NPP case and the Dutch cases. The DEN-HD case stands out in this 
respect because in fact, the case shows quite explicit non ISC intentions in the sense 
that the implementation of the Habitats Directive was explicitly considered to be a 
sectoral nature conservation issue. 
However, a closer look at the case studies shows that in fact the DEN-HD case is not 
so unique. For example, the AT-AFD case explicitly restricted ISC in the sense that 
at the start of the strategy process some topics were explicitly excluded from the 
debates and because it was decided that results were not allowed to compete with 
existing policies and instruments. Also in the FR-RPF case ISC was restricted and 
referred mainly to coordination with the transport sector to remove the damaged 
trees from the forests.  
In the German cases the explicit intentions for ISC on regional level in the rhetoric 
turn out to be a consequence of more implicit settings - namely the Länder, national 
and EU level. Since they are not capable of doing ISC within their highly specialised 
administration this aim is handed down to the regional level. The inabilities of the 
higher levels not only lead to, but also interfere with the realisation of ISC on regional 
level. 
Several cases note, that although ISC was called for, further specifications of how it 
should be organized and who should take the lead were lacking. Examples are the 
ESP-FPGP case, the FR-CFT case and the GR-MA case. 
The empirical data shows that one of the central mechanisms to comply with 
intersectoral coordination aspirations is to install an intersectoral committee or body 
(see below). 
 
A means to different ends 
In general, coordination between different sectoral actors with different sectoral 
interests is considered important, however, not as an end in itself but as a means for 
other ends. 
The AT-AFD case claims that ISC was important to achieve policy coherence and for 
making implementation more effective. Also the HUN-NFP shows that ISC was 
considered important to ensure harmony between forestry policies and other sectoral 
Analysis along procedural elements 160 
 
 
policies. The GR-MA case refers to the importance of ISC to smoothen 
implementation as well. 
In many cases, ISC is related to balancing of interests or functions or areas. For 
example, the DEN-NPP case, the NOR-LF case, the German cases and the NL-UH 
and GW cases, mention this as the goal of ISC efforts. As regards functions and 
interests, in general a distinction is made between ecological or environmental 
functions and interests on the one hand and economic functions and interests on the 
other. The NL-UH and GW cases refer to the same distinction but use the terms 
green and red instead of ecological/environmental and economic respectively. The 
AT-AFD case also involves the goal of balancing between forestry and environmental 
interests. The DEN-NPP case refers to balancing conservation and (agricultural) use. 
The NOR-LF case mentions economic, environmental and social interests. 
Another important goal of ISC, which is referred to in several case studies, is related 
to achieving policy integration. In the AT-BS case, the ROM-NAT case, and the FR-
CFT case, the intention was to get biodiversity, nature conservation and forestry 
respectively integrated in other policies. Some cases aimed explicitly at achieving 
new integrated policies. The NOR-LF case, the ESP-FPGP case and the NL-NPPN 
case for example, aimed at achieving new, integrated, national level policies. The 
German cases and the NL-UH and GW cases show the importance of ISC to achieve 
local level site specific integrated policies. 
Also the GR-MA case, the Ro-ACP case the FR-RPF case aimed to achieve policy 
integration in the sense of common problem solving. Reference is made to the 
importance of taking actions in all ministerial departments to achieve biodiversity and 
nature conservation objectives in the GR-MA case, to solve the problems caused by 
the storm in the FR-FRP case and to solve the problem of corruption in the ROM-
ACP case. 
 
Why was ISC on the agenda? 
Another perspective, as regards motives, examines those factors which actually 
contributed to put ISC on the governance agenda, also in cases where quite some 
resistance against ISC was observed. 
We found a number of different motivations for actually putting ISC on the agenda. In 
most cases more than one cause can be observed, usually a couple of different main 
motives of actors are reported. Some factors stand out. 
Unsurprisingly in some cases concrete cross-sectoral policy problems were the main 
starting point for ISC efforts. However, in a number of cases ISC was introduced 
primarily because it was part of the rules: ISC may be prescribed e.g. by law, by non-
legally binding agreements (e.g. by international forest policy agreements), enforced 
by governmental bodies, it may be a principle inherent in a framework or strategy, 
etc. 
In some other cases, driving factors were economic incentives which motivated 
actors to coordinate, either market forces which made ISC necessary (NOR-LF), or 
incentives set by higher level programmes like EU subsidy framework programmes 
which prescribed certain procedures including ISC (see above). In the latter case 
competition for economic incentives can be seen as a significant mechanism 
facilitating ISC. 
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Last but not least, in a couple of cases ISC resulted from new, region-oriented or 
local approaches in policy making, that is “ISC in the wake of a change to territorially-
oriented policy-making approaches”. 
 
ISC as part of the rules 
In the cases related to National Forest Programmes (NFP) (AT-AFD, HUN-NFP NFP, 
ESP-FPGP), ISC is defined as a procedural principle. ISC is inherent to the NFP 
approach as it was defined in various documents in International and European 
forest dialogues. The same principle applies to the AT-BS: the integration of 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into other sectoral policies 
was one of the main objectives of the CBD and accordingly the Austrian Biodiversity 
Strategy. 
Also the concept of Integrated Rural Development, which became a new funding 
principle with the GAK “reform” in 2003 calls for ISC (GER-IRD, GER-GAK), just as it 
was prescribed as a normative principle in Leader Programme (GER-L+) and as a 
programme requirement in the case of GER-RA. In case of FR-CFT the 
establishment of the forest charters also required ISC. 
 
Concrete cross-sectoral problems 
In some of our cases, a main motivation for new efforts in ISC, were pending, cross-
sectoral policy problems. The most straight forward example is provided by the FR-
RPF case, in which strong cross-sectoral interdependencies in times of crisis after 
the catastrophic windfall actually made intersectoral cooperation a must. In the 
situation of crisis, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry coordinated with all other 
relevant administrations. Actually, in this case the issue was not addressed in terms 
of intersectoral co-ordination but in terms of dependence on other sectors to solve 
problems. 
Concrete policy problems are also observed and framed as problems of policy 
fragmentation and as implementation problems (NL-NPPN, GR-MA). In case of the 
NL-NPPN case, the reasons for intersectoral coordination originated from the 
problematization of a high degree of policy fragmentation, from observed 
implementation deficits and lack of support and from the recognition of the societal 
value of nature. 
In the NOR-LF case it was not so much a pending concrete policy problem as such, 
but it was widely recognised among the stakeholders that intersectoral coordination 
was crucial for efficient forest management. 
 
Economic incentives 
In a couple of cases economic incentives play a decisive role in formulating ISC 
intentions. In these cases, ISC was a pre-condition in the development of projects 
applying for funds. 
For the GR-MA case it is reported that significant incentives for striving to enhance 
ISC were related to securing EU funding and to the legal obligation to implement ISC. 
However, in this particular case, overcoming cross-sectoral policy problems was the 
main argument for ISC in policy documents as well as in actors’ perceptions.  
In France the Forest Charters (FR-CFT) were developed rapidly also because of 
financial support that was offered from the national level. The Forest Charters were 
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initially conceived as an approach aiming for funding in forestry development from 
national and EU levels. 
Financial incentives were also main triggers in the Romanian, Hungarian, Austrian 
and German cases. Ministries started to cooperate to be able to access EU funds 
(ROM-NAT), regional sectoral actors cooperated for accessing EU and national 
integrated rural development funds (GER) and processes were legitimised against 
resistance of powerful actors with intersectoral program formulation as a potential 
precondition for applying to EU rural development funds (AT-AFD). In Hungary 
(HUN-NFP) the National Forest Program was, besides other motives, designed and 
initiated with the goal to secure the mid-term financing of reforms relating to forest 
land use. In competition with other sectors for scarce resources, ISC was perceived 
as a need for the forestry sector. 
The GER-IRD case provides also an example of the effect of financial incentives to 
sectors on ISC: since funding for rural development was meant to be taken from 
agricultural, forestry- and fishery-funds, these sectors were reluctant towards 
increasing the scope of ISC, while actors from other policy domains, who were 
potential winners from budget transfers (e.g. WWF), were in favour of broader ISC 
processes. 
Finally, not only funding as source of direct economic incentive to enhance ISC was 
observed. In the NOR-LF case the overall governance process was basically started 
because of market pressures: the process itself would not have taken place had it not 
been for the fact that the forest sector was forced to take measures by international 
market demands. 
 
ISC in relation to regionalization 
A group of cases points to ISC taking place in the wake of changes towards region-
oriented or local policy making approaches. Interestingly, in some cases ISC was in 
fact strengthened or even introduced only in relation to such territorial approaches. 
In the German cases on regional development policy, ISC is reported as a result of 
new territorial approaches for rural development which had been discussed for some 
time and were a reaction to identified weaknesses of “more traditional”, sectoral 
forms of supporting rural regions. In these cases, the basic idea was that rural 
development could not be achieved anymore by sectoral approaches but had to be 
facilitated by intersectoral development strategies. Hence, ISC in the German cases 
was a problem-solving strategy which was a consequence of the increased emphasis 
on regional planning. In the GER-GAK case a previous ‘sectoral approach’ of 
measures was supplemented by ‘a more spatial approach’. In both, the GER-L+ as 
well as in the GER-RA cases, ISC was observed as the result of new territorial 
approaches for rural development. 
In France, in the case of the Forest Charters (FR-CFT) the main driving force for 
change was the shift from sectoral to territorial policy making. The goal was to 
integrate forests and forestry into the development and management of territories by 
applying a regional approach to ISC. 
Last but not least, also the Dutch cases NL-UH and NL-GW are reported as region-
oriented approaches which have particularly striven for integrative, intersectoral 
perspectives. 
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4.3.2.3  The process 
Many different processes of ISC are documented in the case studies. Apparently, 
relatively clear intentions as regards ISC materialize in a wide variety of processes 
which differed with respect to five issues: 
1. participating sectors; 
2. the installation of specific committees; 
3. the territorial levels where ISC actually took place and the types of actors that 
were included; 
4. power imbalances; 
5. ISC dynamics. 
 
Participating sectors 
It turns out that the amount and diversity of involved sectors differs widely between 
the cases due to diverging reasons. 
Some processes were designed to integrate a broad range of sectors and interests, 
such as the NOR-LF, the Danish NPP or the Austrian FD case. Most of those cases 
actually turned out as including a great number of sectors and interests, some cases 
even report that new actors (ESP-FPGP) or actors “beyond the usual suspects” (NL-
NPPN) took part. In the Austrian FD case some sectors did not engage, though, due 
to a lack of interest and also in the second Austrian case (AT-BS) it is stated that the 
overall involvement of some ministries was not satisfying.  
The French RPF case was not actually designed to include many stakeholders, as it 
was a reaction to an unforeseen catastrophe; nevertheless, all the sectors affected 
were associated to the process. 
On the other hand, initiatives, in which certain sectors that would have been 
interested to participate were deliberately kept out, were also detected, the most 
extreme being the Danish HD case, where all stakeholders were left aside except the 
ones that were directly affected by the habitat designations by owning land. 
Nevertheless, some stakeholders managed to force their way into influence during 
the process and the now ongoing Natura 2000 process takes a more open approach.  
A less extreme example is the FR-CFT case where any link with the environmental 
sector was considered as creating difficulties and was therefore avoided. 
The NL-NPPN case shows a much more selective and ad hoc way of ISC. In the 
second phase of the process, coordination between different ministerial departments 
took place only when necessary to resolve specific issues. This was also observed in 
the AT-BS case where broad ISC changed into coordination on a national level to 
resolve inter-ministerial wrangles.  
Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of ISC (FR-CFT) or joint problem 
solving (FR-RFP), the French cases show that issues were quickly defined in mono-
sectoral and in technical terms and that, in practice, mostly forestry related actors 
were invited and represented. In a similar vein, the GER-RA case, although in 
principle open to all sectors, especially appealed to the organic and sustainable 
agriculture sector. 
The DEN-HD case and the GER-IRD cases stand out in this respect because it was 
specifically documented that ISC practices did not take place in these cases.  
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ISC institutions 
As just elaborated, most case studies refer to processes in which different sectors 
were invited and actually at the table. To achieve this, most processes 
applied/developed integrated strategies, plans or programmes. A central instrument 
in most of these processes was, as mentioned before, a committee or similar 
initiative. Such ISC bodies can be found in both Austrian, one Danish (DEN-NPP) 
and all three Dutch cases, in the GER-RA, the GER-GAK and the GR-MA case as 
well as both Romanian cases and the ESP-FPGP case. The Norwegian case not 
only developed around an ISC-structured body, but also, lead to a permanent council 
with different interests represented by stakeholders. 
The constitution of the committees varies from case to case, basically they consisted 
of actors of the sectors described in previous and upcoming chapters. 
As to decision making rules, a large part of these committees (AT-BS, FR-RPF) 
strived for consensus. The French RPF case reports documented high pressure for 
consensus, the Danish NP case states that “to reach agreement” and to “avoid 
significant opposition” was important, the Greek case, although majority voting was 
required by law, emphasises “significant effort devoted to achieve consensus” and 
the Austrian FD states that a maximum of consensus should be reached. In the 
NOR-LF case simple majority vote was applied. It is important to keep in mind 
however, that not necessarily the most important questions were debated in these 
committees. The NL-NPPN case for example reports that the most crucial issues 
were dealt with outside the especially created advisory group. 
 
Levels and actors 
Some of the documented ISC practices were restricted to the national or subnational 
level. Examples are the NL-NPPN case, the Austrian cases, the GR-MA case, the 
HUN-NFP case, the NOR-LF case, and the ESP-FPGP case. Other cases also refer 
explicitly to the local level. Examples are the DEN-NPP case, the GR-MA where 
coordination among sectors was organized ad hoc by management boards and 
partially also the Fr FC case. The NL-UH case and the NL-GW case are unique in 
the sense that the ISC was located on a level between local and regional.  
When taking the German cases together, an interesting relation emerged between 
the national or subnational and the local/regional level. The national and subnational 
levels prescribed rules in terms of ISC (which were not necessarily the result of 
national level ISC processes) that the local/regional level was encouraged to conform 
with. In the GER-L+ case, the inability to achieve effective ISC on EU, national and 
Länder level lead to the delegation of ISC expectations/efforts to local and regional 
levels. Within the GAK, national level actors, mainly ministries, called for a more ISC-
oriented approach, which was not or only very limitedly realised at the national or 
Länder level, but moved to the regional level by means of rural development 
strategies in the course of implementation. For the Ge IRD in general it turned out 
that despite a lot of ISC intentions on national level, the coordination and integration 
of ISC on national level was difficult and was therefore rhetorically and also acutally 
passed on to the local/regional level . 
In the Romanian cases, ISC was restricted to state actors in the sense that the case 
reports refer to specific interministerial institutions and in the ROM-ACP case ISC at 
the local level involved state actors solely; also the GER-GAK case included just 
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state actors. In the other cases non state and state actors from different sectors were 
involved. 
 
Power imbalances 
Although in many cases different sectors were in fact at the table, usually not all were 
equally strong. Also the attitudes towards cooperation among sectors differed quite a 
lot. 
In the AT-AFD case the forestry sector which was not in favour of a broad 
intersectoral process in the run-up period to the strategy process, mostly focused on 
defending their interests. The forestry sector was powerful enough to formally restrict 
the potential scope of ISC, at least at the start of the process. The environmental 
sector, on the other hand, wanting to promote changes, was less able to influence 
the process in the run-up and in the starting phase. However, this case is interesting, 
since over time the process developed self-momentum enough to re-balance powers 
between these sectors, so that finally, no topics could be kept from the agenda 
completely. Also in the French cases, the forestry sector dominated and was able to 
define issues in mono-sectoral and rather technical terms. In the HUN-NFP case, the 
forestry sector also dominated, but primarily because other sectors were not too 
much interested to participate in the process.  
In contrast, the forestry sector was weak in the GER-RA case, in which mostly 
organic farmers, tourism actors, renewable energy and trade were represented. 
In the AT-BS case economic sectors are seen to dominate over environmental 
sectors. In a similar vein, the ISC initiative Hart van de Heuvelrug in the NL-UH case 
shows that the environmental and nature conservation ‘green’ sector, who initiated 
the project, felt that the economic ‘red’ sector was too dominant. Perceived power 
imbalances triggered ISC efforts to emerge. 
 
Dynamics in intersectoral processes 
Basically ISC can be seen more often and more intense at the earlier phases of the 
processes than at later stages (for example in the AT-BS case, the HUN-NFP case 
and the FR-RPF case). Nevertheless, there are also cases where ISC efforts can be 
detected especially at later stages (for example the FR-CFT case and the GR-MA 
case) or cases where ISC processes remained constant in intensity (for example the 
NOR-LF case). This brings us to the dynamics of ISC in the governance processes 
studied. Some of the cases report developments in ISC over time. In some cases 
broad ISC processes changed into limited ISC or ISC even disappeared altogether 
when concrete political decisions had to be made. Other cases report an increase of 
ISC along the time, sometimes connected to a shift in level.  
The AT-BS case reported that ISC changed from broad settings with state and non 
state actors from different sectors to much more closed coordination between 
ministerial departments. The NL-NPPN case showed similar dynamics. At a certain 
point, political choices needed to be made and broad ISC settings changed into 
closed interministerial coordination about specific topics. Also the German cases, 
when considered in comparative perspective, show this trend. The GER-GAK case 
shows that in the reform of the GAK policies (as a result of previous Integrated Rural 
Development initiatives documented in the other German cases) ISC was dealt with 
on the national level without interference of non state actors. The HUN-NFP also 
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shows that when decisions had to be made and budgets were discussed, broad ISC 
settings with state and non state actors changed into interministerial discussions. 
Also in other ways, ISC processes show dynamics. The GER-RA case points out that 
during the ISC process, the increasing focus on a value chain approach and 
economic effects introduced limitations to the diversity of perspectives that could 
legitimately and effectively be included in the process. The FR-CFT case shows that 
ISC did take place in the first phase. ISC was addressed, but there were no concrete 
actions that integrated environmental, social and economic aspects. In the FR-RPF 
case, quickly after the first broad ISC and participatory initiatives were taken, the 
problems were addressed with a mono-sectoral and technical forestry perspective. 
This case is exceptional though, since it depicts mainly a reaction to an emergency 
and the ISC decreased along with the emergency. 
In the NL-GW and UH cases, an increase of ISC over time was detected. It has to be 
noted however, that the long historical time perspectives of these cases enabled this 
observation. An increase of ISC is also described in the NOR-LF case and in the AT-
AFD case, where readiness of central actors for ISC increased over time. Since the 
Norwegian Living Forest programme included totally new actors into forest decisions, 
this is interpreted as paradigm shift by the case authors.  
Also the GR-MA case is interesting in this respect. This case shows a shift of ISC 
activities from a higher to a lower level in the course of the process. This change 
resulted in a more democratic intersectoral model at the local level, which also 
included non-state actors. The development of a spatial policy-making approach 
which replaced the sectoral approach is described in the German GAK case.  
 
4.3.2.4 Outputs and outcomes 
Given the variety in intentions and aims of ISC and the variety of ISC processes that 
took place, the important questions to address are: what happened? Did sectors 
coordinate, were integrated policies formulated, were interests balanced and with 
what results? 
 
Coordination and cooperation 
The observation that different sectors were at a table in a specific governance 
process does, of course, not necessarily mean that actual coordination or 
cooperation was achieved. 
Sometimes cooperation was ad hoc and temporary. In the FR-RPF case there was 
some cooperation with the transport sector but after this issue was resolved, ISC 
stopped. Also in the third phase of the NL-NPPN case, coordination between 
ministers took place only when necessary to deal with specific issues. 
Long lasting cooperation was established in the NOR-LF case. Although defending 
interests was important throughout the process, this did not hamper actual 
coordination and cooperation. In the end, a permanent council with equal 
representation of economic, environmental and social interests was installed. 
Some cases show that defending interests stood in the way of real cooperation and 
that actors lacked a cooperative attitude. In the AT-AFD case, not all sectors had a 
cooperative attitude and coordination was often limited by actors who defended 
mono-sectoral interests. The AT-BS case is similar in that respect. Not all actors 
were active or cooperative and the strategy document that was produced proved to 
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be little more than a stapled collection of different sectoral chapters, without an 
integrated, overarching logic.  
Also in the ESP-FCGP case, the actual achievements of ISC in terms of cooperation 
and coordination were rather limited. On the sub national level, sectors were not 
really committed to working together.  
In the NL-UH case, actual cooperation was achieved in the establishment of the 
national park but only to a limited extent because actors were mostly active in 
defending their interests, for example by continuing to try building houses. The 
Utrechts Landschap (a nature conservation organisation) played an active role by 
trying to mediate between different landowners and other interests. In the project 
Hart van de Heuvelrug of the NL-UH case, actual coordination is reported. The NL-
GW shows similar characteristics. While in the beginning, ISC was restricted by 
actors primarily oriented towards defending their interests, actual cooperation started 
within the innovation platform “Sustainable Meierij”, the broadened Groene Woud 
coalition and in the Reconstruction process. 
The GER-IRD, the GER-L+ and the GER-RA cases report that on a national and sub-
national level no coordination or cooperation was achieved, in the Leader+ case 
because of a lack of active participation of certain sectors and a general reluctance to 
change, while on the regional/local level cooperation was achieved. 
Local level coordination was also observed in the GR-MA case study which reports 
greater engagement of local actors and increasing coordination. Also the ROM-ACP 
case study reports the achievement of local level cooperation 
 
Balancing of interests 
The DEN-NPP case shows that nature conservation and agricultural interests were 
balanced in the process. Balancing of interests was also very important in the NL-UH 
case and the NL-GW case. In the Hart van de Heuvelrug project of the NL-UH case, 
it was clear that balancing was also achieved, although some criticized the 
dominance of the red sector. Still, defending interests remains a very important 
strategy in these two cases. Also in the NOR-LF case, balancing interests is 
emphasized as important.  
 
Strengthening a single sector 
The DEN-NPP process included ISC in the sense of balancing and integrating 
different interests (most notably agriculture and nature conservation). What was 
achieved in this process was not only a more equal balance between the two 
interests but as a result also the weakening of the agricultural sector and the 
strengthening and establishment of nature policy as a separate policy sector. Also in 
the first and second phases of the NL-UH case, this can be observed. Nature policy 
was not a strong policy sector and needed to establish itself before further ISC could 
take place.  
In the FR-RPF the ministry of Agriculture was strengthened as the leader of forest 
issues. After ISC stopped, the ministry of Agriculture took over at the expense of the 
ministry of Environment. The media attention related to the storms lead to increased 
recognition of the importance of forestry and arguably to increased financial support 
to the sector. 
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Integrated policies 
In some cases integrated policies were formulated. Despite critical attitudes of actors 
regarding ISC, the AT-AFD case documents numerous integrated measures that 
were developed. Also in the NL-NPPN case, integration was achieved in the sense 
that a policy document was produced that integrated hitherto separate policy fields of 
landscape, nature conservation and forest policy. 
Some cases explicitly reported failed integration attempts. In the AT-BS case 
integration failed in the sense, that the produced strategy did not contain an 
integrated vision and because concrete goals and targets were largely lacking. Also 
the FR-CFT reported that there were no examples of improved links between 
environmental protection and conservation and timber production and economy or 
agricultural and forestry activities at the local level. 
In the NL-UH case a spatial plan was produced with some indications of policy 
integration, but this plan was not developed in an ISC setting. The same holds for the 
WCL plan in the second phase of the NL-GW case. Stronger signs of integrated 
policies can be found in the third phase of both cases: in the NL-UH case in the Hart 
van de Heuvelrug project, because actual areas are being exchanged between green 
and red owners; in the NL-GW case because several integrated visions and policies 
were produced. Still, in both cases defending interests has remained important. 
 
Changes in attitude 
Several cases showed changes in attitude of the sectoral actors over time as a result 
of ISC processes. The DEN-NPP case reported that ISC has lead to better 
understanding of different perspectives and interests. The GR-MA case noted 
behavioural change and increasing cooperation spirit. The NOR-LF case reported 
that several actors have gained faith in the benefits of ISC. Significant changes in 
attitude were also reported for the AT-AFD case.  
The AT-BS case reported explicitly that, despite the fact that several ISC measures 
were formulated, changes in attitude of the actors did not occur. Also the NL-UH 
case reported scepticism in that respect. Although quite some achievements of ISC 
were reported in the NL-UH case, it was speculated that actual long lasting changes 
in attitude did not take place. Although actors accepted their interdependencies, the 
argument was made that segregation of sectors would start again after stopping ISC 
attempts. 
 
No achievements? 
For the HUN-NFP case, the ROM-NAT case, the DEN-HD case and the GER-GAK 
case, no achievements of ISC or explicit references to the absence of achievements 
could be found. From the comparative analysis on these cases so far, it can be 
concluded that this was the case because in fact there were few such achievements. 
For the GER-GAK it can be stated that it was actually the intention to have only a 
symbolic ISC at national level. 
 
4.3.2.5 Understanding Intersectoral Coordination 
The cases reported several reasons that explained why things happened as they did. 
Apart from few exceptions, most cases presented reasons that account for limitations 
or restrictions in ISC processes and outcomes, rather than reasons that account for 
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ISC achievements. This makes sense as the relation and differences between actors’ 
intentions and the actual processes and outcomes were the main focus of study. This 
resulted in deviations or gaps between these intentions, processes and outcomes 
being explicitly explained, while achievements were implicitly assumed. 
 
Strong sectoral tradition and organisation 
The strict sectoral organisation of ministerial departments on a national level was 
mentioned in many cases as an important factor to explain limitations in ISC 
processes. No interministerial or national level ISC preceded the AT-AFD and 
therefore, the project was not well embedded in the national level ministerial 
departments. A similar observation was made in the German cases. This had two 
effects: firstly the rhetoric of ISC was still held up high which made it necessary to 
achieve ISC at regional level and increased the expectations towards this end. 
Secondly, it at the same time limited the potential for local level ISC and policy 
integration. Also in the Spanish FPC case, this was observed in the sense that 
people mentioned that it was very difficult to break habits in the administration. 
 
Lack of specifications and instruments for ISC 
The fact that ISC was called for without further specifications of how it should be 
organized and who should take the lead is an explanation for ISC limitations in the 
Sp FPC case and the GR-MA case. 
 
Lack of cooperative attitude 
Many cases documented a lacking cooperative attitude of participating sectors to 
explain limited ISC achievements. These cases generally referred to the fact that 
actors were mostly defending fixed interests and positions instead of really working 
together. Both Austrian cases, the SP FPC case, the NL-UH case, the GER-L+ case, 
the DEN-HD case, the NOR-LF case are examples of this. Some cases specifically 
explain (temporary) ISC limitations by referring to the powerful positions of ministries 
who hinder ISC efforts. Strategies to slow down the process by state actors in order 
to maintain control have been reported in the cases GER-L+, Fr FC and AT-BS. In 
the NOR-LF case ministries did not coordinate well across sector boundaries but 
eventually left way for the partners to find the specific solutions by withdrawing from 
hands-on management. 
 
Lack of resources and time restrictions 
Quite a few case studies noted that a lack of resources and time available stood in 
the way of actual cooperation and involvement in ISC processes. It would just take 
too much time, effort and or knowledge to be able to contribute meaningfully. This 
was reported in the AT-AFD case, the NOR-LF case, the DEN-NPP case and the 
GR-MA case. 
 
Low political importance  
In some cases, limited ISC processes and outcomes were explained by referring to 
the low political weight of the issue involved. Sectors just did not find it worthwhile to 
invest time and effort in these processes and the processes resulted mostly in soft 
goals and measures. 
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In the HUN-NFP case, actors outside the forestry sector did not find the topic of 
forestry very important and therefore, their involvement in ISC processes was limited. 
Also in the AT-BS case, low political weight was used to explain limited ISC 
achievements. In this process, it was not possible to formulate strict sanctions or 
incentives and therefore, the process was not so relevant for many sectors. 
Furthermore, the goals and measures of the updated strategy did not address 
responsibilities or target groups. Arguably, something similar was the case in the AT-
AFD case. From the start, the forestry dialogue was to contain no new policies and 
measures and the many intersectoral measures that were observed were all 
considered to be ‘soft’ policies. Given the predetermined low political status of the 
outcome of the process, it is not surprising that only measures with equally low status 
were formulated. 
Interestingly, in the AT-BS case, the low political weight of the process was also used 
to explain the fact that the strategy does contain (potentially) ambitious targets and 
measures. Although these measures in principle could have far reaching effects, the 
participating sectors could agree on them, because they had no formal policy status.  
 
Urgency, concreteness or political character of the issue 
In several cases it was observed that when urgent, concrete or political choices 
needed to be made, ISC processes were either stopped or restricted to national level 
state actors. The urgency of the problem that had to be solved was an important 
factor in the FR-RPF to understand why the issues were so quickly defined by the 
forestry sector in mono-sectoral and technical terms. The importance of a quick 
solution triggered the definition of an uncomplicated and well structured problem. 
Related to this are the observations done in the NL-NPPN case where it was stated 
that because concrete political decisions had to be made about financial and spatial 
issues, ISC became much more ad hoc, selective and a national interministerial 
issue. Also in the GER-GAK case this was observed. Non-state actors were excluded 
because decision making was about political trade offs. In the HUN-NFP case, 
decision making about budgeting took place in interministerial settings. 
 
Other, more important arenas for ISC 
The AT-AFD reported the existence of alternative venues for ISC as an important 
barrier for ISC. ISC was dealt with in smaller circles in the Austrian system. This 
made the Forest Dialogue less necessary as a location for ISC. 
 
4.3.3 Conclusions 
The previous sections presented a comparative perspective on the intentions of ISC, 
on the ISC process, on ISC outputs and outcomes and on explanations for (barriers 
in achieving) ISC. 
In the chapter on ISC in a governance context we came up with three expectations 
on how ISC would be manifesting itself in policy practices, which is in: 
• blurring boundaries between sectors and increasing interconnectedness of 
sectors; 
• increasingly informal processes of ISC; 
Analysis along procedural elements 171 
 
 
• increasing occurrence of practices in which different sectors, actors and levels 
participate (combination of participation, multilevel coordination and ISC). 
 
Many cases do indeed show blurring boundaries between sectors and increasing 
interconnectedness. Based on the case reports and the comparative perspective we 
can be more nuanced. The majority of cases show these blurring boundaries in terms 
of ISC intentions of actors in governance processes. These intentions are expressed 
by actors involved as well as in drafts, plans or paper strategies in which it is stated 
that cooperation between sectors is a necessity, is of importance, etc.. But it is not 
only in intentions that ISC is occurring. Also many cases present an 
interconnectedness of actors from different sectors in governance processes. This 
especially goes for early stages. In many cases the actors are interacting in 
committees or commissions which are specifically created for ISC efforts. This leads 
to the conclusion that ISC characteristics are emerging both in terms of content 
(actors’ ideas, plans or strategies) and organisation (actors from different sectors, 
organisational structures). At the same time, the cases also show that only in a few 
cases ISC efforts are institutionalized. Though the project focused on hindrances and 
barriers far more than on ISC achievements, it can be concluded that ISC practices 
seldom go beyond intentions and actor involvement. Factors accounting for ISC not 
to materialize are manifold. We have pointed at the following factors: the presence of 
strong sectoral traditions, the controlling behaviour of sectorally organized ministries, 
a lack of ISC specifications and instruments, a lack of cooperative attitude, a lack of 
resources and time, low political importance of ISC, the urgency, concreteness and 
political character of an issue, and finally, the presence of other, more important 
arenas for ISC. 
Our second expectation on the increase of informal processes is more difficult to 
assess. Most cases do not allow for drawing conclusions concerning this topic. There 
are some clues though, that in some cases interactions taking place outside the 
traditional, longer existing structures have been important in ISC efforts. 
Furthermore, some governance processes have seen specific ISC committees or 
commissions in which rules such as consensus building and the agreement that the 
outcomes of the process would not be considered as formal policy were important. 
Our third expectation stated that increasingly we would witness the occurrence of 
practices in which different sectors, actors and levels participate. This is to say that 
ISC is related to participation and multi-level coordination. Many cases do show the 
emergence of ISC and participation at the same time. The intention to strive for ISC 
goes hand in hand with the participation of both state and non state actors from 
different sectors. This is especially the case for early stages of governance 
processes. In the course of time some ISC processes in which both state and non 
state actors participated turned out to be the exclusive domain of state actors. Often 
ISC became an interministerial affair, excluding non state actors. Only in a few cases 
ISC was a multi-level issue at the same time. 
Thus, the expectations have only been met partly. This points to the conclusion that 
ISC practices are not self evident features of contemporary policy processes. ISC is 
present to some extent, mostly in terms of actors, in the form of specially created and 
often temporary structures and foremost in terms of rethorics and intentions. 
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4.4 Democratic and accountable expertise 
Pregernig, M. and M. Böcher 
Science and expertise have long been a political factor in society. Recently, however, 
the interactions between science and politics have developed new qualities and 
unprecedented levels of intensity. Especially in a governance context, it can be 
expected that science and expertise play distinct, new roles that go beyond the mere 
content-wise input of scientific knowledge in political decision-making processes. 
The intense interaction between science and politics evolves from and brings about 
various social dynamics and challenges which are currently discussed under some of 
the following headings: 
• Scientification of politics: As policy issues are becoming more and more complex, 
science has come to play an increasingly influential role in its contribution to the 
formulation of policy and regulatory decisions (Mentzel, 1999, Banthien et al., 
2003). The demand for scientific expertise is especially strong in questions of 
environmental and natural resource policy, not least because of the high 
complexity and long-term character of many environmental problems (Fischer, 
2001). As a result of the growing pervasiveness of science-related issues there has 
been a corresponding increase in the use of expert scientific advice to inform 
decision-making at all levels of policy-making (Glynn et al., 2003). 
• Politicisation of science: The increased coupling of knowledge with politics 
concurrently drives the politicisation of science. Peter Weingart notes that 
knowledge, as it enters the public arena, is inevitably judged and valued by society. 
Advisors are selected not only for their knowledge but also for the legitimation that 
they provide for policies as well as for policy makers and interest groups involved 
in policy processes. “The assumption that science is always disinterested and 
transmits only objective knowledge is obviously a myth. Science has become one 
of the actors to support [policy makers’] specific interests.” (Weingart, 2002b: p. 
704) 
• Legitimacy crisis of science: As the use of scientific advice to policy making has 
increased, so too has the concern over its utility and validity. We witness the 
paradox of expertise being a resource that is increasingly sought for policy making 
and for social choice, but one that is also increasingly contested (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2001). Science that has traditionally drawn strength from its 
socially detached position has become too frail to meet the pressures placed upon 
it by contemporary societies (Jasanoff, 2003). The public discussion and 
confrontation between experts and counter-experts over the interpretation of 
scientific knowledge and its consequences are signs of a lack of social and political 
trust in scientific knowledge (Frederiksen et al., 2001). 
• Call for more “accountable” and “democratic” forms of expertise: Before the 
background of the phenomena described above, both scientific scholars and policy 
makers are asking the question of which role science and expertise should play in 
democratic decision-making processes. When political norms are replaced by 
seemingly inherent necessities, politics threaten to be technocratically “regulated 
away” (Schelsky, 1965, Habermas, 1968). With the erosion of the legitimating 
function of science in modern societies, reinforced by a general trend towards 
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making public decisions more accountable and democratic, such technocratic 
forms of decision-making are commonly dismissed as insufficient. At the moment, 
however, the proper place of scientific expertise in democratic decision-making is 
still under – partly contentious – social negotiation. 
In resistance to the perceived scientification of politics and the ensuing erosion of the 
authority and legitimacy of both science and politics, policy-makers at all levels have 
been calling for more transparent, accountable and democratic forms of scientific 
expert advice (Bäckstrand, 2004). Especially the European Commission has put 
great efforts into the “democratisation of expertise.” The “White Paper on European 
Governance” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001), which is the key document in this 
reform process, aims “to open up policy-making to make it more inclusive and 
accountable. A better use of powers should connect the EU more closely to its 
citizens and lead to more effective policies” (ibid., p. 8). In the White Paper, the 
European Commission considers the relation between science and society as a 
crucial area for European governance and it acknowledges the need for more 
confidence, transparency, and accountability in the use of expertise in policy-making. 
With the “Science and Society Action Plan” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002) the 
Commission further intensified its strategy to involve science and scientists in 
governance processes and to make science more accessible to European citizens. 
The call for more “accountable expertise” in policy making has also opened up the 
question of what can be judged as “good practice”. Responding to a commitment 
made in the White Paper the Commission elaborated a set of “Principles and 
Guidelines on the collection and use of expertise by the Commission” (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2003). The declared objectives of these principles and guidelines are 
to help Commission’s departments at all stages of policy making, to “mobilise and 
exploit the most appropriate expertise for better policies” and to make “the process of 
collecting and using expert advice credible” (ibid., p. 2). 
The question of how to organise the relationship between science and society in a 
more democratic way has not only been addressed in the political but also in the 
scientific realm. In the scholarly literature, the ascendancy of a “participatory 
paradigm” (Bäckstrand, 2004) has come under various catchwords such as civic 
science (O'Riordan, 1996, Shannon and Antypas, 1996), citizen science (Irwin, 
1995), participatory science (Foltz, 1999), or democratic science (Charnley, 2000, 
Lee and Roth, 2001). In all of those concepts, one of the key criteria is the 
democratic legitimation of science-laden political decisions. The question of 
democratic legitimation of science influencing the political process is especially 
discussed against the background of the increasing dependence of political decisions 
on scientific knowledge: If science is more and more influencing political decision-
making then this may result in political decisions lacking democratic legitimacy. So 
the main question is how to secure democratic procedures even in settings in which 
the scientification of public policy-making seems to be necessary (Fischer, 2000). 
 
Before the background of the above-mentioned social dynamics and challenges that 
characterise the interaction between science and politics, the focus of analysis in this 
chapter will be aligned along two overarching questions: 
(i) What are the roles and functions of (different types of) experts and expertise in 
the GoFOR governance processes? 
(ii) To what extent does the involvement of experts and expertise in the GoFOR 
governance cases live up to the normative expectations regarding the 
“democratisation of expertise” propagated, e.g., in EU policy documents? 
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As the empirical insights from the GoFOR case studies shall be linked with the 
general science-policy literature, we will first introduce selected conceptual 
approaches (in sub-chapter 4.4.1) before coming to the results of the comparative 
analysis (in sub-chapter 4.4.2). The final sub-chapter (4.4.3) will provide some 
general conclusions on the role of expertise in governance processes. 
4.4.1 Conceptual approaches 
The interaction between science and politics can be conceptualised theoretically in a 
number of ways. In the following, we give a brief overview of the relevant theoretical 
strands, theories, and models. This overview is not intended to provide a complete 
list of theories but rather a well-chosen selection. To a certain extent, this review of 
conceptual models traces the historic development of the field. Therefore, we not 
only introduce state-of-the-art concepts but also critically evaluate the validity of 
“older” approaches. 
We do not intend to come up with a single comprehensive model of science-policy 
interaction, which probably is not possible or at least not feasible here. Each of the 
models introduced below only gives a partial description of the science-policy 
interface, but by focussing on specific aspects these partial models promise to be 
more instructive and to be more fruitful in producing substantive research 
perspectives than a “catch-all” theory. Each of these models should be able to 
describe some important aspects or phenomena of the relationship between science 
and natural resources policy we have identified empirically in GoFOR. 
4.4.1.1 Knowledge transfer model: Speaking truth to power 
The discussion on the role of science and expertise in policy-making, which has been 
surfacing in waves of varying intensity since the 1960s, was initially dominated by 
“socio-technological” and technocratic ideas and ideals. One of the classical models 
built upon this tradition is the so-called “knowledge transfer model.”50 Under this 
model expectations for the usefulness of advisory knowledge are high. Scientific 
expert advice is believed to make a direct contribution to the increased effectiveness 
and rationalisation of political action (Schuster, 1990, Bröchler, 1999). 
The knowledge transfer model is an ideal type, both as regards its conceptualisation 
of how public policies are formulated and how science provides input into policy 
processes (Stone, 2001). The linear model, as pioneered by Lasswell in the 1950s, 
depicts policy-making as a problem-solving process that is rational, balanced, 
objective and analytical. The policy-making process is seen as a series of sequential 
phases (starting with the identification of a problem or issue, and ending with a series 
of activities to solve or deal with the problem) during which information is rationally 
considered by policy-makers (Sutton, 1999, Crewe and Young, 2002). 
With policy-making being construed as “problem-solving,” expert participation is seen 
as essential. Experts are brought into policy processes to impart their unique 
knowledge and wisdom to policy-makers. Science and politics are linked in a way 
that could be best described with the phrase “speaking truth to power” (Price, 1981). 
The knowledge transfer model is built on a number of specific assumptions. First, it is 
associated with a picture of spatial separation between a place of knowledge 
                                            
50
  This model is also referred to as the “linear model” (Neilson, 2001, Pielke, 2004) or the “modern 
model” (Liberatore and Funtowicz, 2003). 
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production, science, and a place of knowledge use, politics (Nowotny, 1994, Jäger, 
1998). Decision-makers and stakeholders are expected to have questions or 
demands, and scientists are expected to answer these questions or to meet these 
demands by providing policy-relevant solutions. 
Under the transfer model, scientific advice is also conceptualised as the simple 
transmission of ready-made scientific results (Freyend and Haß, 1990, Kuttruff, 1994, 
critically: Weingart, 1999). First, there is knowledge closure on the side of science, 
meaning that scientific questions are completely resolved and a finished product is 
handed over to policy-makers; after that, policies are formulated (“get-the-facts-then-
act model”) (Pielke, 2004: p. 406). 
According to the transfer model, facts can (and must) be separated from values. 
Scientists’ role in the collaboration with policy-makers is to present scientific 
information in the areas of their expertise. The transfer model is based on the 
assumption that those parts of decision-making requiring specialised knowledge 
should be depoliticised and left to experts (Wildavsky, 1987, critically: Ezrahi, 1980, 
Fischer, 2000). 
In the light of recent scholarship, the naïve hopes of the cascade-like “scientification 
of the non-scientific world” (Beck and Bonß, 1984: p. 382) turned out to be untenable, 
both in a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Scientists can no longer – and 
probably never could – simply do the science and hope that someone else uses the 
information to make “good policies” (Cortner et al., 1999). 
Although the value of the knowledge transfer model as a correct depiction of 
empirical reality was already questioned at an early stage (e.g. Habermas, 1968), 
this unilinear approach of science in policy-making to some extent still dominates 
perceptions among policy-makers and scientists alike (Weingart, 1999, Beck and 
Bonß, 1995). 
4.4.1.2 Group politics models: Expertise as a power resource for political actors 
While the knowledge transfer model takes a rather “apolitical” look at the role of 
science and expertise in social and political processes, another set of models, 
commonly termed “group politics models”, put the focus on the more “political” 
aspects of the interaction between expertise and politics. In group politics models 
which are based on public choice theory, policy making is seen as a process of 
permanent conflict and compromise among different actor groups. Martin and 
Richards (1995) use the group politics model to describe the role that scientific 
knowledge plays for political actors and their interests in the policy process. Here, 
generally, scientific knowledge is just seen as a resource of power for different actors 
without having an epistemic function. Political actors use or even mis-use (Krott 
2007) scientific knowledge just as an additional power resource for achieving their 
political goals. 
Group politics models follow the classic idea of liberal democracy in which different 
groups mutually interact in a kind of “political marketplace” in order to influence 
political decisions (Martin and Richards, 1995). Theories of this group, inter alia, 
focus on how different groups are able to mobilise and use a range of “resources”, 
including money, political power, supporters, and scientific authority (Renn, 1992) or 
they analyse the different potentials of special interest groups to organise collective 
action (Olson 1965). 
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In group politics approaches, contending groups use scientific knowledge simply as 
an additional resource to increase their authority or legitimation. The traditional 
analysis of power accords only an advocacy role to knowledge, or even no role at all. 
Or, as Claudio Radaelli puts it, knowledge is nothing but a “hook” on which interests 
hang their case (Radaelli, 1995: p. 173). 
In political conflicts, science is often used in a selective way. Competing parties 
choose advice that supports their own policy choices and overlook advice which does 
not. Experts are not necessarily neutral and apolitical but are often forced to come to 
an “arrangement” with those groups that financially support them (Fischer, 1990, 
Krott, 1989). Decision makers try to use expertise for legitimating their interests and 
political programmes (Krott, 1999) and, thus, support those scientists which deliver 
the scientific results which conform to their expectations and beliefs (Schneider, 
1989). Political decisions are legitimated ex post by making them appear as if they 
are without a political alternative due to scientific “inherent necessity” (Schneider, 
1989). 
A very “radical” version of the group politics approach was formulated by David 
Collingridge and Colin Reeve who posit that the impact of science on policy is 
negligible because science either encounters an under-critical or an over-critical 
environment when it is linked to policy: In the under-critical model, policy actors are 
already in agreement with respect to policy goals, thus scientific claims will 
uncritically be accepted as supporting the pre-existing consensus. In the over-critical 
model, political adversaries are sharply divided and scientific claims are subjected to 
heightened scrutiny by experts from rival camps, resulting in endless technical 
debates (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). In neither case does science play a 
productive role in decision making. “All truths are in service to political consensus or 
disagreement.” (Guston, 2001b: p. 102) 
 
Other authors conceptualise the interaction between science and politics in a more 
nuanced way. Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, for example, outlines a number of 
different functions which scientific knowledge can fulfil in the policy process. Scientific 
expertise can, inter alia, serve as: 
• a source of authority and hence legitimacy for official actors; 
• justification for unpopular policies (“greenwash”); 
• an instruments of persuasion in debates and negotiations (with the parties tending 
to select the advice that best fits their own interests); 
• a mechanism for delaying or avoiding action or substituting for action (as 
conducting more research gains time and passes responsibility to somebody else); 
• cover-up for policy change and scapegoat (as science may be used to allow 
politicians to change their minds without losing face or having to admit error) 
(Boehmer–Christiansen, 1995). 
 
Group politics approaches seem to be of high analytical value in cases where there 
are different scientific interpretations of what might be the right things to do (Martin 
and Richards, 1995). In various European countries one can, for example, observe a 
scientific controversy about the right instruments to stimulate economic growth and to 
decrease unemployment: One strand of economists suggest reducing taxes for 
companies and to lower standards in the social security system while another strand 
of economists ask for higher wages to stimulate overall economic demand. This 
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scientific debate can be “exploited” by industrial associations as well as by trade 
unions: Every group uses the scientific knowledge which seems to be most suitable 
for their goals. The different scientific arguments become a legitimating resource for 
the different interest groups participating in the policy process (Weingart, 2003). 
4.4.1.3 Boundary models: Contingent demarcation of science from politics 
Although the knowledge transfer model and the group politics model ascribe different 
roles to science and politics, they still have one thing in common: they largely follow 
an essentialist tradition distinguishing, in an a priori fashion, between politics and 
science. In both models the question of where the boundary between science and 
politics is located, of where science ends and where politics begin, is rather 
unproblematic. The social systems of science and politics are seen as two 
completely separate, self-referential entities. 
In contrast to that, constructivist approaches are more sensitive to the difficulties of 
making analytical distinctions between politics and science. Constructivism argues 
that what demarcates science from non-science is not some set of essential or 
transcendent characteristics but rather an array of contingent circumstances and 
strategic behaviour (Gieryn, 1995, Jasanoff, 1996). 
In recent years, there has been a growing body of work dedicated to the analysis of 
“boundaries” in knowledge-action systems (Gieryn, 1983, Jasanoff, 1987a, 1990b, 
Guston, 2001a). The theoretical preoccupation with boundaries in knowledge-action 
systems started out with Thomas Gieryn’s concept of “boundary work”. Boundary 
work stands for a form of political management of symbolic boundaries between 
science and non-science, “good” and “bad” science, and “facts” and “opinion.” Gieryn 
defines boundary work as “the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution 
of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work 
organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some 
intellectual activity as non-science.” (Gieryn, 1983: p. 782) 
Although initially introduced as a predominantly descriptive concept used to critically 
analyse the symbolic positioning of science and scientists (Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 
1999), boundary work has also found policy-relevant applications, for example, in 
evaluating different forms of science-policy advice processes (Jasanoff, 1987a, 
1990b, Cash and Clark, 2001, Pregernig, 2005, 2007). Those policy-oriented studies 
show that in the interaction between science and politics, boundaries serve a variety 
of – sometimes seemingly contradictory – functions. Clearly discernable and 
undisputed lines of demarcation can protect science from the biasing influence of 
politics or help to organise and allocate authority. But boundaries can also act as 
obstacles to communication, collaboration, and integrated action. With boundaries 
being both a safeguard and barrier their targeted “management” promises to be an 
effective leverage in linking knowledge to action (Cash et al., 2002). 
One of the crucial problems in science-policy advice is how to find the “right” social 
distance between science and politics (Weingart, 2002a). In the context of knowledge 
use the cultural spaces of science and politics move close together. So the challenge 
for scientists and policy-makers is – to use a cartographic picture – to bring science 
near enough to politics without risking a spillover of one space into the other or 
creating ambiguity about where the line between science and politics should fall. 
Gieryn summarises this distance problem by saying that “[o]nly good fences keep 
politics and science good neighbors.” (Gieryn, 1995: p. 436) Empirical studies show 
that science-policy advice processes should not go so far as to make the boundary 
Analysis along procedural elements 178 
 
 
between science and policy completely arbitrary or even non-existent. This would 
neither be in the interest of science or politics. The creation of boundaries seems 
crucial to the political acceptability of advice (Jasanoff, 1990b, Farrell et al., 2001). 
Also growing out of the policy-related work on boundaries between science and 
politics is the identification of institutions that facilitate the communication and provide 
mediating functions across boundaries. David Guston coined the term “boundary 
organisations” for this type of institutions (Guston, 1999). Boundary organisations are 
hypothesised to perform a variety of functions that facilitate bridging science and 
policy across levels. Boundary organisations involve the participation of actors from 
both sides of the boundary, as well as professionals who serve a mediating role. 
They exist at the frontier of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and 
science, but they have distinct lines of accountability to each. Boundary organisations 
draw their stability not from isolating themselves from external political authority but 
precisely by being accountable and responsive to opposing, external authorities 
(Guston, 2001a, Cash and Clark, 2001). 
Statements on the appropriateness of specific institutional forms of scientific expert 
advice can, of course, not be generalised to any politico-historical context. The 
national political culture of a country, its political, legal, and scientific traditions of 
decision-making, influence the mechanisms and institutions for integrating expertise 
in the policy arenas (Brickman et al., 1985, O'Riordan and Wynne, 1987, Jasanoff, 
1990a, Renn, 1995, Pregernig, 2005). In this context it is interesting to see what 
“cultural traces” the distinct political patterns of a country leave behind in specific 
practices of science-policy consultation: What counts as legitimate expertise? Who 
counts as an expert and how much influence and authority does science hold and 
how much accrues to other modes of knowing and deciding? How are the 
contributions of scientists and policy-makers integrated (in a political as well as an 
cognitive way)? Which roles do non-scientific actors and the public play? 
4.4.1.4 Science and democracy: Towards the accountability of expert knowledge 
A last conceptual perspective on the science-policy interface is not so much driven 
by a common theoretical approach than rather by a shared political concern that 
could be paraphrased with the notion of “democratising expertise”. Seen from a 
normative point of view, the inherent tension between an increasing demand of 
scientific knowledge for political decision-making, on the one hand, and the urge for 
securing democratic norms, on the other hand, can be deemed to be critical. If 
scientific experts and their expertise become too powerful in policy processes then 
the political decisions might suffer from a lack of democratic legitimacy, because 
scientific knowledge can “pre-decide” society’s decisions without becoming objects of 
public deliberation and discourses (Böcher 2008). Therefore many scholars argue 
that an increase in the influence of expertise on public policy making may result in a 
loss of democracy. 
In the classic technocratic model of the science-policy interface, which has been 
elaborated by the German sociologist Helmut Schelsky, a scientific solution can be 
applied to every political problem, and politics (or ideologies) can be overcome by 
scientific rationality (Schelsky, 1965): Scientific rationality ultimately replaces 
democracy. Several of these technocratic models describe a replacement of politics 
by a scientifically rational administration (Weingart, 2003: p. 60). 
In reaction to the technocratic approach, Jürgen Habermas argued that there cannot 
be a distinct separation between the spheres of scientific experts and political actors 
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as well as there cannot be a replacement of politics by science (Habermas, 1968). 
He therefore suggests an understanding of the science-policy interface as a mutually 
critical relationship in which communication between science and politics becomes 
the most important aspect. In Habermas’ normative pragmatist model, the democratic 
organization of a public discourse between science and public policy should 
constitute a society’s insurance against the dangers of technocracy. On the one 
hand, the development of new scientific knowledge would then always be reflected 
against the background of existing values. On the other hand, political interests 
would always be examined against the background of the available scientific means 
and knowledge (Weingart, 2003: p. 61). 
In a further step, Habermas developed his model of deliberative democracy in which 
rational discourse forms the basic principle of a democratic society. The possibility of 
free discourse and mutual communication between scientists, politicians, and citizens 
has the potential for legitimising democratic rules and institutions. In his later works, 
Habermas (1996) indeed expressed scepticism vis-à-vis the possibility of citizen 
participation in all realms of decision making due to the problem of the high 
complexity of modern societies. Nevertheless, Habermas’ model "best describes the 
repeated process of problem definition, translating the problem into research 
projects, and their redefinition against the background of existing knowledge, with the 
translation of new findings into political decisions" (Weingart, 2003: p. 61). 
For Peter Weingart, the science-policy interface should be understood as a non-
linear, recursive communication process in which scientific experts communicate 
scientific issues and problems to political actors: science helps to define policy 
problems and contributes to the agenda-setting process, often in collaboration with 
the media, with politicians asking scientists for advice in finding solutions to these 
problems (Weingart, 2003). This recursive communication process fulfils the 
requirements of democratic legitimation due to its embededness in public discourses 
between citizens, experts, and the political actors. 
However, even if we understand the relationship of science and public policy as a to 
a certain degree normatively conceptualised recursive communication process, 
empirically the tension between the role of professional expertise and the democratic 
legitimacy of political decisions remains a problem: In Germany for example, there 
appears to be a tendency to delegate important policy issues to external expert 
bodies with the aim of deliberating upon critical issues which can lead to a pre-
structuring and preliminary decision-making of political debates outside the traditional 
institutions of democratic policy-making (Blumenthal 2003).  
Today, Frank Fischer, whose work is highly inspired by Habermas’ thoughts, still 
claims that „the tension between professional expertise and democratic governance 
is an important political dimension of our time“ (Fischer, 2000: p. IX). According to 
Fischer, a way of organising the transfer of scientific knowledge without running the 
risk of contributing to a loss of democratic legitimacy must be found. From such a 
point of view, the role expertise plays in the policy process must always be assessed 
against the background of existing democratic procedures and rules. In the light of 
this normative discussion, scientific knowledge transfer should not be organised in a 
linear technocratic way but the in a way that secures the accountability of expert 
knowledge against the background of standards of democratic legitimacy. 
To reach democratic accountability of expert involvement, for Frank Fischer – despite 
an increasing demand for scientific knowledge in an “Age of Expertise” – citizen 
participation is a corner stone of democracy (Fischer, 2000). Focusing on the idea of 
a democratic foundation (or legitimisation) of expertise, he claims from the view of 
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post-positivist political science that it is no longer sufficient for experts to deliver 
technical information for political problem-solving (as expected within the technocratic 
model). The experts should also combine their privileged knowledge with knowledge 
about facilitating public deliberation and learning (Fischer 2004: 21). In a 
programmatic statement Fischer (2004: 21) wrote: “If experts, acting as teachers and 
interpreters, could decipher the technological world for citizens in ways that would 
enable them to make intelligent political judgments, the constitutional provisions 
designed to advance public over selfish interests could function as originally 
conceived”. This type of model calls for regular exchanges between citizens and 
experts. The instruments of consensus conferences or mediation, for example, which 
establish a discourse between politicians, experts, and citizens to find political 
solutions, are a result of these ideas. Although Fischer’s perspective may look 
“radical” – at least when compared with the traditional image of science in society –, 
it nevertheless provides interesting insights into actual discussions about the role of 
science in the modern democratic state. In a way, Fischer tries to dissolve the 
“paradoxes of science in politics”. 
4.4.2 Democratic and accountable expertise in comparative analysis 
After having sketchily depicted various conceptual perspectives on the role of 
science and expertise in governance processes, this chapter will put an empirical 
focus on the roles and functions of experts and expertise in the GoFOR governance 
cases. The analysis will first try to unearth the overall character of expert involvement 
in the GoFOR cases (sub-chapter 4.4.2.1), and then go in more depth into the 
questions of what types of experts and expertise are typically involved in governance 
cases (4.4.2.2), what political functions they fulfil (4.4.2.3), and what makes science 
and expertise in governance processes accountable and legitimate (4.4.2.4). Finally, 
the analysis will focus on the question of whether there are discernable temporal 
trends in the use of expert advice (4.4.2.5). 
4.4.2.1 Overall character of expert involvement 
Before coming to the more specific questions of what roles (different types of) 
experts and expertise have played in the GoFOR governance processes and to what 
extent the involvement of expertise can be denominated as “accountable” or 
“democratic”, the involvement of experts in the set of 19 governance cases shall first 
be characterised on a more general level. In this respect three questions shall be 
addressed: First, what is the relative weight of experts and expertise in governance 
processes, i.e. are those processes rather driven by expertise or by politics? Second, 
how are expertise and politics linked in the course of political decision-making 
processes, i.e. does politics build on expertise or vice versa? And third, how are 
expertise and politics institutionally integrated, i.e. are experts part of political bodies 
or are expert bodies and political bodies strictly separated? 
Relative weight of experts and expertise 
In principle, political processes can be located on a theoretical continuum between 
purely expert-driven processes on the one extreme and purely politics-driven 
processes on the other extreme. The GoFOR governance cases fall – as most real-
world processes – somewhere in between those two extremes. Most GoFOR cases 
tend towards the politics rather than the expertise end of the spectrum. None of the 
cases can be characterized as a purely or even predominantly expert-centred 
process. But at the same time, experts and expertise played some sort of role in all 
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the cases. For example, the Norwegian Living Forests process can be seen as a 
paragon in the use of expertise. Experts of different backgrounds have been involved 
at different levels throughout the process. Nevertheless, it cannot be called an 
expert-driven process as it clearly has been a political process with a tug-of-war 
especially between environmental and economic interests. In this context, experts 
and expertise have been mobilized for different purposes. 
Only few GoFOR cases were explicitly framed as “technical” processes or were 
otherwise dominated by scientific reasoning. One of the main inspiring principles of 
the Catalonian General Plan of Forest Policy (FPGP), for example, is that it should 
be “technical”, what means that it should be based on the best scientific knowledge 
and the most comprehensive experience available. It was especially the Editor Board 
which paid attention to ensure technical rigor and coherence over the whole process. 
At the same time, the elaboration of the General Plan was supported by broad 
participation of stakeholders (Pecurul et al., 2007). 
Regarding its overall character, the formulation and implementation of the Austrian 
Biodiversity Strategy was also very much influenced by experts and expertise; 
however, it is fair to say that the whole process was not only expert-driven but was 
just as well influenced by political factors. While scientists have been well 
represented in the National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) and the formulation of 
draft versions of strategy papers was mostly delegated to experts in the National 
Environmental Agency, discussions in the NBC still have taken more the form of 
“negotiations” than purely technical exchange of arguments (Nordbeck and 
Pregernig, 2007). 
National Park management in Greece as well as the implementation of the EU 
Habitats Directive in Denmark and in Romania are also rather expert-centred policy 
processes. Management and administration of the Greek protected area network is 
firmly in the hands of public administration with numerous scientific committees and 
individual experts giving input on science-laden questions (Kassioumis et al., 2007). 
The great degree of expert involvement in the implementation of the Habitats 
Directive is mainly attributable to the highly “technical” character of this EU directive 
(Julien et al., 2000, Alphandery and Fortier, 2001). The main requirement of the 
directive which is to ensure a favourable conservation status for selected habitats 
and species obviously cannot be fulfilled without expert involvement. Implementation 
of the directive not only requires experts on the ecological requirements of species, 
but also experts regarding legal and administrative issues in order to ensure that 
measures are appropriate. Therefore the implementation of the Habitats Directive in 
Denmark and Romania, as in many other European countries, is characterised by 
extensive use of expertise in the policy process (Boon et al., 2007a; Bancu, 2007). 
The majority of GoFOR governance cases can be classified as “political” processes 
where expertise only played a minor role. In the elaboration of the Dutch nature 
policy plan “Nature for People, People for Nature”, for example, expert input mainly 
came from within the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries (LNV) 
(Turnhout, 2007). In the Danish National Park Pilot Process as well as in Romanian 
anti-corruption policies formal expertise hasn’t played a significant role, and expert 
input has been brought in mainly in the form of commissioned studies dealing with 
rather specific, technical questions (Boon et al., 2007a; Bouriaud, 2007). In the main 
working bodies of the Austrian and the Hungarian NFP processes also scientists and 
other experts were represented, but the processes as such were still operating more 
or less in a modus operandi that can be characterized as political deliberation or 
negotiation. Similarly, also in the two French forest policy cases and in the processes 
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related to Integrated Rural Development in Germany science and other types of 
formal expertise played only a rather marginal role. 
Linking of expertise and politics in the course of policy processes 
Having seen that in none of the GoFOR governance cases experts and expertise 
played an outstanding and dominant role but that, on the other hand, all 19 cases left 
some room for expert involvement, it is interesting to ask how expertise and politics 
are sequentially linked in the course of political decision-making processes. For that, 
we will draw on a typology by Millstone (2007) who distinguishes a number of ideal-
type models of science-policy interaction.51 
The first model, which came to be known as the “decisionist” model, goes back to the 
sociologist Max Weber who argued that “the deliberations and judgments of 
bureaucrats (and by extension expert advisors) should always be framed by the 
policy goals and objectives that should be set by politically accountable 
representatives, rather than by unaccountable officials.” (Millstone, 2007: p. 486) 
Here, politicians have the ultimate authority in defining policy whereas experts are 
confined to selecting the most appropriate means by which the politicians’ goals 
could be attained, and for their efficient implementation (“science on tap”). 
In the set of GoFOR case studies a number of processes correspond to a large 
degree to the classical Weberian decisionist model with policy makers setting political 
goals and implementation being left to public administrations and their advisory 
bodies. The implementation of the EU Habitats Directive, which is addressed in three 
GoFOR cases, is almost by definition following a decisionist model logic. The 
designation of Natura 2000 sites in Denmark and Romania and the revamping of the 
Greek national park management structure were clearly driven by politics, to be 
specific, by EU obligations to implement the Natura 2000 regime at national levels. 
As an implementation of this obligation, there have been expert bodies created in all 
three countries to rigorously pursue the objectives. 
The Danish National Park Pilot Process, which aimed at identifying options for 
establishing national parks in Denmark, is another example for a decisionist setup. 
The process was initiated by the Minister of Environment who sketched out rough 
guidelines for the organisation of the pilot projects to the counties and municipalities. 
The subsequent local processes were marked by extensive participation of 
landowners and other local stakeholders, but also expert knowledge was attributed a 
significant role (Boon et al., 2007b). 
Finally, the process around the French Territorial Forestry Charters (CFTs) can be 
seen as a special kind of role model for decisionism as here state actors were 
complemented by non-state actors to set the political guidelines for subsequent 
“technical” implementation. In the creation of this new policy instrument as well as in 
the initiation of specific CFTs, political aspects have been dominant with politicians 
and timber producers (and their representatives) driving the processes. In the 
implementation phase different types of expertise were mobilized, e.g. traditional 
forest specialists’ expertise, local actors’ insider knowledge, and scientific expertise 
(both from ecological and social sciences) (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova, 
2007). 
 
In the science-policy literature the decisionist model is typically contrasted with the 
                                            
51
  Some of the models described by Millstone (2007) will not be taken up here as they are solely 
applicable in a risk management context. 
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“technocratic” model in which scientific rationality is (or in a normative reading: 
should be) the guiding principle for political decisions. Responsibility for policy-
making should be assigned to experts, since only they possess relevant knowledge 
and objectivity (Millstone, 2007). Here, politicians are the agents of the scientific 
community; their responsibilities are confined to recruiting the best experts, and 
following their advice (“science on top”). 
At first sight, no example of a pure technocratic model can be found in the set of 
GoFOR case studies. This might be attributable to the fact that technocratic ideas 
and ideals are hardly ever called for or even explicitly spelled out in the political 
discourse. Millstone, however, notes that “[n]owadays, explicit and enthusiastic 
endorsements are rarely articulated by policy-makers or by policy analysts, but 
whenever policies are represented as if based on, and only on, ‘sound science’ then 
technocratic assumptions are implicitly being relied upon.” (Millstone, 2007: p. 488) 
But also measured against this more differentiated perspective, GoFOR cases 
provide little evidence for technocracy. In some cases, like for example the 
implementation of Natura 2000, we see a rather strong influence of experts, but the 
setup is still far from genuine technocracy since experts rarely have other resources 
than their knowledge to convince policy makers (Boon et al., 2007a) and since the 
problem framings of scientists are – often fiercely and successfully – contested by 
alternative problem framings of societal stakeholders. 
 
While the decisionist model and the technocratic model are mainly built on normative 
arguments a third ideal-type model has its roots in empirical observations, namely 
those of the US American risk management system of the late-20th century. Millstone 
calls this model “inverted decisionism” as here the roles of experts and politicians are 
interchanged. After experts set goals, “responsibility would pass downstream to 
policy-makers to decide how best to implement the advice of the scientists, taking 
account of non-scientific factors such as the costs of alternative courses of actions, 
and the ways different groups of protagonists might respond to policy signals and/or 
regulatory requirements.” (Millstone, 2007: p. 493) 
One GoFOR case, the Hungarian NFP process, shows some characteristics of 
inverted decisionism, insofar as political decision making was preceded by an expert-
centred deliberation phase. This policy formulation phase was marked by an interplay 
of expert-level discussions (supported by commissioned expert studies) and public 
discussion fora. Altogether, deliberations in the formulation phase proceeded on a 
rather “technical” level. When the process entered the decision-making phase, 
political and financial issues came to the fore. This second phase also became 
institutionally separated from the first phase with government bodies and the 
Parliamentary Sub-Committee for Forestry taking the lead. In the subsequent policy 
implementation phase, the Forest Programme lost much of its political clout and now 
is partially stalled because of lack of funding. In retrospect, it can be seen that the 
inverted decisionist model didn’t play out successfully in this case. Expert-led 
deliberations achieved a broad consensus on forest policy goals, but when those 
goals had to be reaffirmed and financially bolstered by political bodies this technical 
consensus began to crumble (Mészáros et al., 2007). 
Institutional integration of expertise and politics 
A third aspect relevant to describe the overall character of expert involvement in the 
GoFOR governance cases is the institutional integration of expertise and politics. 
Basically, expert advice processes can be located on a theoretical continuum 
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between experts being fully part of political bodies, on the one hand side, and expert 
bodies and political bodies being strictly separated, on the other hand side. The first 
model, which could be called the “integration model,” builds on multipartite bodies 
(made up of scientists and policy-makers) that are capable, simultaneously, of 
negotiating differences regarding scientific and political questions. The second 
model, which could be named the “separation model,” makes great effort to divide 
“technical” issues from “political” ones. Here typically, “expert working groups” focus 
on the former while “policy groups” deal with the latter (Farrell et al., 2001, Pregernig, 
2004). In real-world processes often a mixture of the two models can be found. 
In the set of GoFOR governance cases the integration of science and expertise into 
policy processes resembles more the integration model than the separation model. In 
most processes one finds “mixed” bodies in which policy makers, administrative 
officers, interest group representatives, and scientists sit side by side without a clear 
separation of roles. 
The Austrian National Biodiversity Commission (NBC) is one example of such a 
mixed body. In the NBC, the role of scientists has not been exclusively restricted to 
providing expert inputs while also policy makers (in the widest sense) have 
contributed to the knowledge base on which negotiation processes could build upon. 
Features of the separation model can only be found in those instances where 
external experts were consulted on a temporary basis. Their contributions were 
typically more or less restricted to providing content-wise input on a specific topic 
and, after that, leaving the deliberations and negotiations on the actual text of the 
strategy to the ordinary members of the NBC (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007). 
In Greek National Park management, one finds consultation bodies with mixed 
membership at the national, the regional and the local level. The National Scientific 
Natura 2000 Committee, which is responsible for improving the administration of the 
Natura 2000 network, is made up of representatives from six ministries, six 
academics with biological scientific backgrounds, and two representatives from 
NGOs. In the individual parks, Park Boards are typically composed of 7 to 11 
members representing a variety of stakeholders including local interest groups, 
NGOs, public administrators, as well as scientists. This composition suggests a spirit 
of accountability both to the scientific community and the political decision-making 
system (Kassioumis et al., 2007). 
In the Catalonian General Plan of Forest Policy the main coordinating function was 
taken over by the Editor Board. The Board is composed of representatives from the 
Technological Forest Centre of Catalonia, the private Centre for Forest Property, and 
the Undersecretary of Forests and Biodiversity. The head of the Undersecretary 
coordinated the work of the team; he also tried to connect the technical work of the 
team with political agendas and processes (Pecurul et al., 2007). 
Mixed consultation bodies in which scientists and other experts cooperated “at arm’s 
length” with political actors can also be found in a number of other GoFOR 
governance cases, e.g. the French “Relief Plan for Forests”, the Dutch nature policy 
plan “Nature for People, People for Nature”, the Austrian Forest Dialogue, and the 
Hungarian National Forest Programme. 
 
In only a few cases experts were kept in a more peripheral position. In the Danish 
National Park Pilot Process, for example, scientific experts were deliberately kept out 
of the political process and only their results, in the form of technical reports, were 
used as input in the pilot projects. In one instance, expert input was even deliberately 
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ignored: When a report about biodiversity came up in the middle of the process, 
showing that the chosen pilot projects were not optimal from a specific biodiversity 
perspective, this information was deliberately set aside by most stakeholders, 
including the Danish Society of Nature Conservation (Boon et al., 2007b). 
Similarly, in the Norwegian Living Forests process expert input and even genuine 
research have played an important role, but at the same time, scientists have not 
been part of the actual political negotiations at the table. In the first phase of the 
process, environmental NGOs insistently called for more intensive and more 
formalized input from the scientific community. With that, they probably hoped to 
create a kind of counter weight to forestry interests which very much controlled the 
Living Forests process at that time. In 1996, a Scientific Committee was actually set 
up. But even though the committee formally was part of the process its mandate 
remained vague and the resources allocated to the committee were scarce. Those 
two factors prevented the committee to play an independent and substantial role. The 
committee had a limited impact on the actual negotiations and was not set up again 
in the second phase of the process (Ouff et al., 2007). 
4.4.2.2 Types of experts and expertise 
One of the key tenets of new governance processes is that new, often non-state 
actors are involved in policy making. This tendency towards the pluralisation of policy 
networks can probably also be seen in the involvement and role of experts and 
expertise. Some of the theoretical approaches discussed in chapter 4.4.1 above 
make explicit reference to the notion of the “pluralisation of expert involvement”. This 
can be seen most markedly in the fact that “experts” who are involved in governance 
processes are not always and not only perceived to be scientists in a narrower 
sense. Newer approaches allow for other sources of expertise as well, i.e. one sees 
a kind of pluralisation of expertise that no longer is limited to scientific expertise alone 
but is also identified against the concrete background of a special political process or 
a public policy. For example, in boundary work models (see chapter 4.4.1.3), the 
question of who the experts are is also a question of political management of 
symbolic boundaries between science and non-science. A clear distinction between 
expertise and politics can hardly be made. In the more normative approaches this 
pluralisation of expertise is especially discussed in connection with the accountability 
of expert knowledge (see chapter 4.4.1.4). Frank Fischer, e.g., sees expert 
involvement in political processes typically as a cooperative enterprise between 
experts and citizens. Other scholars take this approach one step further by 
thematizing “new modes of knowledge production” in general. Emphasis is put on 
knowledge that is generated beyond traditional disciplinary and sectoral borders in 
heterogeneous forms and by a plurality of different actors who are not necessarily 
just scientists. In such approaches the production of knowledge is no longer only the 
result of scientific relevance but is also steered by anticipating the potential 
applications in (political) practice (Hirsch-Kreiensen, 2003). Such new forms of 
knowledge production are frequently characterized as “mode 2” knowledge (Gibbons 
et al., 1994). In mode 2, “pure” science is no longer the only thinkable source of 
problem solutions; rather the consideration of potential application contexts and the 
involvement of the expertise of different actors and practitioners can help to find 
scientifically based and practically applicable problem solutions. In these concepts 
the production of expertise as reaction to society’s problems is a question of a good 
combination between scientific knowledge and practitioners’ knowledge since both 
sources of expertise are necessary to produce useful knowledge for societies.  
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In the set of GoFOR case studies, a variety of different sources of expertise have 
been mobilised and different types of experts have been involved. Table 18 shows 
the types of experts and expertise that could be found in the GoFOR governance 
cases. 
Table 18: Types of experts and expertise as observed in GoFOR case studies 
Types of experts and expertise  
(i) expertise of university scientists 
(ii) expertise of private research institutes 
(iii) expertise of public research institutes 
(iv) expertise of interest groups 
(v) expertise of private consultants 
(vi) expertise of “ordinary citizens” (local knowledge) 
 
(i) Expertise of university scientists 
In many cases traditional expert input by university scientists has been identified. For 
example, in the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process scientists of various Austrian 
universities have been involved in the work of the key body, i.e. the National 
Biodiversity Commission. In a similar way, in the Norwegian Living Forests process 
university scientists have been quite heavily involved. Another example is Germany, 
where in “Regionen Aktiv” universities have participated in the evaluation procedure 
of this rural development program (Giessen and Böcher, 2007). Altogether it seems 
that traditional scientific expertise, largely represented by scientists working in 
universities, is still quite relevant in new modes of governance too. 
(ii) Expertise of private research institutes 
A second source of expertise is input by private research institutes. The Norwegian 
Living Forests program is once again an example for a governance process where 
private research institutes played a prominent role. This is also the case in the 
German integrated rural development program “Regionen Aktiv”, where two private 
research institutes built the national network unit and provided a lot of conceptual 
knowledge to the relevant ministry and the different rural regions participating in the 
program. 
(iii) Expertise of public research institutes 
Public research institutes also played a certain role in a number of GoFOR cases. In 
the Austrian National Biodiversity Strategy process, experts from the Federal 
Environmental Agency (UBA) which is the expert authority of the federal government 
for environmental protection and environmental control were quite intensively 
involved in the formulation and implementation of the Biodiversity Strategy. It was, in 
fact, UBA experts who prepared the text drafts of the two strategy documents and the 
Action Plan on Alien Species on behalf of the NBC (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007). 
Public research institutes also participated in the Norwegian Living Forests program. 
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(iv) Expertise of interest groups 
In a number of GoFOR cases also interest groups provided expert input. For 
example, in the Norwegian Living Forest process a large number of interest groups 
were involved and the persons representing those interest groups typically were 
highly skilled and knowledgeable in their field. In addition to that, the delegates were 
representing the knowledge of their entire organisations and could draw on their 
members’ expertise (Ouff et al., 2007). 
In some governance cases, interest group representatives provided what could be 
called “counter-expertise”, i.e. expertise which is contradicting and challenging the 
expertise supplied by “official” state bodies or administration concerning. This was 
the case in France, where WWF and its experts published two booklets expressing 
their views on the way the forest reconstitution should be carried out in order to 
guarantee a minimum of sustainability of the forest (e.g. deadwood, diversity of 
species) (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova, 2007). In the Austrian NBC, 
especially representatives of environmental NGOs sometimes had different 
perspectives on biodiversity conservation than representatives from public authorities 
and economic interest groups. 
 
(v) Expertise of private consultants 
Another type of expert input is facilitated by the work of private consultants. In 
France, CEMAGREF, a research institute actively specializing on land and water 
management questions, was contracted by the Ministry of Agriculture to carry out an 
evaluation of the CFT program on a national level. In Austria, briefly after the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) had been signed, the Federal Ministry of 
Environment, Youth and Family Affairs commissioned an external private consultant 
to produce a report on the state of implementation of the CBD’s goals in Austria. It 
was the critical results of this report which, in the end, led to the initiation of the 
National Biodiversity Strategy process in 1997 (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007). 
In some governance cases, the contracting of private consultants seems to have 
served as a kind of link between “science” and “practice”. This was, for example, the 
case in Germany where private consultants (which are perceived as scientifically 
grounded) provided for a link between scientific studies on and practical 
implementation of rural development policies. 
Private consultancy seems to play a special role in new modes of governance due to 
two main reasons: First, new policy programs are frequently combined with special 
evaluation needs; consequently, private consultants are assigned the role of state-
independent, “neutral” observers. Second, private consultants are perceived to be 
able to advise state actors in a more “practitioners’ oriented” way than university 
experts are since private consultants are more familiar with the needs of the 
practitioners than academia (Giessen and Böcher, 2007). 
(vi) Expertise of “ordinary citizens” (local knowledge) 
In line with the concept of “mode 2” knowledge, depicted above, also input of 
expertise provided by ordinary citizens (“local knowledge”) has been found in some 
GoFOR cases. In the Dutch Groene Woud project, local organizations which have a 
lot of on-site ecological expertise played an important role. In the German rural 
development philosophy of the Ministry for Food and Agriculture the importance of 
expertise from rural citizens was explicitly mentioned in the guidelines for integrated 
rural development. Successful rural development should be reached by a 
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combination of different sources of knowledge including knowledge from local people 
(Giessen and Böcher, 2007). 
The set of GoFOR case studies, however, also provided examples to prove the 
opposite, i.e. the deliberate neglect of lay knowledge. While, for example, in the 
formulation and implementation of biodiversity policies in a number of European 
countries, like e.g. the United Kingdom, the expertise of local organisations (like local 
chapters of nature conservation associations) or lay people (e.g. so-called “amateur 
naturalists”) played an important role, the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process did 
almost completely without lay expert input although there are quite some lay 
monitoring activities going on in Austria. With that, the NBC can be said to have 
some sort of “elite bias” (Nordbeck and Pregernig, 2007). 
 
The examples given above strikingly indicate that in many governance processes 
expertise plays an important role but that expert input is far from restricted to 
traditional scientific expertise; expertise is rather provided by a diverse set of sources 
and actors. At the same time, the GoFOR case studies have given proof that there is, 
once again, no single model or pattern of expert involvement in policy processes. 
While in some processes expertise was mainly provided by state actors, in other 
processes civil society actors came to the fore. 
4.4.2.3 Political functions of experts and expertise 
Science and expertise can fulfill various functions in governance processes. In 
different theoretical frameworks on the science-policy interface different functions are 
accentuated. In principle, one can identify three broader strands of conceptual 
models: linear transfer models, group politics models, and deliberative models. 
• Linear knowledge transfer models (as described in chapter 4.4.1.1 above) build on 
the assumption that scientific expertise primarily serves to help resolve political and 
societal problems, i.e. expertise can and does perform a political problem solving 
function. Technocratic approaches go even one step further by assuming that 
increased use of expertise can more or less overcome a political tug-of-war. Here, 
expertise not only helps but rather equals political problem solving. 
• Group politics models (as introduced in chapter 4.4.1.2 above) take a more 
“political” look at the role of science and expertise in social and political processes. 
From this theoretical perspective, expert input is mainly serving the interests of 
political actors. Expertise is nothing but a power resource for political actors who 
try to realize their interests by using appropriate – and from their perspective 
“useful” – expertise. 
• A third strand of theories takes a middle position between the naïve hopes of linear 
transfer models and the to some extent cynical view of group politics models. They 
emphasize that scientific experts are one but not the only source of knowledge 
production for and in political processes. In their search for problem solutions 
political actors typically can choose between different sources of knowledge, be it 
scientific experts or be it consultants, agency staff or sometimes even lay people. 
In tight connection with this notion of a more “pluralistic knowledge field”, the 
question of how knowledge diffuses into society comes into focus. Knowledge 
utilization models point to the fact that the use of scientific findings typically does 
not come in the form of instrumental but rather in the form of conceptual use. Carol 
H. Weiss (1980) coined the term “knowledge creep” to describe the way in which 
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research findings and more often abstract concepts or ideas gradually spread, 
enter into use, and sometimes become the conceptual framework of entire policy 
debates (“percolation”). In this way, expertise fulfils a kind of discursive function as 
being part of societal deliberation processes in which social actors deliberate upon 
new policy ideas or new knowledge and its utilization in politics. Hence, expertise is 
not a source of knowledge that can be applied directly, but it plays an important 
role in public discourses about potential political problem solutions. 
 
In the set of GoFOR governance case studies, all of the different types of functions of 
expertise addressed in the three above-mentioned strands of theory could be found. 
In some instances, expertise seems to have served purely as a power resource 
without having any epistemic function, in other instances, expertise-based knowledge 
could actually contribute to find better political solutions, while, eventually, expertise 
sometimes also played a key role in generating and propagating new policy ideas. 
Building on the theoretical approaches above, the following empirically derived 
typology of functions of experts and expertise in governance processes can be 
developed: 
• Experts as (co-)producers of dominant discourses (“schools of thought”): By 
introducing innovative concepts or general approaches, experts can lay the 
foundations for or push ahead a governance process. 
• Experts as initiators and driving forces in the early phases of governance 
processes: Experts can act as kind of “policy entrepreneurs” who generate, design, 
and implement innovative ideas in the public domain. 
• Experts as consultants on process-related questions or evaluators of policies: 
Experts sometimes perform special organizational or procedural tasks in 
governance processes, like e.g. the development of a code of conduct, the 
moderation of working group sessions, or the evaluation of the whole process. 
• Experts as producers of content-wise knowledge: Experts can also fulfill the 
function that the classical transfer model attributes to them, i.e. giving content-wise 
input into policy processes. 
• Experts as builders of political consensus that serves as basis for negotiation 
processes: By serving as mediators or idea and interest brokers experts’ 
knowledge can contribute to overcome conflicts of interest between different 
political actor groups leading, in the end, to consensus-oriented deliberations. 
• Experts as creators of arguments and counter arguments: Experts can provide 
political actor groups with “suitable” political arguments to make their point in 
political deliberations. 
 
Table 19 gives illustrative examples of where those functions could be found in the 
GoFOR governance case studies. The list of examples given is not exhaustive but it 
still should give the reader a rough picture of how broad the use of expertise in 
governance processes can be. 
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Table 19: Functions of experts and expertise as observed in GoFOR case 
studies 
Functions Empirical evidence in GoFOR cases 
Experts as (co-)producers 
of dominant discourses 
GER-IRD: experts played a key role in developing and propagating the 
overall discourse on “integrated rural development” as a “policy idea” 
AT-AFD: the general concept of “national forest programmes” (NFP) was 
partially stimulated by experts’ arguments 
Experts as initiators and 
driving forces in the early 
phases of governance 
processes 
DEN-NPP: an expert committee (Wilhjelmudvalget) set forward 
recommendations for national park areas to be established, prior to the 
pilot project process was initiated 
HUN-NFP: forestry scientists played a key role in bringing the idea of 
developing an NFP in Hungary on the political agenda 
AT-BS: a series of four workshops organized by the Federal 
Environmental Agency and WWF Austria in 1996 appears to have 
initiated further activities around the CBD in Austria 
Experts as consultants on 
process-related questions 
or evaluators of policies 
HUN-NFP& ESP-FPGP: scientific experts were involved in the overall 
design of the process and acted as overall coordinators and organizers 
AT-AFD: experts were involved in formulating the code of conduct for the 
dialogue process and, later, also served as co-moderators in working 
group sessions 
DEN-NPP: consultants designed and facilitated the participation process 
 
AT-BS, FR-RPF, GER-L+, GER-RA, & NOR-LF: experts were involved in 
carrying out evaluations of the setup and/or outcomes of the respective 
processes 
Experts as producers of 
content-wise knowledge 
all cases 
Experts as builders of 
political consensus 
NOR-LF: it seems that the main purpose of the use of expertise in the 
Living Forests process was to create a common and legitimate point of 
departure for consensus preceding the actual negotiations 
HUN-NFP & ESP-FPGP: a status-quo analysis carried out by university 
scientists provided the basis for process design and the identification of 
further steps 
AT-BS: a study commissioned in the forefield of the elaboration of an 
Action Plan facilitated the political negotiations on this Action Plan 
GR-MA: Special Environmental Studies which had to be elaborated for 
each National Park in Greece served as the basis for subsequent 
participation processes 
Experts as creators of 
arguments and counter 
arguments 
NOR-LF: expertise was also used as a tool for different interests to argue 
their case (esp. between forestry and nature protection interests) 
 
When looking at the illustrative examples in Table 19 it is striking to see that part of 
the functions described are not unique to new governance processes but can 
probably also be found in “classical” political processes. So the key question is 
whether there are any functions that experts and expertise tend to fulfil exclusively or 
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at least predominantly in governance settings? Based on the set of GoFOR case 
studies it is hard to answer this question because the GoFOR research design didn’t 
include contrasting “non-governance processes”. A few general observations can still 
be made. 
It is safe to say that there is not the one function that experts and expertise play in 
governance processes but (i) different types of experts fulfil a variety of cognitive, 
strategic and symbolic functions; and (ii) the set of functions found within one 
governance process varies from case to case. 
One aspect that seems to be somewhat conspicuous for new governance processes 
is the heightened importance of process reviews in and evaluations of governance 
processes and the key role that experts play therein. In a number of GoFOR case 
studies, experts were contracted as consultants on process-related questions or 
evaluators of policies. A possible reason for that could be that policy makers strive to 
legitimate their policies by including external, “neutral” authorities, and science 
seems to be perfectly apt to symbolize this neutrality. Rather than supporting efficient 
and rational decision making, evaluations (also) serves as an important symbol of 
acceptability, indicating transparency and administrative willingness to learn and, 
thus, being central to the legitimation of state actors (Power, 2000). 
What is also worth mentioning is that the “cognitive function” of expertise, i.e. experts 
providing relevant knowledge to policy makers, still seems to be quite relevant in new 
governance processes as well. In almost all case studies, experts gave content-wise 
input in one or the other form, be it in written reports, in hearings, or in actively 
participating in expert bodies. So, one can conclude that experts’ function as 
knowledge providers is far from being replaced by other, more “politicized” functions. 
One rather sees a differentiation of multiple functions that become (more or less) 
relevant in one and the same governance process. 
4.4.2.4 Accountability and legitimation of experts and expertise 
Discussions on the role of science and expertise in politics have frequently been 
framed along the question of how to link expert knowledge and political decision-
making in the most effective way. Under the dictum of “evidence-based policy-
making,” reform-oriented political or administrative bodies (such as the European 
Commission, the British Labour Government, or the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, just to name a few) have recently launched a wide-range of ambitious 
initiatives to strengthen the use of evidence in public policy and practice (Davies et 
al., 2000, Sanderson, 2002, Nutley et al., 2003). 
The call for more “evidence-based policy-making” is, however, not generally and 
unanimously supported. Bolstering the role of science in politics creates inherent 
tensions between professional expertise and democratic governance. Frank Fischer 
insistently notes: “Democracy’s emphasis on equality of citizenship, public opinion, 
and freedom of choice exists in an uneasy relationship with the scientific expert’s 
rational, calculating spirit.” (Fischer, 2000: p. ix) Fritz Scharpf points out that in 
democratic societies, “output legitimacy”, i.e. acceptance due to the positive 
outcomes of a political decision, is increasingly linked to “input legitimacy”, i.e. 
acceptance due to fair procedures (Scharpf, 1997, 1999). Similarly, Bernstein (2004) 
emphasises that “legitimacy concerns a judgement of appropriateness determined by 
the values of the relevant audience, not because efficiency per se produces 
legitimacy.” To be legitimate, un-elected institutions such as Supreme Courts, central 
banks but also scientific advisory bodies require transparent decision-making and 
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reasoning. Civil society appears less willing to simply allow authority to move to 
technical experts by default. “No democratic society accepts the legitimacy of 
discarding democratic processes in favour of efficiency.” (Bernstein, 2004: p. 7) From 
this perspective, “evidence-based policy-making” could even be seen as a form of 
“technocratisation in disguise”. 
In resistance to the perceived scientification of politics and the ensuing erosion of the 
authority and legitimacy of science and politics, both scientific scholars and policy 
makers have been calling for more transparent, accountable and democratic forms of 
scientific expert advice. As described in the introduction to this chapter, especially the 
European Commission has put great efforts into the “democratisation of expertise” 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
In the following, we will try to answer two questions: (i) how accountable and 
legitimate was the integration and use of expertise in the GoFOR governance case 
studies and (ii) what special democratic qualities made expertise accountable and 
legitimate? In our analysis, the democratic qualities of expert involvement in politics 
will be operationalised with a broad set of criteria, including the balanced 
representation of different types of expertise, the degree of accessibility and 
understandability of expert knowledge, the transparent and unbiased selection of 
experts, as well as the relation to state institutions. 
 
Balanced representation of different types of expertise 
A first important criterion touches upon the question of whether in a political process 
different types of expertise are mobilized and used in a rather balanced way or 
whether there is a strong dominance of one type of expertise while other types of 
expertise are depreciated. The set of GoFOR governance cases provides evidence 
for both patterns: the relative domination of one type as well as the rather balanced 
use of different types of expertise. 
The Austrian Forest Dialogue (AFD) is a good example for the first pattern. Expertise 
– if it was mobilized at all – was mainly called for and brought in by forest scientists 
or by other experts from forestry or forest industry. Other disciplinary perspectives 
didn’t play too prominent a role (Hogl and Kvarda, 2007). This is partly due to the fact 
that forest policy historically has been perceived as a rather “technical” policy field 
with expertise being concentrated largely within the forestry profession (Glück, 1992). 
This tendency has probably been amplified by a social phenomenon known as 
“Green Pillarization” (“Grüne Versäulung”). Green pillarization aims at uniting the 
“pillars” of the forestry sector, i.e. the forest bureaucracy, private forest owners’ 
associations, and forestry science, into a single bloc with conflicting interests 
equalised and with all forestry actors pursuing a common goal (Pleschberger, 1989, 
Pregernig, 1999). Expertise has always played an important integrative role in this 
“green” sector network. With its strong focus on forestry expertise, the Austrian 
Forest Dialogue, despite its numerous innovative aspects described above, more or 
less reproduced traditional patterns, at least as regards the mobilization of expertise. 
Similar patterns can be seen in the case of anti-corruption policies in the forestry 
sector in Romania. When expert knowledge is called upon, policy makers principally 
fall back on the traditional “forestry academe”, represented especially by the 
Academy of Agriculture and Forest Sciences and the National Forest Research and 
Management Planning Institute. Their expertise is used to justify regulatory policies. 
The other participants in the process have not yet been able to present “counter 
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expertise” to attest that the solution proposed is not the only viable option (Bouriaud, 
2007). 
 
In other GoFOR case studies, expertise was brought into governance processes in a 
more balanced way. A good example for that is the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy 
process. Here, different types and sources of expertise have been used in a rather 
unbiased way, i.e. one sees no dominance of one type of expertise (like: ecological 
expertise) and the depreciation of other types. This is probably due to various factors: 
First, the Convention on Biological Diversity uses a rather broad notion of 
“conservation”, including the “sustainable use” of biodiversity. Second, the Austrian 
Biodiversity Commission, as the key driving force of this strategy process, has been 
set up as a very broad, pluralistic body. Regular NBC members, who are to be 
considered as important source of expertise as well, have come from a range of 
institutional backgrounds (like federal ministries, provincial governments, interest 
groups, as well as research organizations). When having to fall back on additional, 
external expertise the Commission typically tried to include a broad spectrum of 
experts. However, the spectrum of expertise typically only refers to different thematic 
areas or disciplines (like botany, zoology, or ecology) and not to different “schools of 
thought” in the sense of “expertise” and “counter-expertise” (Nordbeck and 
Pregernig, 2007). 
 
Some GoFOR case studies document an interesting change in the role of different 
types of expertise in the course of time. In Dutch nature policy, for example, one sees 
three distinct phases which can be accounted for in each of the three Dutch case 
studies: (i) the dominance of agricultural expertise after World War II; (ii) the 
supremacy of ecological expertise in the 1980s and 1990s; and (iii) a pluralisation of 
expertise in recent years. In the first phase, technical knowledge which supports 
agricultural interests and positions was dominant. With growing public concern that 
agricultural processes are detrimental for natural and landscape values, ecological 
knowledge gained in importance. Although initiated by a more value laden argument, 
this type of knowledge had a predominantly technical character as well. Only in 
recent years, other types and sources of knowledge were recognized as important 
(Arnouts et al., 2007). The policy document “Nature for people, people for nature”, for 
example, was heavily influenced by new ideas on nature and nature policy. The 
dominance of ecological science knowledge was problematised and opened up. 
Social scientific knowledge about the societal importance of nature and about the 
broad spectrum of peoples’ wishes for nature (incl. “lay knowledge”) informed policy 
processes from the beginning (Turnhout, 2007). 
A similar picture can be seen in German agricultural and rural development policies. 
This policy field was dominated by expertise from the agricultural sector for a long 
time. Recent changes in the political environment, including a change of government 
from a conservative-liberal to a “red-green” government coalition, several food crises 
in Europe (esp. the outbreak of BSE and FMD), and the development of EU 
structural policies, opened up the policy field for new policy actors as well as for new 
kinds of expertise. Studies commissioned to “alternative” research institutes, the 
involvement of expertise from NGOs, and scientific expertise more or less 
unconnected from agrarian agendas began to play an increasingly important role in a 
policy field which was no longer perceived as (just) “agricultural policy” but rather 
framed by the concept of “Integrated Rural Development”. What is also noteworthy in 
this case is that, especially in the LEADER+ program, one not only sees a 
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diversification of expert input but also a kind of “pluralisation of the demand side”. 
Under LEADER+, the circle of addressees of expert advice has broadened with 
expertise not only being provided to national-level policy makers but also to local 
level and non-state actors. In recent years, one can identify an ensuing “pluralisation 
on the supply side”, where former “addressees” in the new sense (i.e. Local Action 
Group members or managers) now are requested to share their expertise (Giessen 
and Böcher, 2007). 
A trend towards pluralisation can also be found in Norwegian forest policy. Forest 
policy in Norway was traditionally heavily dominated by “pure” forest expertise. Also 
in the Living Forest process forest professionals played a key role. The Living 
Forests secretariat, for example, was staffed by undoubtedly skilled personnel, but 
most of them were foresters. In the course of the process the question arose: What 
scientists have the most credibility? This topic was mainly addressed by 
environmental NGOs who pointing to the fact that few biologists were deeply involved 
in the process. In recent years, the use of expertise in the Norwegian forestry sector 
has broadened and new knowledge has entered the scene. The general impression 
is that the Living Forests process has added to and maybe accelerated this trend 
(Ouff et al., 2007). 
The two French GoFOR case studies deviate from the patterns described above 
insofar as they do not show linear developments (here: from narrow to broader 
expert involvement) but rather give evidence for a kind of “pendular movement”. 
Historically, French forest management and policy showed strong dominance of 
technical expertise, with the National Forest Service (ONF) having been considered 
as the only rationalistic basis for decisions. With the Relief Plan for the 
Reconstruction of the Forests (RPF) and the Territorial Forestry Charters (CFT) this 
situation changed, at least temporarily. In the direct aftermath of the catastrophic 
storms of December 1999, the problem, as well as its possible solutions, was framed 
in a rather comprehensive way, i.e. seeing the Relief Plan not only as a “mission for 
forestry” but rather as a broad societal challenge. Consequently, new types of 
expertise, especially those addressing economic, social, and political facets of the 
problem, were in dire need. At this early stage, also studies on the possible causes of 
the storms and on their ecosystemic effects were commissioned, mainly mobilising 
ecological expertise. In 2002, when the immediate crisis situation was overcome, the 
conventional technical forestry expertise came to the fore again and ONF could, once 
more, impose its technical priorities. A similar pattern can be seen in the CFT 
process. The introduction of the new policy instrument of CFTs brought a wider view 
on forest management, including ecological, economic and social aspects, and, 
consequently, a more comprehensive involvement of different types of expertise. In 
the implementation of individual Charters, traditional forestry expertise often came 
out on top again (Buttoud and Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova, 2007) 
 
Accessibility and understandability of expert knowledge 
The degree to which expert input into political decision making processes is 
perceived as accountable and legitimate not only hinges on the balanced 
representation of different types of expertise, but also the question of how easily 
expert knowledge is accessible and understandable for a policy and lay audience is 
assumed to play an important role. In the set of GoFOR case studies, the degree of 
accessibility, openness and transparency of expert advice varied remarkably. 
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In the case of German rural development policies, all the reports of the 
accompanying research were freely available via internet. Some important 
milestones of the accompanying research (e.g. the self evaluation method) have 
been developed in cooperation with regional actors (inter alia, discussed in an 
internet forum). Different venues for the exchange of ideas between experts and 
social actors have been established to secure the “accessibility” of expertise (e.g. 
focus groups, workshops etc.). Beyond that, the guidelines on integrated rural 
development were formulated and layouted with the help of a professional PR 
agency in order to make its contents more accessible and easier understandable for 
practitioners (Giessen and Böcher, 2007). 
Also in the Danish National Park Pilot Projects, documents and reports were readily 
accessible to the public throughout the process, as they could and can be 
downloaded from the internet. This openness also contributed to the transparency of 
procedures. In the course of the process, expert, in a way, got closer to the public as 
they were, for example, asked to report on their methods towards the broader public 
(Boon et al., 2007b). 
In other GoFOR governance cases, expertise moved less close to its “audience” than 
in the German and the Danish examples. The Austrian National Biodiversity Strategy, 
for instance, can be characterized as a semi-open process. The Austrian National 
Biodiversity Commission (NBC) has used, in principle, a rather transparent mode of 
operation with the Chair regularly distributing relevant documents, including relevant 
scientific studies and expert opinions, to all Commission members. Transparency has 
been more restricted when it came to the political reconciliation of positions, e.g. in 
the formulation or reformulation of strategy documents. Since NBC members were 
supposed to send their comments to the Chair only, individual comments were not 
accessible for all Commission members.52 In addition, while adhering to at least basic 
requirements of transparency within the NBC itself, the work of the Commission 
remained quite opaque to the outside. This is, in part, attributable to the fact that 
“biodiversity” is per se a rather difficult concept. Compared to related concepts like 
“nature conservation” or “species conservation” biodiversity is hard to communicate 
to policy makers and a broader lay audience. Also the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy 
has been burdened with this disadvantage and the NBC has not (yet) found an 
appropriate way out of that problem. Key documents, like the two versions of the 
Strategy or the Action Plan on Alien Species, are written in very technical language. 
Also the length of the documents makes them difficult to penetrate. Even in the 
revised Strategy of 2005, the Commission could not agree on a prioritised, and with 
that reduced, list of targets. Only very recently, a small brochure that synthesises the 
key messages of the revised Biodiversity Strategy was published (Nordbeck and 
Pregernig, 2007). 
Also in other GoFOR cases, the excessive use of technical-scientific language 
doubtlessly reduced the political clout and legitimacy of the governance processes. 
Documents related to the Natura 2000 process in Denmark have been linguistically 
difficult to access, mainly because of the expert-centered language applied (Boon et 
al., 2007a). In the course of the elaboration of the Hungarian National Forest 
Program the special forestry language of the White Book was criticised by some 
stakeholders as not suitable for an open, public debate (Mészáros et al., 2007). 
                                            
52
 This is a form of interaction which Scharpf denominated as “negative coordination” (Scharpf, 1993). 
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Transparent and unbiased selection of experts 
A third element that has an effect on the perceived accountability and legitimacy of a 
governance process is the way experts are selected to take part (or not) in political 
advice and decision making. In some GoFOR governance cases experts have been 
selected in a transparent way, in others selection procedures have been more 
opaque. 
In the two Austrian strategy processes investigated, expert recruitment was, in 
principle, rather open and transparent. The National Biodiversity Commission was set 
up as an “open body” right from its start. All relevant institutions were invited to 
nominate representatives and still today the Commission is open for new members. 
In the Austrian Forest Dialogue, the right of all involved stakeholders to bring in their 
experts and expertise or even call for external experts to be commissioned by the 
competent Ministry had been set down in writing before the start of the process in a 
“Code of Conduct”. Nevertheless, expert mobilization in both processes showed quite 
some biases. It was typically expert institutions with which the organizing bodies had 
intensive interactions before which were commissioned to write a report or bring in 
expert opinion otherwise. In any case, it is difficult to understand the real motivations 
for expert selection and especially to tell apart cognitive reasons (“We chose them 
because they know better.”) and political motivations (“We chose them because they 
say what we expect.”). 
In other GoFOR cases, the selection of experts was organized in a more opaque 
way. A good case in point is National Park management in Greece, where it was 
even impossible for the scientific investigators to find out whether there is a standard 
selection process or whether there are specific rules used for appointing chairmen of 
scientific committees. Thus, the process in this respect lacks transparency and 
openness. At the same time, there was no objection or questioning by the involved 
actors about the selection methods and the criteria used (Kassioumis et al., 2007). 
 
Relation to state institutions 
A last attribute to understand the legitimation of governance processes (and the 
involvement of experts therein) is the relation of those processes to state institutions. 
Most of the GoFOR governance processes have been embedded in state structures 
in one way or the other. Closeness to state institutions and the related perception of 
being somehow “official” processes seems to have given those processes also some 
special kind of legitimacy. The Austrian, the Hungarian, and the Spanish Forest 
Programs, the Danish and the Greek nature conservation processes as well as the 
French regional forest policy initiatives are good examples for this category of 
“governance in the shadow of government”. 
The Norwegian Living Forest Project falls in a different separate category. The Living 
Forests Project is an inter-sectorial co-operation project between stakeholders from 
forestry, environmental and outdoor recreational organisations, trade unions, and 
consumers’ organizations. The Ministry of Agriculture and The Ministry of the 
Environment had active observing roles during the project, but no right to vote in 
negotiations. Thus, the process was very much driven by non-state actors. Also 
expertise was mainly mobilized and generated by private actors, like universities and 
private research institutes (Ouff et al., 2007). 
There is one case which stands in stark contrast to the above-mentioned processes, 
i.e. the case of Romanian anti-corruption policy. In Romanian anti-corruption policy, 
Analysis along procedural elements 197 
 
 
the credibility – and with that the political clout – of scientific studies seems to 
increase with the distance from state institutions. Corruption issues have often been 
covered by audits and studies sponsored by international watchdog organizations 
(like Freedom House or Transparency International), international donor 
organizations (like World Bank) or international NGOs (like WWF). Those audits and 
studies develop special democratic qualities as non-state actors stand for transparent 
methods of evaluation and free public access to documents; NGOs are perceived to 
analyze the situation from a “non-governmental viewpoint”. Today, even 
governmental actors are aware of those special qualities. By listening to and 
considering the recommendations of NGOs in the policy process, they can give state 
policies additional credibility and legitimation. In the field of forestry, however, the 
situation is still quite different. When dealing with corruption in the forest sector, state 
institutions still play a dominant role. In addition, all types of policies in the forest 
sector are still affected by a sever lack of basic data on timber existing in the forests, 
on the volume of timber harvested and, thus, on illegal timber cutting, as well as on 
private forest owners and their behaviour in the cutting issue. The ongoing 
establishment of the National Forest Inventory will supply helpful data for policies in 
the forest sector. With that, the role of civil society will probably also change in the 
forest sector (Bouriaud, 2007). 
4.4.2.5 Trends in the use of expert advice 
Finally, the question arises of whether there are specific temporal trends in the role of 
expert advice in governance processes: Do the policy fields under study show a 
trend towards increased (or rather decreased) use of expert advice? Do the 
governance processes themselves reinforce (or rather impede) this trend? 
In many of the GoFOR governance case studies, one sees a trend towards the 
increased use of expert advice in policy making. One driving force behind this trend 
seems to be the European Union with its directives and funding programs. The EU 
Habitat Directive, with its strongly technical and scientific character, has undoubtedly 
reinforced the trend towards expert involvement in nature conservation policy in 
Denmark, Greece and Romania. In all three countries, one recognizes a marked 
increase in the number of experts and committees that serve to facilitate decision 
making at national, regional, and sometimes even local levels. In German Integrated 
Rural Development policies the use of expertise has been fostered especially by 
LEADER+, the EU funding program that aims to assist rural communities in 
improving the quality of life and economic prosperity in their local area. 
But, also independent of EU initiatives, a trend towards the increased use of expert 
advice in governance processes can be found. Two good examples from the set of 
GoFOR case studies are the Hungarian NFP process and the Norwegian Living 
Forest Project. For the last-mentioned process it can even by hypothesized that it 
served as a kind or role model for the whole policy field, thus contributing to the 
increased use of expertise in Norwegian forest policy in general (Ouff et al., 2007). 
For some GoFOR case, no discernable trend can be identified. When, for example, 
looking at the involvement of scientists and other experts in the two Austrian strategy 
processes one sees no marked changes over time. Forest policy and nature 
conservation policy have always been policy fields where expertise played an 
important role, and this didn’t change with the initiation of the two strategy processes. 
None of the GoFOR governance case studies shows a trend towards the decreased 
use expertise. 
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Besides asking for possible trends in the frequency and intensity of policy makers 
falling back on expert advice in a governance context, one could also ask whether 
there are temporal patterns discernable in the democratic quality of expert 
involvement. Do the policy fields under study show a trend towards more 
technocratic or towards more democratic forms of policy making? Do the governance 
processes themselves reinforce (or rather impede) this trend? 
Once again, one sees no unanimous trend in the GoFOR case studies but there are 
still different common patterns. In some cases, a traditional technocratic approach 
was – if not fully strengthened so at least – reinforced over time. Here, the two 
French regional forest policy processes, Greek National Park management and, at 
least to some extent, the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process serve as good 
examples. 
As already described above, some cases are marked by distinct phases in the 
course of the process with an initial swing towards more “pluralistic” forms of expert 
involvement in the policy process and, then, old-established institutions and actor 
networks gaining momentum and narrowing down the scope of relevant forms of 
knowing and deciding again.  
In quite a few GoFOR cases, one has seen remarkable trends towards more 
democratic forms of expert involvement in policy processes. The spectrum of 
expertise mobilized has been broadened to include new disciplinary knowledges, 
such as environmental expertise in forest policy in Norway, Austria, or Spain, or 
social science expertise in nature policy in the Netherlands. In some processes, like 
the German Integrated Rural Development processes or the Dutch “Nature for 
People, People for Nature” process, also great efforts have been put into making 
scientific insights more easily accessible to and understandable for a lay audience. 
4.4.3 Major conclusions on democratic and accountable expertise 
While participation, multi-level coordination and inter-sectoral coordination are quite 
familiar conceptual perspectives when analysing governance processes, the 
conceptual focus on the role of expertise in governance processes is not so prevalent 
in the scholarly literature. In the GoFOR research design, expertise was taken up as 
a distinct focus of analysis based on the expectations that in a governance context 
science and expertise play special, new roles that go beyond the mere content-wise 
input of scientific knowledge in political decision-making processes, and that the 
tighter coupling of science and politics could lead to inherent tensions between 
professional expertise and democratic legitimation. 
As set out in the introduction to this chapter, the science-policy literature points to 
various social dynamics and challenges in the interaction between expertise and 
politics, namely (i) the scientification of politics and (ii) the concurrent politicisation of 
science, (iii) an ensuing legitimacy crisis of science, and (iv) a call for more 
“accountable” and “democratic” forms of expertise. In our analysis, we wanted to find 
out to what extent and how those phenomena have played out in the GoFOR 
governance cases as well. 
The scholarly literature indicates that, in recent years, science has come to play an 
increasingly influential role in policy making. Also in the set of GoFOR governance 
processes, science and expertise have frequently played a prominent role. At the 
same time, the GoFOR cases provide no indication for the “scientification of 
politics” in a narrower sense, i.e. that scientific expertise is dominating or even 
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replacing politics. As outlined in chapter 4.4.2.1 above, none of the cases analysed 
can be characterized as an expert-centred process dominated by scientific 
reasoning, but most cases were predominantly influenced by “political” factors. So in 
general, the analysis of 19 governance cases does not provide too much evidence in 
support of the above-mentioned thesis of the “scientification of politics” and the 
related danger of “technocratization”. A possible explanation for that could be that 
these phenomena cannot be generalized to all policy settings and that the science-
policy literature hitherto has looked at another type of policy problems than the 
GoFOR project did. In the science-policy literature, the “scientification of politics” has 
typically been accounted for in a very special class of policy problems, namely 
problems characterized by a high degree of system uncertainties and high decision 
stakes (cf. the concept of “post-normal science” by Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
Most GoFOR cases do not fall into this category. They do, for example, not deal with 
the adoption and implementation of cutting-edge technologies (like biotechnology or 
stem-cell research) but rather with different forms of land use which are, of course, 
sometimes contested but the consequences of which are more or less predictable. In 
addition, a number of GoFOR cases has looked at a special class of political 
processes, namely “strategy processes”. With their long-term perspective this type of 
political processes is probably more detached from pressing political questions which 
call for immediate political action; strategy processes somehow take a more 
“distanced” view on policy problems. In this type of settings political and societal 
actors have seemingly less incentives to draw on science as a problem-solver and/or 
a source of political legitimacy. 
The special character of the GoFOR case studies can probably also be seen in 
connection with the second, related phenomenon described in the science-policy 
literature, i.e. the “politicisation of science”. While in many high-tech and risk 
related policy fields the increased coupling of knowledge with politics has driven the 
politicisation of science, we see little evidence for that in the GoFOR governance 
cases, at least not in the sense that scientific knowledge claims have been 
deconstructed along the lines of conflict of the underlying political dispute. But that 
does not mean that in the governance processes analysed, experts and expertise 
have been “apolitical”. 
One indication for that is that in most GoFOR cases expertise and politics have been 
tightly interwoven. As described in chapter 4.4.2.1, the integration of science and 
expertise into policy processes typically resembles more a kind of “integration model” 
than a “separation model”. In many GoFOR cases, science-policy advice has built on 
multipartite bodies made up of experts and policy-makers that are capable, 
simultaneously, of negotiating differences regarding scientific and political questions. 
In those “mixed” bodies policy makers, administrative officers, interest group 
representatives, and scientists sit side by side without a clear separation of roles. In 
only a few cases experts were kept in a more separated position. What is also 
interesting to see here is that neither the integration of science and politics in mixed 
bodies nor the organizational separation of science and politics were explicitly 
thematized in public discourses in any of the GoFOR case studies; the chosen 
organizational setups were more or less tacitly taken for granted. This stands in stark 
contrast with experiences especially from the United States of America. US advisory 
systems are usually organized in line with the “separation model” and great efforts 
are made to not only institutionally but also rhetorically “shield” science from politics 
(Jasanoff, 1987b, Renn, 1995). In a European context, this rhetorical “boundary 
work” does not seem to be necessary (Pregernig, 2005). 
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There is a second indication for the fact that also in the GoFOR cases expert 
involvement definitely had a “political” character as well: As described in chapter 
4.4.2.3, experts and expertise fulfilled a number of different functions. In some 
instances, expertise-based knowledge could actually contribute to substantively 
improve policy making, sometimes by providing direct and specific pieces of advice 
to policy makers, sometimes by influencing the policy process in a more indirect way, 
e.g. by generating and propagating new policy ideas or “schools of thought”. In other 
instances, expertise seems to have served mainly as a political power resource 
without playing any epistemic role: Contending groups used scientific knowledge 
primarily as a means to increase their authority or legitimation. In conjunction with 
that, the selection of experts was heavily influenced by political considerations, i.e. 
policy makers chose those experts which were expected to deliver the results that 
conform most closely to their own expectations and beliefs. 
The science-policy literature has pointed to several paradoxes of science in politics, 
one being the seemingly antithetic situation of expertise being a resource that is 
increasingly sought for policy making and for social choice, but one that is also 
increasingly contested (Weingart, 1999, van Eeten, 1999). Science has seemingly 
plunged into a kind of legitimacy crisis. Once again, our analyses showed that this 
phenomenon didn’t materialize too strongly in the set of GoFOR governance case 
studies. In none of the governance processes analysed, the utility and validity of 
scientific knowledge claim were absolutely called into question. There were some 
instances of confrontation between experts and counter-experts over the 
interpretation of scientific knowledge and its consequences but be found no signs of 
a complete lack of social and political trust in scientific and other types of expert 
knowledge. 
In reaction to the discernable scientification of politics and the consequent legitimacy 
crisis of science and politics, both scientific scholars and policy makers have been 
calling for more “accountable” and “democratic” forms of expert advice. 
Especially EU bodies have put great efforts into searching for new models of how to 
organise the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). In the set of GoFOR governance 
case studies, one only rarely sees explicit calls for the “democratisation of expertise” 
but, interestingly, quite a number of actual practices that go in this direction. In a 
number of case studies, expert input has been far from restricted to traditional 
scientific expertise. As depicted in chapter 4.4.2.2, one rather sees a kind of 
pluralisation of expert involvement with expertise being provided by a diverse set of 
sources and actors: public and private research institutes, interest groups, private 
consultants, and “ordinary citizens” (local knowledge). As regards the question of 
how balanced the representation of different types of expertise was, the set of 
GoFOR cases provides evidence for different patterns, both the relative domination 
of one type as well as the rather balanced use of different types of expertise (see 
chapter 4.4.2.4). Some case studies document interesting trends in the role of 
different types of expertise. Typically, the use of expertise has broadened and new 
knowledge has entered the scene in the course of time. But there are also counter-
examples, in which after a period of pluralisation traditional forms of expertise came 
to the fore again. In a similar vein, GoFOR governance cases also show quite 
heterogeneous patterns as regards the accessibility and understandability of expert 
knowledge and as regards the degree of transparency and independence in the 
selection of experts. In a few cases, expert knowledge has been easily accessible 
and understandable for a policy and lay audience, while in others expertise moved 
less close to its “audience”. Especially the excessive use of technical-scientific 
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language reduced the political clout and legitimacy of some processes. Analogously, 
in some governance processes, experts have been selected in a transparent way, 
while in others selection procedures have been more opaque. Finally, there is also 
quite a large degree of heterogeneity as regards temporal patterns discernable. In 
some GoFOR cases, traditional technocratic approaches were – if not fully 
strengthened so at least – reinforced over time. In others, one sees remarkable 
trends towards more democratic forms of expert involvement in policy processes. 
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4.5 Adaptive and iterative processes 
Lars Julius Halvorsen, L.J., S.M. Ouff, J. Barstad, and A. Lengyel 
4.5.1 Conceptual Frame 
A governance process is an undertaking, which is often characterized by significant 
uncertainty as well as complexity. Governance processes typically enter new 
“terrains”, with uncertain maps, new tools, and often with new partners. Since 
governance processes tend to include quite a few participants, they are also rather 
complex. As such governance processes compared to rational planning processes 
can better be described as social learning situations (Amdam 2005). Thus, the 
development and results from a governance process are largely dependent on the 
process participants’ ability to gather information, learn and adapt throughout the 
process.  
 
Evaluations, monitoring and adaptation 
One strategy to handle such uncertainty is to regularly evaluate and review the 
development of the process. Processes with this characteristic are often referred to 
as iterative. The phrase iterative suggests a stepwise movement towards a goal 
where, at intervals, the situation is evaluated and necessary measures are taken to 
ensure the process being “on track” towards the objective. Such steps will normally 
be like loops, where you go backwards in the step-line and kind of “run it through 
another cycle”. A highly related concept regarding process development is adaptivity. 
As the term indicates, an adaptive process is characterised by the ability to adapt to 
challenges during the course of the process. Adaptations can of course take place in 
processes that are neither monitored nor evaluated, but such adaptations will 
typically be accidental, and often occur when the problems have been all to evident 
for a while. 
 
The figure below illustrates an iterative and adaptive process (Barstad and Lengyel 
2005). 
Figure 7: Illustration of an iterative process 
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One implication from the discussion above is that systems for monitoring and 
evaluations typically play important roles in governance processes. Further, this role 
will increase when the uncertainty and complexity of the governance process 
increases. In this situation the evaluator faces a paradox: Meanwhile increasing 
complexity and uncertainty creates a greater need for a more complex system of 
monitoring and evaluation. The challenges of monitoring and conducting evaluations 
also increase. 
 
An iterative and adaptive process will typically be regularly evaluated and adjusted 
according to challenges occurring. This illustrates that systems for evaluations and 
monitoring is a necessary and integrated part of a governance process. The 
relationship between the use of evaluations and monitoring and the adaptivity and 
iterativity of the GoFOR-processes will be an important topic to be discussed in this 
subchapter. 
 
Based upon theories regarding practically applied process evaluations it seems 
reasonable to emphasis four aspects of evaluations (Hall and Hall 2004; Argyris 
2003).  
 
6. The first aspect is the choice of evaluator. Important questions in this respect 
is whether the evaluator is internal or external or if he or she is biased towards 
the subject for evaluations or not.  
7. The second aspect is the role and focus of the evaluation. Is the evaluation 
focussing on strategy, process, and/or output? Is the evaluation focussing on 
technical or environmental issues or political, financial or organizational 
issues? 
8. The third aspect is how evaluation and monitoring is organized. In order to 
contribute to efficient adaptations to challenges, evaluations must be designed 
to discover different kinds of problems that could occur, and most importantly 
at an early stage when they can still be dealt with. 
9. The fourth important aspect is the actual use of information gathered through 
evaluations and monitoring to adapt to challenges. In order to contribute to 
efficient adaptation, stakeholders do not only need information about the 
problem, but also a resolve to do something with it.  
 
New knowledge and learning 
The last aspect is especially important. An ability to incorporate and utilise new 
lessons, experiences, different viewpoints, as well as new information during the 
governance process, seems to be a necessary condition for efficient adaptation. One 
plausible source of this kind of organizational learning is the use of systems for 
evaluation and monitoring as discussed above. There are also other also important 
sources of learning.  
 
Another common source of learning is practice. Learning through practice is 
commonly referred to as learning by doing. In organization theory this strategy is 
often referred to as “muddling through” (Lindblom 1959). Muddling through as 
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learning by doing strategy is often assumed to be relatively efficient in situations with 
high degree of uncertainty and complexity. 
 
A third source of learning is observed changes in external factors. During the course 
of a governance process changes in the process environment could occur, that 
makes adaptations necessary (Scott 2003). It is important to notice that such 
happenings do not present themselves objectively to the stakeholders. Rather, they 
must be interpreted and reacted upon. Both the interpration and the reaction is partly 
dependent on the stakeholders original understanding of the situation (Argyris 2003).     
  
Uncertainty and Complexity 
Two important complicating factors related to governance processes in general are 
the twin themes uncertainty and complexity.  
 
Uncertainty regarding the outcome of different strategies is a factor that makes 
adaptations necessary in the first place. Without uncertainty, there would be no need 
for adaptations as the decision makers would know the outcome of their strategies in 
advance, thus making rational ex ante planning would be sufficient (Williamson 1985; 
Scott 2003). Thus the strategy of iterative and adaptive process management can be 
interpreted as a direct response to such uncertainty (Barstad and Lengyel 2005). 
 
A highly related topic is the complexity of the governance processes. If the degree of 
complexity is low, the challenges caused by uncertainty would decrease. The reason 
for this is quite obvious. The problem with uncertainty arises due to human bounded 
rationality, in the sense of a lack of cognitive capacity to fully understand complex 
issues (Williamson 1985). When the complexity is reduced, the human capacity to 
understand the situation would increase. Translated into a governance context, a 
simple, straightforward process could be manageable despite a large degree of 
uncertainty, while a complex governance process under the same conditions could 
prove unmanageable (Scott 2003).  
 
The Role of Iterativity under Uncertain and Complex Circumstances 
Even if the two concepts iterativity and adaptivity is interconnected, there is a 
fundamental difference between them. While adaptivity is a characteristic of a 
process design, iterativity can be seen as a tool to promote efficient adaptations to 
circumstances or new knowledge about the existing situation. As earlier mentioned, 
increasing uncertainty and complexity poses increasing challenges to stakeholders in 
a governance process. This challenge will be further increased as the time period of 
the process grows large. On way to deal with such situations, is to limit the time 
scope or partial analyses as much as possible by using an iterative, sequential 
approach (Barstad and Lengyel 2005).  
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4.5.2 Empirical insights on adaptive and iterative processes (AIP)  
 
The GoFOR-cases that provides the empirical basis vary significantly in terms of 
most of the aspects of the analysis. This is also the case when it comes to the AIP 
aspects evidently.   
 
On basis of our empirical material of the case studies, the general statement can be 
made that AIP aspects in the policy documents were called upon explicitly in limited 
ways only (rhetorics), with some clear exceptions. Neither the wording of “adaptive 
nor iterative” were often used. This also indicates that this aspect formulated in a 
clear way is somewhat new in the policy arena.  
 
The second statement on this however is, that many of the processes’ policy 
documents (if existing) called indirectly for aspects of AIP. This concerns mostly 
periodic monitoring or evaluation and/or prescribed repetitive stages of process 
design and implementation. These aspects indicate in most cases clear policy 
intentions to take up tasks in an adaptive and iterative way, we conclude. These 
aspects are rather clearly possible to be tracked in processes with the basis of some 
kind of policy documents (strategy papers, programme documents).  
 
An explicit call on AIP as such mainly exist in the national forest programme 
processes as the set up of their features has been discussed intensively in 
international policy processes, such as the MCPFE or UN processes on forests. 
Therefore these documents comply with the international requirements by their 
nature and take them as basis to their core aspects. As national forest programmes 
are however policy frameworks, there is room for interpretation and implementation 
of these in the practice of course.  
 
The other group of processes where AIP aspects are rather clear formulated at the 
rhetoric level are the Natura 2000 related ones. Here however, we have to do with 
the implementation of an EU directive at the national level and AIP aspects, such as 
surveillance, periodic evaluation by reviews and reporting are clear prescriptions at 
the EU level directives. Their implementation is therefore also a must. 
In the other EU related process group of the rural development cases the same 
applies mainly, with the difference that not “directives” are the basis of 
implementation providing more room for national or regional initiatives. Here also 
periodic reporting and evaluation and a somewhat iterative process design is 
stressed as basis for AIP aspects.  
 
For the comparative frame it makes sense at the empirical level to handle specific 
issues of the AIP aspects and their implementation. As concerning adaptive and 
iterative process features one of the underlying questions is how adaptation was 
brought about in the processes at hand and what role played there iterative process 
features and learning.  
 
In the following sections three aspects of adaptivity and iterativity will be discussed:  
 
• Adaptation brought about by evaluation and monitoring,  
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• Adaptation as result of new knowledge/information or past experience (learning) 
and  
• The role of AIP aspects under uncertain and complex circumstances in the 
processes (adaptivity, iterativity). 
 
 
 
4.5.2.1 The Role of Monitoring and Evaluations 
 
The main purpose of this subchapter is to investigate the relationship between 
monitoring and evaluations on one side, and iterativity and adaptatity on the other. 
Knowledge on challenges and effects is an important prerequisite for adaptations 
during the span of a process. Systems for monitoring and evaluations are possible 
providers of such knowledge. Since monitoring and evaluations are a common part of 
processes and projects, we could expect it to play an important role as promoters of 
adaptations in the 19 GoFOR-processes.   
 
This chapter will be structured in five parts. The first part will present the presence of, 
and motivations for establishing systems for monitoring and evaluations. The second 
part will investigate who initiates these systems for evaluations and monitoring and 
who were in charge of them in the processes. The third part will look into how the 
evaluations and monitoring were organized. The fourth part investigates the 
relationship between monitoring, evaluations and adaptations in the processes. The 
last part will contain a summary of the major findings concerning this issue. 
 
 
Presence of and Motivations for Monitoring and Evaluations 
 
This sub section will discuss our findings regarding the presence of systems for 
monitoring and evaluations in the GoFOR-processes and the rationales behind 
establishing such systems.  
Looking at the overall picture, one can conclude that monitoring and evaluation is 
viewed as substantially important in almost all of the GoFOR processes. As a result 
all the 19 cases have some kind of monitoring and evaluation system.  
 
On the other hand, the specific rationales for planning and/or conducting monitoring 
and evaluations differ largely between the cases. So does the number of motives 
involved. In eight of the cases only one motive for monitoring and conducting 
evaluations is mentioned, while two or more motives can be identified in the 
remaining 10.53 The distribution of motives between the processes is presented in the 
table below. 
 
                                            
53
 In only one case is three motives given.  
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Table 20: Motives for conducting monitoring and evaluation 
 
 
Below we will discuss the three motives involved; legitimacy and control, external 
requirements and organizational learning respectively.  
 
1. Legitimacy, Control and Efficiency 
Gaining legitimacy and maintaining control seems to be frequent motives for 
establishing systems for monitoring and evaluations. We can trace such motives for 
conducting evaluations in a total of 13 processes. It is important to mention that the 
motives within these processes also differ quite a lot. In six of the cases, challenges 
of legitimacy and efficient implementation are mentioned as reasons for conducting 
evaluations and monitoring. In the remaining seven cases, monitoring and evaluation 
is meant to be a tool for keeping control over the progress and/or the content of the 
                                            
54
 Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.  
55
 Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.  
56
 By measuring process quality and input. 
57
 For  the 1st and 2nd evaluation respectively. 
Motives for conducting monitoring and evaluation 
Process Legitimacy, 
Control and 
Efficiency 
External 
requirement for 
funding 
Promote 
learning 
Number of 
motives 
involved 
AT-AFD X   1 
GER-GAK  X  1 
FR-RPF   X 1 
ESP-
FPGP 
 X  1 
ROM-ACP X   1 
NL-GW X   1 
DK-NPP   X 1 
NL-NFP
54
   X
55
 1 
DK-HD X X  2 
ROM-NAT X  X 2 
GER-RA X  X 2 
GER-
LEADER 
X X  2 
GR-MA X X  2 
NL-UH X  X 2 
FR-CFT X  X
56
 2 
HUN-NFP X X  2 
NOR-LF X  X 2 
AT-BS X X
57
 X 3 
Sum 13 7 9 29 
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process, and thus improve the efficiency of the process. Still, we have chosen to see 
the two subgroups of motives in relation, because it is likely that efficiency, especially 
funding efficiency, contributes to legitimating the process, and can also ease the 
implementation of actions or measures.  
 
It is necessary to mention that the term efficiency should be treated with a little 
caution in this respect. It seems that the concept relates to different kinds of 
efficiency in different processes. Some process partners use the concept referring to 
“funding efficiency”, for others it means “process efficiency”, and in some cases 
“efficiency of protection measures and actions”. Still, the use of the concept has a 
common denominator. Whether it relates to the output from spending, how well the 
process develops, or the environmental effects of the processes; the concept evolves 
around the issue of maintaining some kind of control or possibility to adapt to new 
knowledge. 
 
2. Externally required evaluations  
One of the most frequent reasons for establishing systems for monitoring and 
evaluations is legally binding obligations towards local, national, or international 
authorities. Monitoring and evaluation can be imposed upon the process 
management by law or other kinds of commitments, like international agreements.58 
In many instances systems for evaluation is a requirement for receiving funding for 
the processes. This kind of obligation is a motive for evaluations and monitoring in 
seven of the processes.  
 
It is plausible to expect that evaluations only motivated by some kind of external 
requirement, will tend to be conducted in closer accordance with a minimum 
requirement level. This may especially be the case in three of the processes where 
external requirements are the only motive for conducting evaluations and monitoring. 
In the remaining four of these processes we see that the wish for keeping control and 
improve efficiency, and to promote learning goes hand in hand with mandatory 
evaluations.  
 
3. Organizational learning  
In most organisational learning theory, learning is seen as a condition for 
accomplishing a given organisation’s objectives: 
 
“(…) organizational learning is a competence all organizations should develop. (…) 
the better the organizations are at learning the more likely it is they will detect and 
correct errors.  Also, the more effective organizations are at learning the more likely 
they will be at being innovative or knowing the limits of their innovation”.  
(Argyris 2003: xiii)
 59
 
 
Table 20 shows that promoting learning is mentioned as a motive for conducting 
monitoring and evaluation in nine out of the 19 cases. In some of the processes this 
motive is seen in accordance with a need to maintain in control over the process. 
Following Argyris, this tendency could lead us to expect that evaluation and 
                                            
58
 Like the MCPFE and the NSNC (National Scientific Natura 2000 Committee).  
59
 Argyris, Chris 2003 [1992]: On organizational learning. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.   
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monitoring has been a major contributor to adaptations in these processes. But is this 
really the case? 
 
A closer investigation of the actual systems for monitoring and evaluations shows 
that the concept of learning is used quite superficially. No theoretical foundation 
seems to be applied, and the learning is kept within the single-loop, as Argyris puts it 
(Argyris 2003), meaning that they only address the efficiency of the actual output 
from the processes. I.e. technical issues have been addressed far more frequently 
than rules-of-the-game issues as well as issues that might imply issues of political 
character.  
 
This indicates that, although learning is frequently mentioned as a reason for 
executing monitoring and evaluation, process management does not necessarily 
conduct them wholeheartedly, or does not feed them back into the process. This gap 
between theory and practice in the implementation of evaluations will be further 
discussed under the paragraph Monitoring, Evaluation and Adaptation below.  
 
Initiative and Execution of Monitoring and Evaluations 
 
A common assumption in social science is that external monitoring and evaluation is 
regarded more unbiased and trustworthy than internal ones (Hall and Hall 2003). On 
the other hand, internal evaluators tend to be in a position in which they can use the 
result from the evaluation to influence the process (Scott 2001). The purpose of the 
following discussion is A) to investigate who initiated and who executed the 
evaluations. B) Further, and most importantly to discuss to what degree external 
evaluators had any impact on the processes.  
 
We have considered institutions as external if they are not directly involved in the 
GoFOR-process as decision makers. I.e. research institutions, in order to be 
regarded as external, has to be independent from decision making institutions 
(ministries, companies etc). Evaluations or monitoring that has been carried out by 
actors (or their research institutions) within the process itself are regarded as internal.  
 
Table 21: Initiators of monitoring and/or evaluation 
 National authorities EU/International 
authorities 
Others 
Process    
RPF X   
CORR X X  
NfP-PfN X   
LF X  Project partners 
NPA X  Park boards 
LEADER 
+ 
 X  
RA X   
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 National authorities EU/International 
authorities 
Others 
BS X   
NPP X  NGOs 
HD  X  
CFT X   
GAK X X  
N 2000  ?  
FPGP X X  
NFPH   Coordination unit 
AFD   Coordination groups 
 
Regarding the high degree of mandatory evaluations as discussed earlier, it comes 
as no surprise that national and international authorities have initiated as many as 12 
and six evaluations respectively.60 Other partners contributed to three initiatives. In 
two of these three, the partners were NGOs participating in the process. The 
remaining initiative is an introduction of voluntary monitoring schemes by park boards 
in the Greek NPA process.  
 
Another relevant topic is who conducted the evaluations in the respective processes. 
The distribution of this is presented in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: Who conducted the evaluations? 
 
Who conducted the evaluations Frequency 
Only external evaluators 4 
Only internal evaluators 4 
Both internal and external 8 
 
 
In eight of the processes it was conducted both internal and external evaluations. 
The remaining 10 processes have been subject to either external or internal (five 
each). In several of the cases, external evaluation bodies are independent research 
institutes in different fields, in a wide range from forest management through 
environmental research to project management. Different bodies within the EU-
system have also executed a large part of the external monitoring and evaluations.  
Besides the distribution of initiatives between the processes, the existing empirical 
material does not allow us to identify the degree of awareness of the potentials, 
strengths and weaknesses of external and internal evaluations.  
 
One indicator of such awareness could be the relation between the motives for 
conducting evaluations and the composition of internal and external evaluations. In 
the table below, the distribution of externally conducted and mixed evaluations in 
relation to the motive for conducting evaluations is presented.   
                                            
60
 International authorities in this respect is largely the EU.  
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Table 23 indicates two tendencies. The first tendency is that in general, there seems 
to be no correlation between the motivation for conducting evaluations and the kind 
of evaluators used. The second tendency is that when it comes to the particular 
motive of maintaining control, the process participants tend to choose mixed kinds of 
evaluations. Due to low N, and insufficient instrumental congruency (Grønmo 2004), 
these tendencies are far too uncertain to allow any conclusion regarding whether the 
choice of external or internal evaluators is a result of coincidences or conscious 
considerations.   
 
Table 23: Choice of evaluator in relation to motivation 
 Motivation for evaluation 
Choice of 
evaluator 
Secure 
implementation 
Binding 
obligations 
Promote 
learning 
 
Maintain control 
External 6 5 8 3 
Mixed 6 5 9 7 
 
 
 
How are Monitoring and Evaluations organized? 
 
As we have seen above, the motives, the source of the initiative, and the actual 
executors of the evaluations and monitoring differ quite a lot between the GoFOR-
processes. It is plausible to assume that this would have had some impact on the 
actual organization of evaluations along the processes. This paragraph will discuss 
how the systems of evaluations and monitoring are organized throughout the 
processes.  
 
The discussion will be organized in three parts: the first part looks into what kind of 
evaluations the projects underwent. The second part discusses how the mix of 
evaluations is distributed amongst the different GoFOR-processes. The third part 
takes a closer look at the role the respective evaluations did play in the processes, 
related to frequency and integration into the design of the GoFOR-processes. 
 
1. What kind of evaluations has been conducted? 
Focusing on the role of evaluation and monitoring, it is possible to identify four main 
categories of evaluations conducted in relation to the GoFOR-processes. The first 
category refers to those evaluations conducted in order to control and enhance the 
efficiency of the processes. The second category is evaluations intended to produce 
and disseminate information about the processes. The third category includes those 
measures taken to evaluate the environmental and biological effects of specific 
projects related to the GoFOR-processes. Finally, the remaining category represents 
those evaluations investigating the development of the actual GoFOR- processes. 
Applying these typologies we are able to classify all but two processes. The latter two 
are the NL-UH and the NL-GW which are not so relevant in this respect, since they 
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are long term historical developments after the Second World War in the field of 
governance of natural resources in certain parts of the Dutch landscape.  
 
The distribution of different kinds of evaluations between the remaining 16 processes 
related to the four categories of evaluations is presented in Table 24. 
 
Table 24: Aim and topic of the evaluations 
 Aim and topic of the evaluation 
Process Control/ 
efficiency 
Information 
gathering 
Process 
development 
Env/biological effects 
RPF X X  X 
PGPF X  X X 
LF  X X X 
NFPH X X   
BS X X   
AFD X  X  
CORR X  X  
CFT X  X  
NP X  X  
NPA X   X 
N 2000 X   X 
RA  X X  
GAK X    
HD X    
LEADER + X    
NP   X  
NfP-PfN    X 
Sum 13 5 8 6 
 
Table 24 suggests that maintaining control and enhancing efficiency is by far the 
most frequently present motive in the GoFOR processes, including a total of 13 
cases. On the other side, evaluations designed to produce information were only 
conducted in five of the processes. Eight of the cases under study have been 
subjected to evaluations regarding the development of the processes. The last 
category of evaluations, addressing environmental or biological effects from the 
GoFOR processes, has been conducted in six of the processes.  
 
2. The scope of the evaluation system      
A closely related factor is the variety of the evaluations used in each process. Even if 
the GoFOR-processes differ a lot regarding their degree of complexity and diversity, 
they can all be classified as rather complex processes. Accordingly, if systems for 
evaluations and monitoring are to be used to address obstacles and challenges 
facing the processes, the scope of the evaluations conducted should be an important 
factor. One indicator of the scope of the system of monitoring and evaluation is the 
number of different kinds of evaluations.  
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Table 25: Number of different kinds of evaluations 
Different kinds of evaluations Frequency 
1 5 
2 9 
3 3 
 
As the table shows, three processes were subject to as many as three different kinds 
of evaluation, while a majority of nine was subject to two kinds of evaluation. Four of 
the processes were only subject to one kind of evaluation. The different use of 
evaluations indicates that the potential adaptations based upon evaluation vary 
largely between the processes. We can expect governance processes, in which 
several different evaluations are conducted to be able to adapt to a wider array of 
challenges. 
  
 
3. The evaluation characteristics 
Besides the type and variety of the evaluations conducted, the frequency and role in 
the process design could also be an important factor deciding the potential to adapt 
to challenges. Among the 19 GoFOR-processes, a total of 18 were subject of 
evaluations during the process period. The latter, the Dutch Nature for People- 
People for Nature- process, was a result of an ex ante evaluation, but was not 
subject to any evaluations throughout the process.  
 
As indicated in the table below, the time span of the processes, the regularity, the 
frequency of the evaluations and monitoring, as well as their degree of integration 
into the general process design differs a lot between the remaining 18 processes.  
 
Table 26: Monitoring and evaluation characteristics 
Process Integration in 
process design 
Time 
span  
Regularity Frequency When in process 
NL-NFP Not integrated 2000- 
(2007) 
  Ex ante 
 
NOR-LF 
Integrated 
subsequently 
1995- Regularly Every 5 years from 1995  
Mid-term 
FR-CFT Integrated 2001-  Regularly Every 5 years Along the process 
DK-HD Integrated 2003 Regularly Every 6 years Along the process 
 
GER-
LEADER  
Integrated  
2000-
2006 
Regularly Ex ante, 3 and 5 years into the 
programme, and no later than 3 years 
after completion.  
Ex ante,along the 
process, and after the 
prcess  
ROM-NAT Integrated 2000- Regularly 1992, 1996, 1999, then annually.  Along the process 
DK-NPP Integrated  2001- 
(2007) 
Regularly 2003, 2005. Every 6 years when 
completed.   
Along the process 
 
ROM-
ACP 
 
Integrated 
 
2000-
2007 
 
Regularly 
Weekly, half yearly, yearly and at the 
end of strategic period. 
 
Along the process 
GR-MA Integrated 1991-  Annually from park boards, 
management plans every 5 years, 
every six years from Ministries to EU.  
Along the process 
Analysis along procedural elements 214 
 
 
Process Integration in 
process design 
Time 
span  
Regularity Frequency When in process 
GER-GAK Integrated 1969- Regularly Reviewed annually, the framework is 
negotiated every 4 years, 
Along the process 
FR-RPF Integrated 
subsequently 
2000- Regularly ? Along the process 
HUN-NFP Integrated 2001- Regularly annually  Ex ante and along the 
process 
 
AT-AFD 
 
Integrated 
 
2002- 
 
Regularly 
- Ex ante, during drafting, 
mid-term, end (not 
carried out yet).  
AT-BS Integrated 1998 Occasionally -  Along the process 
GER-RA Integrated 2001- Occasionally -  Along the process 
ESP-
FPGP 
Integrated 1994- Occasionally -  Along and after 
NL-UH Difficult to say 1945  –  Occasionally -  Along the “process” 
NL-GW Difficult to say 1945- Occasionally -   Along the “process” 
 
It is plausible to assume that evaluations that are integrated into the process design 
are more likely to induce adaptations than those being performed on a more ad hoc 
basis. As we can see from the table above, systems for monitoring and evaluations 
have with few exemptions been an integrated part of the GoFOR processes. The 
table also shows that the processes vary to a large degree when it comes to the 
question of how evaluations were integrated in the process design. 
 
An interesting variable in this respect is the regularity of the evaluations. A system in 
which evaluations are performed regularly can be expected to promote a more 
systematic mapping of problems at an early stage. Occasional evaluations on the 
other hand, can be expected to look into problems at a later stage when they are 
clearly visible to all parties. Other research suggests that problems at the stage they 
are visible will tend to be more developed, thus having caused more damage to the 
process as well as being harder to deal with (Amdam 2005; Halvorsen 2007). 
 
As shown in the table above, evaluations were conducted occasionally in five of the 
processes, while more than twice as many (twelve processes) were subject to 
evaluations and monitoring on a regular basis.  
 
There are however, significant differences between the processes within the latter 
category, regarding the frequency of the evaluations.  For the same reason as for 
regularity, it is plausible to assume that a system for frequent evaluations along the 
process will improve the ability for the process partners to address specific 
challenges effectively at an early stage. As the table shows, three of the processes 
with regular evaluations are scheduled as seldom as each fifth or sixth year, while 
the latter eight are conducted either annually or at least quite often.  
 
Summing up, only six GoFOR-processes have integrated systems for evaluation and 
monitoring on a regular, frequent basis. The latter 12 cases either have not 
conducted any evaluations along the process (1 process), have only conducted 
evaluations occasionally (6 processes), or have a system for less frequent regular 
evaluations (3 processes). On this basis, it is possible to argue that generally 
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speaking, evaluations in the GoFOR processes were not organized in a way that 
maximizes the potential for efficient adaptation to challenges.  
 
Still, we could expect that the results from the actual evaluations and monitoring have 
resulted in some kind of adaptations. The following subchapter investigates the 
relation between monitoring and evaluations on one side and actual adaptations on 
the other.    
 
Monitoring, Evaluation and Adaptation 
 
The discussion above has shown that the organization of the monitoring and 
evaluations of the GoFOR-processes differs a lot between the cases. Assuming a 
causal relationship between monitoring and evaluation on one side and adaptation 
on the other, it is plausible to expect that the use of evaluations to adapt to 
challenges at hand also will vary between the processes. Below, the empirical 
evidence on this matter is presented and discussed. 
 
The discussion is organized in three parts. The first part contains a presentation of 
the distribution of specific adaptations between the GoFOR-processes. The second 
part investigates the actual sources of the adaptations that took place. The third part 
uses the Living Forest process as a case to illustrate the importance of the 
organizations as well as the potential importance of evaluations for improving 
process efficiency. 
 
 
Adaptations in the processes 
One highly relevant question is whether adaptations took place during the processes. 
The table below gives an overview over whether we could trace significant 
adaptations in each of the processes, and if so how many.  
 
 
Table 27: Adaptations occurring 
Process  Significant adaptations traced How many different adaptations? 
RPF Yes 1 
PGPF No /not known  
LF Yes 3 
NfP-PfN No /not known  
UH/GW No /not known  
ACÜ No /not known  
AFD No /not known  
CFT Yes 2 
LEADER+  Yes 4 
RA Yes 3 
NFPH Yes 1 
BS Yes 1 
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Process  Significant adaptations traced How many different adaptations? 
NP No /not known  
HD No /not known  
NPA No /not known  
N 2000 No /not known  
GAK No /not known  
Sum Yes: 7  No: 10 15 
 
Table 27 suggests that the processes vary to a large degree regarding whether 
adaptations took place. It is important to notice that this subject was hard to 
investigate in several of the processes. Thus, the tendencies in this material are very 
uncertain. In two of the processes it seems that no significant adaptation has taken 
place. In additional eight cases there might have been some adaptation, but a lack of 
details in the data, prevent us from drawing any clear conclusions on this issue. In 
the remaining seven GoFOR-processes we can trace a total of 15 specific 
adaptations to different challenges at hand. 
 
Sources of adaptation 
Another interesting question that relates to the seven processes, in which a total of 
15 adaptations took place, is what the sources of these adaptations were. We are 
able to distinguish five different sources of adaptations in the material. The 
distribution of these between the processes is presented in the table below. 
 
Table 28: Sources of adaptation 
 Sources of adaptation 
Process  Evaluations or 
monitoring 
Top down 
decisions  
Dialogue and 
negotiations 
Experience Expertise 
RPF  X    
LF X  X   
CFT X     
LEADER+  X     
RA X   X X 
NFPH  X (decision 
making) 
X (drafting)   
BS X     
AFD   X   
 
There are two major tendencies in the table above. Firstly, the sources of adaptations 
vary significantly. One adaptation was top-down induced by the government in the 
respective country.  In three cases, negotiations and dialog between the process 
participants resulted in the adaptations. In one process a combination of experience 
and expertise brought about the adaptation. Secondly, evaluations and monitoring 
was by far, the most frequent source of adaptation in the processes, causing 
adaptations in five of the processes.  
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The latter comes as no surprise. As discussed earlier, organizational learning has 
been mentioned as a motive for conducting evaluations in nine of the 19 GoFOR-
processes. Actually one could argue that the number of five processes adapting to 
evaluations is rather low in this respect. At the same time it is important to have in 
mind that this result is quite uncertain. The fact that we are unable to trace any 
adaptations does not necessarily mean that none occurred. 
 
 
Evaluations as a tool for necessary adaptations – illustrated by the Living Forest 
process 
So far we have mapped the use of, the rationale for, and the organization of 
evaluations and monitoring in the GoFOR-processes. The general tendency is that, 
even if almost every process was subject to evaluation and monitoring, and most 
evaluations were integrated in the process design, the potential from evaluations is 
far from being utilized. This seems to be closely related to some common 
characteristics in the evaluations among the processes. One important finding is that 
evaluations in many cases have been motivated by obligations related to receiving 
funding. Thus, the evaluations are conducted on a minimum required level. Another 
important finding is that many of the processes have utilized internal or partly internal 
evaluators. The latter, in combination with a somewhat limited focus and scope of the 
evaluations has led to evaluations not being able to address all aspects of these 
rather complex processes.  
 
To illustrate that evaluations can hold a greater potential, we will discuss the 
organization and role of evaluations in the Norwegian Living Forest process. This 
way of using a case study does not allow us to draw general conclusion, but it could 
serve as a useful example to illustrate the potential that lie in good systems for 
evaluations as well as for how certain aspects of the evaluations system affect this 
potential. 
 
LF was established in 1994 by the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and leading 
economical actors in the forest sector as a response to international market demands 
for more sustainable forestry, in addition to a general growing pressure from the 
public opinion towards better environmental conservation.  The next year 
environmental and recreational NGOs were invited to join. From day one, the 
process participants represented different worldviews and different interests. An 
additional complicating factor was a history of confrontations between economic 
interest groups and environmental organisations, which had resulted in distrust 
between the different parties.  
 
This nearly lead the process to a collapse twice, first in 2001 and secondly in 2003. 
Acknowledging the graveness of the threat, the project partners in 2003 decided to 
initiate three evaluations. The main purpose was to secure further cooperation by 
producing new knowledge that could provide a commonly shared perception of reality 
as well as shared goals for the process.  
 
The three evaluations have covered as different topics as environmental concerns 
related to the felling patches, the development of the Norwegian forests according to 
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some selected standards, and the actual organization of the LF-process. All was 
conducted by external evaluators who were considered to be impartial and regarded 
as experts on their respective fields by the different participants.  
 
The result of conducting these evaluations was the development of a more common 
understanding, pawing the way for further cooperation between the parties. The 
evaluation it self was probably not a sufficient factor. Other aspects of the process, 
i.e. hiring an impartial project leader from 2003, as well as a greater will to cooperate 
on the part of the forest owners were also important factors. Still it is plausible to 
argue that the three evaluations conducted in 2003 were necessary for the process 
to continue. 
 
Summary 
 
Systems for monitoring and evaluation are viewed as substantially important in 
almost all of the GoFOR processes. As a result 18 of the 19 cases have some kind of 
monitoring and evaluation system. On the other hand the motives for conducting 
monitoring and evaluations differ largely between the cases. Promoting learning has 
been frequently mentioned as a motive for conducting evaluations, but the concept is 
applied quite superficial. This indicates that evaluations in some of the processes are 
not conducted wholeheartedly. 
 
Enhancing efficiency is by far the most frequently appearing motive for conducting 
evaluations, but generally speaking, evaluations in the GoFOR processes have not 
been organized in a way that realizes the potential for efficient adaptations to 
challenges. 
 
The latter tendency also seems to affect the actual adaptations that occur. Out of the 
19 processes, we are only able to trace adaptations in seven of them. On the other 
hand, in these seven GoFOR-processes we identified a total of 15 specific 
adaptations. Evaluations and monitoring was the most frequent source of adaptation 
in these processes, causing adaptations in five of the processes. Still, one could 
argue that the number of five processes adapting to findings in evaluations is rather 
low in this respect. Also, the adaptations made can be seen as quite limited.  
 
The Living Forest case illustrates that monitoring and evaluations have the potential 
to play an important role in improving the efficiency of governance processes. The 
findings in general however, illustrates that this potential is far from being realized in 
most of the GoFOR-processes.   
 
 
4.5.2.2 The role of new knowledge and learning towards process altering 
 
In this section the role of learning by new information or knowledge will be analysed 
in terms of the processes’ changing ability (adaptation). Learning is associated in 
planning theory mostly with cyclical process design called here as iterative processes 
to get closer to desired or defined goals – therefore plays a basic role in AIP. 
However, the planning theory view proved to be for some research cases in the 
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GOFOR project too normative as process’ result enhancement was not always 
clearly to be tracked or intended. Learning will be used in this section therefore for 
the analysis in a broader sense following e.g. P. Sabatier stating that learning can be 
interpreted as the consequence of experience and/or new information which leads to 
change of thought or behavioural intention.  
 
Presence of learning in the processes  
 
In this sub-section will be looked at the empirical evidence of learning and its effects 
as found in the process descriptions. The following table gives a first overview on the 
existence of learning in the cases. 
 
Table 29: Presence of learning in the GOFOR cases 
Process Learning by 
planned activities 
“Learning by doing” No 
learning  
Change by external 
factors or without 
learning effect 
AFD X  X   X   
BS   ?  
GAK  X    
RPF  X   
PGPF X  X    
ACP X    
GW  X   
NP (DK)   X  ? 
NfP-PfN
61
 X  X    
HD   X   
N 2000 
(R)  
   X   
RA X  X    
LEADER+  X  X   
NPA X     
CFT X  ?   
NFPH X (drafting) X (drafting)  X  (decision making) 
LF X  X (process design)   
Sum 8 9 4 2 
    
   
It is perhaps worth to ask what kind of changes in the cases were caused by learning 
and how these changes occurred? 
In general it can be stated, that learning will be often viewed as source of process 
changes but primarily it occurs in cyclical designed processes.  
                                            
61
 Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.  
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The case studies state in France however, that examples with linearly designed 
processes can also fit here: RPF case and the CFT case. In RPF “…changes were 
permanent“ and “..adaptation became the most important issue”, which is an 
indication for substantial and continuous/intensive learning. This was certainly, partly 
due to the crisis situation of the storm damages had to be resolved step by step -  
giving time for learning - and also actors’ active decision making role adds to learning 
effects - giving ways for learning (actor initiated changes by exercising critics). 
 
Periodic exchange played a crucial role in Germany in RA, where the cyclical design 
explicitly aimed for optimisation and adaptation and an intended knowledge transfer 
took place. Reporting of mandatory self-evaluations had no effects and this reporting 
practice got changed completely.  However in a number of regions self-evaluations 
served as basis of learning (but the special tool of the so-called FOCUS groups, 
which provided feedback to the programme formulation, were the basis for 
enhancements through empirical analysis of the situation and process experiences. 
This is a classical institutionalised process learning case indeed. But here also the 
idea behind the model regions can be understood as part of a learning process, as 
the model regions’ aim is to facilitate learning to other regions.  
 
In Greece monitoring was viewed as learning facilitator, as “…those who learned 
more are the ones involved in the monitoring and evaluation processes” – apparently 
enabled by new capacities gained via learning.  
 
In the Spanish case it was stated that among rather young organisations - as process 
stakeholders - learning and capacity building took place during the dialogue phase. 
However, there is a strong belief to be sensed also that dialogue alone was not 
enough to change the process, but triggered capacity building and “…the 
development of beliefs and preferences for public participation and democratic 
institutions” (values). This indicates that learning was present to a high degree in this 
process (PGPF) affecting rather views than actions.   
 
In the Netherlands in case of the Groene Wound process the “Chaos model” practice 
proofs to be relevant for learning as provides for options of different actors’ influential 
decisions in the region. Here feedback rounds and concept negotiations were 
employed to achieve this. There was apparently continuous adaptation taking place 
according to the authors, but effectiveness of learning/adaptation however is not 
obvious, as stated in “…after all this time the reconstruction process still is not 
properly underway”.  
 
The role of new knowledge can be seen on the ecological expertise, which got more 
recognised and was most essential in the process.  In the NfP-PfN process 
evaluations played the decisive role in adaptation and change and in Austria more 
specifically internal evaluations and discussions played the main role in the AFD 
process changes. However, in the AFD the ENGO pressure was a significant reason 
for process altering. In the corruption case study in Romania institutional learning 
plays a role and will be furthered by classic evaluations and monitoring accompanied 
by the positive role of NGOs.    
 
There are just a few cases where learning played no role at all in process change. In 
these cases change was introduced by e.g. external factors or powerful actors 
Analysis along procedural elements 221 
 
 
(NFPH- decision making). There were also cases where simple not much interest 
appeared towards learning but other motives dominated. The Danish cases show 
that the underlying motivations for evaluation might be others than learning (e.g. 
power execution or gaining the overview) and that as a result “…not much 
consequences to the process” appeared (Boon, Lund and Nathan 2007a, 2007b). 
 
In Germany in the “LEADER +” case the technical feature of evaluation was felt to be 
hindering institutional learning but self-evaluations were obviously used for this 
purpose. 
 
In Romania proposals of changes or studies’ results could not influence the process 
of the habitat directive planning as implementation was not designed.  
 
In the NFPH no learning between policy levels took place and process altering in the 
decision making phase was due to influential civil servants and not by learning. In 
contrast to that in the NFPH learning played a crucial role in the drafting phase as 
source of process change, but it could not be maintained. This case is contrasted 
most by the PfN-NfP process in the Netherlands, where the influential civil servant 
(secretary of state) decided to change the process design due to feedbacks from 
colleagues; therefore the learning effect makes a huge difference and substantial 
process design changes and legitimates the act of personal intervention with 
authority to alter the process significantly.  
 
The following table tries to indicate major sources/ideas or methods behind learning 
or causes of non-learning seen in the processes. 
Table 30: Methods or sources for learning in the processes - overview     
Process Sources and methods of learning No learning 
AFD Internal evaluations and discussions ENGO pressure 
GAK EU evaluations?  
RPF Crisis elimination needs & actor 
empowerment  
 
PGPF Dialogue  
CORR Evaluation  
GW “Chaos model” – shared decision powers  
NP (DK)  Ignorance of evaluation results  
NfP-PfN
62
 Evaluation, influential player by learning  
HD (DK)  Feedback on monitoring results not 
guaranteed    
N 2000 (R)   Ignorance of studies 
RA Periodic exchange, self evaluation,  
FOCUS Groups 
 
LEADER +  Technical evaluation  
NPA Monitoring and evaluation  
                                            
62
 Ex-ante the process. During the work, no evaluations were conducted.  
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Process Sources and methods of learning No learning 
CFT Local initiatives   
NFPH Thematic WG sessions, open dialogue 
(drafting) 
 Change by influential player with 
authority (decision making) 
LF Evaluation, past experiences  
  
 
 
Summary 
 
Not surprisingly, we could see from the various forms and ideas behind learning in 
the cases its context-, and actor-bonded feature and special relevance. Motives for 
the application of learning or process enhancement methods vary highly and range 
from extremes of crisis elimination by natural or human disasters (storm vs 
corruption) to rather normal governance cases of sector development processes of 
NFPs. 
One interesting observation might be that top-down, nature conservation based 
processes dealt with here, such as the Natura 2000 cases tend to have less 
process/institutional learning. This is however surprising a bit, but shows top-down 
approaches’ basics of not being often exercised very adaptively. Contrasting to this 
are the cases where the actor empowerment or grass rout initiatives result in high-
level learning and its potential to alter the process (RPF, GW, CFT, RA cases).  
The special cases of self-evaluation are always employed to facilitate learning in 
contrast to external evaluations or monitoring, where the motives can be different. 
Dialogue and exchange-driven learning tends to remain at the stakeholder level, than 
being transferred to the institutional or process level (PGPF). Special instruments 
and methods of learning (Focus groups) can show high-level effects especially in 
combination with other methods (self-evaluation).       
The role of evaluation and monitoring in reality is not matching their ideal typical role 
as in reality they are not always employed by intentions of learning or process 
enhancement. They might have only informative feature or remain pro-forma 
obligations as well without feedback to the process (see for more section 4.5.1). 
Their role as basis for changes/adaptation must be contested on basis of the 
empirical evidences. This role depends of course on decision making finally. In this 
respect the cases where local actors’ empowerment in decision making was 
exercised not much role was granted to evaluations in terms of adaptation of the 
process and process changes. This issue remains however somewhat contradictory 
in our view.   
As said before, learning gets interesting in terms of AIP aspects if its effects feed 
back to the process formulation or implementation. Increased actor capacity by 
learning might result in the same effect of course.  
 
4.5.2.3 The role of iterativity under uncertain and complex circumstances 
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Iterativity vs. Adaptivity 
 
There is a fundamental difference between adaptivity and iterativity, as the latter one 
is a tool, and a process is iterative if it is designed so, while adaptivity is a 
characteristics of a process, which can be a result of iterativity among many other 
factors.  
 
Iterativity 
Iterativity in this section will be viewed from two different perspectives. On one hand 
iterativity is a tool, which can be used for providing framework for negotiations on a 
large scale among high number of stakeholders. When there is a cyclical order of 
actions that enables the participants to reflect to or react on developments of the 
process that have been made since they last had chance to participate, that can 
facilitate interaction among large number of groups consisting of large number of 
members. This coordination mechanism is part of our analysis, but its focus is on 
how to establish and maintain an effective communication rather than focusing on the 
outputs of the process. Looking at iteration this way does not fit to the analysis of 
how aims of a process are targeted, and how it is monitored to what extent the aims 
are achieved. 
 
Another perspective is to look at iterativity as a tool for monitoring the status of the 
process and the status of achieving aims of the process. In this sense the role of 
iterativity is to facilitate monitoring or evaluation as well as process changing 
mechanisms and restart the cyclical actions in order to better fulfil predefined aims.  
 
Either way the tool of iterativity is closely related to complexity of problems and/or an 
uncertain environment. If the aims to be achieved are of high complexity, or if there 
are a large number of stakeholders to be coordinated, or if factors to be taken into 
account are interrelated in a way that makes impossible to impute them exactly, the 
only choice is to have more than one attempt to achieve the aims, and that requires 
iterative process design. 
 
 
Adaptivity 
Adaptivity under this section refers to the process unless stated otherwise. Therefore, 
we are looking for evidences of a process being able to adapt to something, or even 
being unable to do so, and analysing the way it takes place. In many cases the term 
adaptivity or adaptation can confuse the reader when it addresses either the 
behaviour of participants, or the political traditions, or the reason for the existence of 
the process, or any other context factors. These are having of course major influence 
on the process, but describing them adaptive or calling them adaptation does not 
meant to refer to the nature of the process as such. 
In order to avoid confusions, we define a model of process classification for analytical 
reasons. Empirical data from case studies will be compared to these classes to 
enable insights and conclusions.. 
 
Model (or things to look at in the case studies) 
A) Linearity with regular evaluation at checkpoints that can result in corrections 
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In cases, when the process has clear and simple aims that are clear and simple 
enough to specify them at the beginning of the process, and if the context factors are 
imputable, then a linear process can be designed. Linearity does not always mean a 
‘single line’ structure, as parallel sub-processes and actions can also be organized in 
a linear manner. The distinctive characteristics of such processes are the straight to 
the point approach, without loops of actions, even though feedbacks between the 
actions are possible. These processes might include monitoring and evaluations that 
serve as checkpoints (milestones) to make sure the process is on track, and if the 
interim achievements do not meet the predefined aims, clear actions can be taken. 
The above described processes can be easely identified as projects. 
 
B) Iteration based on new attempts to better meet objectives 
In more complicated cases, when it is difficult to find direct links between actions and 
results, exact plans cannot be elaborated. The disability to predict the outcomes can 
be a result of many factors: 
• The lack of sound data/information 
• The lack of comprehensive knowledge 
• The lack of resources 
• Etc. 
 
If there is no chance to find a direct way to the aims, the process needs to put 
possible actions to the test, and evaluate the outputs. This requires loops in the 
process design, in order to have more and more attempts, and to see which actions 
take the process closer to the objectives, and which actions do not. This means at 
the same time a learning process, in which knew knowledge is created from 
experience that is being built upon in further attempts.  
 
C) Adaptation to ensure changes can be responded to 
Cyclical process design and iterative approach are also useful tools, when context 
factors - either internal or external - are likely to change within the time span of the 
process. These (possible) changes need to be monitored, to make sure the process 
can react on them. There are two major differences between a simple correction and 
an adaptation to changes of context factors. After a correction the process, or a part 
of it is not repeated again, but it continues with the scheduled actions, while 
adaptation to new situation assumes typically the whole (sub)process to be repeated. 
Another difference is that correction refers to rather technical issues, while adaptation 
can affect the process design itself, and can result in more fundamental changes.   
 
Figure 8 illustrates the above deliberated model on process design and terms relating 
to each other in the sense of this section. 
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Figure 8: Classification model of processes by process design and process 
characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
Further considerations on the model 
This classification is strongly influenced by the degree of complexity and uncertainty. 
The degree of these factors cannot be specified objectively, but the application of 
iteration and adaptation is not based on objective factors either, but rather results of 
subjective considerations like the perception of, crisis situations, the context factors 
as stated in some of the case studies at hand. 
 
There is a strong linkage between iteration and adaptation, which is also reflected in 
the common feature of cyclical process design with periodical monitoring and 
evaluation. The reason for the differentiation is that we would like to emphasise the 
different focus of repeated actions, and we also assume, that there are 
distinguishable cases that have primary focus either closer to iteration, or closer to 
adaptation. 
 
This close relation between iteration and adaptation means that they have common 
characteristics, too, and one of the most important of these similarities is that the 
need for being adaptive or iterative is not always evident from the beginning or at the 
planning stage. This emphasises the importance of evaluation and learning within the 
frame of the process, which is typically based on the experience of both internal and 
external origin gained along process execution.   
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Classification of the processes based on empirical data 
As a preparation for analysis case studies are classified according to characteristics 
of the model, namely the design of the process, sources of complexity and 
uncertainty if there is any.As it was mentioned above the concept of adaptivity has 
been narrowed down to the property of a process, and adaptation as subject of the 
process has been excluded, furthermore some conceptual clarification was provided, 
therefore the classification of cases here may differ from those of the authors.  
 
Table 31: Classification of case studies with reference to process design, 
complexity and uncertainty  
Process 1 
Cyclical - 
iterative 
2 
Complexity Uncertainty 
Comments 
Itera-
tion 
Adap-
tation 
Deg-
ree Source 
Deg-
ree Source 
AFD x  x  H participants    
GAK  X        
RPF x X  x H subject H extreme 
situation 
clearly not adaptive but 
maybe iterative 
FPGP x    H actions    
CORR  X    subject H changing 
political 
environment
consecutive plannings 
GW - - - - - - - - - 
NPP   x  H participants 
& subject 
H unpredictable 
intentions of 
stakeholders
not applicable 
NfP-PfN - - - - - - - - - 
HD   x  H subject   was not planned but 
become cyclical 
N 2000 X         
RA X        loops inside 
LEADER + X    H levels    
NPA X        administrative, hierarchical 
UH - - - - - - - - - 
CFT  X   H subject & 
new 
instrument
  linearly elaborated plan, 
iterative execution 
NFPH  X   H new 
instrument
   
LF   x x H subject H conflicts was not planned but 
become cyclical 
BS  X x      two consecutive documents
 
Remarks: 
1 - Linear – regular,   
2 - Iterativity as a communication tool. 
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Processes with “historical dimension” 
Three of the processes in the GOFOR project represent historical developments, in 
which the time span, or the changes occurred during the process makes them 
difficult to evaluate as comprehensive processes, and also according to the authors 
adaptivity and iterativity are not relevant issues. Their interpretation would be no 
more than artificial exercise, so they are left out from this part of the analysis. (3 
cases from The Netherlands)  
 
Linearity 
 
Linear approach 
Single line approach is only applicable, when there are definite aims, and a more or 
less logical way of achieving them. There are five such cases and almost all of them 
are related to a planning process initiated from a higher level than where it was 
applied, and in many cases the original initiator is the European Union.  
Two cases were dealing with nature protection (Implementation of acquis 
communautairein nature protection in Romania and the Designation of national parks 
in Greece), and they are both connected to the designation of NATURA 2000 sites. 
These processes have a large number of examples from other countries, and the EU 
as the initiator also provides protocols to the process, even though it does not cover 
each and every step, and not all elements are obligatory. The same applies to the 
elaboration of National Forest Program for Catalonia, which also had former 
examples. 
 
There are also slightly more complicated cases to classify, as the Regionen Aktiv and 
the LEADER+ projects in Germany are consisting of stages organized in a linear 
way, but their utter aim is the adapt EU or other higher level policies to regional level. 
This confusion originates also from the fact that the consecutive stages interlinked, 
and the results of evaluations between them are fed back to the next stage. This is a 
very important characteristic of the processes under study, that if the evaluation is 
focusing on the outcome of the project, and it feeds back the necessary corrections, 
then it is different from cases where the functioning of the project is evaluated and 
redesigning becomes necessary. With other words step-by-step approach is a 
necessary condition to talk about iterative process, but repeated actions in loops are 
also required. 
 
This reasoning draws attention to another important feature of policy related 
processes, namely that a linearly organized process with stages built on each other 
can be successful, and its performance can be improved with regular evaluations and 
with necessary corrections. The design is a tool that provides framework for the 
process and not a measure of the quality of the process.  
 
Linearity with iterative implementation 
To further prove that linearity in itself is not necessarily a source of negative effects, 
we would like to draw an example of mixed experiences within one case. Austrian 
Forest Dialog is basically a linear process with well defined stages. On irregularity in 
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this case is that it demonstrates adaptation without being iterative. At a certain point 
of the process the question arose as to how far the measures being formulated 
should be specified, which turned out to be such a significant question that some 
stakeholders threatened to leave the process if this issue was not agreed on. The 
negotiations finally altered the process to a different way, which demonstrate that 
iterativity is not necessarily a prerequisite for adaptation, however, the process at this 
stage definitely stepped back and theoretically it can be seen as a loop.  
 
There is a mixture of linearity and iterativity within the same process. This example 
beside others illustrates the combination of a linear planning phase, when steps are 
well designed and organized in a logical order, while the implementation of the 
elaborated plan is iterative in nature, and is being revised regularly and developed 
further as necessary. 
 
Iteration 
 
Iteration as means for communication and means for tackling uncertainty 
There are examples in the case studies in which iterativity is manifested, but its 
function is not (or not exclusively) to test new attempts, but rather to coordinate 
communication among stakeholders. The most typical situation, where such 
arrangement can contribute to the organized participation of stakeholders is when 
there are too many of them, and it is impossible for everybody to actively take part in 
actions at the same time. In the Forest Relief Plan case from France represents an 
even more interesting example, in which the elaboration of the plan was carried out 
in an iterative manner with the involvement of actors from different levels (local and 
national). 
 
Iteration in the long run 
Iteration as a tool can be observed typically in the long run processes, as the wide 
time span makes regular evaluation and the repetition of a process almost inevitable. 
Many examples support this observation and probably even more would support it, if 
the case studies were all covering at least mid-term processes. From this point of 
view the Anti-corruption Policy in Romania is worth being highlighted, as the overall 
process is divided into phases that are targeted to revise a plan, and since the 
country experienced sudden and turbulent changes compared to western European 
countries, iterative approach and evaluations in particular contributed to a 
developments in this field largely.  But also the Forest Relief Plan, which was already 
cited in connection with the role of iterativity in communication, has demonstrated 
that in an unusual situation like after a heavy wind fall, when new measures need to 
be taken, the continuous evaluations and repeated actions to meet the needs the 
process is to handle is of an outstanding importance. 
 
Adaptation 
 
Probably the most extreme occurrence of adaptation in a process is when the subject 
of adaptation is the design of the process itself. The Living Forest case study from 
Norway reported a major crisis, which temporarily suspended the process and 
required a complete restructuring. As a result, the formerly linearly organized steps 
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were replaced by iterative steps, so that there are more room for negotiations and 
interest harmonisation among stakeholders, and the uncertainty formerly originated 
from the conflicts within the process was mostly eliminated this way.    
 
The National Park case study from Denmark represents an adaptive and iterative 
process, which in opposite of the case from Norway, was originally designed to be 
adaptive. It originates from the fact that the process had no definite aims for 
establishing national parks, but rather it was launched to provide a framework for 
negotiations. Results of the stages of the process influenced the further 
developments not only by feeding back experiences, but also by deciding how to 
continue on.  
 
This case offers an important comparison with the process of a similar subject from 
Greece. While both cases were dealing with the same issue of establishing national 
parks, there is a major difference of process design. Looking at these processes from 
a different point of view one can realise that despite of the same issue, the adaptive 
approach was necessary to employ in the case from Denmark, so as stakeholders 
can get familiar with the idea, and the possible conflicts can be resolved before they 
actually appear, while the process in Greece had a rather technical nature. 
 
Failure of a process plan can lead to adaptation, as this failure leads the process into 
a crisis situation to be resolved, as it took place in the Forest Dialog in Austria. 
Another example for such conversation is the Habitat Directive from Denmark. There 
is also a similar process to this from Romania, where again the same subject was 
dealt with differently. The core of the issue was to implement an EU regulation in 
member states, and it was planned to accomplish in a linear way in both cases. 
Since in Romania the successful implementation was a prerequisite of the EU 
accession - just like for all other new member countries – there was a very strong 
motivation for carrying it out successfully, while in Denmark such an important 
change in the rural areas needed a more careful approach, in which interests could 
be harmonized according to the country’s political traditions. 
 
Summary 
 
The case studies in the GOFOR project coming from different fields are influenced by 
different context factors, and cover different time span. They also represent different 
development stages of processes. This variety of cases prevent us from conducting 
rigid comparative analyses, but on the other hand, they provided wide range of 
examples on how process design, complexity and uncertainty are linked to each 
other. 
 
Throughout the GOFOR project the term adaptivity was conceptualized at least three 
different ways: ‘Adaptive’ refers to the process itself but also to the issues dealt with 
and the approaches towards solving the problems.’ (GOFOR, 2006). It was agreed in 
the GOFOR meetings to use the broader sense in the case study reporting. 
However, to avoid confusion in the comparative analysis adaptation had to be 
narrowed down to the characteristics of the processes. A conclusion to this issue is 
that to be very specific in using these terms, when policy makers or other parties call 
for adaptive and iterative processes. By this substantial misunderstandings should be 
sorted out on the demand side towards a process. As illustration the following 
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statement can be made: In the demand there is a difference to call for a process to 
maintain ability of being adaptive, or there is a need to launch a process that is to 
deliver an adaptation of policy, incentives, etc. as an outcome. 
 
The hypothetical model of the arrangement and relationship of process design and 
process characteristics was traceable in the case studies, but clear demarcation of 
linearity, iterativity and adaptivity was not possible. On the contrary, the preliminary 
assumption that iterativity is a prerequisite for adaptation proved to be an incomplete 
statement. Case examples support that a basically linear process can adapt to new 
situations as well (RPF, CFT, RA). There are also more examples representing 
successful delivery of predefined tasks in a linearly organized process, in which 
monitoring and evaluation plays a significant role, and therefore linearity as a process 
design cannot be judged in itself. 
 
Complexity of problems to deal with and uncertain environment were represented in 
the cases diversely. Sources of these interrelated factors typically were the strategic 
level of operation, wide time span, high number of stakeholders or levels, or the 
subject itself. There is no general rule of how to handle complex and uncertain 
situations, and as it was mentioned above even these situations can be handled with 
simple methods. In our view failures and successes highlighted not only the 
importance of applying a ‘get ready for changes’ attitude in those cases, but they also 
suggested that the broader involvement of people (stakeholders) in policy making 
and policy application is preferred, the more adaptive process should be expected in 
which iteration is one of the most important facilitator. 
 
 
4.5.3 Concluding remarks on AIP 
 
In general, the case studies show that AIP aspects were institutionalized only to a 
limited degree, with some clear exceptions. The specific concepts “adaptive” or 
“iterative” were seldom used. Still, several of the relevant policy documents called 
indirectly for aspects of AIP like periodic monitoring, evaluation, prescribed repetitive 
stages of process design and implementation. These aspects indicate policy 
intentions to take up tasks in an adaptive and iterative way.  
 
A governance process is an undertaking, which is often characterized by significant 
uncertainty as well as complexity. Complexity in the problems to deal with and 
uncertain environment were diversely represented in the cases. Sources of these 
interrelated factors typically were the strategic level of operation, wide time span, 
high number of stakeholders or levels, or the subject itself. There seems to be no 
general rule for how to handle complex and uncertain situations, as even these 
situations can be handled with rather simple methods achieving clear targets or 
goals.  
 
Failures and successes highlighted in the GOFOR cases evidence not only the 
importance of applying a ‘get ready for changes’ attitude in those cases, but they also 
suggest that the broader involvement of people (stakeholders) in policy making and 
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policy application is preferred, the more adaptive process should be expected in 
which iteration is one of the most important facilitator.  
 
Another important aspect is the learning effect in such a complex and/or uncertain 
situation over time. Repeated learning along its time span is crucial towards the 
success or failure of a given governance process. This has posed some important 
challenges for the stakeholders in the GoFOR-processes. One possible strategy to 
promote learning could be to integrate a system for repeated monitoring and 
evaluations in the process design. The GoFOR-case studies show that almost every 
GoFOR-process have integrated some kind of system for evaluation and monitoring. 
On the other hand, the aim, the design, and the application of these systems have 
differed quite a lot between the projects.  
 
The analysis shows that even if evaluations were the most frequent source of 
adaptations among the GoFOR-processes, the number of processes adapting to 
external challenges is rather low. There were cases which illustrate that monitoring 
and evaluations have the potential to play an important role in improving the 
efficiency of governance processes. The findings in general however, prove that this 
potential is far from being realized in most of the GoFOR-processes. It also means 
that the role of evaluation and monitoring in reality is not matching their ideal typical 
role as in reality they are not always employed by intentions of learning or process 
enhancement. They might have only informative feature or remain pro-forma 
obligations as well without feedback to the process.  
 
The most frequently mentioned motive for conducting evaluations has been 
enhancing efficiency, followed by promoting learning and being an external 
requirement for receiving funding. The initiative or requirement for conducting 
evaluatuions has generally been taken by national or international authorities (EU). 
The choice of evaluator and the subject being evaluated also differed.  
 
Their predefined or assumed role as the most important basis for changes/adaptation 
must be however contested on basis of the empirical evidences in most of our cases. 
Of course, finally this depends on decision making. In the cases where local actors’ 
empowerment in decision making was exercised, not much role was granted to 
evaluations in terms of adaptation of the process and process changes.  
 
Related to learning in the processes we saw that special reflective methods used as 
e.g. self-evaluation can highly facilitate learning at the stakeholder- and also at the 
institutional/process level. Somewhat contrasting is the role of external evaluations or 
monitoring in terms of learning effects as their application motives vary significantly in 
the cases. This indicates that motivation remains the basic aspect of individual or 
institutional learning and the mean of prescribed evaluation or monitoring application 
does not guarantee the process ability to adapt or change itself if needed. The need 
for action on basis of the evaluation and monitoring results remains as political 
responsibility of decision makers. 
 
It is also worth to consider that dialogue and exchange-driven learning tends to 
remain at the stakeholder level, than being transferred to the institutional or process 
level in our empirical studies. This indicates that a continuous actor engagement over 
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the whole process timeline is crucial in terms of process adaptation. The analysis 
show that top-down processes tend to have less process/institutional learning - as 
illustrated here e.g. by Natura 2000 cases – as being often not exercised to have 
room for enough adaptation and changes in practice. Cases with actor empowerment 
or grass rout initiatives tend to result in high-level learning and have the potential to 
alter the process as having more decision making/influencing potential in a 
governance sense.    
 
Finally, it is to be stressed that policy makers or other parties should be very specific 
when calling for adaptive and iterative processes. By this distinction, substantial 
misunderstandings can be sorted out on the demand side towards a process. It must 
be noted that there is a difference in the need for a process to maintain ability of 
being adaptive, or there is a need to launch a process that is to deliver an adaptation 
of policy, incentives, etc. as an outcome. In this respect is further to be considered 
that analytically is not easy to identify clear roles of iteration or means of adaptation 
should play as they are closely interrelated to each other. But the preliminary 
assumption that iterative process design is a prerequisite for adaptation proved to be 
an incomplete statement. Case examples support that a basically linear process can 
adapt to new situations as well. There are also more examples representing 
successful delivery of predefined tasks in a linearly organized process, in which 
monitoring and evaluation plays a significant role, and therefore linearity as a process 
design cannot be judged negatively in itself. 
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5 Effects of the governance processes studied 
K. Kassioumis, K. Papageorgiou, and M. Pecurul 
5.1 Introduction: the effects of GoFOR governance processes 
This chapter strives for identyfing and evaluationg different types of effects of the 
governance processes which were studied in GoFOR. The objective of describing 
these effects and also evaluating these processes' performance is a quite demanding 
task. Ideally, determining the extent to wich a process achieved its goals starts from 
well-specified process objectives (cf. Berk and Rossi, 1990). Hence, before 
proceeding with the analysis, the starting question is whether the governance 
processes provided such well-specified, concrete, or even quantitative targets, or 
whether the goals remained rather vague.  
A uniform answer to this is not possible. Overall it can be stated that most of the 
processes lack a real concrete framework of goals, they lack well-defined strategic 
objectives which might serve as a yardstick to “measure” the changes induced by the 
processes. This is, for example, most obvious in the cases that refer to biodiversity 
conservation where ambiguity of the definition of biodiversity restricts straight forward 
evaluation. In other cases, objectives are introducing vague and generic concepts 
such as "sustainable development", often without providing further substantiation. 
Overall the analysis of effects shows a patchwork of different categories of effects. 
Looking at the picture as a whole, it can be inferred that the majority of case 
processes delivered programmes, instruments, strategies etc. as well as some 
changes in the actors’ behaviour. But most of them resulted much less in identifyable 
effects in terms of bio-physical changes, i.e. outcomes “on the ground”. 
This finding points to another limitation as regards the scope of this analysis, namely 
the “immaturity” of a number of case processes that were examined in GoFoR. Most 
of them are rather at the stage of policy formulation and/or in the process of 
implementation. It has to be noted, that this is not a result of a faulty research desing, 
but resulted from the fact that the kind of governance processes which are subject to 
the GoFOR research interest are rather young to the policy domains that stand 
central to our research interest. However, as a consequence the full range of 
“effects” cannot be addressed (yet) in a number of cases. They are not yet advanced 
enough to allow for final conclusions about their material implications; e.g. about the 
outcomes “in the forests” even though they may very likely deliver tangible effects in 
a longer perspective.  
From our analysis it furthermore appears that “time” (immaturity) cannot be the only 
reason for some processes not having overcoming the stage of output or impacts yet. 
Our analyses will provide an empirical basis to judge whether the immaturity of a 
process is indeed the only explanatory factor for poor or inexisting effects “on the 
ground” or whether other reasons may explain barriers to implementation. 
The following subchapter first introduces a typology of effects. Then the case studies 
will be synthesised as regards the types of effects that resulted from the governance 
processes. The ambitious research question here is whether we can find some 
characteristic patterns or tendencies in these effects from a comparative perspective. 
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5.2 Categories of effects: definitions  
Political scientists interested in the evaluation of public policies typically distinguish 
between “output”, “impact” and “outcome”. For the evaluation of effects, it has proven 
useful to build on this heuristic (Figure 9). We consider outputs as the programmes, 
strategies, plans (in a broader sense) that result from a governance process. With 
the term impacts we address changes in the policy actors’ behaviour. Finally, 
outcomes are defined as consequences in terms of biophysical changes, i.e. 
changes which may have materialised at the end of the causal chain from the 
process and its output via the impacts. 
Figure 9: Heuristic frame to operationalise “effects” of governance processes 
While our governance processes may well contribute to such changes along the 
chain from outputs to outcomes, establishing such direct causal relations empirically 
is notoriously difficult to document because of the many intervening factors, the 
diversity of conditions and the time lags involved (Cash & Clark, 2001). Hoewever, 
the effectivity of specific governance processes can not only be evaluated through its 
ultimate effects “on the ground”, but also by assessing the effects “upstream” along 
the causal chain from the immediate outputs to the impacts in the actrors’ behaviour, 
which may finally indeed result in outcomes on the ground.From an ad hoc analysis 
of case reports, it is evident that in most case studies, effects are identifiable more in 
the form of outputs and in the form of impacts but to a lesser degree in terms of 
biophysical changes (i.e. outcomes). 
Furthermore, it was our ambition to identify “effects” of the governance processes not 
only by differentiating these there major categories but in a more nuanced manner. 
Therefore, based on the synthesised empirical results from all the case studies, we 
inductively defined more nuanced sub-types of effects. 
Types of Outputs  
Regarding outputs, some case studies, especially those referring to strategy 
processes, have delivered new programmes, plans, policies or strategy papers. In 
other cases the outputs took the form of guidelines, provincial plans and agreements 
or projects and technical reports. 
Furthermore, in the majority of the cases, outputs have also appeared in the form of 
new or modified legislature, framework acts, policy recommendations or 
governmental decisions. Other types of outputs refer to the introduction of new or 
modified policy instruments such as financial means. This sub-category also includes 
approaches that represent a move from command and control to approaches that 
stressing shared responsibilities of citizens, taht explore alternative funding schemes, 
or emphasise informational means or self-steering arrangements instead. 
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Another sub-category of output refers to changes in the distribution of competencies. 
In general, this sub-category contains all the various effects induced by a varying 
degree of decentralisation which influenced the traditional picture of power 
distribution. 
The last sub-type of output refers to the institutionalisation of actor forums (in terms 
of working groups, partnership schemes, steering committees etc.). 
Types of Impacts  
The typology developed to analyse impacts particularly stresses the policy actors’ 
behavioural changes that resulted from the governance processes; stakeholders and 
state administrators building up frameworks of action, encouraging more open 
processes, changing attitudes, and becoming more cooperative and active over time 
etc. Changes were also found in terms of interest intermediation. New conflict 
resolution frameworks were designed and new coalitions between regional and state 
actors as well as new actor alliances have been detected. 
The analysis of the case findings also revealed re-allocation of funds or the allocation 
of additional funds and/or personnel resources as powerful policy instruments. 
Another significant type of impact that was detected is that new issues were put on 
the policy agendas or increased in relevance through the governance processes. 
E.g. some cases showed increasing consideration of social and economic aspects or 
have put specific processes higher on regional agendas. 
Furthermore, several cases reported effects in the very nature of the debate among 
stakeholders, e.g. changes to a more open dialogue, increasing opportunities for 
mutual feedback etc. Such significant impacts include changes with a positive impact 
on social capital such as the development of local actor networks or the development 
of new actor coalitions. In other cases, such as the regional development cases, 
actors which hat little in common before became involved into joint planning and 
cooperation. 
Finally, a last sub-type of impact refers to the identification of knowledge gaps and 
the mobilization of expertise. In some cases local actors, privat and admistrative 
actors have benefited from interactive learning process, and the role of lay 
knowledge and local experiences increased through the processes. 
Types of Outcomes 
The empirical identification of outcomes has been a hard task. Most of outcomes are 
not quantifiable. In many cases it is simply too early to judge upon outcomes. Hence, 
we attempted to account for outcomes not only in the form of manifest bio-phyiscal 
changes on the ground but also in the form of direct influences to mainstream 
policies and strategies, in plans or on the site projects which originated from the 
governance process and are close to the implementation on the ground. 
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Table 32: Types of effects (output, impact, outcomes) identified by GoFOR 
governance cases 
Types of outputs Types of impacts Types of outcomes 
? New (or revised) strategies, 
programmes or plans (as a 
“document”) New (or 
revised) strategies, 
programmes or plans (as a 
“document”) 
? New laws, reforms of 
existing laws, administrative 
acts, recommendations 
? Introduction of new policy 
instruments (e.g., new or 
revised guidelines for 
subsidy schemes) or 
changes in the predominant 
type of policy instruments    
(e.g. from regulatory to 
financial, informational or 
self-regulatory) 
? Changes in the distributions 
of competencies (e.g. for 
implementation, 
reformulation) 
? Institutionalisation of actor 
forums (e.g., foundation of 
a Forest Forum for Decision 
Makers and; Inner-
bureaucratic working 
groups, platforms of interest 
groups) 
? Changing behaviour or 
strategies of key actors 
and target groups  
? Changes in interest 
intermediation, conflicts, 
coalitions  
? (Re-)allocation of 
resources (budgets, 
personnel, e.g. in 
administration and 
interest groups)  
? Putting issues on the 
policy agenda or raising 
the visibility of policy 
issues  
? Changing the terms of 
the debate or changing 
ways of thinking  
? Developing actor 
networks or institutional 
capacities   
? Identifying knowledge 
gaps and needs  
? Initiation of follow-up 
projects, initiatives etc. 
? Influence to 
mainstream policies-
strategies-institutions 
? (Bio) physical changes   
 
5.3 The outputs of the governance processes 
A comprehensive account of the major outputs of all the case study processes 
classified across the typology developed in the previous section is shown in Table 
33. New policy documents, strategies, plans or other programmatic texts and 
technical reports appear to be the most frequent outputs (except GER-L+ and GER-
GAK). This seems to be related to the fact that a lot of efforts were devoted into 
formulating the policy framework in which, the new governance process should 
operate towards implementation, i.e. before operationalisation stages take place. 
This is particularly true for “strategy processes”, which typically produce “nice” 
outputs (e.g. in the form of booklets or strategy papers) but often lack concrete, 
substantially defined goals with clear time frames for implementation and references 
to the the policy tools to be applied. According to case reports, the majority of the 
processes have set a wide variety of somewhat general goals, without clearly defined 
priorities and without very concrete or even quantitative targets. For example, in the 
cases referring to the field of nature conservation, there are processes such as GR-
MA, AT-BS, ROM-NAT, which lacked quantifiable targets and timeframes. 
Documents were littered with wording such as “to review'', ''to consider'', “to examine'' 
and ''to study further''. In contrast, the the cases of DK-HD, DK-NPP and NL-NfP 
have set specific and relevant targets and especially the Danish cases studies both 
claim good achievement of action plans and conservation effort. 
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The national responses to the international demands for comprehensive strategies 
for sustainable forest management also provide some but a limited variety in the 
characteristics of their deliverables, with most processes producing new programmes 
that contain general statements of intent, guidelines, administrative documents, 
measures and action proposals (AT-AFD, HU-NFP). 
Table 33: Output types by case studies 
Types of outputs Identifiable Not identifiable  
New (or revised) strategies, programmes or 
plans (as a “document”) New (or revised) 
strategies, programmes or plans (as a 
“document”) 
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
AT-AFD, HU-NFP, 
NOR-LF, SP-NFP, 
ROM-ACP, NL-NfP, 
ROM-NAT, AT-BS, 
DK-HD, DK-NPP, 
GER-IRD, GER-RA, 
NL-GW, NL-UH,
 GER-L+, GER-GAK 
GR-MA 
New laws, reforms of existing laws, 
administrative acts, recommendations 
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
HU-NFP,NOR-LF, 
ROM-ACP,  GR-
MA, ROM-NAT, AT-
BS, DK-HD, DK-
NPP, GER-L+, 
GER-RA,  
NL-GW, NL-UH, GER-
IRD, GER-GAK, AT-
AFD, SP-NFP, NL-
NFP 
Introduction of new policy instruments (e.g., 
new or revised guidelines for subsidy 
schemes) or changes in the predominant 
type of policy instruments    (e.g. from 
regulatory to financial, informational or 
seNOR-LF-regulatory) 
NL-NFP, AT-BS, 
NPDD, GER-RA, 
GER-IRD, GER-L+, 
FR-CFT 
FR-RPF, AT-AFD, HU-
NFP, NOR-LF, SP-
NFP, ROM-ACP,  GR-
MA, ROM-NAT, DK-
HD, GER-GAK, NL-
GW, NL-UH,  
Changes in the distributions of 
competencies (e.g. for implementation, 
reformulation) 
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
NOR-LF, ROM-
ACP, GER-RA, 
GER-L+, NL-GW, 
NL-UH, DK-HD, 
DK-NPP  
AT-AFD, HU-NFP, SP-
NFP, GR-MA, ROM-
NAT, AT-BS, GER-
GAK, GER-IRD  
Institutionalisation of actor forums (e.g., 
foundation of a Forest Forum for Decision 
Makers and; Inner-bureaucratic working 
groups, platforms of interest groups) 
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
AT-AFD, NOR-LF, 
ROM-ACP, GER-
L+, GER-RA, GER-
IRD, NL-UH, GR-
MA, ROM-NAT, AT-
BS
NL-NFP, DK-HD, DK-
NPP, NL-GW, GER-
GAK, HU-NFP, SP-
NFP 
Legend: Forest related case studies  
Biodiversity and nature related case studies (bold) 
Rural development related case studies (Italics) 
The formulation of new regulation or the revision of existing legal means also 
appears as a quite popular approach in many of our cases. The formulation of legal 
means differed significantly across case studies: on the one hand, the rural 
development processes, with the exception of GER-L+ and GER-RA, did not entail a 
reshaping of national legislations. On the other hand, the implementation of 
anticorruption policy in Romania is strongly dependent on large scale reforms of the 
justice system including a great deal of new legislation. 
In many cases, the formulation of new strategies, and the creation of actor groups 
are vital requirements, especially for those processes in which the implementation is 
a binding mandate, e.g. based on EU regulations such as the Habitat Directive.  
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Other outputs refer to the introduction of and/or modification of existing policy means 
that can either include new financing schemes, also including investigations of 
possibilities for using subsidy schemes for financing national parks (DK-NPP), 
funding of projects instead of direct “base funding” (FR-CFT), more intensive use of 
market-based instruments, like competition for funding (GER-RA), or schemes that 
shift from purely regulatory features to informational or self-regulatory ones (GER-L+, 
NL-NPPNP). The latter kind of output is represented by the GER-RA case, the output 
of which comprises a mix of market-based, informational and regulatory means.  
Another frequent type of output refers to changes in the distribution of competencies, 
occurring overall in 10 cases. It includes a variety of expressions ranging from 
decentralisation efforts, which gave provincial actors and governments more powers 
in cases such as NL-GW, NL-UH, GR-MA, FR-CFT,  and to strengthening the roles 
of regional actors and networks (GER-L+, GER-RA). This type of effects has been 
apparent in more mature cases and less in those that are at the stage of policy 
formulation or at the initial stage of implementation. This might indicate different 
types of outputs that are developed over time with more institutional reform likely to 
occur at the outset of processes, whilst modification of regulatory means is likely to 
occur rather at subsequent stages. Assuming this, some of the case processes may 
be too “young” for going beyond the stage of the former types of output. However, 
others processes are already quite advanced but they still have not yet gone beyond 
these outputs. The Hungarian NFP and the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy process 
are good examples in this respect. They could have gone further for quite some time 
in principle, but still they got stuck at the stage of stragies and programmes. 
A final type of output materialises in the institutionalisation of new actor forums. It is a 
significant development in many of the governance process, which often empowers 
the representation of broad societal interests in the decision-making process and 
builds up participatory capacities. Practically this is provided in a variety of forms 
such as steering committees or expert panels (FR-CFT, FR-RPF), working groups 
(AT-BS), actor forums (ROM-ACP, AT-FD), various commissions and committees 
(NL-GW, NL-UH), boards (GR-MA) or councils (NOR-LF). 
5.4 The impacts of the governance processes 
An analysis of different types of impacts across the case studies is shown in Table 
34.  
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Table 34: Impact types produced by case studies 
Types of impacts Identifiable Not identifiable  
Changing behaviour or strategies of key 
actors and target groups 
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
AT-AFD, HU-NFP, 
NOR-LF, SP-NFP, 
ROM-ACP,  GR-
MA, NL-NfP, ROM-
NAT, AT-BS, DK-
HD, DK-NPP, GER-
RA, GER-L+, NL-
GW, NL-UH,  
GER-IRD, GER-GAK 
Changes in interest intermediation, conflicts, 
coalitions  
GER-GAK, GER-
IRD, GER-L+, GER-
RA, NL-GW, NL-
UH, FR-CFT, NOR-
LF 
GR-MA, NL-NfP, 
ROM-NAT, AT-BS, 
DK-HD, DK-NPP, FR-
RPF, AT-AFD, HU-
NFP, SP-NFP, ROM-
ACP 
(Re-)allocation of resources (budgets, 
personnel, e.g. in administration and interest 
groups)  
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
AT-AFD, NOR-LF, 
GR-MA, AT-BS, 
DK-HD, GER-RA, 
GER-L+ 
GER-IRD, GER-GAK, 
NL-GW, NL-UH, HU-
NFP, SP-NFP, ROM-
ACP, NL-NfP, ROM-
NAT, DK-NPP  
Putting issues on the agenda and/or raising 
the visibility of policy issues  
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
AT-AFD, HU-NFP, 
NL-NfP, AT-BS, 
GER-RA, GER-L+, 
NL-GW, NL-UH
GR-MA, ROM-NAT, 
DK-HD, DK-NPP, 
NOR-LF, SP-NFP, 
ROM-ACP, GER-GAK, 
GER-IRD 
Changing the terms of the debate, changing 
ways of thinking  
GER-RA, GER-IRD, 
GER-L+, GER-
GAK, NL-GW, NL-
UH, FR-CFT, FR-
RPF, AT-AFD, HU-
NFP, NOR-LF, GR-
MA, DK-NPP, DK-
HD 
SP-NFP, ROM-ACP  
Developing actor networks or institutional 
capacities  
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
NOR-LF, HU-NFP, 
ROM-ACP, GER-
RA, GER-L+, NL-
GW, AT-BS, DK-
NPP 
GR-MA, NL-NfP, 
ROM-NAT, DK-HD, 
GER-IRD, GER-GAK, 
NL-UH, AT-AFD, SP-
NFP 
Identifying knowledge gaps and needs  FR-CFT, FR-RPF, 
AT-AFD, HU-NFP, 
NOR-LF, AT-BS, 
DK-NPP 
GER-RA, GER-IRD, 
GER-L+, GER-GAK, 
NL-GW, NL-UH, GR-
MA, NL-NfP, ROM-
NAT, DK-HD, SP-NFP, 
ROM-ACP 
Legend: Forest related case studies  
Biodiversity and nature related case studies (bold) 
Rural development related case studies (Italics) 
There are two divergent tendencies observed in the table above. Firstly, by large the 
vast majority of case studies have reported changes of the behaviour of actors or 
actor coalitions. Case reports revealed that processes have empowered the actors' 
participatory abilities and have helped setting decision-making in a more transparent 
and open framework (AT-AFD, GR-MA, ROM-NAT, DK-HD). Likewise, in the course 
of processes the attitudes of actors have changed, in a way of becoming more 
cooperative, e.g. in cases such as the GER-L+, NL-UH and NL-GW, or by 
establishing a larger degree of trust and exhibiting a greater will for compromise 
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(NOR-LF). Impacts were also observed in terms of increasing transparency of the 
processes as a whole and in certain cases this also resulted in the dissemination of 
information about the process to the broader public, changes in the communication 
style between the involved actors, e.g. as reported in the report on the Catalan 
Forest Programme process. 
Considering such behavioural changes of actors and organisations, it is no surprise 
that in a sizeable number of cases (8), new actor networks and coalitions have 
evolved (GER-GAK, GER-IRD, GER-L+), greater capacities were assigned which 
contributed to increasing social capital (GER-RA). It is noteworthy that, in contrast to 
processes in the fields of forestry and biodiversity conservation, all rural 
development-oriented processes have exhibited an increased networking and the 
formation of new coalitions. A plausible explanation for this could be that rural 
development activities have, by definition, to take integrated approaches.  
On the other hand, when it comes to the (re-)distribution of new or existing financial 
means as well as to changes in personnel, this is the case in half of the processes 
(9). In most cases, the processes stimulated changes in the distribution of funds, 
either by creating new funding means (FR-RPF), by mobilising additional state 
resources (AT-BS) or by making clear from the outset that implementation costs will 
have to be taken by those actors who voluntarily have taken over responsibility for 
implementation (AT-AFD, NOR-LF). In the Greek case, the most common way for 
increasing funds and channelling additional resources is by using EU structural funds 
and development programmes. Money flow was found to result from increased 
political backing of the process by the government, which in return, is due to the 
binding nature of the Habitat Directive.  
It is widely recognised that all processes examined in the GoFoR project aim at 
increasing participative and cooperative capacities in policy planning and decision-
making as well as increasing the use of new mechanisms for political legitimation 
(e.g. legitimasion by consensus and/or by scientific expertise). This has modified the 
policy agenda and raised new aspects of public management concepts in quite some 
processes (10). The impacts recorded ranged from a general acceptance of the ideal 
of societal responsibility and a broader perspective towards nature conservation and 
the use of natural ressources (NL-NfP), up to administrators using processes as 
arguments to legitimise their actions and to reinforce their political demands (AT-BS) 
or to set issues of nature conservation and rural development higher on national 
agendas (GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW and NL-UH). 
Furthermore, our comparative analysis points to changes in the way of actors’ 
thinking in all rural development processes and also in most of the forestry and 
biodiversisty related cases. Such changes included the introduction of a more 
participatory terminology (AT-AFD) as well as a more participatory behaviour of actor 
groups regionally (GR-MA, GER-RA, GER-L+) and emphasising the need for 
deliberation and intersectoral coordination (FR-CFT, FR-RPF). In other cases, such 
changes manfest as the reduction/elimination of prejudices (DK-NPP) among actors 
and generally to concepts of policy planning which favour more integrated 
approaches instead of sectorial ones (NL-GW, NL-UH).  
Another type of impact refers to the evolvement of networking activities between 
actors, organisations, interest groups and administrators. In other circumstances and 
in traditional models of policy planning, getting those actor groups together would 
have been a difficult and hard task to accomplish. Empirical evidence suggests that 
almost half of the case processes (10) have contributed to the development of some 
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broadened cooperation (DK-NPP, ROM-ACP, NO-LF) and/or to the establishment of 
informal coalitions (GER-RA, GER-L+, NL-GW, NL-UH). 
However, the impacts of the GoFOR case processes were not only positive ones. In 
some cases processes also resulted in increased uncertainty as regards policy 
implementation. This is the case e.g. in the Danish Habitat Directive process, where 
the initial, profound uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the HD as regards 
the specification, the designation and the monitoring of conservation sites resulted in 
a high level of mistrust among landowners and the Nature Agency. Also the 
development of EU rural development programmes such as Leader Plus added 
another administrative chain to the pre-existing structures, which undoubtedly 
increased the volume of administrative bureaucracy at the provincial level. 
5.5 The outcomes of the governance processes 
As stated above, a crtical factor as regards the potential to evaluate biophysical 
effects (i.e. outcomes in a narrow sense) is the progress of the processes. The the 
majority of our case processes are in early stages of implementation. Consequently, 
long or meidum-term effects in terms of such outcomes in a narrow sense can not be 
identified empirically.  Hence, we applied a broader definition of outcomes, to also 
grasp effects that are close to implementation on the ground (see above). 
Table 35 indicates the case studies with the most obvious types of outcome as found 
in the case reports. The Norwegian Living forest process is the only case for which 
tangible and concrete outcomes are cleary trace- and identifiable, e.g. an increase in 
the areas of old growth forests and dead woods, improvements in regeneration 
cutting regimes and increased areas of mire and swamp forests. 
Table 35: Types of outcomes found in the case studies 
Types of outcome Identifiable Not identifiable  
Initiation of follow-up projects, initiatives etc. 
 
FR-CFT, HU-NFP,  
GR-MA, DK-NPP, 
GER-IRD, GER-L+ 
FR-RPF, AT-AFD, 
NOR-LF, SP-NFP, 
ROM-ACP, NL-NfP, 
ROM-NAT, AT-BS, 
DK-HD, GER-GAK, 
GER-RA,  
Influence to mainstream policies-strategies-
institutions 
 
FR-RPF, NOR-LF, 
ROM-ACP, ROM-
NAT, DK-HD, GER-
L+, GER-RA, NL-
GW,
FR-CFT, AT-AFD, HU-
NFP, SP-NFP, GR-
MA, NL-NfP, AT-BS, 
DK-NPP, GER-IRD, 
GER-GAK, NL-UH 
(Bio) physical changes   
 
NOR-LF, ROM-
ACP, ROM-NAT, 
DK-HD, NL-GW 
FR-CFT, FR-RPF, AT-
AFD, HU-NFP, SP-
NFP, GR-MA, AT-BS, 
NL-NfP, DK-NPP, 
GER-RA, GER-IRD, 
GER-L+, GER-GAK, 
NL-UH 
Legend: Forest related case studies  
Biodiversity and nature related case studies (bold) 
Rural development related case studies (Italics) 
Furthermore it is noteworthy that some of the identified effects are resulted from 
causes of temporary nature, e.g. depending on external factors such as 
national/sectoral crisis. Such factors have influenced institutional changes in 
directions opposite to expectations. For example, in France, the Relief Plan for 
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Forests led to a spectacular comeback of the central state into the design of the 
forest policy. Moreover, it empowered the role of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
significantly weakened the role of the Ministry of Environment in forestry issues. 
However, the resulting high concentration of powers is expected to decrease when 
the crisis situation is solved. In the German processes examined in the GoFOR 
project, GER-L + and GER-RA the respective processes allowed a mainstreaming of 
rural development measures for achieving synergies.  
Other outcomes were judged critical or ambivalent: E.g. in the case DEN-HD the 
significant increases and concentration of available funds for establishing nature 
conservation sites according to the EU Natura 2000 regulations was seen as limiting 
the availability of national funds to conserve nature outside the Natura 2000 network. 
Some critics have highlighted such a steering mechanism also in the GR-MA case. 
Concluding Remarks 
The present chapter provided a comprehensive synthesis of the effects that we found 
in the GoFoR case studies in terms of ouputs, impacts and outcomes. It became 
obvious that all processes resulted in a variety of ouputs, impacts and outcomes. But 
it also has to be said that the majority of the processes that were studied are 
“immature” in terms of the stage of the policy cycle: Most of them are at the early 
stages of policy implementation. Hence, the GoFOR project was well able to assess 
and categorize a huge variety of outputs and also a good number of different kinds of 
impacts, but only a few outcomes in terms of effects in the bio-phyiscal environment. 
However, the “immaturity” of cases is obviously not the only reasons for that: there 
were also cases where concrete plans and strategies have been decided upon quite 
some time ago but implementation was slow so far and/or stagnated for other 
reasons which are related to the processes themselves (for detailed conclusion on 
“effects” from see chapter 6). 
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6 Conclusions: policy-relevant findings 
Hogl, K., R. Nordbeck, and M. Pregernig 
6.1 New modes of governance: dimensions and causes 
As the previous chapters have shown, governance theory offers a great potential in 
opening up alternative ways and perspectives to look upon political institutions, 
political decision-making processes, as well as policy contents and instruments. In 
the theoretical debate the term governance is often connected to several changes in 
relation to political structures, actors and modes of policy-making. The GoFOR 
project provided us with the opportunity to describe and analyse such changes in 19 
case studies from ten European countries and across different policy fields.  
Our case studies therefore constitute a rich empirical basis to analytically shed light 
on these new modes of governance and on the interaction of state and society in 
processes of collective problem-solving. The cross-case comparison draws an 
interesting picture of the degree to which governance arrangements are 
institutionalized in different empirical contexts and enriches our analytical 
understanding of such arrangements. Across the 19 case studies we detected 
innovations and changes related to the main components of governance as defined 
in the introductory chapter of this report.  
Table 36 provides a framework for the analysis of new modes governance along the 
three classical dimensions of political analysis, i.e. polity, politics, and policy. Along 
those dimensions we will first (in the second part of this sub-chapter) deal with the 
causal factors leading to new governance arrangements. The next sub-chapter (6.2) 
will discuss the importance and the role of different governance elements in new 
policy arrangements and the concluding sub-chapter (6.3) will summarise the 
empirical reality of governance effects from the GoFOR case studies. 
Table 36: New Modes of Governance - Dimensions and Causal Factors 
 
Dimension Cause of change  Governance elements Expected governance effect 
Structural/Institutional 
(Polity) 
• Internationalization 
• Europeanization 
• Decentralization  
• Establishment of a 
multi-level system 
• Loss of national  sovereignty 
• Increase of regional/local autonomy 
Actor-related 
(Politics)  
• Loss of legitimation 
• Cross-sectoral 
coordination deficits 
• Participation 
• Intersectoral 
coordination 
• Democratic and 
accountable expertise 
• Enlargement of actor networks in terms 
of sectors and societal domains 
(public/private) 
• Increasing levels of co-ordination and 
cooperation 
• Increasing input and output legitimacy 
• New/changing roles of state actors 
• Additional resources, competences and 
information available 
Content-related 
(Policy) 
• Limits of command-
and-control regulation 
• Less hierarchical 
steering 
• Adaptive and iterative 
policy making 
• New instruments (e.g. strategy 
processes) 
• Mix of modes of coordination 
• increased flexibility, higher efficiency 
• Policy learning 
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The discernable trend towards new modes of governance is driven by a number of 
causal factors stemming from the economic, political and social environment of 
governments. In Table 36 these factors were grouped along three political 
dimensions: structural and institutional changes, actor-related changes, and content-
related changes. All identified causal factors can potentially lead to changes in 
political decision-making and result in some kind of new governance arrangements.  
 
Structural/institutional dimension (polity): 
Concerning the structural and institutional dimension of new modes of governance 
two different issues were most relevant. First, a shift of competences, negotiation and 
decision-making arenas towards higher political-administrative levels through 
processes of internationalization and Europeanization. This factor has been very 
important in several GoFOR case studies, most obviously in cases which are related 
to domestic implementation of international and supranational obligations. The term 
Europeanization is used in the literature to describe two different phenomena related 
to the process of European integration. On the one hand, it describes the 
development of institutions of governance at the European level. Formal-legal 
institutions and a normative order based on some overarching constitutive principles, 
structures and practices both facilitate and constrain the ability to make and enforce 
binding decisions and to sanction non-compliance. On the other hand, it describes 
the penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance. Europeanization 
here involves the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of 
governance. Europeanization, then, implies adapting national and sub-national 
systems of governance to a European political center and European-wide norms. 
Internationalization primarily concerns the increased activities and influence of 
actors, ideas and institutions from beyond state borders. The term internationalization 
is used to refer to when policies within domestic jurisdiction face increased scrutiny, 
participation, or influence from transnational actors and international institutions, and 
the rules and norms they embody. 
The second important institutional factor has been decentralization. Many EU 
member states have implemented reforms over the last decade in order to 
decentralize the political institutions and decision-making (e.g. Belgium, Spain, UK). 
This trend can also be seen in the new EU member states (e.g. Romania). 
Decentralization defines a process that involves a wide range of actors in policy 
formulation and increasing responsibility at various levels that can be coupled with 
greater flexibility in implementation. Hence, this process requires not only a 
delegation of power but also improved coordination. Decentralization has some 
potential advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it provides e.g. the 
advantage of more flexible and “tailor-made” formulation and implementation of 
policies, i.e. decentralised entities can optimise the policy output from the local and 
regional perspective. On the other hand, it brings with it the risk of weak 
administrative and/or financial capacities at sub-national levels resulting in 
implementation deficits. The restructuring of authority towards a multi-level system of 
co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local 
levels was a major reason for change in political decision-making in several of our 
case studies. The main rationale for decentralization has been the attempt to 
increase the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while 
increasing the authority and capabilities of sub-national levels.  
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Actor-related dimension (politics): 
With regard to the politics dimension, the main causes for change are (i) the loss of 
legitimacy of the traditional, opaque way of political decision-making based on 
negotiations in closed circles between politicians, administrative officials and 
representatives of organized interest groups, and (ii) coordination deficits due to a 
compartmentalised way of policy-making by sectors and areas without interacting 
with other sectors or the wider society. Both critiques have contributed to the opening 
of actors’ networks through more participation and intersectoral coordination, i.e. 
the appearance of non-governmental organisations or other civil society groups and 
the inclusion of organized interest groups from various sectors. The efforts to 
increase the number of actors are due to different underlying rationales. In some 
cases participation is regarded as a goal in itself, in other cases it is a mean to 
improve problem-solving. In any case, these developments have led to the 
establishment of broad policy networks which are able to use the resources, 
competences and information available from various public and private actors. The 
increased significance of such actor networks for policy-making and for implementing 
public policies is therefore expected to allow for a more flexible approach, seeking 
context sensitive solutions, and involving citizens, business organisations and NGOs 
in both the formulation and implementation of policies. Broader participation reflects 
the fact that more and more players wield effective power, i.e. that they are enabled 
to affect the future course in society. One benefit of increased participation can be 
wider sharing among actors of responsibility for the solution of common problems.  
Another important point is that the involvement of various stakeholders has also led 
to greater transparency in political decision-making. The issue of transparency has 
also become very important with regard to the accountability of expertise. Relating 
to expertise we witness the paradox that experts are increasingly sought for and 
used as a source for policy making, while expertise is at the same time also 
increasingly contested because of the lack of transparency in the way expertise is 
selected and used by governments. The access to and transparency of the process 
of development, selection and use of expertise for policy making are thus important 
conditions for new modes of governance.  
 
Content-related dimension (policy): 
Finally, the limits of the traditional approach of command-and-control regulation have 
resulted in a search for more flexible and less intrusive policy instruments. The 
governance literature thus argues persistently that ‘new’ or what are sometimes 
labelled ‘softer’ instruments, have become much more widespread. The deployment 
of new policy instruments is insofar another important element to explain the 
emergence of new modes of governance. The new instruments are assumed to allow 
social actors more freedom to coordinate amongst themselves in pursuit of societal 
goals, with far less or even no central government involvement. At the same time, the 
concern for effective implementation led to a more systematic and professional 
approach with regard to the evaluation and monitoring of public policies. 
Retrospective evaluations are regarded as crucially important both for accountability 
and for learning from experience. Evaluations can also bring further benefits in the 
form of empowerment and involvement of all stakeholders in a policy process. 
However, to be useful, the monitoring and evaluation of policies should be based on 
a sound methodology and valid data, and their conclusion should be derived from 
well-justified findings.  
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Though all of the above-mentioned dimensions and causes related to new modes of 
governance are important factors, not all of these causes are present in all of our 
case studies at the same time; rather we find two and sometimes three of the major 
categories of causes – structural, actor-related and content-related causes – 
simultaneously at work in the governance processes analysed. Furthermore, the 
effects of these causal factors are not uniform across the case studies and countries 
analysed. Hence, the degree of change towards new governance arrangements 
differs extensively depending on differences in political institutions, political cultures 
and characteristics of the policy fields in the specific case study. 
6.2 Role of governance elements 
This chapter synthesises the main strands of our findings as regards the role of 
procedural governance elements, as they have been defined in the GoFOR project: 
participatory approaches, multi-level and inter-sectoral co-ordination, the role of 
democratic and accountable expertise as well as approaches to establish adaptive 
governance processes. More concretely, it synthesises the empirical findings from 
the 19 case studies on the manifestation of these elements in political rhetoric and 
actual practices. In doing so it also works out main findings as regards the role and 
significance of different kinds of policy actors: governmental actors, interest groups, 
different kind of experts - in particular scientists - and the general public. 
6.2.1 Role of participation 
Participation is generally acknowledged as one of the central elements of new modes 
of governance, both in the political arena (cf. EC White Paper on European 
Governance; MCPFE Approach to National Forest Programmes in Europe) and in 
the scientific realm (e.g. Heinelt et al. 2002, Benz and Papadopoulos 2005). Also in 
the field of forest and natural resources policy a political ambition to strengthen public 
participation has grown during the past twenty years throughout the European 
countries. 
Participation is an elusive concept with many possible definitions. On a rather 
abstract level it can be seen as “a voluntary process whereby people, individually or 
through organized groups, can exchange information, express opinions and articulate 
interests, and have the potential to influence decisions or the outcome of the matter 
at hand.” (FAO/ECE/ILO 2000). Thus, the essence of participation is about citizens 
being given or themselves taking opportunities to influence decision processes of 
public interest. 
The different forms of public participation can be categorised according to their 
potential degree of power sharing between decision-makers and participants, ranging 
from restricted two-way communication (e.g. surveys, public excursions), to 
consultation (hearings, advisory boards) and co-operation (e.g. task forces) to 
partnership and citizen control (e.g. self-governing land owner groups, NGO 
initiatives) (Boon 2002). 
In our analysis of 19 governance case studies we investigated (i) participation 
rhetoric, i.e. the different rationales underlying participatory processes, (ii) the actual 
practices of participation in the governance cases, and (iii) the extent to which the 
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participatory elements have actually created momentum for new stakeholders to 
influence the processes. 
Among the five constituting elements of governance studied in GoFOR, participation 
has on average featured most prominently in the set of GoFOR case studies. In 
almost all cases, participation was considered an important element to characterise 
the process. Similarly, in almost all cases participation was considered important to 
explain the overall successes or failures of the governance process. 
In current natural resources policy, the dominating rhetoric is that more participation 
is better participation. This is also reflected in the majority of GoFOR cases. The calls 
for participatory approaches can partly be explained by the increased international 
focus on the topic from the 1990s and onwards, but partly also from a recognition 
among decision-makers that problem solving is not possible without the participation 
of stakeholders that can affect or are affected by the decision. 
In about half the processes studied, participation was justified by referring to 
international treaties and legal frameworks, such as EU legislation, the Proposals for 
Action of the IPF and IFF, MCPFE resolutions, the Aarhus Convention etc. 
Governments tend to justify participatory processes by referring to the international 
level particularly in those cases where participation has not traditionally been 
considered part of the political culture. 
Participation is sometimes considered as an aim in it self, sometimes as a means to 
improve problem solving. In this sense, the role of participation in relation to 
normative criteria of legitimacy can be interpreted both in terms of democratic quality 
(input legitimacy) and in terms of effectiveness (output legitimacy). 
In more than half of the cases studied, participation was seen as a goal in itself (at 
least on a rhetorical level). The initiators and coordinators of the processes frequently 
emphasised openness and transparency, and the aim of reaching consensus. Other 
arguments for (more) participation were creating a sense of local ownership, basing 
policies on voluntary action and dialogue, finding new models for co-operation, and 
ensuring clarity and rule of the law. 
References to output legitimacy were less frequently chosen. In about one third of 
the cases studied, participation was mainly justified as a means to increase 
effectiveness. Process designers, for example, hoped that the public could contribute 
with proposals, ideas, and comments, that participation would create support from 
the public and, thus, ensure “acceptance” for policy measures, and that involving new 
actors would help to mobilise networks and resources that could further the 
implementation of already identified policy objectives. 
In a number of GoFOR cases, the distinction between input and output legitimacy is 
blurred because many arguments link participation with effectiveness. In most case 
two, sometimes even all three, rationales for (more) participation (i.e. international 
obligations, input legitimacy, effectiveness) were evoked. 
The scholarly literature points to the fact that the – frequently overly positive – 
“rhetoric” of participation sometimes stands in stark contrast to the real-world 
practices of participation in political processes. This pattern can also be seen in the 
set of GoFOR case studies. 
In the GoFOR cases several forms of participation were used with many cases being 
characterised by not only one but a number of formalised forms of participation. The 
dominating form was to consult major interest organisations in various forums for 
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discussion. The effective steering of those processes was frequently taken over by 
different types of steering committees, advisory groups or assisting secretariats. 
In almost all cases, the key steering bodies arranged supplementary forms of 
participation along the process to get input from a broader range of participants. This 
broader involvement could take the form of additional advisory groups, one-time 
participation events to involve a broader range of interest groups or citizens, as well 
as a range of information activities and informal participation. 
Common to almost all the cases with invited participation was that the initiators 
followed rather “traditional” processes, inviting organised participants who are easy to 
reach, and who are already known to the decision makers. There have been few 
experiments with new modes of participation. The non-organised citizens were 
mainly addressed in terms of information campaigns, and where they were invited for 
actual (consultative) participation, they were difficult to mobilise. 
What was the role of state actors in the GoFOR governance processes? The GoFOR 
project intentionally focuses on government initiated participatory processes, not on 
pure bottom-up, non-governmental processes. In the vast majority of selected cases 
the participatory procedures were induced, designed and to differing extents 
controlled by public officials. Even in the few exceptions that can be considered non-
governmental processes, the public administrators still played an influential role. The 
Norwegian case, the Living Forest Project (NO-LF) is unique among the 19 cases as 
it is the only process that was initiated “bottom-up”. The initiator was the private 
forest owners’ organisation realising the need to strengthen the environmental brand 
of Norwegian forestry. A few cases aimed at stimulating bottom-up participation. In 
these processes, the public authorities set the frames and provided funding, but the 
process itself was to be conducted by participatory committees established for the 
purpose. Here, the public administration played the role as “meta-governor”, i.e. 
indirectly governing the process through e.g. framing and boundary setting. In a few 
cases, the public processes were initiated as a response to pressure from NGOs. 
Who participated in the participation processes? The forms of participation in the 
GoFOR cases focused on ensuring representation of the affected interests through 
participation by well-defined interest groups that were considered legitimate 
representatives of the interests. Another main focus seems to have been on including 
the participants that were considered crucial for process success. The national 
government, represented by its public officials, was a key participant in almost all 
cases. In more than half of the cases, the federal/local government was a key 
participant (too). Other typical key participants were environmental and recreation 
NGOs, NGOs representing landowners, and NGOs related to the specific topic at 
hand (rural development, anti-corruption) as well as representatives from industry 
(forestry, rural development consultants) and research. With one exemption, 
involvement of ordinary citizens was limited to information campaigns and (passive) 
access to participate in public hearings. 
Who did not participate? In some cases, actors were reluctant to participate because 
they didn’t see the benefit in it. In other cases actors felt excluded from the process 
and without influence on the decision-making. A review of the cases gives the 
impression that on the one hand, public authorities as well as actors who had hitherto 
had a privileged position with the public authorities in terms of gaining influence on 
policies could be reluctant to open up for a broader range of stakeholders because 
they feared diminished influence and having additional restrictions imposed on their 
management. But on the other hand, there emerged a need to involve other 
stakeholders, with pressures coming from the international level being one driving 
Conclusions: policy-relevant findings 249 
 
 
force for that. Participation was increasingly seen as a way to develop legitimacy of 
governance processes. So in many cases the process design would likely be so as to 
invite for participation to ensure legitimacy of the process and the sector as such, but 
to retain the decision power with a restricted range of stakeholders, eventually the 
public authorities. 
When looking at the development over time, one sees marked changes. In most of 
the cases the governance processes studied were designed as participatory 
processes from the very beginning. In some cases participation was not considered 
an issue in the beginning of the process (apart from having limited consultative 
processes with regard to ensuring good technical quality of the decisions). Gradually, 
rhetoric changed towards actually having public involvement. In a few cases one 
sees an opposite trend, i.e. decision making becoming more closed again in the final 
phase of the process. 
When finally comparing the rather far-reaching rhetoric of participation in the 19 
governance processes studied with the actual practices or participation one gets a 
mixed picture. Before the background of a normative definition of participation (which 
sees participation as an instrument that gives citizens the opportunity to influence 
decision processes of public interest) the following weaknesses and strengths could 
be identified. 
In quite a number of cases there was an overrepresentation of public officials and 
some “priviledged” sectors (esp. forestry). Environmental and social interests were 
often excluded. Also NGOs felt expelled from important decision bodies and, e.g. 
women were underrepresented. Some processes were too focused on expert input 
and thus implicitly or explicitly excluded other interests and bodies of knowledge. 
Our analysis showed that some of those drawbacks could not even be averted by 
ideal-type, benevolent state actors. First, the public often showed limited interest to 
actively engage in participation processes. And second, in complex policy settings 
participation processes are administratively very demanding. Participation in and 
especially the management of such processes requires substantial capacities and 
resources (personnel, time, expertise, financial resources) that neither state nor 
private actors can easily mobilize. 
On the positive side, it can be said that for almost all cases it seems that when 
looking at the long-term, the overall policy culture is likely to become more 
participatory, providing more opportunities to participate and providing a broader 
range of stakeholders legitimate access to influence decision-making within the given 
policy field. So even if the power redistribution within the individual cases was limited, 
then the participatory processes have still stimulated the establishing of new 
networks, a first step towards legitimate demands for influence among new 
stakeholders, and increasing understanding among all stakeholders of the value of 
broad and inclusive decision-making to not only input but also output legitimacy.  
6.2.2 Role of multi-level coordination 
Multi-level coordination has been ranked as a very important or important element in 
three quarters of the governance processes analyzed in GoFOR. Only in four cases 
multi-level coordination was judged as rather unimportant to characterize the 
governance process. A slightly different picture emerges when it comes to the 
importance of multi-level coordination for explaining the overall success and failure of 
the governance process. In this dimension, multi-level coordination was viewed as 
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very important or important in only eight cases. This suggested at a very general 
level a basic relation: the more important multi-level co-ordination was judged for 
characterising the processes that were studied, the more important it was for 
explaining the overall processes’ success or failure in terms of policy outputs and 
impacts, and vice versa. 
The six GoFOR case studies which were presented in greater detail provided us with 
a rich empirical base to describe and analyse coordination issues in different multi-
level systems, and furthermore gave us a good basis to search for patterns of multi-
level coordination among the diverse case studies. The six case studies have shown 
that the processes of Europeanization and regionalization entailed some novel 
elements of interlacing and interlocking politics. They raise the challenge of including 
actors from various territorial levels in a multi-level system without impairing effective 
decision-making, which tends to suffer if too large a number of actors and arenas 
need to be co-ordinated in the decision-making process. From our analysis we see 
patterns of multi-level coordination emerging around three main issues: functional 
and territorial differentiation, institutional continuity and innovative forms of linkages 
between territorial levels, and the issue of mixed or combined modes of coordination.  
First of all, the case studies have shown that the necessity of multi-level coordination 
under the conditions of Europeanization and regionalization triggered processes of 
differentiation of intergovernmental decision-making structures.  
On the one hand, we observe a specific differentiation related to functions. Here, 
problems are divided into partial tasks to be dealt with by separate arenas, as shown 
in the German case study on LEADER+ and the Danish case study on the 
implementation of the Habitat Directive. On the EU level, decisions are made in both 
of these cases on the overall concept and the general policy goals, and additionally 
on the principles for the allocation of grants to regions in the case of LEADER+. The 
substantial policy goals are formulated in both cases at the national and/or sub-
national level through operational programmes respectively Natura 2000 plans, and 
finally executed at the regional and local level for each regional partnership or Natura 
2000 site through individual projects and specific Natura 2000 action plans. Also in 
the German case study on Regionen Aktiv and the French and Greek case studies 
we see a functional differentiation between the decision-making at the national level, 
i.e. the formulation of overall policy goals and their adoption as laws or programs 
(“framework steering”), and the decision-making at the regional level related to the 
establishment of regional partnerships, CFTs, and park management boards as well 
as the implementation of concrete projects (“detail steering”). In particular in the 
French and Greek case studies on decentralization we can observe this form of 
“decoupling” of levels of government. Interestingly, both case studies point to the 
benefits of decentralization as well as to negative effects. The lower levels of 
government face several challenges including the lack of financial capacities, the 
necessity of legal and scientific advice, and often they are cut off from information 
exchange with higher levels. This point out that reasonable decoupling presupposes 
the availability of the capacities that are needed at the level of the decoupled arenas 
(levels) to effectively fulfil their tasks within overall multi-level policy structures. 
On the other hand, the complexity of processes is simplified by territorial 
differentiation in intergovernmental relations. Here, multi-level coordination is limited 
to particular nations or regions. In contrast to systems of joint decision-making, 
including all decentralized governments, the dominant mode of decision-making 
under conditions of territorial differentiation is bilateral instead of multilateral. In this 
way, multi-level coordination can be adjusted to different institutional settings of 
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lower-level governments. This form of differentiation is particularly evident in both 
German cases on regional policy, where individual regions apply for funding either 
from the EU or the federal government. The federal and/or sub-national ministries 
operating the funding programmes negotiate individually with each region, based on 
the general policy framework. In the French case, a similar mode is used for 
coordination, i.e. each regional Forest Charter is trying to collect funding for their 
projects bilaterally from different sources at the national, regional or department level. 
The same can be said about the vertical coordination with regard to specific Natura 
2000 sites in Denmark or the management boards of national parks in Greece.  
Regarding the institutional forms of linkages between territorial levels it can be said 
that the challenges of Europeanization and regionalization favour the rise of new, 
innovative forms of linkages between levels and, more generally, a new mixture 
of modes of governance. All of our six case studies describe and analyse some kind 
of institutional innovations. This is most obvious in the French and Greek cases 
where competences and decision-making processes have been administratively 
decentralized to regional and local levels. The German case studies show two 
different innovative forms of linking levels to empower regional actors: The case of 
LEADER+ provides us with an example of EU multi-level governance that is based 
on the idea of lesser influence of the central government compared to the sub-
national levels, whereas the case of Regionen Aktiv is an interesting example where 
the central government tries to circumvent the federal states and their constitutional 
rights by negotiating more directly with regional actors. In the majority of cases, 
institutional change and innovation takes place most obviously on the regional and 
local levels, whereas on the national-institutional level we have observed many 
elements of institutional continuity, with traditional patterns of level linkages and joint 
decision-making are largely being preserved.  
Another important element of innovation are new patterns of ‘loose coupling’ of 
arenas and levels of government. The term ‘loose coupling’ means that decisions in 
one arena do not completely determine decisions in other arenas but only influence 
parts of the decision premises. Such a loosely coupled multi-level system is not 
structured in the form of ‘connected games’, in which actors’ strategies depend on 
outcomes of other games, but as ‘embedded games’, in which policy-making in one 
arena sets the context for negotiations in other arenas. This context-setting is 
achieved by a shift in the mode of interaction from power and control to information 
exchange, communication and persuasion. Moreover, in the differentiated systems of 
governance, actors at the interface of arenas play the role of mediators and 
promoters. Good examples are the National Network Unit for LEADER+ in the 
German case study and the regional governors in the French and Greek cases. As a 
rule, in a loosely coupled structure state actors play less of a monopoly role of control 
and decision-making, but rather a mediation role. However, the more they can 
operate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, the better they can perform the softer role of 
mediation.  
This last point reminds us that effective vertical coordination in multi-level systems is 
often not delivered by one single form but rather by a balanced mixture of different 
modes of governance which helps to manage the tensions produced by the multi-
level framework. As shown by our case studies, the specific mixture of modes of 
governance varies with the given institutional and policy context. In all case studies, 
except the Danish HD case, different modes of coordination are combined, in some 
cases up to three different modes. Good cases in point are the German case studies 
on regional policy. Both cases present a mixture of three different modes of 
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coordination, namely hierarchy, negotiation, and competition. In these cases the 
different modes are not used simultaneously, but rather subsequently, i.e. at different 
levels and at different stages of the policy process. As the results of the German 
case studies suggest, the provision of greater flexibility by applying different modes 
of coordination can lead to effective decision-making in quite complex multi-level 
systems. However, some (minor) problems of MLC have been reported for these two 
cases too.  
Other combinations of ideal-type modes of governance have been less successful. 
For instance, the combination of negotiation and networking as coordinating 
principles in the functionally differentiated multi-level system described in the case 
study on the Austrian Biodiversity Strategy. The process analysed here led to weak 
MLC, ineffective decision-making and finally to rather mediocre outputs. Furthermore, 
the French and Greek case studies reported problems with horizontal competition 
among regional units in an otherwise hierarchically structured multi-level system. 
6.2.3 Role of intersectoral coordination 
The need of inter-sectoral coordination has increasingly gained attention in recent 
decades, both in practice as well as in studies on environmental and natural resource 
policy. This was particular the case in the context of policy processes which lean on 
the rhetoric and the conceptions of “new modes of governance” and aim at 
integrative policy making. Accordingly, GoFOR considered ISC as one of the 
constituting elements of the umbrella concept ‘governance’. 
Based on scholarly literature we expected ISC to manifest in the form of increasing 
interconnectedness of sectors, increasingly blurring boundaries between sectors, and 
consequently in an increasing occurrence of practices in which actors, both state and 
non-state actors from different sectors participate in policy formulation and 
implementation. GoFOR was interested in to what extent and how we encountered 
ISC in governance arrangements, both in rhetoric and practices. For empirical 
research ISC was conceptualised as referring to (often site-specific) processes which 
aim at the integration of different interests, functions and uses of areas, but also as 
referring to coordination efforts between different sectoral ministerial departments 
and policy networks. 
Perceptions and definitions of “what is a sector” vary, both in scholarly conceptions 
and in political practice. Sectoral boundaries are not fixed. They are interpreted 
differently by different policy actors; they may be established, challenged and 
modified. With only a few exceptions, the GoFOR case studies refer to sectors in the 
form of “policy fields” like agriculture, industry, tourism, etc. In general these 
definitions correlate closely with administrative structures, e.g. with jurisdictions of 
ministries or ministerial departments. By and large policy, actors recognised “sectors” 
as structured along formal lines of competencies and flows of formal powers. 
With a view to the rhetoric, most GoFOR case processes clearly show intentions for 
ISC. In a number of cases it was explicitly high on the agenda, i.e. ISC standing 
central in the rhetoric of programmatic policy papers, process principles, etc., while in 
other cases the intentions for ISC were rather implicit to the processes, but 
recognizable to empirical research. Interestingly, even in cases in which ISC was 
explicitly called for, further specifications of how it should be organized, of the actual 
goals of ISC and about who should take the lead were usually lacking. 
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Furthermore, our empirical evidence has shown that the actual motives for and the 
aims of ISC differ a lot among governance processes. In some cases concrete cross-
sectoral policy problems were the main triggers, e.g. in Dutch cases and most 
obvious in the case of strong inter-sectoral interdependencies in times of crisis (FR-
RPF). In quite some other cases ISC was introduced primarily because it is “part of 
the rules”, e.g. as prescribed by binding or non-legally binding international 
agreements or general conceptions of a policy programme (e.g. ISC as an 
internationally agreed NFP principle, ISC as one of the main objectives of the CBD, 
ISC as part of the concept of Integrated Rural Development). Another major driving 
factor which was found in several cases are economic incentives, be it market forces 
which made ISC a necessity (NOR-LF), incentives provided by funding programmes 
that prescribed integrative procedures, or the simply the strive for mobilising 
additional funds by coordinating with other sectors (HUN-NFP). 
Last but not least, and most interestingly, in a number of cases ISC was triggered by 
decentralization, by changes to region-oriented or local approaches in policy making 
(“ISC in the wake of territorially-oriented policy-making”). In some cases ISC was in 
fact strengthened or even introduced only in the wake of a change from a sectoral to 
a territorial policy approach (e.g. GER-L+, GER-RA). 
Intentions for ISC materialize in quite some variety of processes which differ with 
respect to the range of participating sectors, the institutionalisation of ISC and the 
territorial levels that are involved: Some processes were deliberately designed to 
integrate a broad range of sectors; this is in particular the case for strategy processes 
(e.g. AT-AFD, AT-BS, HUN-NFP, ESP-FPGP). Other cases were more selective, e.g. 
processes which were directly reacting to urgent issues, like in the FR-RPF. In spite 
of that, urgent problems which affected a number of sectors, making inter-sectoral 
coordination a must, served to effectively overcome sectoral barriers, however, even 
if in rather selective and ad hoc way. 
Most governance processes aimed at developing kind of integrated strategies, 
programmes, plans or projects. The most common organisational instrument was 
some kind of inter-sectoral committee which was often established temporarily only. 
As to decision making rules, these committees usually strive for consensus. Even if 
majority voting is the formal rule, significant efforts are usually devoted to achieve 
consensus, making ISC a time consuming endeavour. A critical aspect which was 
reported from several cases is that most crucial issues are dealt with outside such 
specifically established ISC committees, i.e. in other, pre-existing institutions outside 
the organisational structures of the processes that were studied. This indicates a 
potential limit for ISC in newly established institutions that are embedded in a rather 
sectoral-structured administrative landscape. 
Another more general observation is that inter-sectoral coordination and integration 
turned out difficult at the national level, despite all the rhetoric and intentions. As a 
consequence, in a number of cases ISC was rhetorically and practically delegated to 
the regional and/or local level, where the respective efforts often turned out more 
effective. 
Intentions and institutionalisation do of course not guarantee effective ISC. In fact, 
our evaluation of ISC efforts in terms of output and impact provides a mixed picture: 
Overall, the governance processes researched in GoFOR clearly show a divergence 
between programmatic ISC ambitions on the one hand, and a scattered picture of 
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successful ISC practices.63 We observe cases in which long lasting inter-sectoral 
cooperation was indeed established (NOR-LF), or is likely to result from ongoing 
processes. But defending sectoral and administrative interests stood in the way of 
more effective cooperation in many cases. This seems particular true for national 
level processes, in which ISC efforts partly turned out as rather symbolic endeavours 
(e.g. AT-BS).  
The main barriers that account for limitations or restrictions in ISC in the processes 
analysed are the following ones: Well-entrenched sectoral organisation of ministerial 
departments and their respective environment of interest groups often contributes to 
explain significant barriers and limitations of ISC processes. Even if ISC rhetoric is 
held up high, sectoral-structures often frustrate more effective ISC. Powerful 
sectors/actors may effectively block ISC, as long as there are no sufficient problem 
pressures, no effective inter-sectoral interdependencies or hierarchically induced 
pressures or incentives which serve to overcome sectoral logics. 
Actual commitment to ISC first and foremost depends on the political weight of the 
policy issue concerned. In a number of cases rather limited achievements in terms of 
ISC can be explained by a low political relevance of the issues addressed, as 
perceived by sectoral actors that were meant to get involved (e.g. AT-BS, HUN-
NFP). Low political relevance leads to low or even no actual engagement of actors 
from “outside” a respective lead sector (.e.g. NFP processes). Even if such 
processes do formulate inter-sectoral goals and measures, these outputs tend to be 
“soft policies”, unbinding, rather narrow in scope, vague or do hardly become 
implemented. Since ISC is to be seen as an ambitious and highly demanding 
undertaking, both institutionally and in terms of resources, it needs strong incentives 
or pressures for stimulating the necessary engagement. From the policy actors’ 
perspective ISC is not an end in itself. Hence, it needs careful selection and 
concentration on those issues and sectors that shall be dealt with and integrated to 
safeguard the capacities for fruitful ISC. 
By referring to our theoretically lead expectations, we can indeed note a blurring of 
sectoral boundaries in many GoFOR case studies. Based on the rich empirical 
information that has been elaborated, our findings are even more nuanced: The 
majority of cases show these blurring boundaries in terms of intentions for ISC. Such 
intentions are individually expressed by the policy actors, in strategy papers, policy 
plans, guidelines and process principles etc. Many cases also prove an 
interconnectedness of actors from different sectors, in particular in the early stages of 
governance processes (agenda setting and policy formulation). Sector 
representatives are interacting in committees which are often specifically created, but 
often on a temporary basis only. Hence in the processes that were studied in 
GoFOR, ISC characteristics are indeed evident, both in terms of programmatic 
intentions, in content (actors’ ideas, plans or strategies) and organisationally. But at 
the same time, only a few cases the ISC efforts are institutionalized on a long term 
basis. Hence, ISC practices rarely go beyond intentions and a temporary cross-
sectoral involvement.  
Furthermore, as expected, many cases show that the intention and efforts for ISC go 
hand in hand with participatory processes involving state and non state actors from 
different sectors, especially in early stages of governance processes. However, in the 
                                            
63
 This finding has to be qualified since most of the governance processes assessed in GoFOR are 
rather “young” processes, whereas effective ISC seems to presuppose long term endeavours. 
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course of time some of the analysed processes changed into exclusive domains of 
state actors with ISC becoming inter-ministerial affairs only. 
Thus, our basic research hypotheses as regards the manifestation of ISC in 
governance processes have only partly been validated by the empirical findings. 
They clearly show that ISC practices are not at all self-evident features of 
contemporary governance processes, even though we observe quite a lot of 
programmatic statements as regards the necessity of more integrated policy making. 
ISC is present to some extent, mostly in terms of a broadened range actors involved 
and in the form of specially created institutions. But still, ISC is most present in terms 
of rhetoric and intentions. 
6.2.4 Role of democratic and accountable expertise 
As policy issues become increasingly complex, political decisions strongly depend on 
insights derived from science and other sources of expertise. On the one hand, there 
are growing expectations for how science and politics can be linked in the most 
effective way. The interaction between the two social systems does not come without 
tensions, however. The science-policy literature points to a number of social 
dynamics and challenges, namely the scientification of politics and the concurrent 
politicisation of science, an ensuing legitimacy crisis of science, and a call for more 
“accountable” and “democratic” forms of expertise. 
In GoFOR, we have, first, given an overview of theoretical conceptualisations of the 
science-policy interface and, then, drawing on empirical insights from 19 governance 
case studies, have put an empirical focus on the roles and functions of experts and 
expertise in governance processes. The GoFOR project started out with the 
assumption that in a governance context, science and expertise play distinct, 
(probably) new roles that go beyond the mere content-wise input of scientific 
knowledge in political decision-making processes. The normative concept of 
“democratic and accountable expertise” was used to address the question of how the 
relationship between science and society is organized in governance processes and 
how it could be developed in both a more effective and a more democratically 
legitimate way. 
Especially EU bodies have put great efforts into searching for new models of how to 
organise the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). In the set of GoFOR governance 
case studies, however, one only rarely sees explicit calls for the “democratisation of 
expertise” but, interestingly, quite a number of actual practices that go in this 
direction. 
In its effort to singularize the overall character of expert involvement in governance 
processes GoFOR first looked into the relative weight that experts and expertise 
have in political processes. On a theoretical continuum between purely expert-driven 
processes on the one extreme and purely politics-driven processes on the other 
extreme most GoFOR cases tend towards the politics rather than the expertise end 
of the spectrum. Only few cases were explicitly framed as “technical” processes or 
were otherwise dominated by scientific reasoning. From the set of case studies, 
especially the implementation of the EU Habitats Directive, which was investigated in 
three countries (Denmark, Greece, and Romania), falls into this category. The great 
degree of expert involvement in the implementation of the Habitats Directive seems 
to be mainly attributable to the highly “technical” character of this EU directive 
(Alphandery and Fortier, 2001). The majority of GoFOR governance cases can be 
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classified as “political” processes where expertise played a minor (but nevertheless 
clearly identifiable) role. 
Another aspect relevant to describe the overall character of expert involvement in 
governance cases is the institutional integration of expertise and politics. In the set of 
GoFOR governance cases the interaction between science and politics is mainly 
characterized by multipartite bodies (made up of scientists and policy-makers) that 
are capable, simultaneously, of negotiating differences regarding scientific and 
political questions (“integration model”). In most processes one finds “mixed” bodies 
in which policy makers, administrative officers, interest group representatives, and 
scientists have been sitting side by side without a clear separation of roles. Scientists 
and other experts cooperated “at arm’s length” with political actors. The role of 
scientists has not been exclusively restricted to providing expert inputs while also 
policy makers (in the widest sense) have contributed to the knowledge base on which 
negotiation processes could build upon. In only a few GoFOR cases experts were 
kept in a more peripheral position. 
When looking at the role which experts and expertise play in governance processes it 
is safe to say that there is not the one function but different types of experts fulfil a 
variety of cognitive, strategic and symbolic functions; and the set of functions found 
within one governance process varies from situation to situation. In the set of GoFOR 
governance case studies, a number of different functions could be found: experts as 
(co-)producers of dominant discourses (“schools of thought”) who introduce 
innovative concepts or general approaches and, thus, lay the foundations for or push 
ahead a governance process; experts as initiators and driving forces in the early 
phases of governance processes (“policy entrepreneurs”); experts as consultants on 
process-related questions or evaluators of policies; experts as mediators or interest 
brokers who help to build political consensus that serves as basis for subsequent 
political negotiation processes; experts as creators of arguments (and counter 
arguments) who provide political actor groups with “suitable” political arguments to 
make their point in political deliberations; and, last but not least, experts as providers 
of content-wise input into policy processes. 
Expert involvement in a governance context not only shows a variety of functions but 
also a remarkable plurality of actor involvement. In the set of GoFOR case studies, 
expert input has been far from restricted to traditional scientific expertise. Expertise 
was provided by a diverse set of sources and actors: public and private research 
institutes, interest groups, private consultants, and “ordinary citizens” (local 
knowledge). As regards the questions of how balanced the representation of different 
types of expertise was, of how transparent and independent the selection of experts 
was and of how accessible and open the input of expertise was, the set of GoFOR 
cases showed quite heterogeneous patterns. In many cases there has been an 
increasing plurality of experts and expertise involved and there have been some 
efforts taken to make expertise more accessible. In other cases, one sees relative 
domination of one type of expertise and rather opaque procedures. Especially the 
narrow definition of “relevant experts” and the excessive use of technical-scientific 
language reduced the political clout and legitimacy of some processes. 
In summary, it can be said that in the set of GoFOR case studies, science and 
expertise have frequently played a prominent role. At the same time, the cases 
neither provide an indication for the “scientification of politics”, i.e. scientific expertise 
dominating or even replacing politics, nor for the reverse phenomenon of the 
“politicisation of science”. A possible explanation for that could be that these 
phenomena cannot be generalized to all policy settings and that the science-policy 
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literature hitherto has looked at another type of policy problems than the GoFOR 
project did. In the science-policy literature, the “scientification of politics” has typically 
been accounted for in a very special class of policy problems, namely problems 
characterized by a high degree of system uncertainties and high decision stakes. 
Most GoFOR cases do not fall into this category. They do, for example, not deal with 
the adoption and implementation of cutting-edge technologies (like biotechnology or 
stem-cell research) but rather with different forms of land use which are, of course, 
sometimes contested but the consequences of which are more or less predictable. In 
addition, a number of GoFOR cases has looked at a special class of political 
processes, namely “strategy processes”. With their long-term perspective this type of 
political processes is probably more detached from pressing political questions which 
call for immediate political action; strategy processes somehow take a more 
“distanced” view on policy problems. In this type of settings political and societal 
actors have seemingly less incentives to draw on science as a problem-solver and/or 
a source of political legitimacy. 
The empirical findings of the GoFOR project reported above show that there is not 
the one and completely new role of science in governance processes that replaces 
traditional roles of science in public policy. Rather the set of 19 case studies shows 
that there are various roles for science in governance processes that empirically 
reflect different conceptions of the science-policy interface ranging from expertise 
fulfilling a rather apolitical, “cognitive” function in political processes (“speaking truth 
to power”), to the interest-driven use of science and expertise (“knowledge as a hook 
on which interests hang their case”), to new knowledge gradually spreading, entering 
into use, and sometimes becoming the conceptual framework of entire policy debates 
(“knowledge creep”). 
Interestingly, the tension between effectiveness and democratic accountability of 
science is still quite relevant: In the range of GoFOR cases, we could find both a 
comeback of more “technocratic” forms of science-policy integration as well as 
remarkable practices of organising expert involvement in a more democratic and 
accountable way. This shows that there is not a unique new role of expertise in 
governance processes but a supplementing of traditional functions of expertise with 
new expertise-related governance practices. 
6.2.5 Role of adaptivity and iterativity 
The case studies in the GOFOR project cover different time spans and also 
represent different development stages of processes. This variety of cases provided 
us with a wide range of examples on how process design, complexity and uncertainty 
are linked to each other. The preliminary assumption that iterativity is a prerequisite 
for adaptation proved to be an incomplete statement. Case examples support that a 
basically linear process can adapt to new situations as well (FR-RPF, FR-CFT, GER-
RA). There are also more examples representing successful delivery of predefined 
tasks in a linearly organized process, in which monitoring and evaluation plays a 
significant role, and therefore linearity as a process design cannot be judged in itself. 
In general, the case studies show that AIP aspects played only a limited role, with 
some exceptions. The specific concepts “adaptive” or “iterative” were seldom used. 
This indicates that these aspects are yet not well developed and integrated in 
governance processes. Still, several of the relevant policy documents called indirectly 
for aspects of AIP like periodic monitoring, evaluation, and prescribed repetitive 
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stages of process design and implementation. These aspects indicate policy 
intentions to take up tasks in an adaptive and iterative way.  
Instruments for monitoring and evaluation are viewed as important in almost all of the 
GoFOR governance processes. Some kind of monitoring and evaluation systems has 
been used in 18 of the 19 cases analysed. However, the aim, the design, and the 
application of these systems in the governance processes differ quite substantially. In 
many cases the instruments for monitoring are not well institutionalised and 
evaluations have been conducted rather wholeheartedly. The most frequently 
mentioned motive for conducting evaluations has been enhancing efficiency, followed 
by promoting learning and being an external requirement for receiving funding. But 
generally speaking, evaluations in the GoFOR processes have not been organized in 
a way that realizes the potential for efficient adaptations to challenges. 
Some of our cases illustrate that monitoring and evaluations have the potential to 
play an important role in improving the efficiency of governance processes. The 
findings however, prove that this potential is far from being realized in most of the 
GoFOR-processes. It also means that the role of evaluation and monitoring in reality 
is not matching their ideal typical role. In reality these instruments are not always 
employed by intentions of learning or process enhancement. They might have only 
informative feature or remain pro-forma obligations without feedback to the process. 
Their role as primary source for change and adaptation must be contested on basis 
of the empirical evidences.  
This tendency also seems to affect the actual adaptations that occur. The analysis 
shows that even if evaluations were the most frequent source of adaptations among 
the GoFOR-processes, the number of processes adapting to external challenges is 
rather low. Out of the 19 governance processes analysed, we are only able to trace 
adaptations in seven of them. In these seven GoFOR-processes we identified a total 
of 15 specific adaptations. Evaluations and monitoring was the most frequent source 
of adaptation in these processes, causing adaptations in five of the processes. Still, 
one could argue that the number of five processes adapting to findings in evaluations 
is rather low in this respect. Also, the adaptations made can be seen as quite limited.  
Another important aspect with regard to adaptivity and iterativity is the occurrence of 
learning effects in the governance processes. Various forms and ideas behind 
learning can be identified in the GoFOR case studies. Related to learning in the 
processes we can conclude that reflective methods such as self-evaluation can be 
used effectively to facilitate learning at the stakeholder- and also at the institutional 
and process level. Somewhat contrasting is the role of external evaluations and 
monitoring instruments in terms of learning effects as their application motives vary 
significantly in the cases. This indicates that the underlying motivation is a crucial 
factor to explain individual or institutional learning, and the means of prescribed 
evaluation and monitoring alone does not guarantee that the governance process will 
adapt or change if needed.  
It is also worth to consider that in our empirical studies dialogue and exchange-driven 
learning tends to remain at the stakeholder level, rather than being transferred to the 
institutional or process level. This indicates that a continuous actor engagement over 
the whole process timeline is crucial in terms of process adaptation. The analysis 
show that top-down processes - as illustrated here e.g. by the Natura 2000 cases – 
tend to have less process and institutional learning. Mainly because these top-down 
approaches are exercised in a way that leaves little room for adaptation and changes 
in practice. In contrast, cases with actor empowerment or grassroots initiatives tend 
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to result in high-level learning and have the potential to alter the process (e.g. FR-
RPF, NL-GW, FR-CFT, GER-RA). 
6.2.6 Effects of governance processes 
The empirical research in GoFOR also provided a comprehensive overview of the 
effects to be found in governance processes. For the evaluation of effects, GoFOR 
has fallen back on a typology from the policy literature which distinguishes between 
“outputs”, “impacts” and “outcomes”. From the analysis of 19 governance processes, 
it is evident that in most case studies, effects are identifiable more in the form of 
direct outputs and in the form of impacts (i.e. changes in the policy actors’ behaviour) 
but to a lesser degree in terms of biophysical changes (i.e. outcomes). 
New policy documents, strategies, plans or other programmatic texts were found to 
be the most frequent outputs. In a number of cases, new laws, reforms of existing 
laws, administrative acts, or policy recommendations could be found. In some 
instances, we also found changes in the distribution of competences and the 
institutionalisation of new actor forums. 
As regards impacts, the vast majority of case studies have shown changes of the 
behaviour of actors or actor coalitions: processes have empowered the actors' 
participatory abilities and have helped setting decision-making in a more transparent 
and open framework. In the course of many of the processes the attitudes of actors 
have changed, in particular towards becoming more cooperative. Most of the 
governance processes also resulted in changes as reagards the terms of the debate 
and in changing ways of thinking. Such changes included the introduction of a more 
deliberative and participatory terminology, the reduction or elimination of prejudices 
among actors and, more generally, the strengthening of more integrated approaches 
instead of sectorial ones. 
In most of the examined governance processes, goal attainment in terms of 
outcomes in a narrow sense, i.e. in terms of bio-physical changes, has been 
indiscernible at this stage. Firstly, in fact, in a number of cases it is impossible to 
verify any effects as there are no clearly identifiable chains of cause and effect. This 
does not only restrict ex-post evaluation but also the potential for prognosis as 
regards future achievements. Secondly, governance processes are a rather recent 
approach in public policy making. Thus there is no adequate external evidence 
(history) which might help to evaluate these processes as regards their likely further 
implementation and goal attainment. The majority of the processes that were studied 
are immature in terms of the stage of the policy cycle: Most of them are at the early 
stages of policy implementation. However, there were also cases where concrete 
plans and strategies have been decided upon quite some time ago but 
implementation has been slow so far or has stagnated for other reasons which are 
related to the processes themselves. 
6.3 New modes of governance or only “The Emperor's New 
Clothes”? 
As described in sub-chapter 6.1, the call for new modes of governance is connected 
with a number of – typically positive – expectations. Based on the empirical findings 
from 19 governance case studies, this final sub-chapter addresses the question 
whether and to what extent the expected effects of new modes of governance can 
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actually be realized in real-world governance processes. Subsequently, the following 
questions will be addressed: 64 
– To what extent (if at all) have actor networks become enlarged beyond sectoral 
boundaries and territorial levels? 
– Do governance processes actually apply new modes of coordination, do they 
facilitate policy learning and greater process flexibility, and do they result in 
innovative policy instruments? 
Therewith, we also provide answers to the major research questions of GoFOR, 
namely as regards: 
– the impetus and motivation for new modes of governance, 
– the manifestation of governance rhetoric in terms of programmatic policy 
statements as compared to the actual practices of governance and the forms of 
institutionalisation, 
– the interaction of “new” and “traditional modes of governance”, i.e. whether and to 
what extent traditional structures and practices have lost or gained in importance 
or have changed as regards their functions, and 
– whether the roles of different policy actors have changed through the introduction 
of governance processes (in particular the role of state actors) and whether the 
use of expertise has become more democratic and accountable. 
 
The governance rhetoric 
“New modes of governance” are high on the agenda in current natural resources 
policy-making. The dominant rhetoric is usually a positive, optimistic one, stressing 
that more participation is better participation, that more integrated and co-ordinated 
policies are preferable, that the integration of a broad range of stakeholders 
increases policy effectiveness and legitimacy, that policies should be expert-based 
etc. This trend from the early 1990s onwards goes hand in hand with an increased 
international focus on the topic of “governance”, “new modes of governance” or 
“good governance” and it is also reflected in the majority of GoFOR cases.  
In terms of rhetoric, it was especially the principle of participation that was found high 
on the agenda in almost all the cases studied. Sometimes participation was 
considered as an aim in itself; sometimes it was seen as a means to improve 
problem solving and/or to increase the democratic quality of decisions. Similarly we 
found programmatic calls and intentions for increasing cross-sectoral and multi-level 
co-ordination as well as calls for adaptive and iterative approaches in a number of 
policy documents. In contrast, explicit reference to the “democratisation of expertise” 
was reported only rarely in the case studies, but interestingly quite a number of 
actual practices were found in this respect. 
 
Consequences of internationalization, Europeanization and decentralization 
In many cases this governance rhetoric was very much stimulated by and leaning on 
international and/or European agreements and policies. In about half the processes 
participation was argumentatively justified by referring to international treaties or non-
legally binding agreements, to pan-European agreements or to EU legislation, in 
                                            
64
 See the right hand column in Table 36 
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particular when e.g. participation has not been customary in the respective political 
culture. 
This also applies to inter-sectoral co-ordination to a significant extent: Certainly, in 
some cases concrete, national or regional cross-sectoral policy problems were the 
main triggers for striving towards more integrated policies. But in quite some other 
cases ISC was primarily introduced as “part of the rules”, rules that are often 
prescribed by binding or non-legally binding international agreements or European 
policies. Furthermore, internationalization and Europeanization also took effect in 
terms of economic incentives resulting from globalized markets or from European 
Union programmes. These incentives have been found as another major driving 
force. EU funding programmes, for example, prescribe participatory cross-sectoral 
programming procedures and formally entail the need to co-ordinate among territorial 
levels. Indeed, in many cases the actors´ commitment to the processes was very 
much “facilitated” by such policies and prescriptions. That is, international and 
European discourses and programs set significant incentives towards changes in 
governance arrangements or even prescribe specific planning and implementation 
procedures; e.g. as regards the implementation of the Habitats-Directive. Thus, they 
directly and/or indirectly affect national sovereignty. 
Likewise, EU bodies have put great efforts into searching for new models of 
organising the relationship between science and society in a more democratic way 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, 2002, 2003). However, in contrast to the 
discourses on participation, inter-sectoral and multi-level coordination these efforts 
and discourses haven’t taken serious effect in the national level processes that we 
have studied. 
Besides effects of internationalization and Europeanization we have witnessed 
consequences of decentralization in several GoFOR case studies. The benefits of 
decentralization approaches were found in the empowerment of provincial/local 
administrations, in increased involvement of new actors and the integration of 
different sectors’ interests into local/regional development processes. Local 
politicians became leaders of collective actions. Processes have succeeded in 
(re-)mobilizing societal capacities, and became less sector-focused but more 
integrative. Even though the traditional structures of power distribution are still visible 
and influential, decentralized governance processes have increased regional/local 
autonomy. 
 
Institutionalisation and practices of governance 
With the international and the European impetus, among other pressures, the need 
to involve a broadened range of stakeholder and territorial levels into governance 
processes has emerged. Participation is increasingly seen as a way to increase 
legitimacy in policy formulation and implementation.  
Accordingly, many of our processes aimed at integrating a broad set of stakeholders, 
sectors and territorial levels for deploying additional resources, information and 
competences, as well as to increase input and output legitimacy. However, the 
intention of major policy actors, of private stakeholders and public authorities as well, 
often was to retain the decision-making power within pre-dominant actor networks. 
Accordingly, our analysis yields a mixed overall picture: most of the governance 
processes that we have studied did in fact result in enlarged sets of sectors and 
territorial levels involved. But in a number of cases well entrenched administrative 
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structures, interests and sectoral logics significantly constrained or even marginalised 
the processes’ outreach and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, processes tend to be institutionalised on a temporary basis only, even if 
they are labelled as long-term, open-ended endeavours (e.g. strategy processes). 
Coordination efforts have been institutionalized on a long term basis in only a few 
cases, in a number of processes we observed rather symbolic short-term cross-
sectoral involvement in which sectoral and administrative interests often hamper 
more effective cooperation. 
We also found cases in which most crucial policy issues were dealt with outside the 
specifically institutionalised governance processes, i.e. in parallel, in traditional, pre-
established structures. This indicates another limitation of such governance 
processes which have been established along-side but not integrated into the overall 
governmental arrangements: Well-entrenched sectoral organisation of ministerial 
departments and their respective interest group environments then easily manage to 
marginalise their effectiveness. 
In compliance with the governance rhetoric, some kind of monitoring and evaluation 
has been conducted in practically all cases. Nevertheless, these procedures have 
often not been organized in a way that would have allowed realizing their potentials 
and have consequently played a limited role. With a few exceptions, evaluations 
haven’t been effectively integrated into the processes. They rarely resulted in 
effective feedback to processes and/or were conducted pro-forma to fulfil externally 
prescribed obligations. These findings stand in stark contrast to the most frequently 
mentioned motives for conducting evaluations: “to enhance efficiency” and “to 
facilitate learning”. Policy learning was rarely and not too effectively induced by 
monitoring and evaluation. 
The GoFOR case studies have also shown that the processes of Europeanization 
and regionalization (see above) raise the challenge of including actors from various 
territorial levels in a multi-level system without impairing effective decision-making. 
We found different approaches that promise to meet this challenge effectively: 
functional and/or territorial differentiation of tasks along the chain of decision-making, 
patterns of loose coupling among levels of government, in which levels interact in 
terms information exchange, communication and persuasion but not in the form of 
hierarchical command and control, and effective vertical coordination by 
combinations of different ideal-type modes of co-ordination (i.e. market 
mechanisms, hierarchy, negotiations, and networks). These approaches promise to 
ease the tensions that are inherent to multi-level policy-making frameworks. 
Institutional change and innovation was mainly found in the wake of decentralization, 
taking place most obviously at the regional and local levels, whereas we often 
noticed institutional continuity at the national level, with traditional patterns of 
decision-making being largely preserved. Increasing levels of co-ordination and 
cooperation were triggered and strengthened by decentralization processes, i.e. by 
changes to region-oriented or local approaches in policy making. In some cases 
cross-sectoral coordination was explicitly delegated to the regional or local levels and 
turned out more effective there. 
Last but not least our case analyses definitely point to the fact that participatory, 
cross-sectoral and/or multi-level governance processes usually constitute complex 
settings that are very demanding. Facilitation and management of such processes 
requires substantial expertise, capacities and resources that often neither state 
nor private actors can easily mobilize. 
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Enlarged networks, new actors and changing actors’ roles 
One key aspect within the governance discourse is the enlargement of the range of 
actors, interests and expertise being involved into policy processes. This discourse is 
usually accompanied by the question about whether the role of state actors is likely 
to change. 
In the vast majority of the GoFOR governance cases participatory and coordination 
procedures were induced, designed and to a varying extent also controlled by state 
actors. This may be due to the selection of cases: GoFOR intentionally focuses on 
government-initiated processes, but not on pure bottom-up, non-governmental 
processes. However, even in the few exceptions from this selection rule, in cases 
that can be considered non-governmental processes, public administrators were very 
influential. The national and/or local government, represented by public officials, were 
key participants in almost all our cases. In summarizing, pre-existing administrative 
structures and the governmental actors did remain central policy shaping 
factors. They effectively promote or hinder new governance perspectives in various 
ways: by providing or withholding commitment, by changes in policy style, by 
establishing the institutional framework of the governance processes, and by defining 
process objectives, timeframes, measures etc. State actors are usually well endowed 
with the capacities and resource to steer or influence the processes. Hence, 
increased state actors’ commitment goes hand in hand with increasingly effective 
policy formulation and implementation processes. On the other hand, this central role 
of the state also points to the fact that most of the processes that we have studied 
are highly dependent on and susceptible to changes in governmental regimes, and 
changes in the state actors’ strategies and preferences. 
Besides state actors, typical key participants were environmental and recreation 
NGOs, landowner associations, industry representatives and research bodies. The 
involvement of non-organized citizens, in contrast, was very limited in almost all our 
cases: citizens were mainly addressed by information campaigns. Where they were 
invited for actual (consultative) participation, citizens proved difficult to mobilise. 
Science and expertise have frequently played a prominent role. But our cases do not 
at all provide an indication for a “scientification of politics”, nor for the reverse 
phenomenon of the “politicisation of science”. Even though we have detected an 
increasing plurality of experts and expertise involved and some efforts to make 
expertise and information more accessible in a number of cases, we did not 
observe the one and new role of science and expertise that would have replaced its 
traditional roles. As a rule, interaction between science and politics is characterized 
by multipartite bodies made up of scientists and policy-makers (“integration model”): 
Scientists and experts cooperated “at arm’s length” with political actors. 
Overall we summarize that the governance approaches that we have studied 
resulted in enlarged sets of actors who became involved. However a synthesised 
review of our cases gives the impression that public authorities as well as other 
hitherto privileged actors have often proved reluctant to open up major decision 
arenas to a broader range of stakeholders. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Referring to the cases that we have studied, we conclude that the overall policy-
making culture is likely to become more participatory, to provide more opportunities 
and access to a broader range of stakeholders who may gain increased and 
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legitimate influence on decision-making within the given policy fields. Even though 
the actual redistribution of power that we observed in most of our cases was quite 
limited, the participatory processes have still stimulated the emergence of enlarged 
and new actor networks. 
Based on our findings we further conclude that the introduction of the governance 
rhetoric and practices at national, regional and local levels is often very much due to 
international and/or European discourses, agreements and policies. Firstly, ideas, 
arguments and procedural elements of new governance approaches have 
increasingly taken hold in national level discourses. Secondly, quite some 
international agreements and in particular EU policies even prescribe participatory 
and integrative policy-making procedures as well as monitoring and evaluation of 
processes and outcomes etc. Consequently we assume this trend to continue in the 
years to come, i.e. a further trend towards applying governance elements in the field 
of environmental and natural resource policy, at least in the programmatic rhetoric. 
On the other hand, besides a number of strategic processes that were stipulated by 
international forest dialogues or conventions, we have barely found innovations in 
policy instruments. In most cases new modes and processes of governance did not 
replace traditional modes, structures or processes. Rather they complemented them 
or even proceeded in parallel, almost unconnected to the traditional decision-making 
procedures and arenas. This again points out that the pre-existing structures, 
traditional institutions, actor networks and the entrenched patterns of power 
distribution remain central to the explanation of governance processes’, as well as 
these processes’ policy outputs, impacts and outcomes. 
New modes of governance, as defined in agreements, programmes and policy 
papers at the international, the European, the national and the regional levels set 
principles and procedures for meaningful public participation and for horizontal as 
well as vertical policy coordination and integration. Our research shows that effective 
application of these principles and procedures is highly dependent on a broad variety 
of context factors, in particular on the commitment of influential state and non-state 
actors.  
Our rich empirical materials allowed pointing out some concrete, most significant 
factors that either facilitate or hamper effective implementation of governance 
processes. However, based on the available evidence we conclude that an all-
encompassing, European-wide transferable “blueprint” that might instruct about how 
do simultaneously achieve effective participatory, inter-sectoral, multi-level and 
adaptive governance processes in various policy domain settings is hardly 
conceivable yet, due to the complex interrelations among the procedural elements 
and the variety of contextual conditions.  
Even though “new modes of governance” have been high on the political agendas for 
almost two decades now, in depth comparative, empirical research is still scarce. The 
GoFOR project has given us the opportunity to significantly contribute to the body of 
knowledge by providing detailed empirical evidence, some answers have been 
provided, but – as always – more questions are still up to further research. 
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